

CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS

SOLICITUD DE OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA SOBRE LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA Y LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS PRESENTADA ANTE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS POR LA REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA Y LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE

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INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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HUMANOS**

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El Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development presenta estas observaciones en calidad de *amicus curiae* para apoyar a esta Corte en el contexto de la solicitud de Opinión Consultiva presentada por la República de Chile y la República de Colombia sobre “Emergencia Climática y Derechos Humanos”.

A RESUMEN Y RECOMENDACIONES

Tal como están reconociendo los tribunales de todo el mundo, la emergencia climática ya constituye una emergencia de derechos humanos. Las obligaciones vinculantes de los Estados de respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos ante dicha emergencia van más allá del cumplimiento de sus compromisos autodefinidos y no vinculantes en virtud de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático y el Acuerdo de París.

Basándose en la experiencia del Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development (IGSD), actuando en la calidad de *amicus*, las presentes observaciones comienzan presentando las pruebas científicas sobre la emergencia climática y sus impactos en los derechos humanos, centrándose en las Américas.

Al momento de determinar el alcance de las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos, es fundamental que la Corte se guíe por la mejor información científica disponible sobre las causas y las soluciones a la emergencia climática. Esta información científica deja claro que si no se actúa de inmediato para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento y mantener el aumento de la temperatura del planeta por debajo de 1,5 grados centígrados (1,5°C) con respecto a la temperatura preindustrial; o al menos limitar la cantidad y la duración del “sobrepaso” del límite de seguridad de 1,5°C¹, se causará un daño extraordinario e irreversible a nuestro planeta y, a su vez, a los derechos humanos.

¹ Por “sobrepaso” se entiende que la temperatura media mundial supera temporalmente 1,5°C antes de volver a situarse por debajo de ese límite de temperatura. Según la Oficina Meteorológica del Reino Unido, es “más bien probable” que la temperatura mundial anual, a diferencia de la temperatura media decenal o trienal, supere los 1,5°C al menos un año entre 2023 y 2027. Organización Meteorológica Mundial, [OMM GLOBAL ANNUAL TO DECADEAL CLIMATE UPDATE](#), en 2 (2023) (en adelante, “OMM, GLOBAL ANNUAL TO DECADEAL CLIMATE UPDATE”); véase también Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, [CALENTAMIENTO GLOBAL DE 1,5°C](#), *Informe especial del IPCC sobre los impactos del calentamiento global de 1,5 °C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales y las trayectorias correspondientes que deberían seguir las emisiones mundiales de gases de efecto invernadero, en el contexto del reforzamiento de la respuesta mundial a la amenaza del cambio*

Este daño será inevitable a menos que los Estados aceleren e intensifiquen sus acciones ahora. La Corte tiene una oportunidad única de orientar a los Estados para que eviten dichos daños y, al hacerlo, respeten sus obligaciones de derechos humanos en virtud de la Convención Americana y los protocolos asociados. Tal como se propone en las presentes observaciones, la emergencia climática requiere que la Corte reconozca el derecho humano a la resiliencia como el marco adecuado para definir el alcance de las obligaciones de los Estados de abordar y evitar violaciones a los derechos humanos. Además, se propone el desarrollo de un concepto de daño y urgencia alineado con la mejor información científica disponible como una herramienta jurídica clave para apoyar a la Corte y a futuros tribunales en la adjudicación de casos relativos al clima.

La temperatura de la Tierra actualmente es de 1,2°C de calentamiento observado con respecto a los niveles preindustriales, y es probable que este año llegue a 1,4°C, el más cálido en 125.000 años. Con cada incremento de calentamiento adicional, los impactos del cambio climático en todas las regiones del mundo se tornan más generalizados y graves. Según el Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático de las Naciones Unidas (IPCC), el límite crítico de seguridad de la temperatura es un calentamiento de 1,5 °C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales, más allá del cual los impactos y riesgos “para la salud, los medios de subsistencia, la seguridad alimentaria, el suministro de agua, la seguridad humana y el crecimiento económico” serán devastadores y, seguramente, irán en aumento.

Es probable que el planeta alcance 1,5°C a principios de la década de 2030, o incluso ya en la de 2020, y con las actuales medidas de mitigación va camino a alcanzar entre los 2,5°C y 2,9°C a finales de siglo. Este es “el momento COVID” de la emergencia climática, que afecta directa o indirectamente a todos los habitantes del planeta. Más allá del límite de seguridad de 1,5°C, el planeta corre un riesgo cada vez mayor de desencadenar “puntos críticos de inflexión” a nivel regional y mundial, que provocarán cambios irreversibles en los sistemas climáticos, aunque la plena manifestación de los daños pueda no ser observable durante algún tiempo. Comprender los impactos catastróficos y duraderos que tendrá para la humanidad el desencadenamiento de estos puntos críticos de inflexión es

climático, el desarrollo sostenible y los esfuerzos por erradicar la pobreza [V. Masson-Delmotte y otros (eds.)], en 24 (2018) (en adelante, “IPCC, 2018: Calentamiento Global de 1,5°C”).

fundamental para aclarar el concepto de daño y el contenido y alcance de las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos en virtud de la Convención Americana.

Esta es la década crítica para actuar. Queda muy poco tiempo para que los tribunales actúen para proteger los derechos humanos de los daños presentes y futuros causados por el cambio climático; y esta ventana de tiempo se está cerrando rápidamente. Basarse en la mejor información científica y tecnológica disponible, frenar el ritmo de calentamiento y mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C requiere la aplicación inmediata de las siguientes estrategias de mitigación:

- (a) La rápida reducción de las emisiones de “supercontaminantes climáticos”, es decir, el metano (CH₄), los hidrofluorocarbonos (HFC), el ozono troposférico (O₃) y el carbono negro (“contaminantes climáticos de vida corta” (CCVC) o “supercontaminantes”), y el óxido nitroso (N₂O);
- (b) La preservación inmediata, así como la expansión, de los bosques y otros sumideros naturales de carbono (terrestres y oceánicos) para facilitar la remoción natural de dióxido de carbono (CO₂). Los sumideros terrestres fundamentales incluyen bosques nativos como la Amazonia, otros bosques tropicales, el Chaco Americano, los Páramos y los Bosques Boreales; y,
- (c) La descarbonización urgente de los sistemas energéticos mundiales para lograr emisiones netas iguales a cero a mediados de siglo o antes y estabilizar el sistema climático a finales de siglo.

Las dos primeras estrategias de mitigación, la reducción de los supercontaminantes climáticos de vida corta y la protección de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono que absorben CO₂, representan “estrategias de mitigación rápida”, ya que son capaces de frenar el ritmo de calentamiento a corto plazo, lo que es fundamental para evitar violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos. Con respecto a los supercontaminantes climáticos de vida corta, la mitigación del metano es la más eficaz para reducir el calentamiento a corto plazo y de aquí a 2050, con medidas efectivas en términos de costos y que proporcionan importantes beneficios colaterales para la salud pública.

Basándose en la mejor información científica disponible, estas observaciones incluyen una lista de medidas para aplicar estrategias de mitigación rápida compatibles con las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos [véase ¶¶ 23, 31 y 68], junto con las siguientes recomendaciones.

A.1 Recomendaciones del IGSD

El IGSD solicita respetuosamente a la Corte que proporcione orientación y formule las siguientes recomendaciones en su Opinión Consultiva:

- (1) El daño causado por el cambio climático tiene una dimensión presente y futura. Este concepto de daño subyace a la interpretación de las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos en virtud de la Convención Americana y refleja el daño presente real y observable a los derechos humanos provocado por el cambio climático, así como la certeza de “encerrar” un daño futuro aún mayor a los derechos humanos cuando se desencadenen puntos críticos de inflexión, incluido un daño irreversible, a menos que los Estados actúen urgentemente para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento en esta década y mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C [¶¶ 32–37].
- (2) Las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos van más allá de sus obligaciones y compromisos de procedimiento en el marco de su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional (CDN) de conformidad con el Acuerdo de París. El alcance de las obligaciones de derechos humanos de los Estados debe determinarse en función de la mejor información científica disponible para alcanzar el objetivo de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, en virtud de estos acuerdos, de estabilizar el sistema climático en un plazo suficiente para permitir la adaptación de los ecosistemas, garantizar que la producción de alimentos no se vea amenazada y permitir el desarrollo sostenible manteniendo la temperatura media mundial por debajo de 1,5°C, el umbral crítico de temperatura para respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos [¶¶ 38, 40–47].
- (3) En el contexto de la emergencia del cambio climático, una interpretación evolutiva de la Convención Americana y de sus protocolos asociados requiere reconocer el derecho humano a la “resiliencia” [¶¶ 48 y 55].
- (4) El derecho humano a la resiliencia, como un derecho autónomo conectado con los derechos sustantivos y de procedimiento más afectados por el cambio climático [¶¶ 55–59], o como una manifestación del derecho a la vida del artículo 4 de la Convención Americana [¶ 60], impone varias obligaciones vinculantes a los Estados como parte de las siguientes obligaciones duales [¶¶ 64, 66, 68]:

- (a) *Una obligación de mitigación:* limitar los riesgos climáticos a niveles manejables mediante la adopción de todas las medidas eficaces necesarias para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento lo máximo rápido posible, de forma coherente con una trayectoria para permanecer por debajo de 1,5°C. La mejor información científica disponible muestra que esto requiere medidas destinadas a reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos en los próximos 10 a 15 años; facilitar la remoción de CO₂ basada en la naturaleza a través de la protección y la restauración de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono; y descarbonizar rápidamente los sistemas energéticos para lograr emisiones netas iguales a cero para 2050 o antes.
 - (b) *Una obligación de adaptación:* garantizar los medios para reducir la vulnerabilidad mediante la adopción de todas las medidas apropiadas y necesarias para fortalecer la resiliencia de los grupos vulnerables de la sociedad.
- (5) Los Estados deben tomar todas las medidas apropiadas y necesarias para cumplir con estas obligaciones actuando con diligencia debida, en consonancia la mejor información científica disponible y la necesidad de mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C [¶¶ 72–74]. Los Estados deben adoptar un enfoque diferenciado para proteger a los grupos vulnerables, incluyendo el cumplimiento de estas obligaciones de la manera más urgente y expeditiva [¶¶ 69–71, 64].
 - (6) La obligación de los Estados de cooperar eficazmente para hacer frente a la emergencia climática debe interpretarse en el sentido de exigir a los Estados que cooperen en el desarrollo inmediato de un acuerdo vinculante para reducir las emisiones de metano, empezando por el sector del petróleo y el gas, ya que la mitigación del metano es capaz de frenar el calentamiento más que cualquier otra estrategia en el menor periodo de tiempo [¶¶ 76–80]. La obligación de cooperación exige que un acuerdo mundial del metano incluya objetivos específicos de reducción del metano de conformidad con el objetivo de mantenerse por debajo de 1,5C y la obligación de los países desarrollados de financiar y facilitar la transferencia de tecnologías para lograr a tiempo las reducciones de metano necesarias.
 - (7) El contenido de la obligación de los Estados de proporcionar acceso a la justicia y un recurso legal oportuno para proteger y reparar los derechos humanos afectados por la emergencia climática (Artículos 8(1) y 25 de la Convención Americana) debe basarse en la mejor información científica disponible que demuestre que la demora en los procesos judiciales durante

esta década inevitablemente provocará un encerramiento de calentamiento y aumentará la magnitud de las violaciones de derechos humanos en el futuro.

- (a) El principio de “plazo razonable” en este contexto debe interpretarse a la luz de dicha información científica [¶ 84].
 - (b) Los Estados incumplen obligaciones de proporcionar un acceso adecuado a medidas cautelares al no evitar el aumento del daño climático mientras los procesos judiciales nacionales están en curso. [¶ 85].
- (8) Las medidas provisionales y cautelares deben adoptarse cuando las acciones u omisiones específicas de los Estados corran el riesgo de exacerbar la emergencia climática, creando así un riesgo más urgente de ocasionar un daño irreparable aún más grave a los derechos humanos. La Corte debería aclarar los criterios de urgencia y daño en la búsqueda de medidas provisionales y cautelares en el marco del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos para garantizar que éstas aborden adecuadamente la emergencia climática. Esto debe basarse en la mejor información científica disponible en materia climática y en el principio de precaución, y requiere trasladar la carga de la prueba del peticionario al Estado [¶¶ 86, 89–96].
- (9) Debería establecerse un sistema de indicadores para monitorear y apoyar la aplicación de la Opinión Consultiva, en consonancia con la práctica exitosa de la Corte en el pasado. Basándose en la mejor información científica disponible, este sistema de monitoreo debería dar prioridad a las medidas de mitigación rápida que frenen el ritmo de calentamiento en los próximos 10–15 años en concordancia con el objetivo de mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C [¶¶ 97–99].
- (10) Dada la necesidad de una financiación adecuada para lograr una rápida mitigación, la descarbonización y un desarrollo sostenible para todos, el Grupo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) debería garantizar que las inversiones sean congruentes con el papel que juegan las Américas para mantener el aumento de la temperatura del planeta por debajo de 1,5°C y promover inversiones en medidas destinadas a reducir los supercontaminantes climáticos, y a fortalecer y proteger los bosques y otros sumideros naturales de carbono, junto con inversiones en la descarbonización. Estas inversiones deberían ser divulgadas anualmente por el BID [¶ 101].

B ACERCA DEL IGSD

- 1 El IGSD presenta estas observaciones escritas para apoyar a la Corte en el contexto de la solicitud de Opinión Consultiva presentada por la República de Chile y la República de Colombia sobre “Emergencia Climática y Derechos Humanos”.
- 2 El IGSD es una organización sin fines de lucro constituida en Washington D.C. Su misión es acelerar la respuesta mundial a la emergencia climática promoviendo una rápida mitigación del cambio climático para frenar el calentamiento global a corto plazo. Esto incluye trabajar con los principales expertos científicos a nivel mundial, los responsables de políticas y las instituciones encargadas de la ejecución para generar soluciones que aborden la emergencia climática mediante la reducción de los supercontaminantes climáticos de vida corta. Entre los científicos que colaboran con el IGSD se incluyen premios Nobel y autores del IPCC.
- 3 El IGSD abordará las Preguntas A y D de la solicitud de Opinión Consultiva. Los hechos expuestos en estas observaciones están respaldados por pruebas científicas incontestables. El **Anexo** de estas observaciones contiene el *Resumen de la Ciencia sobre el Cambio Climático* del IGSD, que describe las causas de la emergencia climática, sus impactos a nivel mundial y en LAC y las estrategias de mitigación para hacer frente a la emergencia climática.

C INTRODUCCIÓN

- 4 Las presentes observaciones abordan el alcance y el contenido de varias obligaciones de los Estados para mitigar y adaptarse al cambio climático (Pregunta A) y para brindar acceso oportuno a la justicia en los procedimientos relativos a los derechos humanos afectados por la emergencia climática (Pregunta D). El presente escrito también identifica formas prácticas para que la Corte Interamericana aclare el papel del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos para proteger mejor los derechos humanos bajo riesgo por la emergencia climática. Antes de abordar estas cuestiones, las observaciones describen los hechos fundamentales en los que debería basarse la Opinión Consultiva de la Corte: el consenso científico sobre las causas del cambio climático antropógeno y los riesgos que la emergencia climática plantea para los pueblos y los ecosistemas.
- 5 El IGSD sostiene respetuosamente que la Opinión Consultiva de la Corte debería proporcionar orientación a los Estados, en el contexto de la emergencia climática, sobre lo que se requiere

específicamente de ellos para respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos consagrados en la Convención Americana y sus protocolos asociados. Para lograr esto, la Corte debería guiarse por el consenso científico sobre las causas, los impactos y las soluciones del cambio climático tanto a corto plazo como al 2050 y más allá. En consonancia con la experiencia del IGSD, los argumentos jurídicos presentados en estas observaciones se basan y se apoyan en las mejores pruebas científicas, incluidos los informes del IPCC y las investigaciones científicas más recientes. Las observaciones del IGSD también proporcionan un contexto adicional para ayudar a comprender las mejores pruebas científicas disponibles sobre el cambio climático para aclarar las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos.

- 6 El alcance de la función consultiva de la Corte se extiende no sólo a la labor interpretativa para desentrañar “el sentido, propósito y razón de las normas internacionales sobre derechos humanos”, sino también, a coadyuvar a los Estados Miembros y a los órganos de la OEA para que “cumplan de manera cabal y efectiva sus obligaciones internacionales en la materia y definan y desarrollen políticas públicas en derechos humanos”². De esta manera, la Opinión Consultiva se aplica a todos los Estados Miembros de la OEA, así como a los órganos Miembros de la OEA cuya esfera de competencia se refiera al tema de la consulta³.

D LAS MEJORES PRUEBAS CIENTÍFICAS SOBRE LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA Y LOS RIESGOS EXISTENCIALES PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS

- 7 Tal como ha señalado el Secretario General de la ONU, el cambio climático supone una amenaza existencial para la vida en este planeta, incluida la vida de toda la humanidad⁴. En la fecha de presentación de estas observaciones, la temperatura media a largo plazo de la Tierra se sitúa en 1,2°C de calentamiento observado con respecto a los niveles preindustriales⁵. Los meses de julio,

² Identidad de Género, e Igualdad y No Discriminación a Parejas del Mismo Sexo - Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Cambio de Nombre, la Identidad de Género y los Derechos Derivados de un Vínculo entre Parejas del Mismo Sexo: (Interpretación y alcance de los Artículos 1.1, 3, 7, 11.2, 13, 17, 18 y 24, en relación con el Artículo 1 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17, 24 de noviembre, 2017 CtIDH, (ser. A) No. 24, ¶ 22 (24 de noviembre, 2017) (En adelante, “Opinión Consultiva AO-24/17”).

³ *Id.* en ¶ 28.

⁴ Antonio Guterres, [Remarks at Austrian World Summit](#), Naciones Unidas (15 de mayo, 2018).

⁵ Esta cifra de temperatura se publica cada año en enero y representa la temperatura media mundial del año calendario anterior. Véase Servicio de Cambio Climático de Copernicus, [2022 fue un año de extremos climáticos](#),

agosto, septiembre y octubre de 2023 fueron los más calurosos jamás registrados, y el 17 de noviembre de 2023 fue el primer día en que la temperatura global superó los 2°C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales⁶. 2023 se encamina a ser el año más cálido jamás registrado, con cerca de 1,43°C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales⁷. Con la continua emisión de gases y aerosoles que calientan el clima y la constante destrucción de bosques y de otros sumideros de carbono, el planeta sigue calentándose a un ritmo sin precedentes y es probable que supere el 1,5°C de calentamiento con respecto a los niveles preindustriales, al menos temporalmente, un año entre 2023 y 2027⁸, y se mantenga por encima de los 1,5°C a principios de la década de 2030⁹, y quizá incluso ya en la década de 2020¹⁰. La ventana de oportunidad para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C y evitar violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos se está cerrando rápidamente.

- 8 La Tierra está demasiado caliente con el calentamiento actual de 1,2 °C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales¹¹, y los impactos lineales del cambio climático, donde un poco más de calentamiento provoca un poco más de impacto, ya están causando daños significativos. Por ejemplo, por cada 0,1°C más de calentamiento por encima de 1,2°C, 140 millones de personas más estarán expuestas al calor extremo¹². Al aproximarnos a 1,5 °C de calentamiento, queda poco tiempo antes de que los bucles de retroalimentación que se autoamplifican —en los que la Tierra se calienta a sí misma— desencadenen una serie de puntos críticos de inflexión regionales

[*con temperaturas máximas récord y crecientes concentraciones de gases de efecto invernadero*](#) (9 de enero, 2023).

- ⁶ Servicio de Cambio Climático de Copernicus, [*La temperatura global supera los 2°C con respecto a la media preindustrial el 17 de noviembre*](#) (21 de noviembre, 2023); Servicio de Cambio Climático de Copernicus, [*2023 en camino de convertirse en el año más cálido tras el récord de octubre*](#) (10 de noviembre, 2023).
- ⁷ Servicio de Cambio Climático de Copernicus, [*2023 en camino de convertirse en el año más cálido tras el récord de octubre*](#) (10 de noviembre, 2023).
- ⁸ OMM, GLOBAL ANNUAL TO DECADEAL CLIMATE UPDATE en 2.
- ⁹ Noah S. Diffenbaugh & Elizabeth A. Barnes, [*Data-driven predictions of the time remaining until critical global warming thresholds are reached*](#), 120(6) PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. en 2 (2023); Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, [*CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO 2021: LAS BASES FÍSICAS*](#), *Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo I al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático* [V. Masson-Delmotte y otros (eds.)], en TS-42 (2021) (en adelante “IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI”).
- ¹⁰ James E. Hansen y otros, [*Global Warming in the Pipeline*](#), 3 OXFORD OPEN CLIMATE CHANGE en 21 (2023).
- ¹¹ Véase nota al pie 6, *supra*; Administración Nacional de la Aeronáutica y del Espacio (NASA), [*La NASA afirma que 2022 es el quinto año más cálido registrado, continuando con la tendencia del calentamiento*](#) (12 de enero, 2023); Oficina Nacional de Administración Oceánica y Atmosférica (NOAA), [*2022 was world's 6th-warmest year on record*](#) (12 de enero, 2022).
- ¹² Timothy Lenton y otros, [*Quantifying the human cost of global warming*](#), 6 NAT. SUSTAIN. en 1237 (2023).

y globales que provoquen impactos no lineales, donde un poco más de calentamiento puede empujar al sistema climático a impactos desproporcionados, irreversibles y catastróficos. Si esto ocurre, el clima de la Tierra empujará a miles de millones de personas fuera del corredor de vida sostenible donde evolucionó la civilización¹³.

D.1 La Mejor Información Científica Disponible sobre la Emergencia Climática

- 9 El requisito de que los Estados actúen sobre la base de la “mejor información científica disponible” es una piedra angular del derecho ambiental internacional¹⁴. El Informe del Relator Especial sobre las implicaciones para los derechos humanos de la gestión y eliminación ambientalmente racionales de las sustancias y los desechos peligrosos ha señalado que este término se refiere a la mejor información científica disponible¹⁵ que “está conformada por datos y análisis reproducibles, derivados de fuentes fiables e imparciales, que respetan los principios aceptados de integridad científica e investigación científica responsable y que, tras un proceso de revisión por pares, son publicados y forman parte de la literatura científica”. La “mejor información científica disponible se distingue por gozar de amplia aceptación en la comunidad científica...”¹⁶. Los tribunales nacionales han interpretado que la “mejor información científica disponible” consiste en las últimas investigaciones y observaciones de organizaciones como el IPCC, la Organización Meteorológica Mundial (OMM), el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente (PNUMA) y los institutos de investigación independientes de expertos, la investigación académica revisada por pares y las pruebas de organismos nacionales científicos o especializados¹⁷. La mejor información científica disponible constituye la base de los informes

¹³ Chi Xu y otros, [Future of the human climate niche](#), 117 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 21en 11350 (2020).

¹⁴ Por ejemplo, el Acuerdo de París requiere que las Partes reduzcan rápidamente las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero, “de conformidad con la mejor información científica disponible” (Art. 4(1)) y que realicen periódicamente un balance de la aplicación del Acuerdo “a la luz de la mejor información científica disponible” (Art. 14(1)). Véase, Pacto de Glasgow para el Clima, FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1 (8 de marzo, 2022), ¶ 1; Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar, Art. 119(1)(a), 234. 10 de diciembre, 1982

¹⁵ “Pruebas científicas” obtenidas a partir del proceso científico, se define como “un acervo de conocimientos especializados acumulados a través de un proceso iterativo, lógico ... a partir de fuentes fiables, imparciales y examinadas por otros expertos”: Informe del Relator Especial sobre las implicaciones para los derechos humanos de la gestión y eliminación ambientalmente racionales de las sustancias y los desechos peligrosos, [El Derecho a la Ciencia en el Contexto de las Sustancias Tóxicas](#), citas de la respuesta al cuestionario de la American Association of the Advancement of Science, en 20 (2021).

¹⁶ *Id.* en 51.

¹⁷ Caso Urgenda del Tribunal Supremo, ¶ 2.1, 4.1–4.8; Tribunal Administrativo de Berlín, 31 de octubre de 2019, Backsen y otros (Agricultores Familiares Alemanes) vs. República Federal de Alemania, Sentencia, VG 10 K

y recomendaciones del IPCC, así como de otras organizaciones internacionales y de diversos organismos gubernamentales nacionales y subnacionales en virtud del derecho interno en las Américas.

- 10 Los informes del IPCC son una parte fundamental para brindar la mejor información científica disponible. El proceso de elaboración de cada informe del IPCC es consultivo, transparente, exhaustivo y científicamente riguroso. Desde su creación hace 34 años, el IPCC ha publicado seis Informes de Evaluación, en 1990, 1996, 2001, 2007, 2014 y 2022. Estos informes se publican cada 5–7 años e incluyen un análisis detallado de la información científica, los impactos y las respuestas al cambio climático. El IPCC también elabora Informes Especiales para evaluar cuestiones específicas solicitadas por los Estados. El sexto y último Informe de Evaluación (IE6) consta de contribuciones de cada uno de los tres Grupos de Trabajo del IPCC¹⁸ junto con un Informe de Síntesis que integra las contribuciones de los Grupos de Trabajo y los Informes Especiales elaborados desde el último Informe de Evaluación (IE5). Aunque los representantes de los gobiernos no están autorizados para editar los informes de los Grupos de Trabajo del IPCC, participan en el examen y revisión línea por línea de un “*Resumen para responsables de políticas*” (RRP).
- 11 El ciclo de elaboración de cada Informe de Evaluación es prolongado. Como consecuencia, en el momento de su publicación, la información científica presentada en el informe ya lleva al menos varios meses de retraso. La contribución del Grupo de Trabajo I al IE6 sobre las bases físicas del cambio climático es ilustrativa de los plazos típicos para producir cada contribución a un Informe de Evaluación. La reunión para redactar el borrador del IE6 tuvo lugar en mayo de 2017 y los borradores se aprobaron en septiembre de 2017. El primer borrador del informe del Grupo de Trabajo I se sometió a la revisión de expertos del 29 de abril al 23 de junio de 2019, y el segundo borrador fue revisado por expertos y gobiernos del 2 de marzo al 5 de junio de 2020. La fecha límite para presentar literatura científica al Grupo de Trabajo para su consideración por

412.18 (traducción no oficial), en 19, 20; Tribunal Constitucional Federal de Alemania, 24 de marzo de 2021, Neubauer y otros vs. Alemania, Sentencia, BvR 2656/18, 1 BvR 96/20, 1 BvR 78/20, 1 BvR 288/20, 1 BvR 96/20, 1 BvR 78/20 (traducción oficial) [en adelante, asunto del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Neubauer], párrafos 18–24.

¹⁸ La contribución del Grupo de Trabajo I trata sobre las bases físicas del cambio climático; la del Grupo de Trabajo II, sobre los impactos del cambio climático, la adaptación y la vulnerabilidad; y la del Grupo de Trabajo III, sobre las estrategias de mitigación.

los Autores Principales fue el 31 de enero de 2021 (prorrogado desde septiembre de 2020 debido a los retrasos por la pandemia COVID-19). La cuarta reunión de los Autores Principales tuvo lugar la semana del 15 de febrero de 2021, durante la cual se consideró y finalizó el borrador de la contribución tras la revisión de los expertos. Tras una revisión final de la Distribución Gubernamental Final del 4 de mayo al 20 de junio de 2021 y una sesión plenaria de aprobación del IPCC celebrada del 26 de julio al 6 de agosto de 2021, el informe se publicó el 9 de agosto de 2021¹⁹.

12 De este proceso surgen dos puntos importantes:

12.1 En primer lugar, el proceso inclusivo de revisión por expertos permite que los informes del IPCC presenten el consenso de la comunidad científica sobre cuestiones clave del cambio climático. Esto hace que las conclusiones y los análisis científicos de los grupos de trabajo y de los informes especiales del IPCC sean piezas fundamentales de la mejor información científica disponible.

12.2 En segundo lugar, en el dinámico y cambiante campo de la ciencia climática, los informes del IPCC siempre deben complementarse para garantizar que se tenga en cuenta la información científica “disponible” más reciente.

13 La información científica actual demuestra que el mundo se encuentra en una situación de emergencia climática aún más grave de lo que indicaba la seria evidencia científica presentada en el IE6 al momento de su publicación. Según el Informe sobre la Brecha de Emisiones de las Naciones Unidas, publicado el 20 de noviembre de 2023, es probable que el calentamiento alcance los 2,5–2,9 °C a finales de siglo —incluso si se cumplen todos los compromisos del Acuerdo de París²⁰.

¹⁹ Véase Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, [Background](#) [última consulta el 23 de noviembre, 2023]; IPCC, [Review and Scoping process of the Working group I contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report](#) [última consulta el 23 de noviembre, 2023]; IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI en vii–ix.

²⁰ Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente, [Informe sobre la Brecha de Emisiones. Un megahit candente: Aun con temperaturas récord, el mundo fracasa en reducir sus emisiones \(por enésima vez\)](#), en xx (2023). (En adelante, “Informe del PNUMA sobre al Brecha de Emisiones (2023)”).

D.2 Los Impactos en los Derechos Humanos del Calentamiento Actual de 1,2°C

- 14 Con la actual media a largo plazo de 1,2°C de calentamiento, los impactos del cambio climático en todas las regiones del mundo son evidentes. En las Américas, millones de personas ya están siendo sometidas a calor extremo, sequías, inundaciones y otros fenómenos meteorológicos extremos²¹. Las repercusiones económicas de estos impactos son significativas. Los fenómenos relacionados con el clima ya han provocado la pérdida de porcentajes de dos dígitos del PIB en algunos países²². El Caribe ya ha sufrido pérdidas económicas significativas y desproporcionadas a causa de los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos ocurridos en las últimas dos décadas²³, con repetidos periodos de calor extremo sin precedentes y prolongados que han afectado la capacidad laboral y la productividad de toda la región²⁴. Algunos países caribeños han perdido el equivalente a más del 100% de su PIB a causa de los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos recientes²⁵. La modelización de los impactos y riesgos del cambio climático en los sistemas financieros está evolucionando, pero sigue existiendo una brecha considerable entre la

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- ²¹ Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, [CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO 2022: IMPACTOS, ADAPTACIÓN Y VULNERABILIDAD](#), *Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo II al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático*, [H.-O Pörtner y otros (eds.)], en 1698–1717, 1936–1939 (2022) (en adelante “IPCC 2022, IE6 GTII”); Organización Meteorológica Mundial, [EL ESTADO DEL CLIMA EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE](#), en 13–17 (2023). Véase también C. Tuholske y otros, [Global urban population exposure to extreme heat](#), 118 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 41 (2021) (Cuadro S2).
- ²² Organización Meteorológica Mundial, [El costo económico de los desastres meteorológicos se dispara, pero las alertas tempranas salvan vidas](#) (22 de mayo, 2023), según la Organización Meteorológica Mundial, [ATLAS SOBRE MORTALIDAD Y PÉRDIDAS ECONÓMICAS DEBIDAS A FENÓMENOS METEOROLÓGICOS, CLIMÁTICOS E HIDROLÓGICOS EXTREMOS](#) (2023). En Estados Unidos, el número medio de catástrofes de mil millones de dólares ha pasado de menos de 5 al año antes de 2000 a 16 al año desde 2016. National Centers for Environmental Information, [U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters](#), Oficina Nacional de Administración Oceánica y Atmosférica (NOAA) (2021).
- ²³ En la clasificación de los impactos de los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos entre 2000 y 2019, cinco países del Caribe figuraron entre los 20 primeros a nivel mundial en términos de víctimas fatales per cápita, mientras que en términos de pérdidas económicas como proporción del PIB, ocho de los 20 países que encabezaron la lista se encuentran en el Caribe. Grupo del Banco Mundial, [Hoja de Ruta para la Acción Climática en América Latina y el Caribe, 2021-2025](#) en 1 (2022).
- ²⁴ En 2021, la pérdida potencial promedio de los ingresos por la reducción de la capacidad laboral debido al calor extremo representaba en promedio un 1,60% del PIB nacional en Sudamérica. Stella M. Hartinger y otros, [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), 20 LANCET REG. HEALTH AM., en 24 (2023).
- ²⁵ Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente, [Después de la lluvia: los efectos duraderos de las tormentas en el Caribe](#), [última consulta el 20 de noviembre, 2023].

mejor información científica disponible sobre los impactos climáticos actuales y futuros y los modelos económicos²⁶.

- 15 La velocidad y la gravedad de los efectos del cambio climático a 1,2°C de calentamiento ya están planteando graves limitaciones a la capacidad de adaptación de los individuos y las comunidades²⁷. En la actualidad, el 50% de la población mundial sufre una grave escasez de agua y 3.300 millones de personas viven en países con una alta vulnerabilidad climática²⁸. Los habitantes de las Américas son especialmente vulnerables, ya que el cambio climático aumenta las sequías, las lluvias excesivas y las inundaciones graves, al tiempo que agrava el desplazamiento de personas ya vulnerables debido a la violencia, la inseguridad y la inestabilidad²⁹.
- 16 La ciencia de la atribución ahora es capaz de cuantificar en qué medida la influencia humana sobre el clima es responsable de impactos específicos³⁰. Muchos estudios de atribución se centran en los efectos del cambio climático sobre fenómenos meteorológicos extremos particulares³¹. Algunos estudios cuantifican las pérdidas económicas, las muertes y los impactos en la salud atribuibles al cambio climático³². Esta información científica confirma que el cambio climático ya está afectando a todas las regiones del mundo.

²⁶ Véase por ej., Institute and Faculty of Actuaries y Universidad de Exeter, [*The Emperor's New Climate Scenarios: Limitations and assumptions of commonly used climate-change scenarios in financial services*](#) (2023); Lloyds, [*Extreme weather leading to food and water shock: How vulnerable is the global economy to extreme weather and food shocks?*](#) (11 de octubre, 2023).

²⁷ IPCC 2022, IE6 GTII en13.

²⁸ *Id.* en 12, 555.

²⁹ Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, [*Climate change, disasters and displacement of the most vulnerable in the Americas*](#), en 1–2 (2022).

³⁰ Stephanie C. Herring y otros, [*Explaining Extreme Events of 2020 from a Climate Perspective*](#), 103(3) BULL. AMER. METEOR. SOC. (2022); Ben Clarke y otros, [*Extreme weather impacts of climate change: an attribution perspective*](#), 1(012001) ENVIRON. RES. CLIM. (2022); World Weather Attribution, [*Extreme heat in North America, Europe and China in July 2023 made much more likely by climate change*](#), (25 de julio, 2023); Sjoukje Y. Philip y otros, [*Rapid attribution analysis of the extraordinary heatwave on the Pacific Coast of the US and Canada*](#), WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION en 26 (2021).

³¹ *Id.*

³² Rebecca Newman & Ilan Noy, [*The global costs of extreme weather that are attributable to climate change*](#), 14(6103) NAT. COMMUN. (2023); Ana M. Vicedo-Cabrera y otros, [*The footprint of human-induced climate change on heat-related deaths in the summer of 2022 in Switzerland*](#), 18(7) ENVIRON. RES. LETT. (2023); Marina Romanello y otros, [*The 2023 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: the imperative for*](#)

D.3 Se Prevén Impactos Catastróficos en los Derechos Humanos Más Allá de 1,5°C de Calentamiento

- 17 En 2018, el IPCC presentó su Informe Especial sobre los impactos del calentamiento global de 1,5°C. En dicho Informe, el IPCC concluyó que 1,5°C es el límite crítico de temperatura, más allá del cual el clima mundial corre un riesgo cada vez mayor de pasar por puntos críticos de inflexión irreversibles³³. En el IE6, el IPCC reiteró que se prevé que los impactos y riesgos “para la salud, los medios de subsistencia, la seguridad alimentaria, el suministro de agua, la seguridad humana y el crecimiento económico” con un calentamiento más allá de 1,5°C serán devastadores y seguramente irán en aumento³⁴.
- 18 A pesar de la gravedad y la escala de los impactos del cambio climático a un calentamiento actual de 1,2°C, la mayoría de los impactos continúan siendo “lineales” —es decir, aumentan en proporción al incremento del calentamiento. Estos impactos lineales empeoran con cada aumento de un grado y empiezan a activar bucles de retroalimentación climática que se autoamplifican, en los que la Tierra se calienta a sí misma. Un ejemplo de este tipo de retroalimentación, que ya está en marcha, es el deshielo del permafrost³⁵. A medida que el planeta se calienta y el permafrost se descongela, se liberan antiguas reservas de metano y otros GEI, y más GEI provocan más calentamiento, lo que a su vez descongela más permafrost —creando un bucle de retroalimentación que se autoamplifica: se calienta, se descongela, se liberan más GEI, y vuelta a empezar³⁶. Estas retroalimentaciones que se autoamplifican aceleran el calentamiento y plantean el riesgo de empujar el sistema climático más allá de los puntos críticos de inflexión³⁷.

[*a health-centred response in a world facing irreversible harms*](#), 30 THE LANCET (2023); David J. Frame y otros, [*The economic costs of Hurricane Harvey attributable to climate change*](#), 160(2) CLIM. CHANGE (2020)

³³ IPCC, 2018: Calentamiento Global de 1,5°C en 7.

³⁴ Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, [IE6 SYNTHESIS REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2023](#), *Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo I, II y III al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático*, [P. Arias y otros (eds.)], en 36 (2023) (en adelante “IPCC, 2023: IE6 Informe de Síntesis”).

³⁵ IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI, en 348.

³⁶ IPCC, 2022: IE6 GTII, en 273. Este bucle de retroalimentación podría liberar de 110 a más de 550 GtCO₂ este siglo, rivalizando con las emisiones acumuladas de EE.UU. a su ritmo actual. Mika Rantanen, [The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979](#), 3(168) COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRON., en 3 (2022).

³⁷ IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI, en 739.

- 19 Más allá de 1,5°C, el planeta corre un riesgo cada vez mayor de desencadenar puntos críticos de inflexión no lineales³⁸, en los que un poco más de calentamiento provoca un impacto desproporcionado. Los puntos críticos de inflexión son umbrales que, una vez superados, desencadenan cambios irreversibles, como la pérdida de la selva amazónica o de la capa de hielo de la Antártida Occidental³⁹. Algunos puntos de inflexión ya se han traspasado, mientras que otros están cada vez más cerca a medida que se acelera el calentamiento, y una vez que alcancen un nuevo estado, muchos provocarán mayor calentamiento en un bucle de retroalimentación que se refuerza a sí mismo y que puede interactuar para crear cascadas de puntos críticos de inflexión que pongan bajo amenaza la existencia de las civilizaciones humanas⁴⁰.
- 20 La historia de la Tierra en una escala temporal de milenios revela que los elementos de los sistemas climáticos regionales y globales pueden cambiar de estado, a menudo bruscamente, en cuestión de décadas y a veces de forma irreversible. Estos cambios son “no lineales”, ya que sus impactos son desproporcionados en relación con el aumento del calentamiento⁴¹. Comprender los impactos catastróficos y duraderos para la humanidad cuando se desencadenan puntos críticos de inflexión es fundamental para aclarar el contenido y el alcance de las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos en virtud de la Convención Americana.
- 21 Una evaluación reciente concluyó que superar 1,5°C aumenta la probabilidad de desencadenar o comprometer seis puntos críticos de inflexión climáticos que se autoperpetúan⁴². El IPCC confirma que existe un conjunto de seis cambios bruscos entre 1°C y 1,5°C de calentamiento y otros once entre 1,5°C y 2°C. Estos datos científicos son relevantes a la hora de considerar el alcance de las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos⁴³. Por ejemplo, una

³⁸ *Id.* en 633.

³⁹ Timothy M. Lenton, y otros, [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comentario, 575(7784) NATURE, en 593 (2019). (En adelante, “Lenton, *Climate tipping points*”); David I. Armstrong McKay y otros, [Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), 377(6611) SCIENCE, en 7 (2022) (en adelante, “Armstrong McKay, *Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points*”).

⁴⁰ Will Steffen y otros, [Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene](#), 115(33) PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. en 8254, 8256 (2018).

⁴¹ Lenton, *Climate tipping points* en 593 (2019); Véase también notas al pie 10 y 13, *supra*.


⁴² Véase Armstrong McKay, [Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), en 7.

⁴³ Para consultar un resumen de los puntos críticos de inflexión regionales véase Hoegh-Guldberg, O., y otros “[Impactos de 1,5°C de Calentamiento Global en los Sistemas Naturales y Humanos](#)” en [Calentamiento Global de 1,5°C](#), Informe Especial del IPCC sobre los Impactos del Calentamiento Global, V. Masson-Delmotte y otros (eds.), 262 (2018). Un resumen de los puntos de inflexión regionales figura en Hoegh-Guldberg, O., y otros

vez que el calentamiento supere los 1,6 °C durante varios años, la capa de hielo de Groenlandia estará destinada a un deshielo irreversible. Si toda Groenlandia se derritiera, contribuiría a elevar el nivel del mar entre 5 y 7 metros.

- 22 Estos cambios en el sistema climático están interconectados de manera tal que, al desencadenarse uno o más puntos críticos de inflexión, se corre el riesgo de desencadenar un efecto dominó, o de cascada, de puntos críticos de inflexión, en todas las regiones y en todo el mundo (**Figura 1**). Se prevé que los impactos sean abruptos e irreversibles, alterando partes del sistema climático de forma irrevocable y convirtiendo amplias zonas del mundo en inhóspitas para los seres humanos, especialmente para los más vulnerables⁴⁴. Las consiguientes violaciones de los derechos humanos perdurarían durante generaciones.

Figura 1. Puntos Críticos de Inflexión Climática



“Impactos de 1,5°C de Calentamiento Global en los Sistemas Naturales y Humanos”, en *Calentamiento Global de 1,5 °C*, Informe Especial del IPCC sobre los Impactos del Calentamiento Global, V. Masson-Delmotte y otros (eds.), Cuadro 3.7. Véase también Abram, N., y otros “Marco y Contexto del Informe”, en *El Océano y la Criósfera en un Clima Cambiante*, Informe Especial del IPCC sobre los Impactos del Calentamiento Global, H.-O. Pörtner y otros (eds.), 1–81 (2019).

⁴⁴ Armstrong McKay, *Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points*, en 7.

Fuente: Timothy M. Lenton, y otros., [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comentario, 575(7784) NATURE (2019).

D.3.1 Medidas Necesarias y Herramientas para Mantenerse por Debajo de 1,5°C y Evitar Impactos Climáticos Catastróficos Irreversibles y Violaciones Masivas de Derechos Humanos.

- 23 La mejor información científica y tecnológica disponible nos dice que para mantener el aumento de la temperatura media mundial por debajo de 1,5°C (con un sobrepaso limitado) se requiere la aplicación inmediata de las siguientes estrategias:
- 23.1 La rápida reducción de las emisiones de los “supercontaminantes climáticos”, a saber, el metano (CH₄), los hidrofluorocarbonos (HFC), el ozono troposférico (O₃) y el carbono negro (“contaminantes climáticos de vida corta” (CCVC)) y el óxido nitroso (N₂O)⁴⁵;
 - 23.2 La preservación inmediata, así como la expansión, de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono (terrestres y oceánicos) que eliminan CO₂⁴⁶.
 - 23.3 La descarbonización urgente de los sistemas energéticos mundiales para lograr emisiones netas iguales a cero a mediados de siglo o antes y estabilizar el sistema climático para finales de siglo.
- 24 Una nueva investigación estima que la cantidad neta de CO₂ que el ser humano aún puede emitir para tener una probabilidad del 50% de limitar el calentamiento global a 1,5°C es de sólo 250 gigatoneladas (miles de millones de toneladas) de dióxido de carbono (GtCO₂), lo que equivale aproximadamente a seis años de emisiones actuales de CO₂ a partir de enero de 2023⁴⁷. (Esta investigación utiliza la misma metodología que el análisis del presupuesto de carbono del IE6).

⁴⁵ Estos contaminantes son “supercontaminantes” porque son mucho más potentes que el CO₂ a la hora de calentar el planeta. Por ejemplo, en un periodo de 20 años, el metano es 80 veces más potente para calentar el planeta que el CO₂. Los CCVC también tienen una vida mucho más corta en la atmósfera. En comparación con el CO₂, que una vez emitido puede permanecer en la atmósfera durante siglos, los CCVC permanecen en la atmósfera entre unos pocos días y unos pocos años. IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI, en 2248–2249.

⁴⁶ IPCC, 2018: Calentamiento Global de 1,5°C en 17.

⁴⁷ Piers M. Forster, y otros, [Indicators of Global Climate Change 2022: annual update of large-scale indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence](#), 15(6) EARTH SYS. SCI. DATA 2295, en 2299–2302 (2023); Robin D. Lamboll y otros, [Assessing the Size and Uncertainty of Remaining Carbon Budgets](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE (2023) (en adelante, “Lamboll, *Assessing the Size and Uncertainty of Remaining Carbon Budgets*”).

Se trata de una disminución considerable con respecto al presupuesto de carbono del IE6 de 400 GtCO₂ restantes a principios de 2020 para una probabilidad de un 67% de limitar el calentamiento a 1,5°C⁴⁸.

- 25 El presupuesto de carbono es una herramienta para cuantificar las reducciones de CO₂ necesarias para mantener el aumento de la temperatura del planeta por debajo de 1,5°C. Este presupuesto también proporciona una base para asignar la reducción de emisiones de forma más equitativa⁴⁹. Sin embargo, es importante señalar que la cuantía del presupuesto de carbono restante es incierta y depende de varios factores⁵⁰. Además, el presupuesto de carbono se calcula a partir de una serie de supuestos. Es importante destacar dos de estos supuestos, ya que refuerzan la necesidad de adoptar un enfoque preventivo a la hora de determinar las obligaciones de mitigación de los Estados:

25.1 En primer lugar, la metodología del presupuesto de carbono supone que ciertas reducciones de las emisiones distintas del CO₂ (incluido el metano) se producirán automáticamente en 2030 y 2050⁵¹. La revisión de estos supuestos para reflejar las tasas reales de emisiones de gases distintos del CO₂ (incluidas las emisiones de metano, que actualmente se están acelerando)⁵² reduce el presupuesto de carbono restante⁵³.

25.2 En segundo lugar, la metodología del presupuesto de carbono no incluye muchas retroalimentaciones que se autoamplifican, ya que son difíciles de cuantificar⁵⁴. Como se

⁴⁸ IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI en 753.

⁴⁹ Lavanya Rajamani y otros, [National 'fair shares' in reducing greenhouse gas emissions within the principled framework of international environmental law](#), 21(8) CLIMATE POL'Y, en 983 (2021).

⁵⁰ Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO 2022: MITIGACIÓN DEL CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO, *Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo III al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático* [P.R. Shukla y otros (eds.)], en 6 (en adelante, "IPCC, 2022: IE6 GTIII").

⁵¹ *Id.* en 6.

⁵² Xin Lan y otros, [What do we know about the global methane budget? Results from four decades of atmospheric CH₄ observations and the way forward](#), 379(2210) PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. A, at 11 (2021); Shushi Peng y otros, [Wetland emission and atmospheric sink changes explain methane growth in 2020](#), 612(7940) NATURE, en 481 (2022).

⁵³ IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI en 751; Lamboll, *Assessing the Size and Uncertainty of Remaining Carbon Budgets*.

⁵⁴ Lamboll, *Assessing the Size and Uncertainty of Remaining Carbon Budgets*.

ha descrito anteriormente, estas retroalimentaciones exacerbaban el calentamiento y aumentan el riesgo de que se desencadenen puntos críticos de inflexión.

- 26 El consenso científico es que todas las trayectorias para limitar el calentamiento global a 1,5°C (con un sobrepaso limitado), y a 2°C, incluyen el uso de medidas de restauración del clima como la eliminación de CO₂ a lo largo del siglo XXI de hasta 1000 GtCO₂⁵⁵. La continuación de las emisiones de GEI y la acumulación de GEI ya en la atmósfera implican que, además de reducciones significativas de las emisiones distintas del CO₂ y del CO₂, es necesaria la eliminación de varios centenares de GtCO₂ para limitar el calentamiento a bastante menos de 2°C (con un sobrepaso limitado) a finales de siglo⁵⁶.
- 27 Además, el IE6 confirma que reducir las emisiones de combustibles fósiles —la principal fuente de CO₂— descarbonizando rápidamente el sistema energético, de forma aislada, acelerará el calentamiento en la próxima década⁵⁷. Esto se debe a que la quema de combustibles fósiles no sólo emite CO₂, sino también aerosoles de sulfato reflectantes. Estos aerosoles actúan enfriando temporalmente el clima al “enmascarar” parte del calentamiento creado por el manto espeso de GEI en la atmósfera. Los aerosoles de sulfato, que tienen un efecto de enfriamiento, desaparecen rápidamente de la atmósfera, mientras que el CO₂ emitido perdura por mucho más tiempo y mantiene espesa la capa de calentamiento. A corto plazo, esto significa que la reducción de las emisiones de combustibles fósiles provocará un calentamiento relativamente mayor porque los aerosoles ya no estarán ahí para enmascarar el calentamiento⁵⁸. Es imperativo que el mundo no evite o retrase una rápida descarbonización. Sin embargo, la pérdida concomitante del enfriamiento por aerosoles y el calentamiento no enmascarado resultante tornan imperativo reducir las emisiones de metano y de otros gases distintos del CO₂ para frenar el calentamiento en las próximas décadas.

⁵⁵ IPCC, 2018: Calentamiento Global de 1,5 °C en 12; IPCC, 2022: IE6 GTIII en 23–24.

⁵⁶ IPCC, 2018: Calentamiento Global de 1,5 °C en 12.

⁵⁷ IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI en 33.

⁵⁸ IPCC, 2022: IE6 GTIII en 31; IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI en 6–8.

D.3.2 Estrategias de Mitigación Rápida para Mantenerse por Debajo de 1,5°C a Corto Plazo

- 28 Debido a su gran potencial de calentamiento global y a su vida atmosférica comparativamente corta, reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos de vida corta, paralelamente con la reducción del CO₂, es la única forma plausible de evitar que la Tierra se caliente por encima de 1,5°C en los próximos 10–15 años. La rápida mitigación de los CCVC es fundamental para evitar violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos, ya que puede evitar un calentamiento casi cuatro veces mayor de aquí a 2050 que las estrategias dirigidas únicamente a reducir el CO₂⁵⁹.
- 29 La mitigación del metano, en particular, es la palanca más poderosa para reducir el calentamiento a corto plazo. El metano es alrededor de 82,5 veces más potente que el CO₂ en un plazo de 20 años y reducir el metano utilizando todas las medidas de mitigación disponibles reducirá el calentamiento futuro tres veces más que la descarbonización por sí sola⁶⁰. Además, la mayoría de las medidas de reducción del metano son efectivas en términos de costos, proporcionan considerables beneficios colaterales para la salud pública y contribuyen a alcanzar los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible⁶¹.
- 30 Otra estrategia fundamental de mitigación rápida es la protección y restauración de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono. Estos sumideros forman parte del ciclo del carbono que absorbe y almacena CO₂ y son fundamentales para que el planeta siga siendo capaz de limitar un calentamiento mayor⁶². El ritmo actual de destrucción de los bosques y de otros sumideros por la actividad humana, plantea el riesgo de convertirlos en fuentes de CO₂. En el caso de

⁵⁹ Gabrielle B. Dreyfus y otros, [Mitigating climate disruption in time: A self-consistent approach for avoiding both near-term and long-term global warming](#), 119(22) PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. en 5 (2022).

⁶⁰ IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI en 923; véase también Robert B. Jackson, [Atmospheric methane removal: a research agenda](#), 379 PHILOS. TRANS. R. SOC. A en 4 (2021) (Cuadro 7.15); Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente & la Coalición por el Clima y El Aire Limpio, [Evaluación Global del Metano: Beneficios y Costos de Mitigar las Emisiones de Metano](#), en 11 (2021) (en adelante, “PNUMA, 2021: Evaluación Global del Metano”).

⁶¹ Véase PNUMA, 2021: Evaluación Global del Metano en 21. Según la Evaluación Global del Metano, ya que el metano es un elemento clave del ozono troposférico (smog), un poderoso forzador del clima y peligroso contaminante atmosférico, una reducción del 45% evitaría 260.000 muertes prematuras, 775.000 visitas hospitalarias relacionadas con el asma, 73.000 millones de horas de trabajo perdidas por el calor extremo y 25 millones de toneladas de pérdidas de cosechas al año.

⁶² IPCC, 2021: IE6 GTI en 676; Allie Goldstein y otros, [Protecting irrecoverable carbon in Earth's ecosystems](#), 10(4) NAT. CLIM. CHANGE (2020) en 287; Monica L. Noon y otros, [Mapping the irrecoverable carbon in Earth's ecosystems](#), 5 NAT. SUSTAIN. (2021) en 37.

grandes sumideros como la Amazonia, esto tendría consecuencias catastróficas para los derechos humanos. Existe el riesgo de que cuando se destruya el 20–25% de la Amazonia, la selva se convierta en una sabana, lo que tendría impactos devastadores, especialmente para aquellos pueblos que dependen de ella para mantener las condiciones básicas de una vida digna⁶³. La deforestación actual en toda la cuenca del Amazonas es del 17%, y la selva ya muestra signos crecientes de aproximación a un punto crítico de inflexión⁶⁴. Entre 2021 y 2025, la Amazonia podría perder otros 23,7 millones de hectáreas de selva debido a la deforestación en toda su cuenca⁶⁵.

- 31 En resumen, para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C, para garantizar y respetar los derechos humanos y para evitar violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos tanto a corto como a largo plazo, los Estados deben, como mínimo, actuar sobre la base de la mejor información científica y la mejor tecnología disponible y tomar medidas urgentes para:

31.1 Reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos, incluida la aplicación de políticas coherentes con (i) la reducción de las emisiones mundiales de metano en un 40–45% (o 180 Mt/año) para 2030 en relación con los niveles de 2030⁶⁶; (ii) la reducción de las emisiones de HFC en un 85% para 2050 en relación con los niveles de 2019; (iii) la reducción de las emisiones de óxido nitroso (N₂O) en un 20% para 2050 en relación con

⁶³ Existen pruebas científicas de que la deforestación, el cambio climático y el uso generalizado del fuego indican un punto crítico de inflexión para que el sistema amazónico se convierta en ecosistemas no forestales en el este, sur y centro de la Amazonia con un 20–25% de deforestación: Thomas E. Lovejoy & Carlos Nobre, [Amazon's Tipping Point](#), 4(2) SCI. ADV. at 1 (2018) (en adelante, “Lovejoy & Nobre, *Amazon's Tipping Point*”); IPCC, 2018: Calentamiento Global de 1,5 °C en 263.

⁶⁴ Seaver Wang y otros, [Mechanisms and Impacts of Earth System Tipping Elements](#), 61(1) REV. GEOPHYS. (2023); Lovejoy & Nobre, *Amazon's Tipping Point*.

⁶⁵ Sibélia Zanon, [Deforestation in the Amazon: past, present and future](#), InfoAmazonia (Mar. 21, 2023). Este artículo describe las conclusiones de un informe de la Red Amazónica de Información Socioambiental Georreferenciada publicado en septiembre de 2022. Véase Red Amazónica de Información Socioambiental Georreferenciada, [Deforestación en la Amazonía al 2025: Pasado y Futuro de la Deforestación en la Amazonía](#) (septiembre 2022).

⁶⁶ PNUMA, Evaluación Global del Metano 2021 en 9.

los niveles de 2019⁶⁷; y (iv) la reducción de las emisiones de carbono negro en un 35% para 2050 en relación con los niveles de 2010⁶⁸.

31.2 Detener la destrucción de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono y restaurar y ampliar estos sumideros. En el caso de la Amazonia, es imperativo que las tasas de deforestación y degradación se reduzcan drásticamente de inmediato para que la selva pueda funcionar más eficazmente como sumidero de carbono y para que no se la empuje más allá de un punto crítico de inflexión⁶⁹. Esto requiere una moratoria sobre la deforestación y la degradación en la Amazonia, y la aplicación y el cumplimiento de prácticas sostenibles de uso de la tierra agrícola para permitir la regeneración, al menos hasta que el consenso científico demuestre que es probable que el planeta se mantenga por debajo de 1,5°C de calentamiento global con respecto a los niveles preindustriales⁷⁰.

31.3 Descarbonizar rápidamente los sistemas energéticos para alcanzar emisiones netas iguales a cero para 2050 o antes y estabilizar el sistema climático para finales de siglo.

D.4 Los Derechos Humanos y los Daños Únicos, Presentes y Futuros, Causados por la Emergencia Climática

32 Lo que distingue al daño causado por el cambio climático es “no sólo su magnitud, sino su irreversibilidad”⁷¹. La ciencia demuestra que el daño climático tiene dos dimensiones; una se sitúa en el presente, y la otra comienza en el presente pero es posible que su pleno impacto no se manifieste durante años. Y lo que es más importante, ambos tipos de daños activan hoy las

⁶⁷ IPCC, 2022: IE6 GTIII en 17. El porcentaje de reducción del metano en líneas generales equivale al objetivo de la Evaluación Global del Metano del PNUMA, que utiliza diferentes modelos de referencia. Véase nota al pie 66, *supra*.

⁶⁸ IPCC, 2018: Calentamiento Global de 1,5 °C en 12, nótese que las reducciones de carbono negro se basan en las conclusiones del IPCC publicadas en su Informe Especial de 2018, pero se trata de un área de investigación en constante evolución.

⁶⁹ Lovejoy & Nobre, *Amazon's Tipping Point* en 1.

⁷⁰ Véase en general Lovejoy & Nobre, *Amazon's Tipping Point*; véase también Carlos Nobre y otros (eds.), [INFORME DE EVALUACIÓN DE AMAZONÍA 2021](#), en 34–44 (2021); y Daniel Grossman, [Trouble in the Amazon](#), NATURE (24 de agosto, 2023) (*donde se detallan* la conclusiones recientes sobre la salud de la Amazonia y las causas y soluciones respecto de su declive).

⁷¹ *In the Matter of the Application of Hawai'i Electric Light Company, Inc. For Approval of a Power Purchase Agreement for Renewable Dispatchable Firm Energy & Capacity*, No. SCOT-22-0000418, 2023 WL 2472050 (Haw. 13 de marzo, 2023), 19 (Wilson, J., concurrente).

obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos. Para respetar los derechos humanos hoy y evitar violaciones masivas de los mismos, el alcance de las obligaciones de los Estados debe garantizar que las medidas adoptadas en la actualidad aborden suficientemente ambos tipos de daños.

- 33 La información científica descrita en la [Sección D](#) muestra que la media de calentamiento actual 1,2°C a largo plazo ya está causando graves daños a los derechos humanos. Gran parte de este daño es de naturaleza lineal y será proporcionalmente más grave con cada incremento adicional de calentamiento.
- 34 La ciencia también deja claro que, a medida que el calentamiento se acerque a 1,5°C, estaremos encerrando los daños futuros derivados del sobrepaso de los puntos críticos de inflexión. Una vez traspasados los puntos críticos de inflexión, algunos de los daños futuros del cambio climático serán irreversibles y potencialmente catastróficos. En otras palabras, los daños del mañana están encerrados por la incapacidad actual de mitigar adecuadamente las emisiones y proteger los sumideros de carbono. De hecho, cada incremento adicional de calentamiento aumenta la probabilidad de que grandes partes del planeta se vuelvan inhabitables para los seres humanos. La ciencia también deja claro que la magnitud exacta de los daños futuros depende de la eficacia con la que se apliquen y se hagan cumplir las medidas de los Estados en esta ventana crítica de tiempo.
- 35 Tal como demuestra la mejor información científica disponible descrita en la [Sección D](#), es seguro que se producirán daños futuros, además de los que ya se están produciendo, si no se adoptan de inmediato medidas para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento y si se continúa a este ritmo durante los próximos años. La única incertidumbre es determinar precisamente cuándo y en qué medida este daño futuro afectará a los derechos humanos⁷². Si los Estados y las instituciones siguen permitiendo que se desarrollen tanto las dimensiones presentes como futuras de este daño creciente, el derecho de los derechos humanos habrá fracasado.
- 36 Ante este tipo único de daño, la respuesta institucional de la Corte, así como de otros tribunales y órganos de derechos humanos, debe ser la prevención, la precaución y la no discriminación. Cualquier otro enfoque pondrá en peligro los derechos humanos en el presente y en el futuro, y

⁷² *Id. en 38.*

el daño recaerá de forma desproporcionada sobre personas y grupos vulnerables que ya sufren desigualdades y discriminación sistémicas⁷³.

- 37 El IGSD recomienda respetuosamente a la Corte que reconozca la doble dimensión temporal del daño presente y futuro del cambio climático. En consecuencia, la norma de no causar daño⁷⁴ debería guiar la interpretación de la Corte de las obligaciones de derechos humanos de los Estados.

E EL PAPEL DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS PARA GARANTIZAR UNA RESPUESTA CLIMÁTICA EFICAZ PARA MANTENERSE POR DEBAJO DE 1.5°C

- 38 Tal como han reconocido el Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas⁷⁵, la Comisión Interamericana⁷⁶ y los tribunales de todo el mundo⁷⁷, el derecho de los derechos

⁷³ Véase Consejo de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas, *Derecho a un medio ambiente limpio, saludable y sostenible: el medio ambiente no tóxico - Informe del Relator Especial sobre la cuestión de las obligaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas con el disfrute de un medio ambiente sin riesgos, limpio, saludable y sostenible*, A/HRC/49/53, en 1 (2022).

⁷⁴ InforMEA Acceso a la Información sobre los Acuerdos Ambientales Multilaterales, Glosario, Gobernanza Ambiental, norma de no causar daño, disponible en <https://www.informea.org/es/knowledge/glossary/no-harm-rule>. “La norma de no causar daño es un principio de derecho consuetudinario internacional ampliamente reconocido por el que un Estado está obligado a prevenir, reducir y controlar el riesgo de daños medioambientales a otros Estados”.

⁷⁵ *Daniel Billy, y otros. vs. Australia (Petición de los Isleños del Estrecho de Torres)*, Comité de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas (22 de septiembre, 2022) (CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019), ¶ 8.7. (22 de septiembre, 2022)

⁷⁶ *Comunidad de la Oroya, Perú*, CIDH, Informe No. 330/20, Caso 12.718 (2020).

⁷⁷ *Leghari vs. la Federación de Pakistán* (2015) Tribunal Superior de Lahore, W.P. No. 25501/2015; Sentencia T-622/16 (Caso *Río Atrato*), Corte Constitucional de Colombia (2016), traducido y disponible en Dignity Rights Project, 2019; *Generaciones Futuras vs. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Otros*, Corte Suprema de Colombia, Sentencia del 5 de abril, 2018 (11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01); Hoge Raad [¶HR] [¶Corte Internacional de Justicia] La Haya, 20 de diciembre, 2019, 19/00135 (*De Staat Der Nederlanden vs. Stichting Urgenda*) (Países Bajos). ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2006; Tribunal de Primera Instancia de Bruselas (Bélgica). *VZW Klimaatzaak vs. el Reino de Bélgica*. Sentencia del 17 de junio, 2021. 2015/4585/A; *Waratah Coal Pty. Ltd. vs. Youth Verdict Ltd. & Ors.* (No 6) [2022] QLC 21 (Austl.), ¶ 44; *PSB vs. Brasil* S.T.F.J., DJe n° 194/2022 ADPF/708, Relator: Min. Roberto Barroso, 04.07.2022, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.], 28.09.2022, 43 (Brasil); *In the Matter of the Application of Hawai'i Electric Light Company, Inc. For Approval of a Power Purchase Agreement for Renewable Dispatchable Firm Energy & Capacity*, No. SCOT-22-0000418, 2023 WL 2471890 (Haw. 13 de marzo, 2023); y *In the Matter of the Application of Hawai'i Electric Light Company, Inc. For Approval of a Power Purchase Agreement for Renewable Dispatchable Firm Energy & Capacity*, No. SCOT-22-0000418, 2023 WL 2472050 (Haw. Mar. 13, 2023) (Wilson, J., concurrente).

humanos desempeña un papel fundamental en la aclaración, configuración y fortalecimiento de las obligaciones de los Estados para hacer frente a la emergencia climática. Como ha reconocido reiteradamente esta Corte, el objeto y fin del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos es “la protección de los derechos fundamentales del ser humano”⁷⁸ y, para ello, es necesario proteger los derechos humanos de las personas independientemente de su nacionalidad⁷⁹. El IGSD afirma respetuosamente que, en el contexto de los daños únicos que plantea el cambio climático, el cumplimiento de este propósito requiere de la Corte:

- 38.1 *En primer lugar*, interpretar la Convención Americana y el Protocolo de San Salvador para definir obligaciones de derechos humanos claras y específicas que se correlacionen con la magnitud y singularidad del problema. Esta interpretación debe abordar y aclarar la relación entre los marcos multilaterales actuales en materia climática, por ejemplo, la CMNUCC y el Acuerdo de París, y el principio *pro homine*, incluidos los enfoques de precaución y prevención requeridos por la mejor información científica climática disponible;
- 38.2 *En segundo lugar*, establecer mecanismos que garanticen que los Estados aplican y hacen cumplir de forma efectiva medidas coherentes con sus obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos para mitigar, adaptarse a la emergencia climática y hacer frente a la vulnerabilidad causada por la misma⁸⁰. Esto requiere que los Estados se guíen por la mejor información científica disponible para desarrollar, aplicar y hacer cumplir medidas obligatorias para reducir los contaminantes climáticos y proteger los bosques y otros sumideros naturales de carbono. Estas medidas no solo deben reflejarse en sus compromisos de Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional y cumplir con las obligaciones de procedimiento en virtud de la CMNUCC y su Acuerdo de París asociado, sino también deben ir más allá de estos requisitos limitados. Dichos mecanismos deben alinearse con los objetivos más amplios de la CMNUCC de estabilizar el sistema climático

⁷⁸ Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal: Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículo 1.1 y 2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, CtIDH (15 de noviembre, 2017), ¶ 28 (en adelante “Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, CtIDH”).

⁷⁹ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, CtIDH, en ¶ 41.

⁸⁰ Rosa Celorio, [*Several Steps Forward, One Backward: Climate Change, Latin America, and the Human Rights Resilience*](#), 34(1) MD. J. INT’L L. en 97, 100 (2020).

en un plazo seguro para garantizar que la producción de alimentos no se vea amenazada y permitir el desarrollo sostenible. En otras palabras, no tomar las medidas identificadas en ¶ 31 *supra*, constituiría un incumplimiento de la obligación asumida por los Estados en virtud de la Convención Americana.

E.1 Un Enfoque Sistémico a la Interpretación de las Obligaciones de los Estados en virtud del Derecho Internacional en Materia Climática y del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos

- 39 La competencia de la Corte en virtud del artículo 64 le permite examinar el marco jurídico internacional que rige el cambio climático, incluida la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático de 1992 y su Acuerdo de París de 2016⁸¹. Esta Corte también puede considerar otros acuerdos que desempeñan un papel en la protección del clima, incluida la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar, y acuerdos sectoriales como el Protocolo de Montreal relativo a las Sustancias que Agotan la Capa de Ozono (un acuerdo internacional que impone obligaciones vinculantes para reducir las emisiones climáticas), los convenios de la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) que abordan los contaminantes marítimos⁸² y las políticas, Normas y Métodos Recomendados (SARPS, por sus siglas en inglés) de la Organización de la Aviación Civil Internacional (OACI) sobre el cambio climático y la protección del medio ambiente⁸³. Todas ellas son fuentes interpretativas que orientan la interpretación del alcance de las obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos⁸⁴.

⁸¹ El Acuerdo de París fue adoptado por 196 Partes en la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático celebrada en París (Francia) el 12 de diciembre de 2015 y entró en vigor el 4 de noviembre de 2016.

⁸² Véase, Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI), [Convenio internacional para prevenir la contaminación por los buques \(MARPOL\)](#) (1973) modificada por el Protocolo de 1978; e OMI, [Convenio sobre la prevención de la contaminación del mar por vertimiento de desechos y otras materias \("El Convenio de Londres"\)](#) (1972). Para ver ejemplos de acuerdos climáticos sectoriales véase OMI, [Estrategia inicial de la OMI sobre la reducción de las emisiones de GEI procedentes de los buques](#), 2023.

⁸³ Véase Organización de la Aviación Civil Internacional (ICAO), [Resolución A41-21: Declaración consolidada de las políticas y prácticas permanentes de la OACI relativas a la protección del medioambiente – Cambio climático](#) (2022); e ICAO, [Annex 16— Environmental Protection Volume IV— Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation \(CORSIA\)](#), 2023.

⁸⁴ Véase La Figura de la Reelección Presidencial Indefinida en Sistemas Presidenciales en el Contexto del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Opinión Consultiva OC-28/21, CtIDH (ser A) (7 de junio, 2021); Enfoques Diferenciados Respecto de Determinados Grupos de Personas Privadas de la Libertad (Interpretación y alcance de los artículos 1.1, 4.1, 5, 11.2, 12, 13, 17.1, 19, 24 y 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos

E.1.1 Los Compromisos de los Estados en Virtud de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático y su Acuerdo de París no Bastan para Proteger los Derechos Humanos

- 40 Durante más de 30 años, la comunidad internacional ha intentado mitigar las emisiones climáticas antropogénicas, y adaptarse a los impactos del cambio climático causados por dichas emisiones, a través de negociaciones en el ámbito de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático de 1992 y, desde 2016, a través del Acuerdo de París asociado a dicha Convención. Este marco no ha sido suficiente para proteger los derechos humanos y está fracasando a la hora de mantener el aumento de la temperatura del planeta por debajo del límite crítico de seguridad de 1,5°C. Las obligaciones de derechos humanos de los Estados con respecto al cambio climático van mucho más allá del cumplimiento del requisito de presentar sus planes nacionales de acción climática, conocido como Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional (CDN), en virtud del Acuerdo de París.
- 41 El objetivo último de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático de 1992 es “la estabilización de las concentraciones de gases de efecto invernadero en la atmósfera a un nivel que impida interferencias antropógenas peligrosas en el sistema climático” y hacerlo “en un plazo suficiente para permitir que los ecosistemas se adapten naturalmente al cambio climático, asegurar que la producción de alimentos no se vea amenazada y permitir que el desarrollo económico prosiga de manera sostenible”⁸⁵. El “sistema climático” se define como “la totalidad de la atmósfera, la hidrosfera, la biosfera y la geosfera y sus interacciones”⁸⁶.
- 42 En diciembre de 2015, las Partes de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, acordaron en su Acuerdo de París mantener “el aumento de la temperatura media mundial muy por debajo de 2°C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales” y proseguir los esfuerzos “para limitar el aumento de la temperatura a 1,5°C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales”, reconociendo que mantenerse muy por debajo de 2°C y proseguir los esfuerzos para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C “reduciría considerablemente los riesgos y los impactos del

Humanos y de otros instrumentos que conciernen a la protección de los derechos humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-29/22, CtIDH (ser. A) No. 29, (30 de mayo, 2022) ¶ 40. (En adelante, “Opinión Consultiva OC-29/22”).

⁸⁵ Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, art. 2, 9 de mayo, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (En adelante “CCNUCC”).

⁸⁶ *Id.* en art. 1(3).

cambio climático”⁸⁷. Las Partes también acordaron aumentar “la capacidad de adaptación a los efectos adversos del cambio climático y promover la resiliencia al clima y un desarrollo con bajas emisiones” y “situar los flujos financieros en un nivel compatible con una trayectoria” que conduzca a un desarrollo como tal⁸⁸.

- 43 En virtud del Acuerdo de París, cada Estado debe preparar, comunicar y mantener su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional (CDN) para alcanzar de estos objetivos⁸⁹, la CDN de cada Estado debe actualizarse cada cinco años y cada informe sucesivo debe representar una progresión que refleje la “mayor ambición posible” de una Parte y “sus responsabilidades comunes pero diferenciadas y sus capacidades respectivas”⁹⁰. Además de estas obligaciones generales de procedimiento, las Partes tienen absoluta discreción sobre qué incluir en sus informes sobre su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional y cómo aplicarlos y cumplirlos⁹¹.
- 44 Así, el informe sobre la Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional de un Estado es un compromiso de procedimiento para explicar sus acciones de mitigación y adaptación en concordancia con los objetivos de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático y el Acuerdo de París. Normalmente, los países en desarrollo condicionan la aplicación de una parte de su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional a la financiación externa.
- 45 Colectivamente, los esfuerzos actuales de los Estados no son suficientes para cumplir con los objetivos del Acuerdo de París, y no garantizan los derechos humanos. El primer Balance Mundial de las Naciones Unidas (informe de síntesis) en el marco del Acuerdo de París se publicó en septiembre de 2023 y calculó que “la comunidad mundial no está en vías de alcanzar los objetivos a largo plazo del Acuerdo de París... [y] todos los actores deben hacer mucho más, desde este momento y en todos los frentes”⁹². El Informe sobre la Brecha de Emisiones del

⁸⁷ Acuerdo de París a la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático, art. 2(1)(a), 12 de diciembre, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (En adelante “Acuerdo de París”).

⁸⁸ Acuerdo de París art. 2(1)(b)(c). Las Partes que son países desarrollados “deberán proporcionar recursos financieros a las Partes que son países en desarrollo para prestarles asistencia tanto en la mitigación como en la adaptación” al cumplir con sus obligaciones en virtud de la CMNUCC (Artículo 9(1)).

⁸⁹ *Id.* en arts. 3, 4(1).

⁹⁰ *Id.* en art 4(3).

⁹¹ Véase *See, id.* en arts. 4(8), (9), (13), 14(3).

⁹² CMNUCC, Diálogo técnico del primer balance mundial: Informe de síntesis de los cofacilitadores del diálogo técnico (8 de septiembre de 2023) en 11, FCCC/SB/2023/9 (8 de septiembre, 2023).

PNUMA, publicado el 20 de noviembre de 2023, estima que la sumatoria de las actuales Contribuciones Determinadas a Nivel Nacional no condicionadas sitúa al planeta en una trayectoria de calentamiento de 2,9 °C suponiendo que todas las contribuciones se apliquen en su totalidad, y de 2,5°C si las contribuciones condicionadas se financian y se aplican en su totalidad⁹³. En otras palabras, es seguro que los planes actuales de los Estados provocarán violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos.

- 46 El Acuerdo de París es un “marco vivo y de aprendizaje... [que] tiene que completarse bajo este paraguas general mediante mecanismos adecuados, continuando el fortalecimiento de los ya existentes, como las enmiendas al Protocolo de Montreal, la Organización Marítima Internacional, el Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera y los capítulos sobre el clima de las distintas cumbres; y otros nuevos, como los acuerdos sobre el metano o los tratados sobre la protección de los bosques o los océanos”⁹⁴. El Protocolo de Montreal de 1987 relativo a las Sustancias que Agotan la Capa de Ozono ha hecho más por evitar el calentamiento climático que cualquier otro acuerdo multilateral, (como se describe en ¶ 80 *infra*), y va camino a evitar un calentamiento de 2,5°C para finales de siglo⁹⁵.
- 47 Esta Corte debería aclarar que las obligaciones vinculantes de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos no se limitan y van más allá del cumplimiento de informar su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional en virtud del Acuerdo de París, y más allá de los compromisos nacionales cuando estos compromisos sean insuficientes para proteger el clima y los derechos humanos. El alcance de las obligaciones de derechos humanos debe determinarse a la luz de la mejor información científica disponible en materia climática para abordar el daño real e inminente causado por la emergencia climática.

⁹³ PNUMA, [Informe sobre la Brecha de Emisiones](#) (noviembre de 2023) en 30.

⁹⁴ Comisión Mundial para la Reducción de los Riesgos Climáticos por Rebasamiento (en inglés, Climate Overshoot Commission), [Reducing the Risks of Climate Overshoot](https://www.overshootcommission.org/_files/ugd/0c3b70_bab3b3c1cd394745b387a594c9a68e2b.pdf) (septiembre de 2023), en xv, 31. https://www.overshootcommission.org/_files/ugd/0c3b70_bab3b3c1cd394745b387a594c9a68e2b.pdf.

⁹⁵ Velders G. J. M., Andersen S. O., Daniel J. S., Fahey D. W. & McFarland M. (2007) [The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate](#), PROC. NAT'L. A-CAD. SCI. 104(12): 4814–4819, 4814; Young P. J., Harper A. B., Huntingford C., Paul N. D., Morgenstern O., Newman P. A., Oman L. D., Madronich S. & Garcia R. R.; [The Montreal Protocol protects the terrestrial carbon sink](#), NATURE 596: 384–388, 384 (2021).

F EL DERECHO HUMANO A LA RESILIENCIA EN LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA

48 Abordar la Pregunta A requiere que la Corte aclare el alcance de los derechos humanos afectados por la emergencia climática, y que especifique las obligaciones de los Estados de proteger y garantizar estos derechos. Tal como reconoce esta Corte, los tratados de derechos humanos son “instrumentos vivos” que deben “acompañar la evolución de los tiempos y las condiciones de vida actuales”⁹⁶. El IGSD sostiene respetuosamente que la naturaleza y las causas de la emergencia climática y el daño que representa para la humanidad justifican una interpretación evolutiva para reconocer el derecho humano a la resiliencia como un derecho autónomo o, alternativamente, como un derivado del derecho a la vida en virtud del artículo 4 de la Convención Americana.

F.1 La Necesidad de Resiliencia para Mitigar, Adaptarse y Desarrollar y Proteger los Derechos de Manera Sostenible

49 Para que todos los Estados respeten y garanticen los derechos humanos y protejan las condiciones de una vida digna a corto y largo plazo frente a los daños climáticos, todos los individuos y grupos necesitan “resiliencia”. Según la definición del Grupo de Desarrollo Sostenible de las Naciones Unidas, y a efectos de estas observaciones, la “resiliencia” es la capacidad que tienen los individuos, las comunidades, las sociedades y los sistemas para “prevenir, resistir, absorber, adaptarse, responder y recuperarse de forma positiva, eficiente y eficaz cuando se enfrentan a una amplia gama de riesgos, manteniendo un nivel aceptable de funcionamiento sin comprometer las perspectivas a largo plazo de desarrollo sostenible, paz y seguridad, derechos humanos y bienestar para todos”⁹⁷. En el IE6, el IPCC utiliza una definición muy similar, señalando que la resiliencia en el contexto del cambio climático describe no sólo la capacidad de mantener una función o identidad esencial, sino de tener capacidad de

⁹⁶ El Derecho a la Información sobre la Asistencia Consular en el Marco de las Garantías del Debido Proceso Legal, Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, CtIDH (ser. A) ¶ 114 (1 de octubre, 1999), y *Caso Hernández Vs. Arg.* Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia, CtIDH. (Serie C) No. 395 ¶ 67 (22 de noviembre, 2019).

⁹⁷ Grupo de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Sostenible, [Directrices Comunes de las Naciones Unidas para Contribuir a la Creación de Sociedades Resilientes](#) (2021) en 3. Véase también, IPCC, 2022: *Resumen para Responsables de Políticas* y Oficina de las Naciones Unidas para la Reducción del Riesgo de Desastres, UNISDR Terminología sobre Reducción del Riesgo de Desastres (2009).

transformación⁹⁸. Dada la magnitud de la emergencia, el IPCC señala que las acciones climáticas eficaces aumentan la resiliencia y hacen posibles las transformaciones necesarias para proteger la salud humana, el bienestar y los resultados económicos y sociales⁹⁹. El IPCC se refiere al “desarrollo resiliente al clima” como el proceso de aplicar simultáneamente la mitigación del cambio climático y la adaptación al mismo, en combinación con el desarrollo sostenible para todos¹⁰⁰. La necesidad de que los Estados adopten y apliquen políticas coherentes con el “desarrollo resiliente al clima” también ha sido destacada por la Comisión Interamericana como una dimensión del enfoque basado en derechos que debería ser la columna vertebral de la acción de mitigación y adaptación al clima de los Estados¹⁰¹.

- 50 Estos atributos fundamentales de la “resiliencia” en el contexto del derecho de los derechos humanos deben reforzarse y protegerse a nivel individual y colectivo para abordar eficazmente el cambio climático a través de medidas tanto de mitigación como de adaptación y para proteger los derechos humanos de todos. Los objetivos de mitigación y adaptación y de protección de los derechos humanos están irrevocablemente entrelazados.

G EL ALCANCE Y CONTENIDO DEL DERECHO HUMANO A LA RESILIENCIA

- 51 En consonancia con los principios interpretativos del Artículo 29, el IGSD sostiene respetuosamente que el derecho humano a la resiliencia es, por lo tanto, el marco normativo adecuado para interpretar las obligaciones básicas de derechos humanos de los Estados para hacer frente a esta emergencia¹⁰². Dentro de este marco, la Corte puede interpretar este derecho como un derecho autónomo o, alternatively, como uno derivado del derecho a la vida en el Artículo 4 de la Convención.

⁹⁸ IPCC, 2022 IE6 GTII: *Resumen para Responsables de Políticas*, en 7 nota al pie 12.

⁹⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰⁰ IPCC 2022, IE6 GTII, *Resumen para Responsables de Políticas*, y CMNUCC, [Climate Action Pathway: Climate Resilience](#) (2020), en 2.

¹⁰¹ CIDH, Emergencia Climática: Alcance de las Obligaciones Interamericanas en materia de Derechos Humanos (Resolución 3/2021), párrafo 1, 56.

¹⁰² El Derecho a la Información sobre la Asistencia Consular en el Marco de las Garantías del Debido Proceso Legal, Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, CtIDH (ser. A) ¶ 114 (1 de octubre, 1999), y *Hernández vs. Arg.*, Objeciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 395 ¶ 67 (22 de noviembre, 2019).

- 52 Desde su creación, esta Corte ha liderado el avance del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos adoptando un enfoque evolutivo coherente con la progresión del derecho internacional. Cuando nuevos contextos han creado nuevas amenazas reales e inminentes a los derechos humanos, esta Corte ha respondido, incluso reconociendo otros derechos y garantías que son inherentes a los seres humanos, tal como lo estipula el Art. 29 de la Convención. La emergencia climática es el nuevo contexto, y el reconocimiento del derecho humano a la resiliencia constituye una respuesta adecuada.
- 53 El reconocimiento por parte de la Corte de lo que ahora se conoce como “el derecho a la verdad” en su primer caso contencioso en 1988, en *Velásquez Rodríguez*, constituye un caso ejemplar del enfoque evolutivo¹⁰³. La Corte ha continuado aclarando el contenido del derecho a la verdad en diversos contextos, predominantemente para abordar las atroces y complejas consecuencias de la práctica de la desaparición forzada sobre los derechos humanos¹⁰⁴. Esta jurisprudencia demuestra una apreciación matizada de las formas en que el derecho a la verdad se conecta con muchos otros derechos humanos expresamente consagrados en la Convención Americana. Actualmente, el derecho a la verdad ha sido reconocido por varios instrumentos de las Naciones Unidas, así como por la Asamblea General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos¹⁰⁵. En el caso *Gomes Lund y otros vs. Brasil*, la Corte declaró expresamente que el derecho a la verdad era un derecho autónomo que se entrecruzaba con los demás derechos a los que estaba vinculado, pero que no quedaba subsumido en ellos¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰³ Caso *Velásquez Rodríguez vs. Honduras*, Fondo, Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 4 (29 de julio, 1988).

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* En ¶ 181; Caso *Rochac Hernández y Otros*, Fondo, Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 285 (2014); Caso *Rodriguez Vera y Otros*, Fondo, Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 287, ¶ 140 (2014); Caso *Gomes Lund y Otros* (Fondo, Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 219, ¶¶ 110, 111 (2010); Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos: Estudio sobre el Derecho a la Verdad E/CN.4/2006/91 (2006).

¹⁰⁵ Naciones Unidas, Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, Estudio sobre el Derecho a la Verdad, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (2006); Organización de los Estados Americanos, Asamblea General, Resoluciones: AG/RES. 2175 (XXXVI-O/06) (2006), GA/RES. 2267 (XXXVII-O/07) (2007); GA/RES. 2406 (XXXVIII-O/08) (2008); GA/RES. 2509 (XXXIX-O/09) (2009), and GA/RES. 2595 (XL-O/10) (2010), AG/RES. 2662 (XLI-O/11) (2011), AG/RES. 2725 (XLII-O/12) (2012), AG/RES. 2800 (XLIII-O/13) (2013), GA/RES. 2822 (XLIV-O/14) (2014).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Caso *Gomes Lund y otros vs. Brasil*. Objeciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 4 de November, 2010. Series C No. 219, párrafos 200 and 201 (24 de noviembre, 2010). En otros casos, la Corte ha indicado que el derecho a la verdad se encuentra subsumido en los Artículos 1(1), 8(1), 25 y, en algunos casos, en el Artículo 13 de la Convención Americana: véase Caso *Gelman vs. Uruguay*, párrafo 243 (24 de febrero, 2011), Caso de las Masacres de El Mozote y Lugares Aledaños vs. El Salvador. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 25 de octubre, 2012. Series C No. 252, párrafo 298 (25 de octubre, 2012); a efectos similares, véase

- 54 La jurisprudencia de la Corte sobre el derecho a la identidad y el derecho conexo a la rectificación de los registros públicos sigue un camino similar. En la *Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17*, la Corte reconoció que si bien la Convención Americana no se refiere específicamente al derecho a la identidad, ésta incluye otros derechos que forman parte de sus componentes¹⁰⁷. Además, el derecho a la identidad no puede reducirse, confundirse, ni estar subordinado a uno u otro de los derechos que incluye, ni a la sumatoria de los mismos¹⁰⁸. La Corte llegó a esta conclusión porque apreció que el derecho a la identidad posee un valor instrumental para el ejercicio de determinados derechos civiles, políticos, económicos, sociales y culturales. De ello se dedujo que constituye un medio instrumental para el reconocimiento de este derecho y, en consecuencia, para permitir el ejercicio de otros derechos y libertades fundamentales en una sociedad democrática¹⁰⁹. Tras esta decisión histórica, el Estado, como garante de todos los derechos, debe por lo tanto respetar y garantizar la coexistencia de personas con identidades, expresiones de género y orientaciones sexuales diversas, incluso adoptando medidas que permitan el ejercicio del “derecho de rectificación” de los registros públicos¹¹⁰.
- 55 La magnitud del daño real e inminente que plantea el cambio climático para los derechos humanos reconocidos por el sistema interamericano requiere un enfoque evolutivo para reconocer el derecho humano a la resiliencia como un derecho autónomo derivado de la obligación general de respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos (Artículo 1(1)), los derechos sustantivos más afectados por el daño climático y los derechos de procedimiento necesarios para apoyar una acción eficaz¹¹¹.
- 56 El derecho humano a la resiliencia está estrechamente relacionado con los derechos sustantivos consagrados en el sistema interamericano y reconocidos por el derecho internacional como gravemente afectados por la emergencia climática: el derecho a la

el Caso Trujillo Oroza vs. Bolivia. Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia (27 de febrero, 2002). Series C No. 92, párrafo 114, y el Caso Omeara Carrascal y otros vs. Colombia, párrafo 256. (21 de noviembre, 2018).

¹⁰⁷ Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17.

¹⁰⁸ *Id. en* ¶ 90.

¹⁰⁹ *Id. en* ¶ 99.

¹¹⁰ *Id. en* ¶¶ 100, 115, 116.

¹¹¹ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 en ¶ 64

vida¹¹², el derecho a la integridad personal¹¹³, a la salud¹¹⁴, a la alimentación¹¹⁵, al agua¹¹⁶ y el derecho a un medio ambiente sano¹¹⁷. Además, el derecho humano a la resiliencia refuerza los derechos de procedimiento fundamentales para garantizar una acción climática eficaz: el derecho a la libertad de expresión y asociación, a la información, a la participación en la toma de decisiones y a un recurso efectivo¹¹⁸. En pocas palabras, en el contexto de la emergencia climática, el derecho humano a la resiliencia refuerza la obligación general de los Estados de respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos en virtud del artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana.

- 57 El derecho humano a la resiliencia no es sólo la sumatoria de sus respectivas partes, sino que debe considerarse adecuadamente como un derecho autónomo que protege y fortalece los elementos de cada uno de estos otros derechos sustantivos y de procedimiento en el contexto único de la emergencia climática¹¹⁹. Este enfoque también reconoce que no todos los derechos se verán implicados en todos los casos pero ofrece un paraguas para que los jueces adjudiquen violaciones de derechos humanos en los casos climáticos.

¹¹² Organización de los Estados Americanos, Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, 22 de noviembre, 1969 (entrada en vigor, 18 de julio, 1978), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, Artículo 4 (en adelante, “Convención Americana”). Véase Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 en ¶ 67; Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observación General 26: Artículo 6: Derecho a la Vida, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 de septiembre, 2019).

¹¹³ Convención Americana art. 5(1); Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, en ¶ 67.

¹¹⁴ Organización de los Estados Americanos, Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, “Protocolo de San Salvador”, Artículo 10

¹¹⁵ Protocolo de San Salvador, Art. 12.

¹¹⁶ Convención Americana Art. 26. Véase *Lhaka Honhat* en ¶ 228.

¹¹⁷ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 en ¶ 67.

¹¹⁸ Convención Americana, Arts. 8, 13(1) y 25. Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17.

¹¹⁹ Opinión Consultiva OC-24/17. Véase, Eduardo Ferrer-Mac-Gregor [THE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH AS AN AUTONOMOUS RIGHT UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM](#) 9 Mexican L. Rev. 121 (2016).

- 58 Además, como derecho autónomo, el derecho humano a la resiliencia está en consonancia con el creciente reconocimiento internacional¹²⁰, regional¹²¹ y nacional¹²² de las relaciones que existen entre la mitigación eficaz del cambio climático, la adaptación y el desarrollo sostenible para todos. Esto está en armonía con el reconocimiento de larga data por parte de la comunidad internacional de las transformaciones ambientales, sociales y económicas necesarias para lograr el desarrollo sostenible para las generaciones presentes y futuras en todas partes del mundo¹²³. Los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) de las Naciones Unidas son un compromiso mundial para alcanzar estos objetivos de aquí a 2030, incluyendo expresamente el fortalecimiento de la resiliencia y la capacidad de adaptación de todas las comunidades para hacer frente a los daños climáticos¹²⁴. En el núcleo de los ODS se encuentra también la reafirmación de las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos: el reconocimiento de que la Agenda 2030 no puede alcanzarse sin el cumplimiento por parte de los Estados de sus obligaciones de respetar los derechos humanos y se centren en los más vulnerables y los más rezagados¹²⁵.
- 59 A la luz de estas consideraciones, el IGSD sostiene respetuosamente que esta Corte, a través de su Opinión Consultiva, reconozca el derecho humano a la resiliencia como un derecho humano

¹²⁰ Véase por ej., Acuerdo de París, Arts. 2 y 7(1); Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, Observación No 36: Artículo 6: Derecho a la Vida, ¶ 62; Comité de Derechos Humanos. Daniel Billy y otros vs. Australia No. 3624/2019, 21 de julio de 2022, ¶ 8.3; Comité de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas. Ioane Teitiota vs. Nueva Zelanda CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, 7 de enero de 2020, ¶ 8.4.

¹²¹ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, CtIDH, ¶ 52.

¹²² PSB y otros vs. Brasil S.T.F.J., DJe n° 194/2022 ADPF/708, Relator: Min. Roberto Barroso, 04.07.2022, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.], 28.09.2022, 43 (Brasil) pág. 6; Sentencia de la Decisión Atrato River T-622/16 (Caso Atrato River), Corte Constitucional Colombia (2016), ¶ 5.2.

¹²³ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, en ¶¶ 52–54; Declaración de Río sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo. Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo, Río de Janeiro, 3 al 14 de junio, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Principios 1 y 4; Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, Resolución 70/1 intitulada “Transformar nuestro mundo: la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible”, 25 de septiembre, 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, preámbulo y párrafos 3, 8, 9, 10, 33, 35 y 67.

¹²⁴ Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, Resolución adoptada por la Asamblea General el 25 de septiembre de 2015, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/1 (2015). Véase por ej., ODS No 11: “Lograr que las ciudades sean más inclusivas, seguras, resilientes y sostenibles y ODS No 13 “Adoptar medidas urgentes para combatir el cambio climático y sus efectos”, al comprometerse con el objetivo 13.1 Fortalecer la resiliencia y la capacidad de adaptación a los riesgos relacionados con el clima y los desastres naturales en todos los países.

¹²⁵ Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, Resolución adoptada por la Asamblea General el 25 de septiembre de 2015, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/1, párrafos 19, 20, 35, 74 (2015).

autónomo singularmente apropiado para abordar el daño a las personas y los pueblos causado por la emergencia climática.

- 60 Alternativamente, el IGSD sostiene respetuosamente que el derecho humano a la resiliencia puede entenderse como un derivado del derecho a la vida. Como ha reconocido esta Corte, el Artículo 4 de la Convención Americana no comprende sólo el derecho de todo ser humano de no ser privado arbitrariamente de la vida sino también el derecho a que no se le impida el acceso a las condiciones que le garanticen una existencia digna¹²⁶. En consecuencia, las afectaciones del derecho a la salud, a la alimentación y el acceso al agua limpia impactan de manera aguda el derecho a una existencia digna y las condiciones básicas para el ejercicio de otros derechos humanos¹²⁷. Además, la Corte ha desarrollado sistemáticamente obligaciones positivas para la protección individual y colectiva del derecho a la vida desde sus primeros casos emblemáticos y ha vinculado un conjunto de obligaciones de diligencia debida al ámbito del derecho a la vida.
- 61 En la *Opinión Consultiva sobre Medio Ambiente y Derechos Humanos*, la Corte reconoció que el derecho a la vida y a la integridad personal (entre otros), los cuales se encuentran estrechamente relacionados, son especialmente vulnerables al cambio climático, y que la afectación a estos derechos puede darse con mayor intensidad en determinados grupos en situación de vulnerabilidad¹²⁸. Este reconocimiento se alinea con la posterior observación general del Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas de que el cambio climático, junto con la degradación del medio ambiente y el desarrollo insostenible “son algunas de las amenazas más acuciantes y graves a la capacidad de las generaciones presentes y futuras de disfrutar del derecho a la vida”¹²⁹.
- 62 La Corte ya ha especificado varias obligaciones de los Estados de respetar y garantizar el derecho a la vida en el contexto de la degradación del medio ambiente¹³⁰. Aplicando la debida diligencia¹³¹, los Estados deben garantizar que ninguna persona sea privada de su vida

¹²⁶ Caso Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa vs. Paraguay, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, Sentencia, Series C No. 125, ¶¶ 161, 167 (17 de junio, 2005).

¹²⁷ *Id.*

¹²⁸ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, en ¶¶ 66–67

¹²⁹ Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, Observación General No. 36, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018) en ¶ 62.

¹³⁰ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, en ¶¶ 123–145.

¹³¹ *Id.* en ¶ 123.

arbitrariamente (obligación negativa). Esto incluye abstenerse de (i) cualquier práctica o actividad que deniegue o restrinja el acceso, en condiciones de igualdad, a los requisitos para una vida digna (como agua y alimentos adecuados), y de (ii) contaminar ilícitamente el medio ambiente de forma que se afecte las condiciones que permiten la vida digna de las personas¹³². Los Estados también deben adoptar todas las medidas apropiadas para proteger y preservar el derecho a la vida (obligación positiva)¹³³. Esta obligación positiva se proyecta más allá de las acciones directas de los Estados, e incluye la adopción de dichas medidas para prevenir, en la esfera privada, que terceros vulneren los derechos protegidos en el ámbito privado¹³⁴. Además, los Estados deben adoptar las medidas necesarias para crear un marco normativo adecuado que disuada cualquier amenaza al derecho a la vida, salvaguardar el derecho a que no se impida el acceso a las condiciones que garanticen una vida digna¹³⁵.

- 63 Estas obligaciones siguen siendo esenciales para respetar y garantizar el derecho a la vida, en virtud del artículo 4, en el contexto de la emergencia climática pero, por sí solas, no están suficientemente diseñadas para garantizar que los Estados adopten medidas eficaces para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C y evitar daños reales e inminentes al derecho a la vida. La interpretación tradicional de este derecho deja la vida de millones de personas —especialmente las más vulnerables— insuficientemente protegida.

G.1 Obligaciones de los Estados de Proteger y Garantizar el Derecho Humano a la Resiliencia

- 64 La Corte debería reconocer el derecho humano a la resiliencia como un derecho autónomo o como una manifestación del derecho a la vida y, al hacerlo, aclarar las siguientes obligaciones vinculantes específicas de los Estados para proteger y garantizar este derecho.

64.1 *En primer lugar*, una obligación de mitigación para limitar los riesgos climáticos a niveles manejables que, de otro modo, tornarían inútiles la adaptación y la resiliencia mediante la adopción de todas las medidas eficaces necesarias para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento lo más rápidamente posible, en consonancia con una trayectoria para permanecer por debajo

¹³² *Id.* en ¶ 117.

¹³³ *Id.* en ¶ 108.

¹³⁴ *Id.* en ¶ 118.

¹³⁵ *Id.* en ¶ 69.

de 1,5°C. La mejor información científica disponible muestra que esto requiere medidas para reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos en los próximos 10–15 años; facilitar la eliminación natural de CO₂ mediante la protección y restauración de los bosques y de otros sumideros de carbono; y descarbonizar rápidamente los sistemas energéticos para lograr emisiones netas iguales a cero de aquí a 2050 o antes (véase [Sección D](#)).

64.2 *En segundo lugar*, una obligación de adaptación para garantizar los medios para reducir la vulnerabilidad mediante la adopción de todas las medidas apropiadas y necesarias para reforzar la resiliencia de los grupos vulnerables de la sociedad.

G.1.1 Limitar el Riesgo Climático a Niveles Manejables para Mantenerse por Debajo de 1,5°C y Frenar el Ritmo de Calentamiento a Corto Plazo

65 La obligación de mitigación requiere que los Estados adopten medidas coherentes con la mejor información científica y tecnológica disponibles para seguir trayectorias plausibles que permitan mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C a corto plazo. Este enfoque está respaldado por principios reconocidos, tales como el principio de precaución, el principio *pro homine* y la norma de no causar daño. Las tres estrategias necesarias para lograrlo (la reducción rápida de los supercontaminantes climáticos, la protección y restauración inmediatas de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono y la rápida descarbonización) se describen en ¶ 31.

66 Para cumplir con la obligación de mitigación general de respetar y garantizar el derecho humano a la resiliencia en el contexto de la emergencia climática, los Estados deben, por lo tanto, cumplir con una serie de obligaciones positivas y negativas.

66.1 *En primer lugar*, la obligación de prevención requiere que los Estados, a través de sus agentes estatales, adopten todas aquellas medidas de carácter jurídico, político, administrativo y cultural que promuevan la salvaguarda de este derecho humano¹³⁶. La prevención debe ser la principal política de los Estados dado que muchos tipos de daños y perjuicios derivados del cambio climático serán irreparables¹³⁷.

¹³⁶ *Id.* en ¶ 118.

¹³⁷ *Id.* en ¶ 130.

- 66.2 *En segundo lugar*, como parte de la obligación de prevención, el deber de regular requiere que los Estados consideren periódicamente la mejor información científica disponible sobre el alto riesgo de seguir emitiendo CO₂ y supercontaminantes climáticos y de seguir destruyendo bosques y otros sumideros, y que adopten medidas positivas para regular las actividades de las partes no estatales a fin de reducir el riesgo¹³⁸.
- 66.3 *En tercer lugar*, como parte de la obligación de prevención, el deber de supervisar y fiscalizar requiere que los Estados establezcan mecanismos adecuados para supervisar y monitorear las actividades que impidan la violación del derecho humano a la resiliencia¹³⁹. Este deber de supervisar va más allá de la vigilancia del cumplimiento de las leyes y normas relativas a la protección del medio ambiente y requiere que los Estados vigilen de cerca las actividades de las partes no estatales que frustran los esfuerzos de mitigación y/o exacerban el cambio climático.
- 66.4 En cuarto lugar, como parte de la obligación de prevención, los Estados deben incorporar de forma periódica y activa la mejor información científica disponible al momento de considerar los estudios de impacto ambiental¹⁴⁰. Además, estos estudios deben considerar expresamente los daños significativos e irreversibles para los derechos humanos y los ecosistemas más allá de 1,5°C de calentamiento.
- 66.5 *En quinto lugar*, los Estados deben adoptar medidas positivas para garantizar el derecho humano a la resiliencia que permitan a los particulares a ejercer plenamente sus derechos humanos de procedimiento¹⁴¹. Esto requiere que los Estados recopilen y distribuyan ampliamente información sobre los daños climáticos y las trayectorias plausibles para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C (y evitar un sobrepaso limitado), basándose en la mejor información científica disponible. Esta información no se limita a, pero debe incluir:

¹³⁸ Esta obligación deriva de las obligaciones existentes como parte del deber de regular las actividades que puedan causar un daño significativo al medio ambiente: *Id.* en ¶ 147, 149.

¹³⁹ *Id.* en 152.

¹⁴⁰ Tal consideración constituye una aplicación específica de la lista de consideraciones que deben abordar los estudios de impacto ambiental de los Estados ya aclarada por la Corte. Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17, *Id.* en ¶ 156–170.

¹⁴¹ *Id.* en ¶ 121.

- (a) impactos climáticos diferenciados para individuos, comunidades y ecosistemas (incluidos los impactos climáticos previstos a 1,5°C y más allá);
- (b) la necesidad y las medidas requeridas para mitigar rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos;
- (c) la necesidad y las medidas requeridas para proteger y restaurar los bosques y otros sumideros de carbono; y
- (d) la necesidad y las medidas requeridas para descarbonizar rápidamente.

67 Cuando los Estados cumplan con las obligaciones anteriores, también deben, por supuesto, en el proceso respetar y garantizar otros derechos humanos consagrados en la Convención Americana y protocolos asociados¹⁴².

68 El IGSD sostiene respetuosamente que las medidas clave para aplicar las estrategias de mitigación rápida para la urgente reducción de los supercontaminantes climáticos y la protección y restauración de los bosques y de otros sumideros de carbono (descriptas en ¶ 31) deben incluir:

68.1 Reformar la legislación y las políticas existentes y/o adoptar nuevas leyes y políticas para avanzar en la mitigación rápida del cambio climático y proteger y restaurar los bosques y otros sumideros de carbono. Lógicamente, la obligación de los Estados incluye que se desplieguen estas medidas con la celeridad y la escala necesarias para abordar la emergencia climática.

68.2 Estas reformas deben incluir, como mínimo, la eliminación de las subvenciones a los combustibles fósiles; la reducción del metano en los sectores de la energía, los residuos y la agricultura; la imposición de una moratoria sobre los proyectos que fomenten la deforestación y la degradación en la Amazonia; y la adopción de otras medidas eficaces para proteger otros sumideros de carbono fundamentales en la región (incluidos, entre otros, otros bosques tropicales, el Chaco Americano, los Páramos y los Bosques Boreales). Las reformas deben priorizar la aplicación y ejecución de políticas que regulen, supervisen y/o monitoreen efectivamente las actividades de terceros que exacerben la emergencia

¹⁴² *Id.* en ¶ 125.

climática al no mitigar las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero, incluyendo los supercontaminantes climáticos;

- 68.3 Adoptar y/o actualizar planes de acción nacionales para la rápida reducción de los supercontaminantes climáticos que sean ambiciosos, centrados en la ciencia y comprometidos con la aplicación de medidas coherentes con el límite de seguridad de 1,5°C del Acuerdo de París. Tales planes deberían, como mínimo, incluir medidas para regular las emisiones de metano; reducir conjuntamente las emisiones de HFC y mejorar la eficiencia energética de los equipos de refrigeración; y establecer objetivos basados en la ciencia;
- 68.4 Reforzar la comprensión por parte de las instituciones nacionales sobre los efectos de los supercontaminantes en la calidad del aire y el cambio climático, incluida la capacitación de funcionarios públicos;
- 68.5 Fortalecer y aplicar (i) las directrices sobre la calidad del aire ambiente para incluir el ozono troposférico y el carbono negro y (ii) las normas sobre emisiones de vehículos según la mejor tecnología disponible más reciente;
- 68.6 Adoptar y/o actualizar planes de acción nacionales de refrigeración, centrándose en la integración de medidas de eficiencia energética para equipos de refrigeración en las estrategias de eliminación gradual de HFC de los Estados;
- 68.7 Incentivar (i) la adopción de programas de detección y reparación de fugas de metano en el sector del petróleo y el gas; (ii) la reducción de la quema de residuos a cielo abierto y la mejora de la infraestructura para la separación de residuos; (iii) la adopción de normas de eficiencia energética para los equipos de refrigeración;
- 68.8 Cuantificar las reducciones de las emisiones de supercontaminantes climáticos resultantes de la aplicación de regulaciones sobre contaminación atmosférica;
- 68.9 Cuantificar los costos ambientales y sanitarios derivados de la falta de acción a corto plazo para reducir los supercontaminantes climáticos, en particular los impactos en la salud de las poblaciones vulnerables, y hacer que dicha esta información se encuentre públicamente disponible;

- 68.10 Facilitar la financiación, la tecnología y los motores económicos para programas de mitigación rápida de los efectos climáticos, incluida la reducción de supercontaminantes climáticos;
- 68.11 Reconocer los derechos de la naturaleza en la legislación y/o constituciones¹⁴³;
- 68.12 Penalizar las infracciones de las leyes de protección de los sumideros de carbono y los residuos de metano en el sector del petróleo y el gas;
- 68.13 Prohibir la bioenergía forestal y categorizar la bioenergía forestal con captura y almacenamiento de carbono como renovable;
- 68.14 Aplicar prácticas regenerativas de uso de la tierra para minimizar las emisiones provenientes del uso de la tierra y la destrucción y la degradación de los sumideros naturales de carbono; e
- 68.15 Incorporar estrategias de gestión de las tierras de los pueblos indígenas dentro de las medidas para restaurar y proteger los sumideros naturales de carbono.

G.1.2 Reducir la Vulnerabilidad Aumentando la Resiliencia de los Grupos

- 69 La adopción de medidas por parte de los Estados para fortalecer la resiliencia de los grupos vulnerables, que enfrentan impactos devastadores y diferenciados de la emergencia climática en virtud de su ubicación geográfica y otras características, resulta igualmente importante para garantizar el derecho humano a la resiliencia. Entre estos grupos se encuentran las poblaciones costeras y los habitantes de las islas, los pueblos indígenas, las comunidades afrodescendientes,

¹⁴³ Las demandas entabladas en el marco de los derechos de la naturaleza confieren personería jurídica a los elementos de la naturaleza. Este otorgamiento de personería jurídica permite la defensa y preservación de la naturaleza en procedimientos judiciales en beneficio tanto de la humanidad como del mundo natural. Entre los principales casos de derechos de la naturaleza se incluyen: Generaciones Futuras vs. el Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Otros, Corte Suprema de Justicia de Colombia, sentencia del 5 de abril de 2018 (11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01); Sentencia T-622/16 (Caso Atrato River), Corte Constitucional de Colombia (2016); Corte Constitucional de Ecuador, Caso N° 22-18-IN (2021) (en defensa de la protección de los manglares); Corte Constitucional de Ecuador, Caso N° 22-18-IN (2021) Ecuador, CASO No. 1149-19-JP/20 (2021) (en defensa de la protección del bosque Los Cedros); Sentencia, Corte Provincial de Justicia de Loja, (2011) Caso NO. 11121-2011-0010 (protegiendo el curso natural del Río Vilcabama). Véase también Constitución de Ecuador, Art. 71.

las comunidades rurales, los jóvenes, los ancianos, las personas con discapacidad, los defensores del medio ambiente y las mujeres¹⁴⁴.

70 Para garantizar que los Estados cumplan con el deber de promover la igualdad y la no discriminación, junto con las obligaciones contenidas en los artículos 1.1 y 2 de la Convención Americana, deben adoptar un enfoque diferenciado que priorice las medidas destinadas a reducir las vulnerabilidades intensificadas por la emergencia climática¹⁴⁵. Resulta importante destacar que muchas medidas de mitigación también pueden reducir la vulnerabilidad. Como parte de esta obligación de garantizar el derecho humano a la resiliencia los Estados deben:

70.1 Evaluar las medidas que ofrecen resultados en ambos frentes —adaptación y mitigación— y priorizar su despliegue a escala en las comunidades vulnerables;

70.2 Priorizar la inversión en medidas que disminuyan los riesgos de los impactos climáticos en las comunidades más vulnerables; y

70.3 Definir y aplicar un conjunto de medidas concretas orientadas a superar la discriminación estructural e interseccional, a través de la creación de empleo local y facilitar el acceso a las mejores tecnologías disponibles¹⁴⁶.

71 A continuación se presenta una lista no exhaustiva de medidas que los Estados deberían adoptar en consonancia con este enfoque y con la obligación de reducir la vulnerabilidad reforzando la resiliencia.

71.1 Conducir análisis periódicos para identificar las necesidades de los grupos vulnerables y los riesgos derivados de los impactos climáticos previstos.

71.2 Garantizar que todas las políticas y programas de mitigación y adaptación al cambio climático incluyan medidas que garanticen la no discriminación y que tengan en cuenta de

¹⁴⁴ Véase Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Emergencia Climática, Alcance y Obligaciones Interamericanas de Derechos Humanos, Resolución 3/2021, 31 de diciembre, 2021. Estos grupos se encuentran identificados en la solicitud de opinión consultiva presentada por Chile y Colombia y los aspectos de las obligaciones específicas de los Estados con respecto a estos grupos son objeto de las Preguntas B, C y E de la solicitud.

¹⁴⁵ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 en ¶ 67.

¹⁴⁶ Opinión Consultiva OC-29/22 en ¶ 68.

forma positiva las necesidades de los grupos vulnerables, y que estas medidas cuenten con la financiación adecuada.

- 71.3 Eliminar los obstáculos para el acceso a la justicia ambiental y climática de los grupos vulnerables.
- 71.4 Adoptar medidas para eliminar los obstáculos a la participación pública en las políticas ambientales y climáticas.
- 71.5 Exigir que los programas de capacitación sobre cambio climático para funcionarios públicos aborden las formas en que el cambio climático afecta a los grupos vulnerables.
- 71.6 Exigir que las reformas de la legislación y las políticas climáticas se traduzcan a las lenguas indígenas pertinentes y se pongan a disposición del público de forma gratuita para fomentar una mayor participación pública de los grupos vulnerables.

G.1.3 La Obligación de Diligencia Debida en el Contexto del Derecho Humano a la Resiliencia

- 72 Respetar y garantizar el derecho humano a la resiliencia exige que los Estados apliquen una norma de diligencia debida y el deber de diligencia. La diligencia debida para abordar la emergencia climática requiere de un vínculo necesario con la mejor información científica disponible. En otras palabras, un Estado actúa con la debida diligencia si adopta todas las medidas necesarias, de conformidad con la información científica en materia climática, para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento ahora, y permanecer por debajo de 1,5°C. Por lo tanto, el contenido específico de la diligencia debida está dictado por la mejor información científica disponible y variaría, en cierto grado, en función de cada caso y con el paso del tiempo porque las medidas que “en su día pudieron considerarse suficientemente diligentes en un momento dado pueden dejar de serlo a la luz, por ejemplo, de los nuevos conocimientos científicos y tecnológicos” o teniendo en cuenta “los riesgos que entraña la actividad”¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴⁷ Responsabilidades y Obligaciones de los Estados con Respecto a las Actividades en la Zona, (Solicitud de Opinión Consultiva presentada a la Sala de Controversias de los Fondos Marinos) No. 17, Opinión Consultiva, 1 de febrero de 2011, Informes ITLOS 2011, 10 ¶ 117. [La traducción de la cita nos pertenece].

- 73 Algunas de las obligaciones involucran a la comunidad de naciones, y otras a cada nación individualmente. Como demuestra el consenso científico, cada incremento del calentamiento aumenta el daño presente y encierra un daño futuro inminente para los derechos humanos. Es cierto que el grado de daño presente y futuro depende de la debida diligencia de los Estados para abordar la emergencia climática. A mayor diligencia, menor daño. Los Estados saben y han aceptado en el marco del IPCC que los impactos climáticos y el riesgo para los derechos humanos se intensifican al sobrepasar los puntos críticos de inflexión más allá de 1,5°C. Dado que sobrepasar 1,5°C supone violaciones masivas e irreversibles de los derechos humanos, es imperativo que el contenido de las obligaciones de diligencia debida de los Estados se configure en función de este conocimiento científico, y que las normas de conducta, tanto individuales como colectivas, se ajusten a la necesidad de mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C.
- 74 Al momento de este procedimiento, resulta evidente, a partir de las pruebas científicas y teniendo en cuenta los riesgos catastróficos implicados, que algunas acciones y omisiones del Estado incumplen la norma de diligencia debida porque agravan la emergencia climática y aumentan la posibilidad de que las temperaturas se incrementen por encima de 1,5°C. Algunos ejemplos son:
- 74.1 la concesión de subvenciones a entidades emisoras de combustibles fósiles, que incentiva económicamente a las empresas para que agraven aún más el cambio climático;
 - 74.2 el incumplimiento voluntario y deliberado de cualquier compromiso climático internacional, regional o nacional;
 - 74.3 la falta de diseño y aplicación de un plan para reducir el ritmo de calentamiento y mantenerlo por debajo de 1,5°C a corto plazo; y
 - 74.4 la falta de aplicación y cumplimiento de medidas eficaces para evitar la deforestación y la destrucción de los bosques y de otros sumideros de carbono.
- 75 Además, el derecho humano a la resiliencia incluye la obligación de adoptar medidas especiales efectivas y protectoras cuando las autoridades estatales sepan de la existencia de un riesgo real e inmediato para un individuo o grupo de individuos determinado¹⁴⁸. Tal como ha reconocido la

¹⁴⁸ *López Soto y otros vs. Venezuela*, Fondo, Reparación y Costas, Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 362, ¶ 140 (26 de septiembre, 2018).

Corte en repetidas ocasiones, junto con los Relatores Especiales de las Naciones Unidas y el Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, el cambio climático impone una carga desproporcionada a los grupos históricamente discriminados y a los grupos con relaciones más fuertes con los ecosistemas, especialmente los pueblos indígenas, las mujeres, los niños, los ancianos, los afrodescendientes, las personas que viven en la pobreza, las personas con discapacidad y las comunidades costeras y rurales¹⁴⁹. Por lo tanto, en el caso de estos grupos, los Estados deben cumplir con dichas obligaciones de conformidad con una norma reforzada de diligencia debida, que exige a los Estados aplicar todas las medidas necesarias y apropiadas de manera urgente y rápida¹⁵⁰.

H LA OBLIGACIÓN DE COOPERACIÓN PARA ABORDAR EFICAZMENTE LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA

- 76 La Corte ya ha reconocido que la obligación de cooperación de los Estados se deriva del principio de buena fe como parte esencial de gestionar y prevenir los riesgos de daños al medio ambiente¹⁵¹.
- 77 Este principio también se ve reflejado en el Artículo 4 de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático y en el Artículo 12 del Acuerdo de París. La obligación de cooperación tiene un significado especial en el contexto del cambio climático, dada la naturaleza colectiva del problema y que este no puede resolverse sin una acción internacional coordinada¹⁵². Además, la resiliencia de las personas y las comunidades al clima depende de la asignación adecuada y eficaz de recursos financieros y técnicos a través de los presupuestos

¹⁴⁹ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 en ¶ 67. Secretaría General de las Naciones Unidas, Nota con fecha del 15 de julio, 2019, [Informe del Relator Especial sobre la cuestión de las obligaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas con el disfrute de un medio ambiente sin riesgos, limpio, saludable y sostenible](#) (David Boyd) UN Doc A/74/161; Ian Fry, (Relator Especial sobre la promoción y la protección de los derechos humanos en el contexto del cambio climático), Informe Temático con fecha del 26 de julio, 2022 [Promoción y protección de los derechos humanos en el contexto del cambio climático](#), UN Doc A/77/226; y Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observación General 26: Artículo 6: Derecho a la Vida, ¶¶ 23, 24–26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 de septiembre, 2019).

¹⁵⁰ Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Emergencia Climática: Alcance y Obligaciones Interamericanas de Derechos Humanos, Res. No. 3/2021 (31 de diciembre, 2021) ¶ III.16.

¹⁵¹ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 en ¶ 184. Reflejado en el Artículo 26 de la Convención Americana y en los Artículos 1, 12 y 14 del Protocolo de San Salvador.

¹⁵² CMNUCC art. 2; Secretaría del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, [Informe del Relator Especial sobre la cuestión de las obligaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas con el disfrute de un medio ambiente sin riesgos, limpio, saludable y sostenible](#), ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (1 de febrero, 2016).

nacionales y regionales y de la cooperación internacional¹⁵³. Por lo tanto, aclarar el contenido de la obligación de cooperación en el contexto del cambio climático es fundamental para garantizar que todos los Estados hagan todo lo posible por respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos de una manera que esté en consonancia con los principios de la justicia climática¹⁵⁴.

78 Como parte de esta obligación general, el deber de cooperación de los Estados incluye una obligación colectiva de mitigación¹⁵⁵. El IGSD afirma que esta obligación exige que los Estados tomen todas las medidas razonables para participar de forma productiva en la cooperación internacional:

78.1 Para facilitar la asignación efectiva y adecuada de los recursos financieros y técnicos necesarios para aplicar una acción climática eficaz, de conformidad con la mejor información científica disponible; y

78.2 Para acordar y aplicar compromisos vinculantes para facilitar la financiación, la tecnología y los motores económicos para una rápida mitigación del cambio climático; reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos; y detener la destrucción y degradación de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono, todo ello mientras se descarboniza.

79 Tal como se explica en la Sección D, la reducción rápida de los supercontaminantes climáticos es una estrategia de mitigación rápida fundamental para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C a corto plazo (o para reducir el sobrepaso de ese límite de seguridad de aumento de la temperatura durante el menor tiempo posible y en la menor medida posible). Un pilar básico de esa estrategia de mitigación es la rápida reducción de las emisiones de metano—la palanca de control más

¹⁵³ Véase Comité de las Naciones Unidas para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer, Recomendación General No. 37 sobre las Dimensiones Relacionadas con el Género de la Reducción del Riesgo de Desastres en el Contexto del Cambio Climático, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/37, párrafo 45 (2018); Comité sobre los Derechos del Niño, Observaciones Finales sobre el Segundo Informe Periódico de Palau, UN Doc. CRC/C/PLW/CO/2, párrafo 49 (2018).

¹⁵⁴ Opinión Consultiva OC-23/17 en ¶¶ 127–174, 182; Juan Auz, Dos supuestos aliados: conciliar la justicia climática y los litigios en el Sur Global, *en* Litigating the Climate Emergency: How Human Rights, Courts, and Legal Mobilization Can Bolster Climate Action, 152, 156 (Cesar Rodríguez-Garavito ed., 2022).

¹⁵⁵ Véase Secretaría General de las Naciones Unidas, Nota con fecha del 15 de julio, 2019, [Informe del Relator Especial sobre la cuestión de las obligaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas con el disfrute de un medio ambiente sin riesgos, limpio, saludable y sostenible](#) (David Boyd), ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. A/74/161 (15 de julio, 2019) ¶ 68 (“Los Estados tienen la obligación de cooperar con miras a lograr un futuro bajo en emisiones de carbono, resiliente al clima y sostenible . . .”).

poderosa de la acción climática. Como se señala en el ¶ 31, la mejor información científica disponible requiere la reducción de las emisiones mundiales de metano en un 40–45% (o 180 Mt/año) para 2030 en relación con los niveles de 2030, y el IGSD sostiene respetuosamente que la forma más eficaz de lograr una reducción de las emisiones de metano a gran escala en ese plazo es que la comunidad internacional negocie un acuerdo vinculante con objetivos mandatorios de reducción de dichas emisiones.

- 80 La historia del derecho ambiental internacional demuestra que algunos tipos de cooperación y acuerdos internacionales son más eficaces que otros para minimizar la degradación del medio ambiente, abordar el cambio climático y proteger a todas las personas y los ecosistemas. El Protocolo de Montreal relativo a las Sustancias que Agotan la Capa de Ozono es el tratado multilateral más exitoso del mundo en materia ambiental. Este Protocolo ha hecho más para prevenir el calentamiento climático que cualquier otro acuerdo multilateral, evitando una cantidad de calentamiento que de otro modo habría igualado o incluso superado el calentamiento que el CO₂ está provocando en la actualidad, y en miras a evitar 2,5°C de calentamiento para finales de siglo¹⁵⁶. Si bien el Protocolo de Montreal, junto con otros acuerdos sectoriales existentes y propuestos, puede reforzarse aún más, y debería servir de guía a los Estados para seguir cumpliendo con sus obligaciones colectivas e individuales de cooperar de buena fe y dar prioridad a las ambiciosas medidas de mitigación rápida necesarias para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C a corto plazo. En particular, los Estados deberían utilizar el Protocolo de Montreal como modelo para elaborar un acuerdo global destinado a reducir las emisiones de metano en un 40–45% (o 180 Mt/año) para 2030 en relación con los niveles de 2030 y que establezca obligaciones concretas de mitigación por sector.

I OBLIGACIONES DE LOS ESTADOS DE PROPORCIONAR ACCESO OPORTUNO Y EFECTIVO A LA JUSTICIA EN EL MARCO DE LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA

- 81 En la Pregunta D se solicita a la Corte que aclare las obligaciones de los Estados de proporcionar acceso a la justicia y a un recurso judicial oportuno y efectivo en el contexto de la emergencia

¹⁵⁶ Velders G. J. M., Andersen S. O., Daniel J. S., Fahey D. W., & McFarland M. (2007) [The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 104(12): 4814–4819, 4814; Young P. J., Harper A. B., Huntingford C., Paul N. D., Morgenstern O., Newman P. A., Oman L. D., Madronich S. & Garcia R. R. [The Montreal Protocol protects the terrestrial carbon sink](#), NATURE 596: 384–388, 384 (2021).

climática. La Corte ha enfatizado en repetidas ocasiones que los Estados deben proporcionar recurso legal oportuno para proteger y reparar los derechos humanos de acuerdo con el debido proceso legal (Artículos 8(1) y 25)¹⁵⁷. Estas obligaciones han sido reforzadas por el Artículo 8(3) del Acuerdo de Escazú que estipula garantías específicas relativas al derecho de acceso a la justicia en asuntos ambientales y establece que cada Parte, considerando sus circunstancias, contará con: “d) la posibilidad de disponer medidas cautelares y provisionales para, entre otros fines, prevenir, hacer cesar, mitigar o recomponer daños al medio ambiente... f) mecanismos de ejecución y de cumplimiento oportunos de las decisiones judiciales y administrativas” y “g) mecanismos de reparación, según corresponda, tales como la restitución al estado previo al daño, la restauración, la compensación o el pago de una sanción económica, la satisfacción, las garantías de no repetición, la atención a las personas afectadas y los instrumentos financieros para apoyar la reparación”.

- 82 Estas obligaciones son fundamentales en una situación de emergencia climática que avanza a gran velocidad: el tiempo se agota, y un mayor retraso en el acceso a la justicia y la reivindicación de los derechos con toda seguridad causará un daño irreversible a muchos derechos humanos.
- 83 El IGSD destaca dos elementos importantes de las obligaciones de los Estados de proporcionar una justicia oportuna y eficaz que merecen ser reconsiderados y aclarados en el contexto de la emergencia climática.
- 84 En primer lugar, dada la magnitud del daño a los derechos humanos y el tiempo muy limitado que resta para tomar medidas eficaces, el IGSD sostiene que el principio de razonabilidad debe ser reevaluado en las circunstancias de los procedimientos relativos a los derechos humanos afectados por el cambio climático.

84.1 La Corte ha señalado que para determinar si el plazo de tiempo que toma un procedimiento es “razonable” se requiere una evaluación holística de (i) la complejidad del asunto, (ii) la

¹⁵⁷ Comunidades indígenas miembros de la Asociación Lhaka Honhat (Nuestra Tierra) Ass'n vs. Argentina, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 400 (6 de febrero, 2020); Caso Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni vs. Nicaragua, Sentencia del 31 de agosto, 2001. 173; Caso Pueblo Saramaka vs. Surinam, Objeciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 172, IHRIL 3046 (CIDH 2007); Masacres de Río Negro vs. Guatemala, Objeciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 56 (4 de septiembre, 2012).

actividad procesal del interesado y (iii) la conducta de las autoridades judiciales¹⁵⁸. La Corte también ha señalado que la aplicabilidad de estos criterios depende de las circunstancias de cada caso¹⁵⁹, y que la afectación generada por la duración del procedimiento de la persona involucrada en el mismo será muy relevante para el análisis de la razonabilidad en cada caso¹⁶⁰.

84.2 La evaluación de lo que es un plazo “razonable” para impartir justicia en el contexto de los procedimientos relacionados con el cambio climático debe basarse en la certeza científica de que la falta de acceso rápido a la justicia conducirá inevitablemente a mayores violaciones de los derechos humanos a mediano y largo plazo.

- 85 En segundo lugar, dado el daño acumulativo causado por las emisiones climáticas y el tiempo extremadamente limitado que queda para prevenir un daño cierto e irreversible, el IGSD sostiene que los Estados pueden incumplir sus obligaciones al no garantizar que los individuos tengan acceso adecuado a medidas provisionales para evitar la exacerbación del daño climático mientras el proceso judicial está en curso¹⁶¹. Esto se ve reforzado por el Artículo 8(3)(d) del Acuerdo de Escazú.
- 86 Así, la Corte debería aclarar que, para cumplir con sus obligaciones, los Estados deben adoptar todas las medidas disponibles para garantizar que la justicia sea accesible y se imparta sin demora a todos los particulares y grupos que pretendan proteger los derechos humanos afectados por la emergencia climática. Los Estados deben tomar medidas administrativas y judiciales que faciliten la concesión de medidas provisionales y definitivas para evitar la exacerbación del daño climático; el no hacerlo debería influir en la evaluación de la Comisión y la Corte de solicitud

¹⁵⁸ Caso de la Comunidad Moiwana, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 124 (15 de junio, 2005), párrafo 160; Caso Hermanas Serrano Cruz, CtIDH (ser. C) No. 118 (1 de marzo, 2005), ¶ 67. Véase, a efectos similares, Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, *Wimmer vs. Alemania*, no. 60534/00, §§ 23, 24 mayo de 2005.

¹⁵⁹ Caso de la “Masacre de Mapiripán” vs. Colombia. CtIDH (Ser. C) No. 134 ¶ 218 (15 de septiembre, 2005).

¹⁶⁰ Caso Valle Jaramillo y otros vs. Colombia, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, CtIDH., Sentencia, (ser. C No. 192, ¶ 155 (27 de noviembre, 2008)).

¹⁶¹ Véase por ej., *Milieudefensie y otros vs. Royal Dutch Shell PLC* (26 de mayo, 2021) C/09/571932/HA ZA 19-379 (el Tribunal de Distrito de La Haya ordenó a Shell cumplir la decisión del Tribunal de mitigar las emisiones en todas sus operaciones hasta la resolución final del procedimiento de apelación).

de medidas cautelares y provisionales para prevenir el daño climático (descriptas en la Sección J.1).

J EL PAPEL DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS PARA GARANTIZAR LA PROTECCIÓN PERMANENTE DE LOS DERECHOS EN EL MARCO DE LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA

87 La interpretación actual de los principios jurídicos del derecho internacional en materia climática y las normas de derechos humanos son insuficientes para garantizar que la temperatura media mundial se mantenga por debajo de 1,5°C y para proteger el derecho humano a la resiliencia, así como muchos otros derechos humanos, incluido el derecho humano a la vida, para las generaciones presentes y futuras. Por lo tanto, los tribunales y otros organismos de todo el mundo deben interpretar los principios jurídicos existentes de modo que les permita evolucionar y adaptarse para hacer frente a la emergencia climática y proteger suficientemente los derechos humanos¹⁶².

88 Se insta a esta Corte a abordar estas deficiencias en el contexto del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos reconociendo la singularidad del daño climático a un vasto conjunto de derechos humanos protegidos por la Convención Americana y a otros tratados de derechos humanos causado por el cambio climático (véase también la Sección D.4) y a utilizar mecanismos para prevenir dicho daño, incluidas las medidas provisionales y cautelares.

J.1 Aclarar la Disponibilidad de Medidas Provisionales y Cautelares para Proteger los Derechos en el Marco de la Emergencia Climática

89 Un importante paso a seguir en el reconocimiento del daño extraordinario causado por el cambio climático (descripto *supra* en la Sección D.4) es reevaluar y aclarar los criterios para obtener medidas provisionales y cautelares de esta Corte y de la Comisión.

¹⁶² Comité sobre los Derechos del Niño, Observación General No. 26 (2023) sobre los Derechos del Niño y el Medio Ambiente, con Especial Atención al Cambio Climático, ¶¶ 82–85, CRC/C/GC/26, U.N. Doc. Dist.: General (22 de agosto, 2023).

- 90 Tanto los criterios de la Corte como los de la Comisión para ordenar medidas provisionales y cautelares, respectivamente, exigen que un particular demuestre *prima facie* que:
- 90.1 Existe un riesgo o amenaza grave para el goce de los derechos humanos en su grado más intenso (*gravedad* — en la Comisión; y *extrema gravedad* — en la Corte);
 - 90.2 El riesgo o la amenaza sean inminentes y puedan materializarse, requiriendo una respuesta inmediata para remediarlo (*urgencia*); y
 - 90.3 Existe una probabilidad razonable de que la amenaza se materialice y que el daño afectará derechos que no son susceptibles de reparación, restauración o adecuada indemnización (*daño*)¹⁶³.
- 91 Actualmente, los criterios de daño y urgencia, cuando se aplican a la emergencia climática, son poco adecuados para su propósito y no son capaces de proteger adecuadamente los derechos humanos de los daños presentes y futuros encerrados del cambio climático. A continuación se abordan las limitaciones de cada criterio.

J.1.1 El Criterio de Urgencia

- 92 El criterio de urgencia o inminencia del riesgo exige que los particulares demuestren con evidencia *prima facie* el momento en que se producirá una violación concreta de los derechos humanos causada por el cambio climático. Este concepto de *urgencia* no toma debidamente en cuenta la evidencia científica sobre los efectos del cambio climático. En algunas circunstancias podría ser posible satisfacer este criterio con la prueba existente. Sin embargo, en la mayoría de los casos y basándose en la mejor información científica disponible, no se puede predecir con antelación el momento exacto en que se producirán los impactos manifiestos del cambio climático sobre los derechos humanos, aunque se pueda predecir con seguridad el hecho del impacto¹⁶⁴. Este es especialmente el caso de la predicción del momento en que los derechos se verán afectados por el desencadenamiento de los puntos críticos de inflexión. La ciencia actual

¹⁶³ *Cuya Lavy y otros vs. Perú*, [Solicitud de Medidas Provisionales](#), (12 de marzo, 2020), ¶ 5; Reglamento de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, art. 25.1, CIDH, (2013), art. 25.2.

¹⁶⁴ Destacando que, a medida que el campo de la ciencia de la atribución siga desarrollándose, esto puede cambiar con el tiempo.

tiene claro que el planeta alcanzará estos puntos de inflexión en ausencia de una mitigación profunda y que el tiempo es extremadamente limitado para que los actores estatales y no estatales tomen medidas urgentes para evitar que se desencadenen los puntos críticos de inflexión (dado que el mundo ya se encuentra en el rango de temperaturas en el que ya existe el riesgo de que se desencadenen algunos), pero no puede decirnos con precisión cuándo esto ocurrirá, ni cuándo se manifestará el daño, ni con precisión cuándo ese acontecimiento conducirá a una violación concreta de un derecho humano. Lo que está claro, sin embargo, es que cada incremento del calentamiento aumenta la probabilidad de que se desencadenen puntos críticos de inflexión y se produzcan daños catastróficos e irreversibles.

- 93 Como se indica en la Sección D (véase en particular ¶¶ 19–22), una vez que se desencadenen determinados puntos críticos de inflexión climáticos, no será posible revertir o adaptarse a todas las consecuencias de los inevitables daños futuros. Muchos de los impactos acontecerán inevitablemente pero aún no se habrán manifestado lo suficiente como para ser observados, y será demasiado tarde para que los Estados adopten medidas urgentes para evitar violaciones irreparables y masivas de los derechos humanos si esto no se comprende. Así, el riesgo de violaciones catastróficas y continuas del derecho a la vida, por ejemplo, ya es urgente aunque no pueda afirmarse con certeza el momento en que se producirán sus impactos. Por consiguiente, este criterio debería reinterpretarse teniendo en cuenta la mejor información científica disponible, de modo que pueda aplicarse a futuras solicitudes de medidas provisionales y cautelares en respuesta al cambio climático.

Dado el hecho científico incuestionable de que la emergencia climática es aguda, el IGSD sugiere respetuosamente que la Corte estipule claramente que cuando se solicitan medidas provisionales o cautelares para prevenir el daño climático, el criterio de urgencia se cumple automáticamente a menos que el Estado pueda demostrar que no está agravando la emergencia. En otras palabras, cuando se solicitan medidas provisionales o cautelares, debe ser el Estado, y no el peticionario, el encargado de proporcionar a la Corte o a la Comisión pruebas suficientes de por qué una acción o inacción específica no agrava la emergencia climática.

J.1.2 El Criterio de Daño

- 94 El criterio de daño irreparable requiere evaluar si existe una probabilidad razonable de que se materialice un riesgo o una amenaza para los derechos y exige una evaluación del tipo de daño que se producirá. De nuevo, en el contexto de muchos impactos climáticos, tanto lineales como

no lineales, esta prueba tampoco integra adecuadamente la mejor información científica disponible en materia climática.

- 95 Por lo tanto, la Corte debería adoptar un enfoque de precaución en la evaluación y aplicación del criterio de daño, a la luz de las conclusiones de la mejor información científica disponible en materia climática. Dado que el planeta ya se encuentra en un rango de calentamiento susceptible de desencadenar puntos críticos de inflexión y que está tan cerca del límite crítico de seguridad de 1,5°C, resulta conveniente que la Corte reconozca que el derecho a la vida de muchas personas en las Américas (así como otros derechos humanos) ya corren un grave riesgo de sufrir un daño presente irreparable.
- 96 El daño extraordinario que supone el cambio climático exige que la Corte aclare que cuando se soliciten medidas provisionales o cautelares para evitar el agravamiento de la emergencia climática, es deber del Estado aportar pruebas suficientes a la Corte o a la Comisión de que existe nula probabilidad de que la amenaza se materialice y de que el daño no afectará derechos humanos que no sean susceptibles de reparación o compensación adecuada. La emergencia climática requiere trasladar la carga de la prueba del peticionario al Estado. Este criterio es coherente con la mejor información científica en materia climática y con la *raison d'être* de las medidas provisionales y cautelares en el sistema interamericano.

J.2 Un Sistema de Indicadores para Monitorear y Apoyar la Aplicación de la Opinión Consultiva por Parte de los Estados

- 97 El IGSD insta respetuosamente a la Corte a utilizar la oportunidad presentada por las preguntas de la Opinión Consultiva y a establecer un sistema para supervisar y apoyar la aplicación efectiva de las medidas de los Estados consistentes con la opinión de la Corte. El desarrollo de un sistema de indicadores se encuentra arraigado en la práctica anterior y exitosa de esta Corte en el pasado para promover y garantizar la aplicación de sus opiniones consultivas¹⁶⁵.
- 98 Este sistema debería basarse en un conjunto de indicadores que evalúen y establezcan parámetros cuantificables claros para garantizar el cumplimiento, por parte de los Estados, de sus

¹⁶⁵ Opinión Consultiva AO-24/17; Opinión Consultiva OC-29/22.

obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos para mitigar la intensificación del cambio climático y adaptarse a sus impactos.

- 99 La información científica en materia climática apoya una serie de obligaciones vinculantes para los Estados con el fin de frenar el ritmo de calentamiento a corto plazo y mantener así el planeta por debajo de 1,5°C de calentamiento (véase la Sección D). Estas obligaciones se basan en la mejor información científica y tecnología disponibles y reflejan la única manera conocida de tomar medidas eficaces ahora, durante esta década crítica, para mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C. Por lo tanto, el IGSD sostiene que cualquier sistema de monitoreo establecido por la Corte debería dar prioridad a estas medidas de mitigación rápida, incluyendo la reducción de los supercontaminantes climáticos y la protección y expansión de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono.
- 100 La financiación adecuada también será una parte fundamental de la aplicación de medidas eficaces y equitativas de mitigación, adaptación y creación de resiliencia. En este sentido, el Grupo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) seguirá desempeñando un papel clave en la financiación climática dentro de la región. El BID debe garantizar financiación adecuada para que los Estados sean capaces de cumplir con sus obligaciones en materia de derechos humanos para hacer frente a la emergencia climática. El BID ha identificado el cambio climático y la sostenibilidad ambiental como uno de los tres temas transversales (junto con las cuestiones interrelacionadas de la inclusión social e igualdad y la igualdad de género y la diversidad) que deben tenerse en cuenta en la aplicación de las prioridades estratégicas del BID¹⁶⁶. El BID recientemente ha renovado su compromiso de considerar el cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe en su Estrategia Institucional, señalando que este tema es un desafío central para el desarrollo que podría paralizar las economías de la región¹⁶⁷.
- 101 El IGSD afirma respetuosamente que la Corte debería recomendar que el BID, como una institución de la OEA, garantice que todas las inversiones sean coherentes con el objetivo de mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C, y que promueva e invierta en estrategias de mitigación rápida que incluyan medidas para reducir los supercontaminantes climáticos (especialmente el metano

¹⁶⁶ Grupo del BID, Segunda Actualización de la Estrategia Institucional (2019) ¶ 4.10.

¹⁶⁷ Grupo del BID, Segunda actualización de la estrategia institucional (2019) ¶¶ 4.10, 4.14. El monitoreo de esta Estrategia Institucional se lleva a cabo a través del Marco de Resultados Corporativos.

y el carbono negro), junto con inversiones en la descarbonización. Las inversiones que se alineen con esta prioridad deberían ser divulgadas anualmente por el BID. La adopción de estas medidas sería totalmente coherente con la Estrategia Institucional del BID. La Corte también debería recomendar que el BID se abstenga de realizar inversiones que agraven la emergencia climática.

K CONCLUSIÓN

- 102 El planeta se enfrenta a una emergencia climática. El calentamiento global ya es demasiado y el cambio climático ya está causando daños reales e inminentes a los derechos humanos. La tasa de calentamiento es acelerada, y crece el riesgo de que las emisiones continuas de contaminantes climáticos y la destrucción de bosques y de otros sumideros pronto empujen al planeta más allá del límite crítico de seguridad de 1,5°C de calentamiento con respecto a los niveles preindustriales y desencadenen puntos críticos de inflexión irreversibles y catastróficos, causando violaciones aún más graves de los derechos humanos.
- 103 La Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático y el Acuerdo de París tienen como objetivo “la estabilización de las concentraciones de gases de efecto invernadero en la atmósfera a un nivel que impida interferencias antropógenas peligrosas en el sistema climático. Ese nivel debería alcanzarse en un plazo suficiente para permitir que los ecosistemas se adapten naturalmente al cambio climático, garantizar que la producción de alimentos no se vea amenazada y permitir que el desarrollo económico prosiga de manera sostenible...”¹⁶⁸.
- 104 No obstante, estos acuerdos carecen de obligaciones sustantivas obligatorias y no están consiguiendo frenar a tiempo el calentamiento global y mantenerlo por debajo de 1,5°C, algo esencial para evitar violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos. El planeta se encuentra en la ventana de tiempo crítica para tomar medidas. En consecuencia, se insta a esta Corte a interpretar las obligaciones de derechos humanos en virtud de la Convención Americana y sus protocolos asociados para fortalecer la resiliencia de los individuos y grupos de individuos mediante la aclaración de las obligaciones de los Estados para garantizar que los Estados apliquen y hagan cumplir medidas eficaces de mitigación y adaptación.

¹⁶⁸ CMNUCC, art. 2

- 105 En los últimos años, a medida que los tribunales han recibido una oleada de litigios climáticos, los jueces han sido llamados a encontrar el equilibrio adecuado entre las acciones transformadoras a escala que se requieren para hacer frente a la emergencia climática y continuar con un *statu quo* sin introducción de cambios (en inglés, *business as usual*). A medida que los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos se hacen más frecuentes e intensos, los ciudadanos del mundo empiezan a cuestionar la capacidad de los Estados y los gobiernos democráticos para protegerlos frente a la emergencia climática actual y a un futuro apocalíptico.
- 106 Cuando la humanidad se ha enfrentado a retos globales que planteaban cuestiones existenciales, el derecho y las instituciones de derechos humanos han servido tanto de fuente de esperanza como de punto de referencia para evitar graves atrocidades y avanzar hacia un mundo en el que la paz y la solidaridad sean posibles. La Corte tiene una oportunidad extraordinaria para guiar a los Estados y evitar violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos emitiendo una Opinión Consultiva que refleje la urgencia y la ambición necesarias para hacer frente a la amenaza existencial que el cambio climático supone para la humanidad.
- 107 Mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C es la única manera de respetar los derechos humanos y evitar violaciones masivas de los mismos tanto a corto como a largo plazo. Los Estados deben actuar sobre la base de la mejor información científica disponible y la mejor tecnología disponible y tomar medidas urgentes para:
- 107.1 Reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos, incluida la aplicación de políticas coherentes con (i) la reducción de las emisiones mundiales de metano en un 40–45% para 2030 en relación con los niveles de 2030; (ii) la reducción de las emisiones de HFC en un 85% para 2050 en relación con los niveles de 2019; (iii) la reducción de las emisiones de óxido nitroso (N₂O) en un 20% para 2050 en relación con los niveles de 2019; y (iv) la reducción de las emisiones de carbono negro en un 35% para 2050 en relación con los niveles de 2010.
- 107.2 Detener la destrucción de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono y restaurar y ampliar estos sumideros. En el caso de la Amazonia, es imperativo que las tasas de deforestación y degradación se reduzcan drásticamente de forma inmediata para que el bosque pueda funcionar más eficazmente como sumidero de carbono y no se vea empujado

más allá de un punto crítico de inflexión¹⁶⁹. Esto requiere una moratoria sobre los proyectos que promuevan la deforestación y la degradación en la Amazonia, y la aplicación y el cumplimiento de prácticas sostenibles de uso de la tierra agrícola para permitir la regeneración, al menos hasta que el consenso científico demuestre que es probable que el planeta se mantenga por debajo de 1,5°C de calentamiento global con respecto a los niveles preindustriales¹⁷⁰.

107.3 Descarbonizar rápidamente los sistemas energéticos para lograr emisiones netas iguales a cero a mediados de siglo o antes y estabilizar el sistema climático para finales de siglo.

108 Guiándose por la mejor información científica disponible para garantizar y respetar los derechos humanos, la Corte debería recomendar en su Opinión Consultiva que:

- (1) El daño causado por el cambio climático reviste una dimensión presente y futura. Este concepto de daño subyace a la interpretación de las obligaciones de derechos humanos de los Estados y refleja el daño presente real y observable a los derechos humanos causado por el cambio climático, así como la certeza de “encerrar” un daño futuro aún mayor a los derechos humanos cuando se activen los puntos críticos de inflexión, incluido el daño irreversible que aún puede no ser observable, a menos que los Estados actúen urgentemente para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento en esta década y mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C [¶¶ 32–37].
- (2) Las obligaciones de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos en virtud del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos van más allá de sus obligaciones de procedimiento y compromisos en el marco de su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional en virtud de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático y su Acuerdo de París. Resulta fundamental que esta Corte establezca claramente los límites de la absoluta discreción actual de los Estados para hacer frente a la emergencia climática. Estos límites se establecen por el alcance de las obligaciones de derechos humanos de los Estados y debe estar determinado por la mejor información científica disponible sobre lo que debe hacerse para mantener la

¹⁶⁹ Lovejoy T. E. & Nobre C. (2018) *Amazon's Tipping Point*, SCI. ADV. 4(2): eaat2340, 1.

¹⁷⁰ Véase también Id. Science Panel for the Amazon (2021) *Executive Summary of the Amazon Assessment Report 2021*, Nobre C., y otros (eds.), 34–44 y Grossman D. *Trouble in the Amazon*, NATURE (24 de agosto, 2023) <https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-023-02599-1/index.html>. (Donde se detallan las conclusiones recientes sobre la salud de la Amazonia y las causas y soluciones respecto de su declive).

temperatura media mundial por debajo de 1,5°C, el límite crítico de seguridad para respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos [¶¶ 30, 40–47].

- (3) En el contexto de la emergencia del cambio climático, una interpretación evolutiva de la Convención Americana y sus protocolos asociados requiere reconocer un derecho humano a la “resiliencia” [¶¶ 48, 55].
- (4) El derecho humano a la resiliencia, como derecho autónomo conectado con los derechos sustantivos y de procedimiento más afectados por el cambio climático [¶¶ 55–59], o como una manifestación del derecho a la vida del artículo 4 de la Convención Americana [¶ 60], impone diversas obligaciones vinculantes a los Estados como parte de las siguientes obligaciones duales, [¶¶ 64, 66, 68]:
 - (a) *Una obligación de mitigación*: limitar los riesgos climáticos a niveles manejables mediante la adopción de todas las medidas efectivas necesarias para frenar el ritmo de calentamiento lo más rápidamente posible, en consonancia con una trayectoria para permanecer por debajo de 1,5 °C. La mejor información científica disponible muestra que esto requiere medidas para reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos en los próximos 10 a 15 años; facilitar la eliminación de CO₂ basada en la naturaleza mediante la protección y la restauración de los sumideros de carbono; y descarbonizar rápidamente los sistemas energéticos para lograr emisiones netas iguales a cero de aquí a 2050.
 - (b) *Una obligación de adaptación*: garantizar los medios para reducir la vulnerabilidad adoptando todas las medidas apropiadas y necesarias para reforzar la resiliencia de los grupos vulnerables de la sociedad.
- (5) Los Estados deben tomar todas las medidas apropiadas y necesarias para cumplir con estas obligaciones actuando con la debida diligencia, en consonancia con la mejor información científica disponible y la necesidad de mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C [¶¶ 72–74]. Los Estados deben adoptar un enfoque diferenciado para proteger a los grupos vulnerables, incluido el cumplimiento de estas obligaciones de la manera más urgente y rápida posible [¶ 69–71, 74].
- (6) La obligación de los Estados de cooperar eficazmente para hacer frente al cambio climático debe guiarse por la mejor información científica disponible y la necesidad de mantenerse por debajo

de 1,5°C (con un sobrepaso limitado) para garantizar que las medidas de mitigación y adaptación no sean inútiles y para garantizar y respetar los derechos humanos. Dado que la resiliencia al clima depende de la asignación adecuada y eficaz de recursos financieros y técnicos a través de los presupuestos nacionales y regionales y de la cooperación internacional, los Estados deben tomar todas las medidas razonables para participar en la cooperación internacional [¶¶ 76–80]:

- (a) para facilitar la asignación efectiva, equitativa y adecuada de los recursos financieros y técnicos necesarios para aplicar una acción climática rápida y eficaz, de acuerdo con la mejor información científica disponible; y
- (a) para acordar compromisos vinculantes para facilitar la financiación, la tecnología y los motores económicos para mitigar rápidamente el cambio climático; reducir rápidamente los supercontaminantes climáticos y detener la destrucción y degradación de los bosques y de otros sumideros naturales de carbono, así como para descarbonizar el sistema energético.

La obligación de cooperar debe interpretarse en el sentido de exigir a los Estados que cooperen en el desarrollo inmediato de un acuerdo vinculante para reducir las emisiones de metano, empezando por el sector del petróleo y el gas, ya que la mitigación del metano es capaz de frenar el calentamiento más que cualquier otra estrategia en el menor periodo de tiempo [¶¶ 76–80].

- (7) El contenido de la obligación de los Estados de proporcionar acceso a la justicia y a un recurso legal oportuno para proteger y reparar los derechos humanos afectados por la emergencia climática (Artículos 8(1) y 25 de la Convención Americana y Artículo 8(3) del Acuerdo de Escazú) debe basarse en la mejor información científica disponible que demuestre que la demora en los procesos judiciales durante esta década inevitablemente encerrará y aumentará la magnitud de las violaciones de derechos humanos en el futuro.
 - (a) El principio de razonabilidad en este contexto debe interpretarse a la luz de dicha información científica [¶ 84].
 - (b) Los Estados infringen sus obligaciones de proporcionar un acceso adecuado a las medidas cautelares al no evitar el aumento del daño climático mientras los procesos judiciales internos están en curso [¶ 85].

- (8) Las medidas provisionales y cautelares deberían ser utilizadas cuando las acciones u omisiones específicas de los Estados corren el riesgo de exacerbar la emergencia climática, creando así riesgos graves, urgentes e irreparables para los derechos humanos. Los criterios de urgencia y daño en la solicitud de medidas provisionales y cautelares dentro del el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos deberían basarse en la mejor información científica disponible y en el principio de precaución y requiere trasladar la carga de la prueba de los peticionarios a los Estados [¶¶ 86, 89–96]
- (9) Debería establecerse un sistema de indicadores para monitorear y apoyar la aplicación de su Opinión Consultiva, en consonancia con la práctica exitosa de la Corte en el pasado. Basándose en la mejor información científica disponible, este sistema de monitoreo debería dar prioridad a las medidas de mitigación rápidas que reduzcan el ritmo de calentamiento en los próximos 10–15 años en concordancia con el objetivo de mantenerse por debajo de 1,5 °C [¶¶ 97–99].
- (10) Dada la necesidad de una financiación adecuada para lograr una rápida mitigación, descarbonización y desarrollo sostenible para todos, el Grupo del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) debería garantizar que las inversiones sean coherentes con el papel de las Américas para mantener el planeta por debajo de 1,5°C y debería promover inversiones destinadas a medidas para reducir los supercontaminantes climáticos y para fortalecer y proteger los bosques y otros sumideros, junto con inversiones en la descarbonización. Estas inversiones deberían ser divulgadas anualmente por el BID [¶ 101]. El BID debería abstenerse de invertir en proyectos que agraven la emergencia climática.

RESPECTUOSAMENTE,

Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development



Durwood Zaelke
President

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Bateman', with a stylized, flowing script.

Selena Bateman

R.V. Fajardo

Erika Gerstenberger

Eoin Jackson

FECHA:

14 de diciembre de 2023

ANEXO: RESUMEN: CIENCIA DEL CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO DEL IGSD

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El presente informe fue traducido al español por María Candela Conforti.

GLOSARIO

Acrónimos

IE6	El Sexto Ciclo de Evaluación del IPCC consta de un informe de evaluación de cuatro partes (IE6) con tres informes de grupos de trabajo y un informe de síntesis (SYR, por sus siglas en inglés), y varios informes especiales. El IE6 es la evaluación más reciente publicada por el IPCC sobre la ciencia del cambio climático, los impactos y las estrategias de mitigación.
Informe Especial 15 del IE6	Informe Especial sobre el Calentamiento Global de 1,5°C elaborado por autores de los tres grupos de trabajo de la Sexta Evaluación del IPCC sobre los impactos del calentamiento global de 1,5 grados centígrados con respecto a los niveles preindustriales y las trayectorias correspondientes que deberían seguir las emisiones mundiales de gases de efecto invernadero, en el contexto del reforzamiento de la respuesta mundial a la amenaza del cambio climático, el desarrollo sostenible y los esfuerzos por erradicar la pobreza (publicado en octubre de 2018). El primer borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos entre el 31 de julio y el 24 de septiembre de 2017; el segundo borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos y gobiernos entre el 8 de enero y el 25 de febrero de 2018 y el borrador final se sometió a la revisión final entre el 4 de junio y el 29 de julio de 2018. La fecha límite de presentación de la bibliografía fue el 1 de noviembre de 2017.
IE6 SRCCL	Informe Especial sobre el Cambio Climático y la Tierra elaborado por autores de los tres grupos de trabajo de la Sexta Evaluación del IPCC sobre el cambio climático, la desertificación, la degradación de las tierras, la gestión sostenible de las tierras, la seguridad alimentaria y los flujos de gases de efecto invernadero en los ecosistemas terrestres (publicado en agosto de 2019). El primer borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos entre el 11 de junio y el 5 de agosto de 2018; el segundo borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos y gobiernos entre el 19 de noviembre de 2018 y el 14 de enero de 2019 y el borrador final se sometió a la revisión final entre el 29 de abril y el 19 de junio de 2019. La fecha límite de presentación de la bibliografía fue el 28 de octubre de 2018.
IE6 SROCC	Informe Especial sobre los Océanos y la Criósfera en un Clima Cambiante elaborado por autores de los tres grupos de trabajo de la Sexta Evaluación del IPCC sobre cómo el océano y la criósfera han cambiado y se espera que cambien con el calentamiento global en curso, los riesgos y oportunidades que estos cambios conllevan para los ecosistemas y las personas, y las opciones de mitigación, adaptación y gobernanza para reducir los riesgos futuros (publicado en septiembre de 2019). El primer borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos entre el 4 de mayo y el 29 de junio de 2018; el segundo borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos y gobiernos entre el 16 de noviembre de 2018 y el 11 de enero de 2019 y el borrador final se sometió a la revisión final entre el 14 de junio y el 9 de agosto de 2019. La fecha límite de presentación de bibliografía fue el 15 de octubre de 2018.
IE6 SYR	Informe de Síntesis de la Sexta Evaluación del IPCC (publicado en marzo de 2023). El Grupo del IPCC aprobó el borrador del anteproyecto durante su 52ª Sesión, celebrada entre el 24 y el 28 de febrero de 2020. Este informe se sometió a un amplio proceso de revisión y negociación con los gobiernos y las organizaciones observadoras.

IE6 GT1	Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo I al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del IPCC sobre las bases científicas (publicado en agosto de 2021). El primer borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos entre el 29 de abril y el 23 de abril de 2019; el segundo borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos y gobiernos entre el 2 de marzo y el 5 de junio de 2020 y el borrador final se sometió a la revisión final entre el 4 de mayo y el 20 de junio de 2021. La fecha límite para la presentación de la bibliografía fue el 31 de enero de 2021.
IE6 GT2	Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo II al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del IPCC sobre impactos, adaptación y vulnerabilidad (publicado en febrero de 2022). El primer borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos entre el 18 de octubre y el 13 de diciembre de 2019; el segundo borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos y gobiernos entre el 4 de diciembre de 2020 y el 29 de enero de 2021 y el borrador final se sometió a la revisión final entre el 1 de octubre y el 26 de noviembre de 2021. La fecha límite para la presentación de la bibliografía fue el 1 de noviembre de 2020.
IE6 GT3	Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo III al Sexto Informe de Evaluación del IPCC sobre las estrategias de mitigación y su potencial (publicado en abril de 2022). El primer borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos entre el 13 de enero y el 8 de marzo de 2020; el segundo borrador se sometió a la revisión de expertos y gobiernos entre el 18 de enero y el 14 de marzo de 2021 y el borrador final se sometió a la revisión final entre el 29 de noviembre de 2021 y el 30 de enero de 2022. La fecha límite para la presentación de la bibliografía fue el 14 de diciembre de 2020.
CH₄	Metano
CO₂	Dióxido de Carbono
GEI	Gases de efecto invernadero
PCG	Potencial de calentamiento global
HFC	Hidrofluorocarbonos
CtIDH	Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos
IPCC	Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático
LAC	Latinoamérica y el Caribe
LULUCF	Uso de la tierra, cambios en el uso de la tierra y silvicultura
N₂O	Óxido nitroso
O₃	Ozono troposférico
REDD+	Reducción de las emisiones derivadas de la deforestación y la degradación de los bosques en los países en desarrollo

Términos

Límite de Seguridad de 1,5°C	El consenso científico afirma que limitar el aumento de la temperatura global a un máximo de 1,5 °C por encima de los niveles preindustriales es la única manera de evitar los impactos más graves del cambio climático, frenar los bucles de retroalimentación que se autoperpetúan y evitar, o al menos retrasar, puntos críticos de inflexión irreversibles. Limitar el calentamiento a 1,5°C requiere reducir los contaminantes climáticos de vida corta no CO ₂ y CO ₂ , así como proteger los sumideros de carbono existentes.
Forestación	Plantación de nuevos bosques en tierras que históricamente no han contenido bosques.
Neutralidad en carbono	Véase emisiones netas iguales a cero. Puede referirse a las emisiones netas de CO ₂ o de GEI iguales a cero, lo que a menudo se denomina neutralidad climática. La neutralidad en carbono no frena el ritmo de calentamiento a corto plazo a menos que también incluya una reducción sustancial del metano.
Sumidero de carbono	Cualquier cosa que absorba más dióxido de carbono del que emita (es decir, remueve y almacena dióxido de carbono de la atmósfera). Ejemplos de sumideros de carbono naturales incluyen océanos, bosques, turberas, manglares, praderas marinas, bosques de algas, marismas y pantanos.
Fuente de carbono	Cualquier cosa que libere más dióxido de carbono del que absorba. Ejemplos de fuentes de carbono son las emisiones asociadas con la extracción y combustión de combustibles fósiles y la deforestación.
Fuente de metano	Cualquier cosa que libere más metano del que absorba. En un periodo de 20 años, el metano es 80 veces más potente que el CO ₂ para calentar el planeta. Por lo tanto, las fuentes de metano tienen un fuerte impacto en la temperatura del planeta a corto plazo. Entre los ejemplos de fuentes de metano se incluyen el venteo de gas en los yacimientos petrolíferos y las fugas en los gasoductos, la descomposición de los residuos orgánicos en condiciones de poco oxígeno y la fermentación entérica del ganado.
Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático (IPCC)	El IPCC fue creado en 1988 por la Organización Meteorológica Mundial (OMM) y el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente (PNUMA), y aprobado por Resolución de la Asamblea General de la ONU en 1988 . El IPCC elabora revisiones y recomendaciones integrales con respecto al estado actual de los conocimientos sobre el cambio climático y sus posibles impactos ambientales y socioeconómicos. Desde su concepción, el IPCC ha elaborado seis Informes de Evaluación. Los autores y revisores del IPCC son voluntarios seleccionados bajo un proceso establecido. Actualmente el IPCC cuenta con 195 miembros. Los informes se someten a procesos de revisión interactivos para su comentario y revisión antes de su publicación final. El Resumen para Responsables de Políticas es negociado por los gobiernos antes de su publicación. Es importante destacar que debido al proceso establecido, los informes del IPCC no reflejan los últimos datos científicos. Todos los informes del IPCC se someten a dos etapas de revisión. Un Primer Borrador se somete a la revisión de los expertos. Tras dicha revisión, los autores elaboran un Segundo Borrador basado en los comentarios recibidos. A continuación, este borrador se somete a una segunda revisión por parte de los gobiernos y los expertos. Los autores elaboran un Borrador Final basado en los comentarios recibidos durante la segunda revisión. El Borrador

Final se distribuye a los gobiernos en la etapa de la revisión gubernamental final del Resumen para Responsables de Políticas. Nótese que la fecha límite para la presentación de la bibliografía suele ser un mes antes de la revisión del Segundo Borrador, que suele ocurrir al menos un año antes de la publicación de la versión final. En el momento de la publicación, el análisis está como mínimo un año desfasado. En el caso del Informe de Síntesis, que integra las principales conclusiones de los informes de los tres grupos de trabajo, el análisis lleva varios años desfasado, ya que no refleja los nuevos datos científicos desde la publicación de los informes de los Grupos de Trabajo.

Carbono irre recuperable

Reservas de carbono en sistemas naturales que “son potencialmente vulnerables a la liberación por la actividad humana y que, de perderse, no podrían ser restaurados para el 2050”¹

Impactos lineales vs. no lineales

Los impactos lineales aumentan aproximadamente en proporción al aumento del calentamiento, es decir, se escalonan con el calentamiento: un poco más de calentamiento provoca un poco más de impacto.

Los impactos no lineales son diferentes: un poco más de calentamiento puede desencadenar retroalimentaciones que se auto-amplifican y son desproporcionadas con respecto al calentamiento extra, y también puede empujar a los sistemas climáticos regionales o globales hacia puntos críticos de inflexión que provoquen un cambio de estado. Estos cambios pueden producirse de forma abrupta y ser irreversibles, como si se cayera por un precipicio. Nótese que en el caso de algunos puntos críticos de inflexión que se desencadenan a una temperatura determinada, los efectos pueden prolongarse durante décadas e incluso siglos. Por ejemplo, cuando el calentamiento supere los 1,6 °C durante varios años, el manto de hielo de Groenlandia se derretirá de forma irreversible. Si toda Groenlandia se derritiera, contribuiría a elevar el nivel del mar entre 5 y 7 metros a lo largo de siglos o milenios. Los impactos no lineales, como los puntos críticos de inflexión, no suelen estar bien representados en los modelos climáticos ni en los modelos económicos utilizados para evaluar los riesgos del cambio climático. La *aceleración del ritmo de calentamiento* puede desencadenar los puntos críticos de inflexión antes de lo previsto.

Emisiones netas iguales a cero vs. Cero emisiones

Las emisiones netas iguales a cero se consiguen cuando las emisiones antropogénicas de gases de efecto invernadero que se liberan en la atmósfera se equilibran mediante las absorciones en un periodo específico. Cuando se miden varios gases, la cuantificación de las emisiones depende de los parámetros climáticos utilizados (por ej., el potencial de calentamiento global, el potencial de cambio en la temperatura global) así como del plazo elegido. Por el contrario, “cero emisiones” significa que no hay emisión de GEI, sin compensación por la remoción de dióxido de carbono o de GEI. A diferencia de las emisiones netas iguales a cero, que sólo requieren que cualquier emisión antropogénica emitida se equilibre con la eliminación de una cantidad igual de gases de efecto invernadero antropogénicos de la atmósfera, el concepto de cero emisiones requiere que no se emita ningún gas de efecto invernadero antropogénico.

Sobrepaso

Calentamiento global que supera temporalmente los 1,5°C por encima de los niveles preindustriales. Incluso en caso de sobrepaso, algunos impactos podrían ser irreversibles, aun cuando se logre reducir el calentamiento global.

El IE6 del IPCC define el calentamiento global como el aumento estimado de la temperatura media global en superficie promediada durante el último decenio en

comparación con las condiciones preindustriales (1,14°C entre 1850 y 1900), mientras que el SR1.5 define el calentamiento global como “el calentamiento promedio de un período de 30 años en el que se toma como referencia el año actual, en el supuesto de que continúe el ritmo actual de calentamiento”².

Según la Oficina Meteorológica del Reino Unido, es “más probable que improbable” que la temperatura global anual supere los 1,5 °C durante al menos un año entre 2023 y 2027³.

Acuerdo de París

El [Acuerdo de París](#) es un tratado internacional sobre cambio climático adoptado por 196 Partes en el marco de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático (COP21) en París, Francia, el 12 de diciembre de 2015. Entró en vigor el 4 de noviembre de 2016. Su objetivo es mantener “el aumento de la temperatura media mundial muy por debajo de 2°C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales” y proseguir los esfuerzos “para limitar ese aumento de la temperatura a 1,5°C con respecto a los niveles preindustriales”. Para ello, permite a las partes establecer sus propias “contribuciones determinadas a nivel nacional” para la mitigación climática.

Proforestación

La práctica de permitir el crecimiento continuo de los bosques, preservar los bosques maduros y permitir que los bosques se regeneren sin intervención humana para alcanzar todo su potencial ecológico de secuestro máximo de carbono. Las estrategias de proforestación incluyen la prevención de la tala y la gestión forestal activa.

Reforestación

La práctica de repoblar un bosque existente mediante la plantación de nuevos ejemplares.

Retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan

También referidas como “retroalimentaciones positivas” o “retroalimentaciones que se refuerzan a sí mismas”, describen condiciones en las que una perturbación en una magnitud climática se amplifica por los cambios que esta provoca en una relación circular de causa y efecto. En el contexto climático, las retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan causan un calentamiento adicional más allá del calentamiento inicial (por ejemplo, la pérdida de hielo marino en el Ártico reduce la reflectividad, lo que a su vez aumenta el calentamiento, que entonces provoca que se derrita más hielo marino), creando un bucle por el cual el planeta se calienta cada vez más.

Contaminantes climáticos de vida corta (CCVC), o “super contaminantes”

Los CCVC son contaminantes distintos del CO₂ que tienen una vida atmosférica relativamente corta pero que son más potentes que el CO₂ para calentar el planeta. Entre los CCVC se encuentran el **metano**, un potente gas de efecto invernadero; **el ozono troposférico**, un gas de efecto invernadero y contaminante secundario formado por la interacción de la luz solar con los óxidos de nitrógeno, los compuestos orgánicos volátiles; los **hidrofluorocarbonos**, potentes gases de efecto invernadero que sustituyen a los clorofluorocarbonos e hidroclorofluorocarbonos sin agotar la capa de ozono; y el **carbono negro**, que no es un gas de efecto invernadero pero sí un potente aerosol y contaminante atmosférico que calienta el clima. El **óxido nítrico** es un supercontaminante pero no es de vida corta.

Punto crítico de inflexión

Nivel de cambio más allá del cual el sistema se reorganiza, generalmente de forma abrupta y/o irreversible. Véase también, impactos “lineales vs. no-lineales”.

**Convención Marco
de las Naciones
Unidas sobre el
Cambio Climático
(CMNUCC)**

La [Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático](#) es una convención de 198 Estados creada en 1992 como un marco de cooperación internacional para hacer frente a la amenaza global del cambio climático a través de medidas de mitigación y adaptación. El Acuerdo de París se negoció y aplicó bajo su amparo. El Art. 2 de la CMNUCC establece que: “El objetivo último... es lograr, de conformidad con las disposiciones pertinentes de la Convención, la estabilización de las concentraciones de gases de efecto invernadero en la atmósfera a un nivel que impida interferencias antropogénicas peligrosas en el sistema climático. Ese nivel debería lograrse en un plazo suficiente para permitir que los ecosistemas se adapten naturalmente al cambio climático, asegurar que la producción de alimentos no se vea amenazada y permitir que el desarrollo económico prosiga de manera sostenible”⁴.

I. RESUMEN

El cambio climático supone una amenaza existencial para la humanidad. La relación intrínseca entre el cambio climático y los derechos humanos se hace evidente cuando somos testigos de los efectos adversos en diversas dimensiones de la vida humana. Para hacer frente a la emergencia climática, debemos frenar al máximo el ritmo de calentamiento lo antes posible. Sólo una estrategia dual para reducir *tanto* los supercontaminantes climáticos distintos del dióxido de carbono *como* el dióxido de carbono (CO₂) puede mantener la temperatura global dentro de límites seguros y proteger los derechos humanos de las generaciones presentes y futuras.

La emergencia climática plantea un reto de *temperatura, puntos críticos de inflexión y tiempo*.

Temperatura. *La temperatura de la Tierra es demasiado alta a 1,2°C de calentamiento observados actualmente* por encima de los niveles preindustriales. Los impactos lineales ya están provocando daños tremendos que infringen los derechos humanos; y los bucles de retroalimentación que se autoperpetúan—donde la Tierra se calienta a sí misma—pronto empujarán al planeta más allá de una serie de puntos críticos de inflexión que impondrán impactos no lineales abruptos, irreversibles, y catastróficos y que causarán violaciones masivas de los derechos humanos.ⁱ El aumento de la temperatura se ve impulsado tanto por la escalada de las emisiones de dióxido de carbono como por las emisiones de supercontaminantes climáticos distintos del dióxido de carbono, especialmente el metano; así como también por la reducción de las emisiones de contaminantes atmosféricos reflectantes; la destrucción de bosques y sumideros de carbono y la pérdida de la capacidad reflectante de la nieve y el hielo del Ártico.

Puntos Críticos de Inflexión. *Se acercan puntos críticos de inflexión que causarán impactos irreversibles y potencialmente catastróficos.* Un estudio reciente sobre la historia del planeta revela que los sistemas climáticos regionales y globales pueden cambiar de estado, a veces bruscamente. Según una evaluación reciente, superar los 1,5°C aumenta la probabilidad de que se desencadenen o alcancen seis puntos críticos de inflexión climáticos que se autoperpetúan.⁵ En los modelos climáticos se prevén algunos cambios bruscos del sistema, con un grupo de seis cambios bruscos entre 1°C y 1,5°C de calentamiento y otros once entre 1,5°C y 2°C,⁶ tal como confirman dos informes especiales del IPCC.⁷ El objetivo del Acuerdo de París es mantener “el aumento de la temperatura media mundial muy por debajo de 2°C por encima de los niveles preindustriales” y proseguir los esfuerzos para “limitar el aumento de la temperatura a 1,5 °C por encima de los niveles preindustriales”.

Tiempo. Si no se toman medidas rápidas para frenar el calentamiento, *es probable que superemos el umbral de 1,5°C a finales de la década.*⁸ La urgencia de la crisis climática es evidente, ya que

ⁱ Los impactos lineales aumentan aproximadamente en proporción al aumento del calentamiento, es decir, se escalonan con el calentamiento: un poco más de calentamiento provoca un poco más de impacto. Los impactos no lineales son diferentes: un poco más de calentamiento empuja al planeta más allá de una serie de puntos críticos de inflexión con impactos que son desproporcionados al calentamiento extra. Estos impactos abruptos no lineales son como caer por un precipicio. Nótese que en el caso de algunos puntos críticos de inflexión que se desencadenan a una temperatura específica, los impactos pueden prolongarse durante décadas e incluso siglos. Este es el caso, por ejemplo, del manto de hielo de Groenlandia. La aceleración del calentamiento podría desencadenar los puntos críticos de inflexión antes de lo previsto.

la ventana de oportunidad para evitar violaciones masivas y abruptas de los derechos humanos se está reduciendo hasta el final de la década.

Frenar el ritmo de calentamiento a corto plazo es primordial, y requiere medidas inmediatas y específicas. La reducción de los supercontaminantes climáticos puede evitar casi cuatro veces más calentamiento de aquí a 2050 que las estrategias centradas únicamente en el CO₂, y reducir a la mitad la tasa de calentamiento en comparación con un escenario de referencia con una mitigación climática limitada y cuando se tiene en cuenta la reducción de las partículas reflectantes que enmascaran el calentamiento como resultado de las estrategias de descarbonización que eliminan gradualmente el uso de combustibles fósiles.⁹

Estudios anteriores han concluido que podemos evitar hasta 0,6°C de calentamiento para 2050 (sin tener en cuenta el desenmascaramiento) y mantenernos dentro del límite de seguridad de 1,5°C con un sobrepaso limitado, pero esto sólo podría lograrse reduciendo los supercontaminantes climáticos distintos del CO₂—el metano (CH₄), los hidrofluorocarbonos (HFC), el ozono troposférico (O₃) (o a nivel del suelo) y los aerosoles de carbono negro. A título comparativo, una descarbonización agresiva que alcanzara un nivel de emisiones netas de CO₂ iguales a cero en 2050 podría evitar aproximadamente 0,2°C de aquí a 2050, sin tener en cuenta el desenmascaramiento que se produce al reducirse los sulfatos coemitidos con la quema de combustibles fósiles.¹⁰

Las Américas disponen de soluciones para hacer frente a la emergencia climática que ayudarán a mantenernos dentro del límite de seguridad de 1,5°C y a limitar el sobrepaso al menor tiempo posible, además demostrarían a otros países fuera de la región lo que deben hacer para proteger el clima. Acciones sectoriales específicas deben desplegarse rápidamente y a escala para mitigar los supercontaminantes climáticos de vida corta, proteger los bosques y otros sumideros y descarbonizar el sistema energético.

El cambio climático es un problema que avanza rápidamente y no puede resolverse con soluciones lentas. Tal como declaró el Dr. Mario Molina, ganador del Premio Nobel, “la velocidad debe convertirse en la medida clave de todas las estrategias de mitigación del cambio climático: una rápida reducción del calentamiento global antes de que conduzca a mayores retroalimentaciones que se refuerzan a sí mismas y [puntos críticos de inflexión](#); un rápido despliegue de acciones y tecnologías de mitigación; y poner todo esto a escala de forma rápida”. Y seamos claros: por “rapidez” nos referimos a medidas —incluidas las regulatorias— que puedan comenzar a aplicarse en dos o tres años, implementarse sustancialmente en cinco o diez años y producir una respuesta climática en una o dos décadas.”¹¹

II. LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA GLOBAL

A. Temperatura, Puntos Críticos de Inflexión y Tiempo

La emergencia climática se relaciona con factores tales como temperatura, puntos críticos de inflexión y tiempo. La temperatura de la Tierra ya es demasiado alta con los 1,2°C de calentamiento observados actualmente por encima de los niveles preindustriales,¹² con impactos lineales que hoy imponen daños tremendos; queda muy poco tiempo antes de que los bucles de

retroalimentación que se autoperpetúan—en los que la Tierra se calienta a sí misma—empujen al planeta más allá de una serie de puntos críticos de inflexión que suponen impactos abruptos no lineales que son irreversibles y catastróficos. El clima de la Tierra expulsará a millones y, con el tiempo, a miles de millones de personas del corredor de vida en el que ha evolucionado la civilización.¹³ El Secretario General de la ONU ha calificado la emergencia climática como una amenaza existencial para la humanidad.¹⁴

La evidencia científica demuestra que ya nos encontramos en un estado de emergencia planetaria, en el que tanto el riesgo como la urgencia de la situación son agudos.¹⁵ Los impactos climáticos actuales, con 1,2°C de calentamiento observado, son en gran medida impactos lineales que empeoran proporcionalmente con el calentamiento, pero con sorpresas regionales emergentes “no lineales”.¹⁶ Estos incluyen fenómenos meteorológicos extremos más frecuentes y severos¹⁷ como olas de calor nunca antes registradas,¹⁸ sequías,¹⁹ incendios,²⁰ precipitaciones,²¹ e inundaciones.²²

Con 1,2°C, ya estamos en un rango de temperaturas en el que pueden desencadenarse puntos críticos de inflexión no lineales, abruptos y potencialmente irreversibles. Superar los 1,5°C aumenta la probabilidad de desencadenar seis puntos críticos del sistema climático que se autoperpetúan, incluida la pérdida del manto de hielo de Groenlandia y de la Antártida Occidental.²³ El manto de hielo de Groenlandia muestra indicios de que se está acercando a un punto crítico de inflexión, por lo cual se espera un deshielo acelerado.²⁴ El deshielo del manto de hielo de Groenlandia ya es el principal contribuyente a la tasa de aumento de la media global del nivel del mar.²⁵ Cuando toda Groenlandia se derrita, contribuirá a un aumento del nivel del mar de entre 5 y 7 metros.²⁶ Aunque el deshielo total del manto de hielo de Groenlandia podría tardar milenios, el ritmo de deshielo futuro y, por lo tanto, la tasa de aumento del nivel del mar, dependerá “en gran medida de la magnitud y la duración del sobrepaso de la temperatura.”²⁷

Además, los bucles de retroalimentación que se autoperpetúan están acelerando aún más el calentamiento. La pérdida de la nieve y el hielo reflectantes del Ártico, que están siendo sustituidos por océano y tierra más oscuros que absorben la radiación solar entrante en lugar de reflejarla, contribuye a la “amplificación del calentamiento del Ártico”, el cual se está calentando cuatro veces más que la media mundial, acelerando aún más el calentamiento global.²⁸ El Ártico podría quedar sin hielo marino durante los meses de septiembre en un plazo de 10 a 15 años.²⁹ En el caso extremo de que se perdiera todo el hielo marino del Ártico durante los meses soleados, tal como podría ocurrir a mediados de siglo,³⁰ se añadiría el equivalente a 25 años de emisiones climáticas al ritmo actual.³¹ La pérdida de nieve y hielo terrestre podría duplicar esta cifra.³²

Otro bucle de retroalimentación es la destrucción de la Selva Amazónica, que está pasando de ser un “sumidero” que extrae dióxido de carbono de la atmósfera y lo almacena de forma segura en su biomasa y suelo, a una “fuente” de emisiones de dióxido de carbono cuando se talan o queman árboles.³³ Existe el riesgo de que cuando se haya destruido entre el 20 y el 25% de la Amazonia, la selva entre en un espiral de muerte y se convierta en una sabana con impactos devastadores para la región y el mundo.³⁴ Si se liberara todo el carbono almacenado en la Amazonia, el planeta podría calentarse 0,25°C más.³⁵

B. El Presupuesto de Carbono

Otra forma de observar el reto climático es considerar el presupuesto de carbono restante calculado por los científicos antes de que nos estrellamos contra el límite de seguridad de los 1,5°C. La actualización más reciente que incorpora los datos del IE6 redujo el presupuesto de carbono a 250 mil millones de toneladas de CO₂, para una probabilidad de 50:50 de mantener el calentamiento en 1,5°C a partir de principios de 2023, y suponiendo que entre 2020 y 2050 las emisiones de metano se reduzcan a la mitad, las de óxido nitroso un 25% y las de sulfato se reduzcan un 77%.³⁶ El incumplimiento de las reducciones de metano y óxido nitroso disminuiría el presupuesto de carbono restante. La inclusión de las reducciones de sulfato que cabría esperar junto con la reducción del uso de combustibles fósiles representa un desenmascaramiento. Si bien este presupuesto incluye algunas retroalimentaciones climáticas del carbono,³⁷ no toma en cuenta de manera directa las retroalimentaciones no lineales y deficientemente limitadas³⁸ (incluidas las emisiones del permafrost debido a modelos de procesos limitados) ni los puntos críticos de inflexión, pero estos podrían considerarse en función de la elección del nivel de probabilidad de alcanzar la temperatura objetivo (con un mayor porcentaje de cobertura frente a estos riesgos).³⁹

Con los niveles actuales de emisión, este presupuesto de aproximadamente 250 GtCO₂ se agotaría a mediados de 2029.⁴⁰ Según Carbon Brief, para un país con altas emisiones como el Reino Unido, su cuota del presupuesto de carbono se agotará en 2 años.

C. Amenaza Existencial de 1,5°C a 2°C en el Futuro


Si se sobrepasan los 1,5°C, se prevé que muchos impactos climáticos se tornen no lineales, abruptos, irreversibles y catastróficos.⁴¹ Superar los puntos críticos de inflexión desencadenará bucles de retroalimentación que se autoperpetuarán con el riesgo de un estado climático “invernadero” en el que miles de millones de personas vivan en lugares que se vuelvan demasiado calientes para la habitabilidad humana.⁴² El “estado climático invernadero” se asemeja a “estados planetarios que se vieron por última vez hace varios millones de años” y convertiría gran parte del planeta en un lugar inhóspito para los seres humanos y muchas especies.⁴³ El límite de seguridad de 1,5°C procura mantener el calentamiento dentro de un “corredor seguro y justo” de vida para garantizar un sistema climático estable y reducir la exposición a los riesgos asociados.⁴⁴ La Comisión de la Tierra, un equipo mundial de científicos, ha empezado a cuantificar estos límites seguros y justos del sistema terrestre, que incluyen limitar el calentamiento a 1,5°C para mantenerse dentro de unos límites seguros que eviten puntos críticos de inflexión del sistema climático.⁴⁵ El IPCC confirmó la importancia crucial de mantener el límite de temperatura en 1,5°C y estimó que, con las tendencias actuales, este límite de temperatura se superaría a principios de la década de 2030.⁴⁶ Sin embargo, si se mantienen las emisiones climáticas récord, se prevé que el ritmo de calentamiento aumente de 0,2°C a 0,25–0,32°C por década en los próximos 25 años.⁴⁷ En dicho caso, las temperaturas “alcanzarían 1,5°C a finales de la década de 2020 y 2°C en 2050.”⁴⁸

La ventana para lograr una mitigación eficaz y mantenerse por debajo de 1,5°C, frenar las retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan y evitar, o al menos retrasar, los puntos críticos de inflexión irreversibles se está reduciendo rápidamente hasta el final de la década.⁴⁹

Entre 1,5°C y 2°C, se prevé que se desencadenarán seis puntos críticos de inflexión, entre ellos la pérdida del hielo marino estival del Ártico, la pérdida de los mantos de hielo de la Antártida Occidental y de Groenlandia, el retroceso de la selva amazónica, cambios en los ecosistemas de los bosques boreales, la liberación de carbono del permafrost y la pérdida de arrecifes de coral.⁵⁰ Según el Sexto Informe de Evaluación (IE6) del IPCC, con 2°C de calentamiento, el nivel de riesgo de que se desencadenen puntos críticos de inflexión “relativamente grandes, abruptos y a veces irreversibles” pasa a ser alto.⁵¹

Además, se prevé que las interacciones de efecto dominó entre estos sistemas reduzcan los umbrales y aumenten el riesgo de desencadenar una cascada global de puntos de inflexión (**Figura 1**).⁵² Es posible que se produzcan otros puntos de inflexión aún no descubiertos debido a las limitaciones de los modelos actuales y a la exclusión de procesos como los relacionados con el permafrost y otras retroalimentaciones biogeoquímicas.⁵³

En síntesis, los puntos críticos de inflexión extremos desencadenados por retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan plantean riesgos para los sistemas humanos, como la desestabilización financiera y social y el aumento del potencial de conflictos y migraciones masivas, con consecuencias graves e irreversibles para los derechos humanos.⁵⁴



Fuente: Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE, 575(7784): 592–595.

III. ABORDAR LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA

Hacer frente con éxito a la emergencia climática exige que los Estados seleccionen y apliquen soluciones de mitigación rápidas *ahora* para evitar al máximo el calentamiento e impedir que se superen los 1,5°C;⁵⁵ se frenen las retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan y se eviten puntos críticos de inflexión que empeoren los impactos climáticos;⁵⁶ y se proteja a las personas y los

ecosistemas más vulnerables⁵⁷ del calor, la sequía, las inundaciones y otros fenómenos extremos que se agravarán drásticamente con cada incremento del calentamiento adicional.⁵⁸

A. Maratón: La Descarbonización Es Crucial Pero No Puede Frenar El Calentamiento a Corto Plazo Ni Evitar Impactos Abruptos No Lineales

Descarbonizar el sistema energético y lograr emisiones netas iguales a cero es fundamental para estabilizar el clima y mantener las temperaturas por debajo de 1,5°C a finales de este siglo. Sin embargo, incluso si todas las emisiones de CO₂ hoy se redujeran a cero, el planeta no volverá a los niveles preindustriales ya que un porcentaje significativo de CO₂ permanece en la atmósfera durante siglos.⁵⁹ El calentamiento a corto plazo podría acelerarse debido al desenmascaramiento del calentamiento a medida que se reducen los aerosoles de sulfato, a menos que vaya acompañado de reducciones fuertes y sostenidas de los supercontaminantes climáticos.

El IE6 del IPCC y estudios más recientes confirman que la reducción de las emisiones procedentes del uso de combustibles fósiles—la principal fuente de CO₂—mediante la descarbonización del sistema energético, de forma aislada, en realidad acelerará el calentamiento en la próxima década.⁶⁰ La quema de combustibles fósiles no sólo emite CO₂, sino también aerosoles de sulfato, que actúan enfriando el clima. Estos sulfatos refrigerantes desaparecen rápidamente de la atmósfera cuando cesa el uso de combustibles fósiles, mientras que gran parte del CO₂ perdura mucho más tiempo, lo que provoca un calentamiento relativamente mayor durante la primera o segunda década.⁶¹

La maratón para descarbonizar a largo plazo es esencial para la estabilidad del sistema climático, pero el sprint para reducir los supercontaminantes debe producirse de inmediato para reducir la probabilidad de que se superen los 1,5°C,⁶² prevenir las violaciones de los derechos humanos derivadas de los peores impactos climáticos y aumentar la resiliencia.

B. El Sprint: Reducir los Supercontaminantes Climáticos y Aplicar Soluciones Basadas en la Naturaleza Puede Frenar Rápidamente el Calentamiento a Corto Plazo

Reducir los supercontaminantes climáticos puede evitar casi cuatro veces más calentamiento de aquí a 2050 que las estrategias centradas únicamente en el CO₂, en comparación con un escenario de referencia con una mitigación climática limitada y cuando se tiene en cuenta la reducción de las partículas reflectantes que enmascaran el calentamiento como resultado de las estrategias de descarbonización que eliminan gradualmente el uso de combustibles fósiles.⁶³ Según estudios anteriores, la reducción rápida de los contaminantes climáticos de corta vida (CCVC), o supercontaminantes climáticos, podría evitar hasta 0,6°C de calentamiento para 2050 y hasta 1,2°C para 2100.⁶⁴ Esto reduciría el calentamiento previsto en el Ártico en dos tercios, la tasa de calentamiento global a la mitad y evitaría, o al menos retrasaría, las retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan y los puntos críticos de inflexión irreversibles.⁶⁵ El progreso en la reducción del aumento de las emisiones de HFC a través del acuerdo de la Enmienda de Kigali al Protocolo de Montreal acordado en 2016 significa que estamos en vías de lograr alrededor de 0,1°C del calentamiento evitado para 2050. Las soluciones destinadas a reducir los CCVC también disminuyen el desperdicio de alimentos y energía y la contaminación atmosférica.⁶⁶

Según el IPCC, los CCVC son responsables de alrededor de la mitad del calentamiento global actual, contribuyen al aumento del nivel del mar y a fenómenos climáticos más frecuentes y extremos, y perjudican la salud humana, la seguridad alimentaria y la [biodiversidad](#).⁶⁷

Los CCVC son el metano (CH₄), el carbono negro (hollín), el ozono troposférico (O₃, “smog”) y los hidrofluorocarbonos (HFC, o refrigerantes).⁶⁸ Estos CCVC son entre decenas y miles de veces más potentes que el CO₂ para calentar el planeta, pero son de vida corta—es decir, permanecen en la atmósfera entre unos pocos días y unos pocos años, mientras que el CO₂ puede permanecer cientos de años. La reducción de estos contaminantes proporciona beneficios casi inmediatos para el cambio climático y la salud humana.


Otras estrategias rápidas de mitigación para alcanzar los objetivos climáticos a corto y largo plazo son la protección y expansión de los “sumideros de carbono” naturales, que son elementos naturales, como los océanos o los bosques, que absorben y almacenan carbono de la atmósfera.⁶⁹ Estas soluciones basadas en la naturaleza también proporcionan muchos beneficios colaterales a las personas y los ecosistemas,⁷⁰ como la mejora del almacenamiento de agua, la provisión de alimentos y medios de subsistencia y la mejora de la calidad del aire.

IV. LAS CAUSAS HUMANAS DEL CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO

A. Causas Globales del Cambio Climático

De los actuales 1,2°C de calentamiento desde los niveles preindustriales, las emisiones de CO₂ y de otros gases de efecto invernadero (GEI) procedentes de las actividades humanas son responsables de aproximadamente 1,07°C.⁷¹ Las emisiones mundiales de GEI siguen aumentando, y la media anual de dichas emisiones ha alcanzado los registros más altos de la última década.⁷²

Figura 2. Principales Fuentes de Emisiones Mundiales de GEI



Las principales fuentes de emisiones mundiales de GEI provienen del sector de la energía (34%), la industria (24%), la agricultura, la silvicultura y el uso de la tierra (AFOLU) (22%), el transporte (15%) y la construcción (6%). *Fuente:* Dhakal S., Minx J. C., Toth F. L., Abdel-Aziz A., Figueroa Meza M. J., Hubacek K., Jonckheere I. G. C., Kim Y.-G., Nemet G. F., Pachauri S., Tan X. C., & Wiedmann T. (2022) [Chapter 2: Emissions Trends and Drivers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#), Contribución del Grupo de Trabajo al Sexto Informe del Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático, Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.).

En cuanto a los supercontaminantes climáticos, entre el 50% y el 65% de las emisiones mundiales de metano provienen de fuentes antropogénicas de tres sectores principales: la producción de energía (35%),⁷³ la agricultura (40%),⁷⁴ y los residuos (20%),⁷⁵ con la quema de biomasa y biocombustibles como fuentes adicionales.⁷⁶

Los HFC han aumentado en todo el mundo un 18 % entre 2016 y 2020.⁷⁷ Más del 75 % de las emisiones totales de HFC provienen de aparatos de aire acondicionado fijos y refrigeradores industriales/comerciales.⁷⁸


El carbono negro no es un gas de efecto invernadero, sino un potente aerosol que calienta el clima y es un componente del material particulado (concretamente, MP_{2,5}) que entra a la atmósfera a través de la combustión incompleta de combustibles fósiles, así como de biocombustibles y biomasa.⁷⁹ Tiene un impacto en el calentamiento global hasta 1.500 veces mayor que el CO₂ por unidad de masa.⁸⁰ El carbono negro es difícil de cuantificar debido a las limitadas observaciones a escala global.⁸¹

El ozono troposférico no se emite directamente, sino que es producto de reacciones atmosféricas con contaminantes precursores, especialmente metano y otros compuestos orgánicos volátiles y óxidos de nitrógeno. Los niveles mundiales de ozono troposférico aumentaron menos de un 40% desde la era preindustrial hasta 2005, debido al incremento de los contaminantes precursores.⁸² Además de contribuir al calentamiento, es responsable de millones de muertes prematuras,⁸³ de la pérdida de cosechas por un valor de miles de millones de dólares al año,⁸⁴ y del debilitamiento de los sumideros de carbono.⁸⁵

B. Causas del Cambio Climático en las Américas


Desde 1990, y el Caribe (LAC) han contribuido en un 11% al aumento de las emisiones mundiales de GEI,⁸⁶ y en 2019, la región de LAC contribuyó a apenas el 8,1% de las emisiones mundiales.⁸⁷ El sector energético representa el 43% de las emisiones en LAC, muy por debajo de la media mundial del 74%; mientras que la agricultura y el uso de la tierra y la silvicultura combinados representan el 45% de las emisiones, en comparación con la media mundial del 14%.⁸⁸ El sector energético es la mayor fuente de emisiones procedentes de la generación de electricidad basada en combustibles fósiles, junto con el transporte y los procesos industriales.⁸⁹ El sector del uso de la tierra también desempeña un papel crucial en las emisiones de GEI en la región. La deforestación, impulsada principalmente por la expansión agrícola, también representa una fuente importante. Además, el sector industrial contribuye a las emisiones de la región, sobre todo a través de la producción de cemento, acero y productos químicos.

Figura 3. Principales Fuentes de GEI en LAC




Las principales fuentes de emisiones de GEI en LAC son la agricultura (26%), el cambio del uso de la tierra y la silvicultura (21%), el transporte (15%), la producción de electricidad (13%), los residuos y la construcción (12%), y las emisiones restantes provienen de otras actividades tales como los procesos industriales y las emisiones fugitivas (13%). *Fuente:* Grupo del Banco Mundial (2022) [A ROADMAP FOR CLIMATE ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2021-2025](#), 3 (Figura 2).

Figura 4. Principales Fuentes de Emisiones de GEI en Canadá



La principales fuentes de emisiones de GEI en Canadá son el petróleo y el gas (28%), el transporte (22%), la construcción (13%), la industria pesada (11%), la agricultura (10%) y la producción de electricidad (7.7%) y las emisiones restantes provienen de la gestión de residuos y otras actividades (7%). *Fuente:* Environment and Climate Change Canada (2020) [CANADA'S NATIONAL REPORT ON BLACK CARBON AND METHANE CANADA'S THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE ARCTIC COUNCIL](#), Figura ES-6.

Figura 5. Principales Fuentes de Emisiones de GEI en EE.UU.



Las principales fuentes de emisiones de GEI en Estados Unidos son el transporte (28%), la producción de electricidad (25%), la industria (23%), las actividades comerciales y residenciales (13%) y la agricultura (10%). *Fuente:* Agencia de Protección Ambiental de Estados Unidos (28 de abril de 2023) [Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#).

Estados Unidos y Canadá han contribuido históricamente a una cantidad mucho más significativa de emisiones de GEI y tienen una responsabilidad mucho mayor en la emergencia climática. Estados Unidos es el país que más ha contribuido al calentamiento global y ha sido responsable del 20% de las emisiones históricas de CO₂ entre 1850 y 2021.⁹⁰ En 2021, Estados Unidos contribuyó al 11% de las emisiones mundiales de gases de efecto invernadero (lo que equivale a la cuota combinada de emisiones de la UE y Rusia).⁹¹ Actualmente, este país también es el segundo mayor emisor de gases de efecto invernadero del mundo.⁹² Canadá es responsable del 2,6 % de las emisiones históricas de CO₂ entre 1850 y 2021.⁹³ En 2021, Canadá contribuyó al 1,56 % de las emisiones mundiales de gases de efecto invernadero.⁹⁴

De los países de las Américas, Brasil es uno de los principales emisores históricos (el 4° más alto, 5%).⁹⁵ Gran parte de la contribución histórica de Brasil al calentamiento se atribuye a la deforestación de finales del siglo XIX y del siglo XX por los colonos, y en menor medida a las emisiones procedentes de combustibles fósiles.⁹⁶

En cuanto a las emisiones acumuladas de CO₂ en las Américas entre 1990 y 2020, Estados Unidos fue el país con la cuota más alta de emisiones (60%), seguido por Brasil (14%), Canadá (8,3%), México (4,8%) y Venezuela (2,9%).⁹⁷

En cuanto a las emisiones de metano, América del Norte contribuyó al 11,9% de las emisiones mundiales de metano en 2022, siendo el sector energético la fuente más importante.⁹⁸ América Central y del Sur contribuyeron al 10,8% de las emisiones mundiales de metano en 2022, siendo el sector agrícola la mayor fuente de emisiones.⁹⁹ En las Américas, los principales emisores de metano en 2022 fueron EE.UU. (39,42%), Brasil (24,72%), México (0,07%), Argentina (0,07%) y Canadá (0,06%).¹⁰⁰ En cuanto a las emisiones acumuladas de metano en las Américas entre 1990 y 2020, EE.UU. contribuyó a la mayor parte (36%), seguido por Brasil (21%), Venezuela (12%), México (6,8%), Argentina (6,6%) y Canadá (4,7%).¹⁰¹

C. Descripción General de los Supercontaminantes Climáticos por Sector

Los sectores que son fuentes de emisiones de CO₂ también son fuentes de supercontaminantes climáticos en toda América. La agricultura, el transporte y la refrigeración doméstica y comercial producen las mayores emisiones de metano, carbono negro, material particulado (MP) y HFC en LAC, EE.UU. y Canadá.¹⁰² Dado que los supercontaminantes climáticos también son contaminantes atmosféricos, su reducción presenta una oportunidad para abordar cuestiones tanto de salud pública como de seguridad alimentaria y cambio climático. Por ejemplo, la mitigación de las emisiones de supercontaminantes puede reducir el calentamiento en LAC en hasta 0,9°C para 2050.¹⁰³ También puede reducir la mortalidad prematura por MP_{2,5} en al menos un 26% anual en LAC y evitar la pérdida de entre 3 y 4 millones de toneladas de cultivos básicos cada año.¹⁰⁴ Las soluciones para reducir los supercontaminantes climáticos se exponen en la [Sección VI](#).

i. Energía

El sector energético, a través de la producción de combustibles fósiles, es la tercera mayor fuente de emisiones de metano en la región de LAC, representando alrededor del 18% de las emisiones totales de metano en 2019.¹⁰⁵ El metano es emitido debido al venteo y la quema incompleta durante la producción de petróleo y gas y cuando se filtra de tuberías y contenedores durante su almacenamiento y transporte. La producción de gas natural en LAC representó alrededor del 5% de la producción mundial total en 2020, con Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, México, Trinidad y Tobago y Venezuela siendo responsables de la mayor parte de la producción en 2021.¹⁰⁶ Estudios recientes han demostrado que las emisiones de metano procedentes de la producción de petróleo y gas en México son dos veces mayores que las estimadas en el inventario de GEI de dicho país, debido al venteo del gas asociado en los sitios de los pozos y a las fugas de las instalaciones de almacenamiento y transporte.¹⁰⁷

Las emisiones de metano de la industria del petróleo y el gas pueden reducirse en casi un 75% con un ahorro generalizado, dado el precio promedio del gas natural desde 2017 a 2021.¹⁰⁸ Sin embargo, incluso si no se tiene en cuenta el valor del gas capturado, la mayoría de las medidas de reducción disponibles podrían aplicarse a un costo de US\$15/tCO_{2e}.¹⁰⁹ Algunos ejemplos de medidas de mitigación eficaces en términos de costos incluyen la aplicación de programas de detección y reparación de fugas, la instalación de unidades de recuperación de vapor y la sustitución de los equipos con fugas.¹¹⁰

En Estados Unidos, el sector energético representa el 56% de las emisiones de metano.¹¹¹ Un estudio realizado por el Environmental Defense Fund concluyó que entre 2012 y 2018 las emisiones de metano en Estados Unidos fueron un 60 % superiores a las emisiones notificadas por la Agencia de Protección Ambiental (EPA, por sus siglas en inglés).¹¹² Esto se debió a que la EPA subestimó las emisiones de metano procedentes de actividades anómalas como el venteo.¹¹³ En Canadá, el sector energético representó el 58 % de las emisiones de metano.¹¹⁴

ii. Transporte

La combustión de combustibles fósiles en el transporte es una fuente significativa de emisiones de carbono negro en LAC.¹¹⁵ Durante la última década, esta región experimentó una de las tasas de

motorización más altas del mundo, alcanzando un promedio de 201 vehículos por cada 1.000 habitantes en 2015, mientras se enfrentaba a una disminución de la calidad y la productividad de los sistemas de transporte público.¹¹⁶ El sector del transporte representa actualmente el mayor consumo de energía en la región de LAC y depende casi por completo de los combustibles fósiles.¹¹⁷ Argentina, Brasil, México y Venezuela son responsables de las mayores emisiones de carbono negro del sector del transporte.¹¹⁸

En EE.UU., el sector del transporte representa alrededor del 52% de las emisiones nacionales de carbono negro, y los motores diésel contribuyen a aproximadamente el 90% de las emisiones de carbono negro procedentes de dicho sector.¹¹⁹ El transporte y los equipos móviles son, por lejos, la mayor fuente de carbono negro en Canadá, representando el 56% de las emisiones totales en 2021. Los motores diésel contribuyen a aproximadamente el 45% de las emisiones totales.¹²⁰

iii. Agricultura

El sector agrícola es una fuente importante de supercontaminantes climáticos en LAC. Es la mayor fuente de emisiones de metano de la región, representando el 61% en 2019,¹²¹ siendo la ganadería y el cultivo de arroz responsables de más de la mitad de las emisiones de metano de este sector. Solo en América Latina, el subsector ganadero es responsable del 70% de las emisiones agrícolas de metano.¹²²

En EE.UU. y Canadá, la agricultura desempeña un papel menos significativo, aunque importante, en las emisiones de metano. En Estados Unidos, la agricultura representa el 27% de las emisiones de metano,¹²³ y en Canadá, también alcanza el 27%.¹²⁴

La quema de biomasa se ha implementado en toda LAC como una alternativa al tratamiento de residuos, mediante la cual los residuos agrícolas y forestales se queman para producir electricidad.¹²⁵ La quema de biomasa produce carbono negro y deteriora la calidad del aire en la región.¹²⁶ El carbono negro procedente de la quema de biomasa en América del Sur se ha rastreado hasta la Península Antártica y el Océano Austral.¹²⁷ En muchos países, la bioenergía con potencial de captura y almacenamiento de carbono (BECCS, por sus siglas en inglés) se clasifica como neutra en carbono, porque se argumenta que las emisiones de dióxido de carbono se compensan replantando árboles para sustituir los sumideros de carbono que se talan y queman, con emisiones inmediatas de dióxido de carbono. Sin embargo, la BECCS no es neutra en carbono durante varias décadas, si es que alguna vez lo es, ya que las emisiones de carbono procedentes de la tala y la quema de árboles no se compensarán durante décadas o siglos.¹²⁸ La bioenergía a gran escala también afectará la biodiversidad,¹²⁹ dañará la salud humana,¹³⁰ amenazará el suministro de agua y de alimentos¹³¹ y perpetuará la injusticia ambiental.¹³²

iv. Residuos

El sector de los residuos es la segunda fuente de emisiones de metano en América Latina y el Caribe, y representa el 20% de las emisiones de la región.¹³³ El metano se produce cuando los residuos orgánicos de los vertederos son descompuestos por bacterias que producen metano. El Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo estima que la región producirá 296 millones de toneladas de residuos sólidos urbanos (RSU) en 2030, más de la mitad de los cuales se espera que sean

orgánicos.¹³⁴ El 56% de los países de la región eliminan sus residuos en vertederos sanitarios con una implementación limitada de sistemas de captura de biogás y el 40% en vertederos inadecuados.

Los residuos representan el 17% de las emisiones de metano en Estados Unidos,¹³⁵ y el 18% en Canadá.¹³⁶ Los vertederos de residuos sólidos urbanos son la tercera mayor fuente de emisiones de metano relacionadas con la actividad humana en Estados Unidos, representando aproximadamente el 14,3% de estas emisiones en 2021. Las emisiones de metano de los vertederos de RSU en 2021 fueron aproximadamente equivalentes a las emisiones de GEI de casi 23,1 millones de vehículos de pasajeros a gasolina conducidos durante un año o las emisiones de CO₂ producto del uso de energía de casi 13,1 millones de hogares durante un año.¹³⁷

v. Refrigeración

Los HFC son alternativas a las sustancias que agotan la capa de ozono y se utilizan principalmente como refrigerantes para aparatos de refrigeración y aire acondicionado.¹³⁸ A diferencia de otras sustancias controladas por el Protocolo de Montreal, los HFC no agotan la capa de ozono, pero son GEI que contribuyen al calentamiento global varios miles de veces más que el CO₂.¹³⁹

En LAC, el 80% de las emisiones de HFC provienen de Argentina, Brasil y México.¹⁴⁰ Las emisiones de HFC en la región se componen principalmente de HFC-134a y HFC-152.¹⁴¹ A medida que las temperaturas empiecen a subir, también lo hará la demanda de refrigeración. 48,8 millones de personas en LAC corren un alto riesgo de no tener acceso a una refrigeración sostenible.¹⁴² Los pobres de las zonas urbanas son los que corren un mayor riesgo, con un incremento de 500.000 personas entre 2020 y 2021.¹⁴³ Además, con una población en aumento e ingresos y niveles de vida cada vez mayores, se espera que la región multiplique por seis su stock de aparatos de aire acondicionado para 2050.¹⁴⁴ Este aumento previsto de la necesidad y la demanda no sólo podría incrementar las emisiones potenciales de HFC, sino que el aumento del stock de aparatos de aire acondicionado y otros equipos de refrigeración también podría sobrecargar las redes de energía eléctrica.¹⁴⁵

El Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo estima que la intensidad energética (la cantidad de energía consumida por unidad de PIB) en LAC disminuyó un 0,8%, frente a una disminución media mundial del 2,1% anual.¹⁴⁶ Las normas mínimas de rendimiento energético para refrigeración están un 30% por detrás de los principales fabricantes y tendrían que aumentar un 67% para cumplir con las normas establecidas por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente.¹⁴⁷ La mejora de la eficiencia energética en iluminación, refrigeración, aire acondicionado y motores podría ahorrar a la región un 20% en consumo eléctrico.¹⁴⁸

EE.UU., junto con la UE, representan el 80% de las emisiones de HCFC de los países del Anexo 1, y Canadá, junto con Australia, Rusia y Japón, el 20% restante de los países del Anexo 1.¹⁴⁹ El HCFC más común en uso actualmente en EE.UU. es el HCFC-22 o R-22, un refrigerante que todavía se utiliza en los aparatos de aire acondicionado y refrigeración existentes.¹⁵⁰

D. La Contribución de la Deforestación y del Uso de la Tierra al Cambio Climático

Los bosques y otras formas de vegetación son partes esenciales del ciclo del carbono, ya que sirven de “sumideros de carbono” para absorber CO₂ de la atmósfera y almacenarlo a lo largo del tiempo. La degradación de los bosques y de otros sumideros de carbono, por lo tanto, contribuye al calentamiento global al reducir el carbono almacenado en el sumidero de carbono.¹⁵¹ La deforestación combinada con el calentamiento global plantean el riesgo de provocar retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan y de cruzar puntos críticos de inflexión.¹⁵²

La pérdida de bosques y de otros sumideros de carbono contribuye al calentamiento, tanto por privar a la atmósfera de los sumideros de carbono como por contribuir a la liberación de carbono del suelo y de la descomposición. La deforestación combinada con el calentamiento global plantean el riesgo de aumentar las retroalimentaciones que se autoperpetúan y de cruzar puntos críticos de inflexión en los ecosistemas, como la pérdida de la selva amazónica.¹⁵³ Detener la destrucción de nuestros bosques y de otros sumideros de carbono, como los manglares y las praderas marinas, para que sigan almacenando carbono y no se conviertan en fuentes de CO₂ puede proporcionar una rápida mitigación, y al mismo tiempo proteger la biodiversidad.¹⁵⁴

Con las tendencias actuales de calentamiento, el sumidero mundial de carbono terrestre, que ahora mitiga alrededor del 30% de las emisiones de carbono y ha evitado un calentamiento de 0,4°C desde 1900,¹⁵⁵ podría reducirse a la mitad ya en 2040, a medida que el aumento de las temperaturas reduzca la fotosíntesis y acelere la respiración,¹⁵⁶ el proceso biológico de obtención de energía que produce dióxido de carbono y agua como subproductos.

Se calcula que los ecosistemas de la Tierra contienen 139 mil millones de toneladas métricas de “carbono irrecuperable”, definido como el carbono almacenado en sistemas naturales que “son vulnerables a la liberación por la actividad humana y que, de perderse, no podrían ser restaurados para el 2050.”¹⁵⁷ Las mayores concentraciones de carbono irrecuperable se encuentran en la Amazonia, con reservas adicionales a nivel mundial en los bosques boreales, los manglares y las turberas.¹⁵⁸ Las actividades humanas, como la deforestación, la agricultura de tala y quema, la expansión agrícola, así como los impactos climáticos asociados, como sequías, inundaciones y cambios en las precipitaciones, amenazan estas reservas de carbono.

La deforestación masiva en LAC, causada por la expansión de la agricultura, el crecimiento de las ciudades, la explotación maderera y otras actividades humanas, agota los bosques y otros sumideros de carbono terrestres, como humedales, manglares, praderas y otros ecosistemas. Detener la destrucción de los bosques y otros sumideros naturales de carbono de la región, como los manglares y las praderas marinas, para que sigan almacenando carbono y no se conviertan en fuentes de carbono, puede proporcionar una rápida mitigación y también proteger la biodiversidad.¹⁵⁹ Si se liberara todo el carbono (el equivalente a 10 años de emisiones humanas) almacenado en la Amazonia, el planeta podría calentarse 0,3°C.¹⁶⁰ Además, la destrucción de estos ecosistemas naturales por la deforestación y las prácticas de uso de la tierra afecta a un amplio espectro de derechos, que se explican más adelante.

Se prevé que la retroalimentación entre el cambio climático y el cambio en el uso de la tierra, incluida la deforestación, pongan en peligro a la Amazonia y su eficacia como sumidero de

carbono—sólo en la última década, la Amazonia meridional se ha convertido en una fuente neta de carbono, en gran parte debido al cambio climático y la deforestación.¹⁶¹ Entre 1991 y 2022, el aumento promedio de la temperatura en LAC se incrementó en unos 0,2°C por década (comparado con los 0,1°C por década entre 1961 y 1990).¹⁶²

La selva amazónica ya se encuentra al límite de su punto crítico de inflexión estimado, entre el 20% y el 40% de pérdida total,¹⁶³ con un 20% destruido por completo y un 6% adicional irreparable en ausencia de intervención humana.¹⁶⁴ La deforestación continuada y la desecación de la vegetación y los suelos en la Amazonia en escenarios de altas emisiones podrían dar lugar a una pérdida de hasta el 50% de la cubierta forestal para 2050.¹⁶⁵ Además, los cambios en el ciclo hídrico global pueden estar llevando a la Amazonia a un punto crítico de inflexión.¹⁶⁶ La combinación de condiciones más secas, la deforestación y el calentamiento han ido reduciendo la resiliencia de la cubierta forestal amazónica desde 2000, aumentando el riesgo de regresión, punto en el cual la selva tropical se convertirá en sabana.¹⁶⁷ Con el aumento de la deforestación, incluida la provocada por incendios, mayores perturbaciones y temperaturas más elevadas, hay un punto más allá del cual la selva amazónica será difícil de restablecer,¹⁶⁸ y mediciones recientes sugieren que la zona del Sudoeste de la Amazonia ya ha pasado a ser una fuente neta de carbono a medida que aumenta la mortalidad de los árboles y disminuye la fotosíntesis.¹⁶⁹

Estados Unidos y Canadá también tienen una importante cubierta forestal. Casi un tercio del territorio estadounidense está cubierto por bosques. Estos bosques de EE.UU. fueron un sumidero neto de carbono en 2021, secuestrando 794 MMT equivalentes de CO₂ (o 216 MMT de carbono) ese año.¹⁷⁰ Esto representó una compensación del 13% de las emisiones de GEI. Sin embargo, dichos bosques corren el riesgo de sufrir una mayor tasa de incendios forestales, y hay estudios que atribuyen el aumento de los incendios forestales en el oeste de Estados Unidos al calentamiento global provocado por el ser humano.¹⁷¹

Canadá es el tercer país con mayor superficie forestal del mundo.¹⁷² A pesar de esto, los bosques no han actuado como sumideros de carbono en Canadá desde 2001, y solo en 2016 los bosques gestionados de Canadá contribuyeron a unas 78 megatoneladas de emisiones.¹⁷³ Las emisiones son el resultado de prácticas de tala como la tala de bosques antiguos y la quema de vegetación forestal, así como del creciente impacto del cambio climático, incluidos los brotes de escarabajos del pino y los incendios forestales.¹⁷⁴

E. La Contribución de la Destrucción de los Sumideros Oceánicos al Cambio Climático

Los sumideros de carbono oceánico son zonas del océano que absorben y almacenan dióxido de carbono de la atmósfera como parte del ciclo natural del carbono. Al igual que los bosques, la absorción de dióxido de carbono por el océano mitiga los efectos del cambio climático al reducir la cantidad de dióxido de carbono liberado en la atmósfera. Según la Administración Nacional Oceánica y Atmosférica de Estados Unidos (NOAA, por sus siglas en inglés), el océano absorbe alrededor del 30% del CO₂ que se libera en la atmósfera. Como resultado del aumento de las emisiones globales de CO₂, la acidez del océano ha aumentado aproximadamente un 30%, el agua del mar se ha calentado 0,88°C y la Circulación Meridional de Retorno del Atlántico se ha ralentizado aproximadamente un 15%.¹⁷⁵ Sin el océano, la Tierra sería 36°C más caliente.¹⁷⁶

Además de ser importantes sumideros de carbono, alrededor de 3 mil millones de personas dependen de los ecosistemas marinos del mundo para su seguridad alimentaria, su economía y su cultura.¹⁷⁷ En LAC, el océano desempeña un papel fundamental en la absorción y el almacenamiento de dióxido de carbono. El Caribe cuenta con extensos arrecifes de coral, praderas marinas y manglares, todos ellos muy eficaces para almacenar carbono. Proteger y restaurar estos ecosistemas puede ayudar a aumentar el almacenamiento de carbono en los océanos de la región.

En América del Sur, el Río Amazonas desempeña un papel importante en el almacenamiento de carbono oceánico de la región, ya que aporta grandes cantidades de carbono orgánico al océano a través de la escorrentía.¹⁷⁸ Sin embargo, la deforestación y el cambio en el uso de la tierra en la cuenca del Amazonas (descritos anteriormente) plantean un riesgo para este potencial de almacenamiento de carbono.¹⁷⁹ En la subregión de América Central, aunque los manglares ofrecen un potencial significativo para el almacenamiento de carbono, que son muy eficaces en el secuestro de carbono, estos se ven amenazados por la deforestación, el desarrollo costero y la acuicultura. En general, las oportunidades de almacenamiento de carbono en los océanos de LAC son significativas, pero también existen riesgos que deben abordarse para aprovechar plenamente este potencial.

En Estados Unidos, se calcula que los hábitats costeros de carbono azul retienen 4,8 millones de toneladas métricas de CO₂ al año.¹⁸⁰ Estados Unidos anunció en 2021 que conservaría el 30% de la tierra y el océano para 2030 (a través de la iniciativa 30x30).¹⁸¹ Dentro de Estados Unidos, varios estados están incorporando ecosistemas de carbono azul dentro de sus inventarios de GEI, colaborando con la NOAA mediante la creación de áreas marinas y costeras protegidas, incluidas las Reservas Nacionales de Investigación Estuarina y los Santuarios Marinos Nacionales. En 2019, la NOAA incorporó el carbono azul costero en el Inventario de Gases de Efecto Invernadero de Estados Unidos de la EPA, y en 2020, Estados Unidos se convirtió en el primer país del mundo en añadir el carbono azul de las praderas marinas costeras, los manglares y las marismas saladas a su inventario nacional de gases de efecto invernadero.¹⁸²

Asimismo, los ecosistemas costeros de Canadá (el país con el litoral más extenso del mundo), incluidos el océano, las marismas, las praderas marinas, los bosques de algas y los sedimentos blandos marinos, son sumideros de carbono fundamentales.¹⁸³

La sobrepesca supone una de las mayores amenazas para la salud de los océanos. Esta práctica amenaza la resiliencia de los ecosistemas marinos, a los efectos del cambio climático en las aguas oceánicas, y el calentamiento añadido compromete la capacidad de los organismos marinos para repoblarse.¹⁸⁴ Por ejemplo, los especímenes jóvenes de platija de cola amarilla del sur de Nueva Inglaterra y las costas del Atlántico Medio de EE.UU. necesitan “piscinas frías” para sobrevivir, y sin embargo, la tasa de calentamiento de las aguas del noreste de EE.UU. es una de las más altas del mundo.¹⁸⁵ A pesar de algunos éxitos en la repoblación de ciertas poblaciones de peces, se sabe que en Estados Unidos 48 poblaciones están sobreexplotadas, lo que significa que el tamaño de la población es lo suficientemente bajo como para poner en peligro la capacidad de la población para mantener su rendimiento máximo sostenible.¹⁸⁶

V. IMPACTOS CLIMÁTICOS EN LAS AMÉRICAS

Al ritmo actual de calentamiento de 1,2°C, LAC ya está experimentando importantes fenómenos relacionados con el clima que están afectando directa e indirectamente los derechos humanos protegidos por el sistema interamericano. Un mayor calentamiento multiplicará y magnificará estas violaciones de derechos. Si el calentamiento global supera los 1,5°C, estos impactos aumentarán significativamente en escala y gravedad. Sin embargo, los impactos climáticos tendrán consecuencias diferenciadas en toda la región en función de numerosos factores geográficos, económicos, culturales y políticos. Las necesidades de adaptación de muchos individuos y grupos serán menores bajo el límite de 1,5°C.¹⁸⁷ Las estrategias que abordan los impactos del cambio climático sin centrarse adecuadamente en los factores sociales y económicos de vulnerabilidad que permiten que estos impactos violen y erosionen de manera desigual e injusta los derechos de determinadas personas y comunidades ponen en grave peligro muchos de los derechos fundamentales del sistema interamericano. Los esfuerzos de mitigación y adaptación al cambio climático deben tener en cuenta las necesidades de estos grupos para evitar violaciones de los derechos humanos y garantizar una transición justa, equitativa y sostenible.

Cuadro 1. Resumen de Impactos Climáticosⁱⁱ

Impacto		Impactos Actuales	Impactos Futuros Previstos
Muertes producto de enfermedades relacionadas con el clima	Global	39.503.684 millones de muertes en 2019 ¹⁸⁸	3,4 millones de muertes al año a finales de siglo ¹⁸⁹
	LAC	16,52 millones de casos de dengue entre 2010–2019 ¹⁹⁰	260% de aumento del dengue a mediados de siglo ¹⁹¹
	EE.UU. y Canadá	642.602 casos de enfermedades transmitidas por mosquitos, tik y pulgas entre 2004–2016 (EE.UU.) ¹⁹²	9.900 casos anuales de enfermedad de Lyme a finales de siglo (Canadá) ¹⁹³
Muertes producto de temperaturas extremas	Global	Más de 5 millones al año (2000–2019) ¹⁹⁴	Aumento de entre el 100% y el 1000% de la tasa de mortalidad excesiva debida al calor extremo para finales de siglo ¹⁹⁵
	LAC	200.055 personas al año (2000–2019) ¹⁹⁶	
	EE.UU. y Canadá		Se prevé que la mortalidad relacionada con el calor sea más del doble en la década de 2050 y el triple en la de 2080 con respecto a los niveles actuales en las principales ciudades canadienses ¹⁹⁷ 7.300 muertes adicionales para la década de 2030 y 16.000 para la de 2050 (EE.UU.) ¹⁹⁸
Exposición a calor extremo	Global	1.700 millones de personas expuestas al calor extremo solo en zonas urbanas ¹⁹⁹	1.280 millones de personas a finales de siglo ²⁰⁰

ⁱⁱ Obsérvese que el alcance de estas futuras repercusiones previstas variará en función de la escala del aumento de la temperatura mundial, de la medida en que los Estados puedan adaptarse al cambio climático y de cualquier otra posible escalada de la emergencia climática causada por el cruce de puntos de inflexión clave u otros acontecimientos.

Impacto		Impactos Actuales	Impactos Futuros Previstos
	LAC	8,6 millones de personas-día/año entre 1983–2016 (EE.UU.) ²⁰¹	Aumento de los días extremadamente calurosos de 5 a 10 veces para mediados de siglo (Sudamérica) ²⁰²
	EE.UU. y Canadá	41,6 millones de personas-día/año entre 1983–2016 ²⁰³	107 millones de personas a mediados de siglo (EE.UU.) ²⁰⁴
Horas de trabajo perdidas debido al calor extremo	Global	133.600 millones de horas de trabajo en 2018 ²⁰⁵	362–1091 mil millones de horas ²⁰⁶
	LAC	22.000 millones de dólares de pérdida de ingresos en 2021 (Sudamérica) ²⁰⁷	
	EE.UU. y Canadá		1.800 millones de horas (EE.UU.) ²⁰⁸
Exposición a la contaminación del aire	Global	7.280 millones de personas expuestas a PM 2,5 ²⁰⁹	14% del aumento global de la mortalidad relacionada con el ozono a finales de siglo ²¹⁰ 6,6 millones de muertes por contaminación atmosférica en 2050 ²¹¹
	LAC	500 millones de personas ²¹²	
	EE.UU. y Canadá	Más de 103 millones de personas expuestas al smog de ozono (EE.UU.) ²¹³	
Desplazamiento interno debido a catástrofes relacionadas con el clima	Global	23,7 millones de personas en 2021 ²¹⁴	1.200 millones de personas en 2050 ²¹⁵
	LAC	1,7 millones de personas en 2021 (LAC, EE.UU. y Canadá) ²¹⁶	10,6 millones de personas en 2050 ²¹⁷
	EE.UU. y Canadá		
Reducción en el rendimiento de los cultivos	Global		10% para 2050, 25% para 2100 ²¹⁸
	LAC		Reducción del 19% de los cultivos de judías para 2050, reducción del 17,2% del maíz para 2050 ²¹⁹ Reducción del 30% del rendimiento global de las plantaciones de aquí a 2050 (Caribe) ²²⁰
	EE.UU. y Canadá		Reducción del 7% del maíz y del 9% de la soja para mediados de siglo (EE.UU.) ²²¹
Daños directos de catástrofes climáticas	Global		
	LAC		100.000 millones de dólares anuales de aquí a 2050 ²²²
	EE.UU. y Canadá	US\$1,1 billones (2013–2022) (EE.UU.) ²²³ US\$18.000 millones (2010–2019) (Canadá) ²²⁴	US\$14,5 billones en 50 años (EE.UU.) ²²⁵
Pérdida de PIB	Global		65% del PIB a finales de siglo ²²⁶
	LAC	1,7% del PIB anual ²²⁷	16% del PIB a finales de siglo ²²⁸
	EE.UU. y Canadá	0,8% del PIB en 2021 (Canadá) ²²⁹	2,5% del PIB en 2050 y 1–4% del PIB anual a finales de siglo (EE.UU.) ²³⁰

A. Resumen de Impactos en América Latina y el Caribe

En toda la región de LAC, los impactos del cambio climático ya están provocando inseguridad alimentaria e hídrica, migraciones y desplazamientos, alteración de los medios de subsistencia, importantes problemas de salud física y mental y graves pérdidas económicas.

Según el IE6 del IPCC para la región de LAC, es probable que el cambio climático convierta los riesgos existentes en riesgos graves clave para la región. Los mismos incluyen:

1. Riesgo de inseguridad alimentaria debido a las sequías;
2. Riesgo a las personas y la infraestructura debido a inundaciones y deslizamientos de tierra;
3. Riesgo de inseguridad hídrica debido a la disminución de la cobertura de nieve, el retroceso de los glaciares y la variabilidad de las precipitaciones;
4. Riesgo de aumento de epidemias, particularmente de enfermedades transmitidas por vectores;
5. Riesgos en cascada que abruman los sistemas de servicios públicos;
6. Riesgo de cambios a gran escala y cambios de bioma en la Amazonia;
7. Riesgos para los ecosistemas de arrecifes de coral; y
8. Riesgos para los sistemas socio-ecológicos costeros debido al aumento del nivel del mar (SLR, por sus siglas en inglés), las mareas de tormenta y erosión costera.²³¹

El calentamiento por encima de 1,5°C tendrá efectos devastadores en toda la región de LAC, especialmente en las zonas más vulnerables: en Colombia, Brasil y Argentina, la población que se verá afectada por inundaciones aumentará en un 100-200%; en Ecuador, en un 300% y en Perú, en un 400%.²³²

Se espera que el calentamiento por encima de 1,5°C tenga un impacto significativo en las islas del Caribe, por lo que es necesario tomar medidas urgentes para mitigar estos impactos y apoyar los esfuerzos de resiliencia y adaptación de la región.²³³ A medida que aumenta la temperatura global, la expansión térmica y el derretimiento de los glaciares y de los mantos de hielo provocarán un aumento del nivel del mar. Esto tendrá un impacto significativo en las islas bajas del Caribe, que ya están sufriendo inundaciones y erosión debido al aumento del nivel del mar.²³⁴ Es probable que el aumento del nivel del mar también exacerbe las mareas de tormenta y las inundaciones costeras. El cambio climático también aumentará la intensidad y frecuencia de fenómenos meteorológicos extremos como huracanes, tormentas tropicales e inundaciones.²³⁵ Además, se espera que el aumento de las temperaturas provoque un incremento de las tasas de evaporación, lo que podría agravar los problemas de inseguridad alimentaria e hídrica en el Caribe.²³⁶ Muchas islas de la región ya sufren escasez de agua, y esto podría empeorar con un clima más cálido.²³⁷ El Caribe ya es propenso a estos fenómenos, y se agravarán con un clima más cálido, lo que provocará un aumento de los daños en infraestructuras y propiedades, así como la pérdida de vidas humanas.

Los impactos del cambio de uso de la tierra, en particular la deforestación, los incendios y otros efectos del cambio climático tienen repercusiones directas en la salud humana, los ecosistemas, la seguridad alimentaria, los medios de subsistencia y los sumideros de carbono en la región.²³⁸ Específicamente, los impactos previstos en LAC incluyen el aumento de la inseguridad alimentaria

debido a las sequías; el aumento de la inseguridad hídrica debido al derretimiento de la nieve y del hielo de los glaciares (por ejemplo, en los Altos Andes) y a la variabilidad de las precipitaciones; el riesgo para las personas y la infraestructura debido a las inundaciones y el deslizamiento de tierras; el riesgo para la salud debido al aumento de las enfermedades transmitidas por vectores; importantes riesgos físicos y culturales para la Amazonia; y el riesgo para los sistemas costeros debido al aumento del nivel del mar y la erosión costera, entre otros impactos previstos.²³⁹

Entre 2000 y 2019, LAC fue la segunda región más propensa a catástrofes mundiales, con 152 millones de personas afectadas por 1.205 desastres, entre los que se incluyen inundaciones, tormentas, terremotos, sequías, deslizamientos de tierra, incendios forestales y calor extremo.²⁴⁰ Los estudios de atribución ahora pueden vincular el cambio climático a fenómenos meteorológicos extremos específicos y a los daños que causan.²⁴¹ Este conjunto creciente de evidencia científica e histórica en la atribución climática refuerza la base jurídica para reparar los daños.

Según el IE6 del GTI, “[E]s *prácticamente seguro* que ha aumentado la frecuencia y la intensidad de los episodios de calor extremo (incluidas las olas de calor) en la mayoría de las regiones terrestres desde la década de 1950... hay un *nivel de confianza alto* en que el cambio climático inducido por el ser humano es la principal fuerza impulsora de estos cambios.”²⁴² En escenarios de emisiones altas, los periodos de una semana de temperaturas récord son entre dos y siete veces más probables en 2021–2050 y entre tres y veintiún veces más probables en 2051–2080, en comparación con las tres últimas décadas—lo que sería prácticamente imposible sin el calentamiento antropogénico.²⁴³ Además, la intensidad de los incendios nocturnos ha aumentado en todo el mundo un 7,2% en las dos últimas décadas debido al aumento de las temperaturas, lo que provoca incendios más intensos, duraderos y de mayor tamaño.²⁴⁴

Una serie de impactos para la región son de especial importancia para entender cómo los derechos humanos se ven afectados por el inicio del cambio climático en la región y se abordan a continuación.

B. Resumen de Impactos en EE.UU. y Canadá

Estados Unidos y Canadá también están experimentando impactos dramáticos como resultado del cambio climático. Estos impactos afectan de manera desproporcionada a las comunidades indígenas costeras. Si bien ambos países tienen acceso a mayores recursos para comprometerse en la mitigación y adaptación al clima que la región de LAC, el impacto económico del cambio climático está agotando y agotará significativamente los recursos de dos de las mayores economías del mundo. Los impactos del cambio climático en EE.UU. y Canadá ilustran que incluso los países del norte global no pueden escapar a los efectos del cambio climático sobre los derechos humanos.

Según el IE6 del IPCC sobre América del Norte, “si no se limita el calentamiento a 1,5°C, se prevé que los principales riesgos para América del Norte se intensifiquen rápidamente a mediados de siglo (nivel de confianza alto). Estos riesgos provocarán cambios irreversibles en los ecosistemas, daños cada vez mayores en infraestructura y viviendas, tensiones en los sectores económicos, alteraciones en los medios de subsistencia y problemas de salud mental y física, ocio y seguridad. La aplicación inmediata, generalizada y coordinada de medidas de adaptación destinadas a reducir los riesgos y centradas en la equidad tiene el mayor potencial para mantener y mejorar la calidad

de vida de los norteamericanos, garantizar medios de vida sostenibles y proteger la biodiversidad y la productividad ecológica y económica a largo plazo en América del Norte.”²⁴⁵

El calor extremo y los huracanes ya han causado un alto índice de víctimas mortales en Estados Unidos y Canadá, además de costar miles de millones de dólares en daños. El impacto de los huracanes Irma y María fue especialmente devastador, con miles de decesos solo en el territorio estadounidense de Puerto Rico.²⁴⁶ A medida que aumenten la tasa y la escala de los desastres climáticos, también lo harán los recursos económicos necesarios para mitigarlos y adaptarse a ellos. Las pérdidas económicas inducidas por el cambio climático podrían costar a la economía estadounidense US\$14,5 mil millones en los próximos 50 años.²⁴⁷ Esto, a su vez, dificulta la capacidad de Estados Unidos y Canadá para utilizar su mayor poder económico como fuerza para fomentar la cooperación climática mundial.

Estados Unidos y Canadá también están experimentando un aumento de las inundaciones, las sequías y la pérdida de glaciares, lo que está dañando la vida y los medios de subsistencia de las comunidades costeras, además de destruir viviendas e importantes sitios de interés cultural indígena.

Aunque Estados Unidos y Canadá son naciones ricas, sigue habiendo zonas de pobreza y privaciones, sobre todo en las comunidades pesqueras de subsistencia.²⁴⁸ La erosión costera, la acidificación de los océanos y el aumento de los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos dificultan la capacidad de estas comunidades para ejercer sus derechos personales, sociales, económicos y culturales. Los daños a las economías de Estados Unidos y Canadá también son desproporcionados para las comunidades de menores ingresos, lo que provoca un aumento de la desigualdad y la pérdida de oportunidades sociales y económicas.²⁴⁹

El IE6 del IPCC prevé que los principales riesgos en América del Norte se intensificarán rápidamente a mediados de siglo. Estos incluyen un aumento de los riesgos climáticos, como los incendios forestales y las olas de calor, un aumento de los riesgos sanitarios, incluidas las enfermedades transmitidas por vectores, daños a la capacidad de producción de alimentos de la región y una escalada de los impactos del cambio climático en los ecosistemas marinos, de agua dulce y terrestres.²⁵⁰ El Gobierno de EE.UU. podría gastar entre US\$25 y 128 mil millones adicionales al año en sólo seis tipos de gastos federales: ayuda destinada a catástrofes costeras, seguros contra inundaciones, seguros de cosechas, seguros de asistencia sanitaria, extinción de incendios forestales e inundaciones en instalaciones federales para finales de siglo.²⁵¹

C. Impactos del Cambio Climático en la Economía y la Salud

El Informe de Perspectivas Económicas Mundiales 2022 del Fondo Monetario Internacional insta a los responsables de políticas a establecer políticas climáticas creíbles e irreversibles y afirma que los costos de la transición serían “insignificantes frente a los innumerables costos a largo plazo de la inacción.”²⁵²

Sin embargo, al momento de evaluar las repercusiones económicas del cambio climático, es importante destacar las limitaciones de los actuales modelos de financiación climática. Los modelos climáticos no describen de manera precisa ni el futuro ni las implicaciones financieras.²⁵³

La evaluación más reciente de los modelos de financiación climática concluye que los mismos no incluyen los puntos críticos de inflexión, los bucles de retroalimentación, el aumento del nivel del mar, el estrés térmico, las interrupciones del suministro de alimentos, los efectos en cascada ni los costos de adaptación.²⁵⁴ El comunicado de prensa de la evaluación afirma que “[e]sto limita seriamente la utilidad de los modelos para los líderes empresariales y los responsables de políticas, quienes razonablemente pueden creer que estos modelos captan eficazmente los niveles de riesgo, sin ser conscientes de que muchos de los impactos climáticos más graves no se han tenido en cuenta.”²⁵⁵ Es preciso considerar la siguiente información entendiendo que estas proyecciones son inverosímilmente conservadoras si superamos los 1,5°C.

Pérdida de PBI. Cambridge Econometrics cuantificó en un 65% el impacto negativo sobre el PBI mundial en un escenario sin introducción de cambios (business-as-usual, BAU, por sus siglas en inglés) con un calentamiento de 4°C para 2100. Los autores afirmaron que “[e]s probable que estas estimaciones de grandes daños subestimen las pérdidas reales, ya que nuestro método se basa en la relación observada entre temperatura y producción económica, y nos centramos únicamente en los efectos del calentamiento gradual sobre la productividad. No tienen en cuenta los puntos críticos de inflexión ni otros cambios sin precedentes en el sistema climático.”²⁵⁶

Los fenómenos extremos relacionados con el clima ya han costado porcentajes de dos dígitos del PBI en algunos casos.²⁵⁷ En las clasificaciones de los impactos de los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos de 2000 a 2019 en términos de pérdidas económicas como porcentaje del PBI, ocho de los 20 primeros países se encuentran en el Caribe.²⁵⁸ Entre 1970 y 2021, los desastres registrados relacionados con factores climáticos, meteorológicos e hídricos costaron a los países de las Américas US\$2 trillones.²⁵⁹ Para 2050, los daños del cambio climático podrían costar US\$100 mil millones anuales a la región de LAC.²⁶⁰

Pobreza, Inseguridad Alimentaria e Hídrica. Las perturbaciones climáticas reducen los ingresos del 40% más pobre en más del doble del promedio de la población de LAC y podrían sumir a un número estimado de 2,4–5,8 millones de personas de la región a la pobreza extrema para 2030.²⁶¹ Se prevé que las plantaciones en el Caribe caigan en rendimiento hasta un 30% para 2050.²⁶² Un menor rendimiento tendría consecuencias negativas en varios ámbitos, como el crecimiento de la producción y la inversión en agricultura, el sector de exportaciones, la reducción de la pobreza y la seguridad alimentaria. También hay evidencia de un aumento presente y futuro de la escasez de agua, lo que aumentaría aún más la pobreza en la región.²⁶³

La inacción continua ante el cambio climático provocará la pérdida de 900.000 oportunidades de empleo al año en EE.UU. durante los próximos 50 años debido a los daños causados por el clima.²⁶⁴ En Canadá, los hogares con bajos ingresos podrían sufrir una pérdida de ingresos del 12% si la temperatura global aumentara 2°C.²⁶⁵

Las sequías prolongadas, los cambios en las precipitaciones y el cambio en el uso de la tierra agravan la inseguridad alimentaria en LAC, y el aumento de los precios de los alimentos y los factores socioeconómicos pueden dificultar el acceso a dietas saludables en la región.²⁶⁶ En América del Sur, que comprende el 66% de la población de LAC,²⁶⁷ 168,7 millones de personas sufren inseguridad alimentaria moderada o grave.²⁶⁸ Esta cifra no hará más que aumentar a medida

que el cambio climático ejerza mayor presión sobre los sistemas alimentarios,²⁶⁹ lo que subraya la necesidad de reducir el calentamiento a corto plazo para disminuir los impactos del cambio climático sobre la seguridad alimentaria en LAC.

El aumento del nivel del mar provoca la intrusión de agua salada, que puede impedir el acceso a agua potable y supone una de las mayores amenazas para los sistemas de agua dulce.²⁷⁰ En el Caribe, la demanda de agua ya está superando la oferta, lo que se ve agudizado por las severas sequías agravadas por el calentamiento global.²⁷¹ A pesar del aumento de las precipitaciones, algunos lugares de LAC siguen experimentando inseguridad hídrica—entre 2014 y 2016, Brasil vivió una crisis por falta de agua, cuando el principal embalse de Sao Paulo alcanzó solo el 5% de su capacidad de 1,3 mil millones de m³.²⁷²

Salud y Acceso a la Atención Médica. Los impactos del cambio climático se están acelerando y afectando de manera desproporcionada la salud de las poblaciones vulnerables de LAC. La falta de acción expeditiva para reducir el calentamiento cuesta vidas: de todas las muertes relacionadas con el calor, entre el 20% (Argentina) y el 77% (Ecuador) pueden atribuirse al cambio climático causado por el ser humano en LAC.²⁷³ El entorno cambiante también aumenta la probabilidad de enfermedades infecciosas como el dengue.²⁷⁴ Entre 2000–2009 y 2010–2019, los casos de dengue casi se triplicaron (de 6,78 millones a 16,52 millones) en LAC.²⁷⁵ La contaminación atmosférica incrementó las tasas de hospitalización y mortalidad por COVID-19 en esta región.²⁷⁶ Las malas condiciones sanitarias en los países de bajos ingresos pueden exacerbar los riesgos para la salud y provocar más muertes en la región si no se toman más medidas climáticas, ambientales y económicas, lo que subraya la necesidad de actuar de inmediato para reducir el calentamiento a corto plazo.²⁷⁷

D. Las Implicancias de la Vulnerabilidad en LAC

Los grupos vulnerables de la región de LAC se ven desproporcionadamente afectados por el cambio climático en las formas que se detallan a continuación. Las implicancias de la vulnerabilidad ante los impactos climáticos ya plantean amenazas a los derechos humanos y dificultan una transición justa tanto en términos de mitigación como de adaptación.

Pueblos Indígenas. Los pueblos indígenas de América Latina son especialmente vulnerables a los impactos del cambio climático debido a su dependencia de los recursos naturales para su subsistencia y a su profunda conexión cultural con la tierra. Según el Banco Mundial, el 24% de la población indígena de la región vive en condiciones de pobreza extrema (2,7 veces más que la población no indígena), y estas poblaciones se ven afectadas de manera desproporcionada por el cambio climático.²⁷⁸ Este problema amenaza la cultura, los medios de subsistencia y la seguridad de los pueblos indígenas.²⁷⁹ El aumento del nivel del mar, la pérdida de biodiversidad y otros impactos del cambio climático agravan aún más la pérdida de las lenguas indígenas.²⁸⁰

Los pueblos indígenas de LAC ya tienen más probabilidades de experimentar una mayor pobreza, menos empleo y un acceso limitado a la educación, los servicios sanitarios y los procesos de toma de decisiones.²⁸¹ Esto se ve agravado por los impactos del cambio climático que agudizan e imponen vulnerabilidades adicionales debido a la dependencia de las comunidades indígenas del entorno natural para su supervivencia cultural y física.²⁸² Muchas de estas comunidades también se ven obligadas a vivir en zonas propensas a riesgos climáticos, como las zonas costeras bajas y

las llanuras aluviales.²⁸³ Sin embargo, los pueblos indígenas, aunque sólo representan el 5% de la población mundial, protegen el 80% de la biodiversidad del planeta (especialmente las mujeres).²⁸⁴

Mujeres y Minorías de Género. Los impactos climáticos afectan de manera desproporcionada a las mujeres y a las minorías de género en LAC. En esta región, las mujeres experimentan mayores niveles de inseguridad alimentaria y pobreza en comparación con los hombres.²⁸⁵ Las mujeres y las minorías de género también tienen más dificultades para migrar en América del Sur debido a la falta de redes sociales que están más disponibles para los hombres y, por lo tanto, tienen más probabilidades de permanecer en las zonas que sufren los impactos del cambio climático.²⁸⁶ Las desigualdades de género existentes, combinadas con la degradación del medio ambiente, también exacerban la violencia de género, como la violencia doméstica, el matrimonio forzado, la trata de personas, la prostitución forzada y los crímenes de odio.²⁸⁷

Niños y Jóvenes. Los niños y los jóvenes se enfrentan a impactos sanitarios desproporcionados causados por un mundo que se calienta rápidamente. Por ejemplo, la contaminación atmosférica tiene un impacto desproporcionado en los jóvenes, ya que el 98% de los niños de los países de ingresos bajos y medios respiran aire contaminado,²⁸⁸ lo que provoca la muerte de uno de cada diez niños o un retraso permanente en su desarrollo.²⁸⁹ En la región de LAC, 105 millones de niños ya están expuestos a la contaminación atmosférica.²⁹⁰ Si el planeta alcanza 2,4°C de calentamiento en 2050, comparado con 1,7°C, 370 millones de niños más estarán expuestos a olas de calor de larga duración.²⁹¹

Ancianos. Los adultos mayores (65 años y más) son desproporcionadamente vulnerables a los impactos en la salud asociados con el cambio climático y los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos.²⁹² Las personas mayores son particularmente vulnerables a la exposición al calor, y se prevé que el cambio climático aumente el riesgo de exposición. En LAC, el cambio climático ya está aumentando la exposición al calor de las personas mayores.²⁹³ Entre 2012 y 2021, en promedio, los adultos mayores de 65 años estuvieron expuestos a 12,3 millones más de personas-días de olas de calor cada año, en comparación con la línea de base de 1995-2005.²⁹⁴ En casi todos los países de América del Sur, el número de muertes relacionadas con el calor ha aumentado de manera continua entre las personas mayores de 65 años desde el año 2000.²⁹⁵ El número de muertes relacionadas con el calor aumentó un 160% en promedio en el período 2017–2021, en comparación con el período 2000–2004.²⁹⁶ Las personas mayores también son vulnerables al cambio climático porque son particularmente vulnerables a las enfermedades, la calidad del aire, el humo de los incendios forestales, las olas de calor y otros problemas agravados causados por la emergencia climática.²⁹⁷

Comunidades Pobres y Económicamente Marginadas. Los impactos climáticos agravan los factores desencadenantes subyacentes que perjudican a la economía y afectan de forma desproporcionada a las comunidades empobrecidas. Cada año, entre 150.000 y 2,1 millones de personas sufren pobreza extrema debido a desastres naturales en LAC —para 2030, esta cifra podría aumentar a 5,8 millones de personas al año, principalmente debido a los efectos del cambio climático relacionados con la salud.²⁹⁸ Para quienes viven en las zonas más empobrecidas, existe una mayor probabilidad de sufrir impactos climáticos debilitantes, exacerbados por las malas condiciones de vida, la falta de servicios y recursos públicos y los lugares contaminantes cercanos.²⁹⁹ La desigualdad en la región también se interrelaciona con la pobreza, tornando a las

comunidades pobres altamente vulnerables a estos impactos. El acceso limitado a los recursos debido a la desigualdad socioeconómica estructural hace que sea mucho más difícil para las comunidades pobres acceder a las opciones de adaptación.³⁰⁰

Migración, Desplazamiento y Refugiados Climáticos. Los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos inducidos por el calentamiento global amplifican los factores sociales, económicos y ambientales que provocan migraciones masivas y desplazamientos de la población. Existe una tendencia al aumento de la migración climática interna en América Latina, África subsahariana y Asia meridional, con el potencial de superar los 143 millones de migrantes en 2050.³⁰¹ En México y América Central, los migrantes climáticos internos podrían duplicarse entre 2020 y 2050.³⁰² En un escenario más respetuoso con el clima, que cumpla con el límite de temperatura de 1,5°C del Acuerdo de París, el cual todavía es posible con reducciones inmediatas y profundas de los supercontaminantes climáticos tal como se describe en la [Sección VI](#), habría hasta un 87% menos de migrantes climáticos en América Latina en comparación con un escenario sin introducción de cambios.³⁰³

El cambio climático está provocando desplazamientos transfronterizos masivos en las Américas. Por ejemplo, en 2017, los huracanes Irma y María obligaron a las Bahamas y a la isla de Barbuda, en Antigua y Barbuda, a realizar evacuaciones obligatorias en toda la isla, y provocaron la migración de más de 135.000 puertorriqueños a Estados Unidos.³⁰⁴ Hay una escasez de acuerdos regionales sobre cómo abordar y prevenir los desplazamientos en las Américas, que incluyan protocolos para gestionar los desplazamientos provocados tanto por desastres repentinos, como los huracanes, como por efectos climáticos de aparición menos repentina que hacen inhabitables las zonas de asentamiento actuales, tales como los asentamientos en las costas erosionadas del Caribe.³⁰⁵

Los refugiados climáticos se enfrentan a una mayor discriminación y violencia en muchos países cuando solicitan asilo.³⁰⁶ Esto se ve agravado por el hecho de que los gobiernos no identifican o categorizan a las personas desplazadas por motivos climáticos, lo que dificulta el acceso de los refugiados climáticos a la protección y la migración.³⁰⁷ Reconocer y garantizar la protección de los refugiados climáticos como una clase vulnerable distinta de ciudadanos es fundamental para garantizar la justicia climática.

Además de provocar un aumento de la migración y de los refugiados climáticos, los efectos del cambio climático pueden afectar de forma desproporcionada a los refugiados y desplazados actuales.³⁰⁸ Por ejemplo, casi 2,5 millones de venezolanos han emigrado a Colombia, y otros 2 millones a Chile, Ecuador y Perú,³⁰⁹ y se enfrentan a vulnerabilidades adicionales como dificultades económicas, explotación sexual, reclutamiento por grupos armados o pandillas callejeras, intimidación, falta de buenas oportunidades de empleo, acceso limitado a la atención médica y xenofobia.³¹⁰

Defensores del Clima y del Medio Ambiente. Los activistas climáticos y ambientales tienen más probabilidades de sufrir violencia y criminalización por su activismo. Desde 2012, Global Witness ha concluido que al menos 1.700 defensores de la tierra y el medio ambiente han sido asesinados por proteger sus tierras y recursos.³¹¹ En Brasil, el 85% de estos asesinatos se produjeron en la Amazonia, y se intensificaron tras la elección del expresidente Bolsonaro. Los principales

impulsores de estos ataques son la desigualdad de la tierra, los conflictos violentos por la tierra, la corrupción de los que toman las tierras, la reducción de la protección cívica y una cultura de impunidad corporativa que permite que el poder corporativo, apoyado por las políticas gubernamentales, perpetúe la crisis climática y de biodiversidad y asesine a los defensores del medio ambiente.³¹² Los activistas climáticos y ambientales también son criminalizados al ser acusados de coacción, usurpación de tierras y otros delitos para justificar la acción policial, o cargan con demandas SLAPPⁱⁱⁱ entabladas por los actores del poder corporativo para disuadir el activismo.³¹³

VI. SOLUCIONES EN LAS AMÉRICAS PARA ABORDAR LA EMERGENCIA CLIMÁTICA

Abordar la emergencia climática de manera expeditiva y efectiva en las Américas requerirá respuestas coordinadas a nivel regional, nacional y subnacional. Las soluciones son multifacéticas y requieren la mitigación de los supercontaminantes climáticos, la descarbonización y la protección y restauración de los sumideros de carbono simultáneamente para mantener el planeta por debajo del límite seguro de temperatura de 1,5°C. Además, es fundamental asignar recursos para garantizar la mitigación, la adaptación y la resiliencia a gran escala, ya que la falta de financiación y la escasa capacidad de aplicación suponen graves obstáculos en la región y agravan los impactos sobre las comunidades y los ecosistemas.³¹⁴ La única forma de detener las violaciones de derechos futuras y actuales es una combinación de acciones fundamentales mediante las cuales se mitigen los supercontaminantes climáticos, se logre la descarbonización y se protejan los sumideros de carbono.

A. Acciones Sectoriales Específicas para Mitigar Inmediata y Sustancialmente los Supercontaminantes Climáticos y Lograr la Descarbonización en LAC

Los Estados deben aplicar soluciones que abarquen a toda la economía y se centren en sectores altamente contaminantes como la energía, el transporte y los residuos. La adopción de estas medidas de mitigación de eficacia comprobada, con la creación de capacidad y la coordinación regional adecuadas, ofrece oportunidades y beneficios adicionales para la región, como mejoras a corto plazo en la calidad de vida de la población, la creación de puestos de trabajo y la mejora del desarrollo sostenible.³¹⁵

ⁱⁱⁱ Los juicios SLAPP, o juicios estratégicos contra la participación pública, son demandas civiles destinadas a intimidar y silenciar a las personas u organizaciones que se manifiestan sobre cuestiones públicas. Véase en general Cornell Law School, [SLAPP suit](#).

Recuadro 1. Acciones Clave de Mitigación de los CCVC en LAC

- Incorporar las mejores prácticas o actualizar las mejores tecnologías disponibles en los procesos industriales, como la reducción de la quema en antorcha en la industria del petróleo y el gas;
- Buscar la máxima ambición para cumplir con todos los compromisos asumidos en virtud de los tratados atmosféricos, como garantizar la eliminación total o acelerada de los hidrofluorocarbonos (HFC), incorporando al mismo tiempo las máximas medidas de eficiencia energética en el sector de la refrigeración;
- Incorporar medidas dentro de los programas de infraestructuras a gran escala de autoridades públicas como el sector de los residuos, tales como la captura y utilización de las emisiones de metano de los vertederos;
- Aplicar soluciones sostenibles y de bajas emisiones para reducir las emisiones de carbono negro, como ofrecer opciones de transporte alternativas y no motorizadas y gestionar el transporte de mercancías en el sector del transporte;
- Cambio de prácticas, algunas de ellas arraigadas en tradiciones culturales, económicas y sociales, para cocinar y calefaccionar los hogares, así como en la agricultura y las industrias artesanales, y
- Aplicar soluciones climáticas “naturales”, como la proforestación, la mejora de la gestión del suelo y la conservación de bosques, humedales, praderas marinas y otros sumideros naturales.

Energía

- Garantizar el despliegue de las mejores tecnologías disponibles para detener las fugas y prohibir el venteo en el sector del petróleo y el gas;³¹⁶
- Detener el desperdicio de energía capturando el metano en lugar de quemarlo;
- Desinvertir en combustibles fósiles;
- Acelerar la transición hacia las energías renovables invirtiendo en fuentes de energía renovable; y
- Buscar datos sobre energía eólica marina y aprovechar la energía de las olas.

Agricultura

- Mejorar y cambiar las prácticas agrícolas, como la aplicación de diferentes estrategias de pastoreo, cría y alimentación del ganado;
- Se han encontrado varias soluciones efectivas en términos de costos para

reducir las emisiones de N₂O, incluido el uso de nuevas tecnologías en los procesos agrícolas;³¹⁷ y

- Detener la quema con fines agrícolas.

Residuos

- Mejorar el tratamiento de residuos sólidos y aguas residuales;³¹⁸
- Reducir el desperdicio de alimentos, desviando los residuos orgánicos de los vertederos y mejorando la gestión de los mismos;³¹⁹ y
- Desarrollar infraestructura de cadenas de frío sostenibles para reducir los residuos orgánicos enviados a los vertederos.

Transporte

- Introducir rápidamente normas estrictas sobre las emisiones de los vehículos nuevos y eliminar los vehículos con emisiones elevadas, aplicándolas plenamente; y

- Promover y transferir la electrificación en el transporte.

Construcción

- Mejorar la eficiencia energética en múltiples sectores, incluida la construcción y la infraestructura, tanto mediante la modernización como mediante el uso de tecnología energéticamente eficiente en infraestructura nueva;
- Eliminar el gas en las nuevas construcciones y las cocinas con fugas de gas;³²⁰
- Cambiar a energías limpias para la electrificación y calefacción, incluyendo incentivos para promover la instalación de paneles solares y

tecnologías de almacenamiento en baterías;

- Cambiar a equipamientos de cocina limpios para reducir el carbono negro;³²¹
- Cambiar a métodos más limpios de calefacción para reducir el metano y el carbono negro;³²²
- Sustituir o modernizar la tecnología de refrigeración utilizada en los equipos de refrigeración y aire acondicionado;³²³ y
- Actualizar o adoptar normas mínimas de rendimiento energético para los equipos de refrigeración y fortalecer las leyes que prohíben la importación de equipos de refrigeración que no cumplan con las normas en los países exportadores.

B. Acciones Sectoriales Específicas para Mitigar Inmediata y Sustancialmente los Supercontaminantes Climáticos y Lograr la Descarbonización en Estados Unidos y Canadá

Como países de ingresos altos y con emisiones de GEI desproporcionadamente elevadas, tanto en la actualidad como históricamente, Canadá y Estados Unidos deben tomar medidas urgentes para contrarrestar la crisis climática. La variedad de contaminantes (CCVC, óxido nitroso y dióxido de carbono) y de industrias contaminantes torna necesaria la aplicación simultánea de múltiples soluciones. Estados Unidos y Canadá tienen la capacidad de liderar el desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías para aumentar la eficiencia energética, incrementar la tecnología de captura de carbono y garantizar una transición justa. Abordar la emergencia climática en Canadá y Estados Unidos requiere una acción urgente en diversos sectores, el sector privado y en todos los niveles de gobierno.

Estados Unidos y Canadá deben centrarse en el desarrollo de tecnologías para la transición hacia un futuro sin emisiones de carbono, enfocándose en sectores contaminantes clave como la energía, el transporte, los residuos y la agricultura. Estas acciones de mitigación ofrecen oportunidades para que estos dos países se conviertan en líderes del desarrollo sostenible, creen puestos de trabajo y garanticen una transición justa.

Recuadro 2. Acciones Clave de Mitigación de los CCVC en EE.UU. y Canadá

- Explorar el potencial de desarrollo de las tecnologías necesarias, como el hidrógeno limpio, energías renovables y estrategias de captura de carbono;
- Cambiar los incentivos financieros, incluida la eliminación de las subvenciones a los combustibles fósiles, desinvirtiendo fondos públicos de combustibles fósiles e incentivando el desarrollo de tecnologías más sostenibles;
- Incorporar las mejores prácticas o actualizar las mejores tecnologías disponibles en los procesos industriales, especialmente en el sector energético;
- Modernizar la infraestructura, la construcción y la tecnología para reducir las emisiones y mejorar la eficiencia energética en todos los sectores;
- Explorar soluciones climáticas naturales practicando una gestión sostenible de la tierra y protegiendo los sumideros de carbono;
- Gestionar las emisiones procedentes de los residuos y la agricultura; y
- Eliminar las lagunas en la presentación obligatoria de informes sobre emisiones.

Energía

- Eliminar las subvenciones a los combustibles fósiles y desinvertir fondos públicos de combustibles fósiles;
- Eliminar las lagunas en la presentación obligatoria de informes sobre emisiones, incluidas las emisiones procedentes de la puesta en marcha, el cierre y las averías de los grandes productores de energía;
- Limitar las emisiones de metano en el sector del petróleo y el gas, incluso mediante la promulgación de regulaciones que limiten las emisiones procedentes del venteo y fugas;³²⁴
- Apoyar el desarrollo de energías renovables, por ejemplo diversificando las cadenas de suministro, explorando el potencial de los pequeños reactores modulares y apoyando las innovaciones en materia de combustibles biogénicos con bajas emisiones de carbono;³²⁵
- Ampliar el suministro de hidrógeno azul y verde, apoyar el crecimiento de los biocombustibles y de los combustibles sostenibles para la

aviación,³²⁶ e invertir en hidrógeno limpio creando demanda de hidrógeno bajo en carbono y desarrollando tecnologías de uso final del hidrógeno;³²⁷

- Regular los artefactos que utilizan madera como combustible para reducir las emisiones de carbono negro;³²⁸
- Sustituir las fuentes de gas natural por fuentes de energía con cero emisiones de carbono, especialmente en los sectores de energía eléctrica, fabricación, productos químicos y construcción;³²⁹ y
- Ampliar las renovables invirtiendo en la cadena de suministro de energías renovables, expandiendo la red eléctrica, garantizando el acceso a tierras adecuadas para el despliegue de energías renovables instalando las mismas.³³⁰

Tecnología de Emisiones Negativas

- Explorar soluciones basadas en la naturaleza mediante la restauración de hábitats, la protección de los sumideros de carbono y la adopción de prácticas

indígenas y otras prácticas de gestión sostenible de la tierra;³³¹

- Apoyar el desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías de captura, utilización y almacenamiento de carbono (CCUS, por sus siglas en inglés).³³² Esto incluye mejorar la captura biológica de carbono con almacenamiento geológico, incluyendo la bioenergía con captura y almacenamiento de carbono (BECCS, por sus siglas en inglés) y la fertilización oceánica,³³³ y mejorar e invertir en tecnologías no biológicas, incluyendo la meteorización mejorada de rocas y la captura directa en el aire;³³⁴
- Establecer centros de captura de carbono en lugares clave, como la Costa del Golfo y Medio Oriente;³³⁵ y
- Explorar opciones para eliminar el metano de la atmósfera, incluso a través de la oxidación química catalítica, el aumento de los sumideros atmosféricos y la eliminación microbiana por los metanótrofos.³³⁶

Construcción e infraestructura

- Adoptar restricciones a la exportación de equipos de refrigeración que no cumplan con las normas de eficiencia energética y las obligaciones del Protocolo de Montreal del país exportador;
- Invertir en mejorar la eficiencia energética en diversos sectores, incluyendo la construcción y la infraestructura, tanto mediante la modernización como el desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías;³³⁷
- Reducir las emisiones de las instalaciones y la infraestructura existentes, incluso mediante la modernización, la electrificación y la captura de carbono;³³⁸
- Aplicar códigos de edificación para reducir la intensidad de las emisiones

de la infraestructura comercial y residencial, incluida la calefacción, la refrigeración y el uso de electricidad; y

- Introducir normas gubernamentales para las compras exigiendo que el gobierno adquiriera únicamente productos y servicios con cero emisiones en las categorías donde sea posible.³³⁹

Transporte

- Aplicar normas más estrictas para las emisiones de los vehículos como exigir filtros de partículas diésel;
- Promover la electrificación del transporte mediante el apoyo e inversión en infraestructura, incluyendo la actualización de las redes eléctricas para apoyar la producción de autos eléctricos, la inversión en ómnibus eléctricos y sistemas de ferroviarios,³⁴⁰ y invertir en vehículos eléctricos;³⁴¹ y
- Abordar las emisiones de carbono negro del transporte apoyando una rotación de los vehículos con motores diésel.³⁴²

Agricultura

- Desarrollar soluciones para reducir las emisiones de N₂O de los procesos agrícolas, como la agricultura de precisión, los inhibidores de nitrógeno y las bacterias promotoras del crecimiento de las plantas;³⁴³
- Invertir en mejorar la eficiencia energética en el sector agrícola;³⁴⁴ y
- Tomar medidas para reducir el consumo de productos animales, incluyendo la inversión en proteínas alternativas, promoviendo las dietas bajas en carne y brindando acceso a alternativas vegetales.³⁴⁵

Residuos

- Mitigar las emisiones de metano de las fuentes de agricultura como la fermentación entérica;³⁴⁶
- Incentivar el desvío de los residuos orgánicos de los vertederos;³⁴⁷ y
- Mitigar las emisiones de metano de los vertederos de residuos sólidos urbanos,³⁴⁸ incluso a través de regulaciones que exijan controles de metano en los vertederos.³⁴⁹

C. Proteger y Restaurar los Sumideros de Carbono en las Américas

Salvar los sumideros de carbono terrestres en las Américas requiere una estrategia múltiple de protección de los bosques de la región mediante la prevención de la deforestación y la restauración de los sumideros a través de la proforestación.³⁵⁰

Recuadro 3. Acciones Clave para Proteger y Restaurar los Sumideros de Carbono en las Américas

- Establecer derechos a la tierra para las comunidades indígenas y locales;
- Aplicar medidas de zonificación para reducir la usurpación de tierras urbanizadas;
- Establecer reservas de tierras protegidas y promover la protección de los bosques y las prácticas que favorezcan la forestación;
- Proteger los humedales amenazados;
- Preservar las turberas existentes y restaurar las degradadas;
- Restaurar los ecosistemas costeros de ‘carbono azul’; y
- Prohibir la bioenergía.

Los esfuerzos para proteger los sumideros de carbono terrestres deben empezar por reconocer los derechos indígenas a la tierra e incorporar estrategias de gestión de tierras indígenas, como la silvopastura y la agricultura regenerativa.³⁵¹ Las soluciones indígenas y de las comunidades locales podrían ayudar a restaurar una parte significativa de este potencial de almacenamiento de carbono, ya que estas comunidades administran al menos el 22% del carbono forestal mundial, que consiste en áreas que albergan el 80% de la biodiversidad del planeta.³⁵² Sólo en la Amazonia, los bosques gestionados por los pueblos indígenas secuestraron 340 millones de toneladas métricas de carbono al año entre 2001 y 2021.³⁵³ Las investigaciones han demostrado que el establecimiento de derechos a la tierra para las comunidades indígenas y locales tiende a reducir las tasas de deforestación y las emisiones de carbono, mientras que las tasas de deforestación son mayores en las zonas donde no se garantizan estos derechos.³⁵⁴

Por ejemplo, entre 2000 y 2012, la deforestación en la Amazonia brasileña sólo se produjo en el 0,6% de las tierras protegidas por comunidades indígenas, en comparación con el 7,0% de las tierras no indígenas.³⁵⁵ Además, debido a la gestión de la tierra y a las prácticas de defensa del medio ambiente, los bosques administrados por comunidades indígenas contienen un 36% más de carbono por hectárea que las tierras no indígenas de la Amazonia brasileña.³⁵⁶ Sólo en este lugar, las tierras indígenas y las zonas protegidas por el gobierno podrían evitar la deforestación de 27,2

millones de hectáreas de aquí a 2050, ahorrando 12 mil millones de toneladas de CO² (lo que equivale a las emisiones de CO² de todos los países de América Latina y el Caribe en tres años).³⁵⁷

Además, las medidas para proteger los sumideros oceánicos incluyen la restauración de los ecosistemas costeros de “carbono azul.”³⁵⁸ En la última década, los ecosistemas oceánicos y terrestres han secuestrado el 52% de las emisiones antropogénicas de CO₂—sin embargo, es posible que esto no tome en cuenta otros ecosistemas costeros.³⁵⁹ Por ejemplo, los manglares secuestran carbono a un ritmo diez veces mayor que el de las selvas tropicales cada año.³⁶⁰ Reducir las tasas de deforestación de los manglares podría secuestrar hasta un 55–61% más de carbono.³⁶¹ Por lo tanto, proteger los sumideros costeros, terrestres y oceánicos existentes es fundamental para una rápida mitigación.

El Panel de Alto Nivel para una Economía Oceánica Sostenible, un grupo multilateral formado por representantes de 14 países oceánicos, prevé que para 2050 las opciones de mitigación del cambio climático y almacenamiento de carbono basadas en los océanos podrían representar el 21% de la reducción de emisiones necesaria para limitar el calentamiento global a 1,5°C.³⁶² Esto equivale a un porcentaje mayor que todas las emisiones actuales de las centrales eléctricas de carbón en todo el mundo.

Otra estrategia para preservar los sumideros es mediante el despliegue de REDD+, o reducción de emisiones a partir de la gestión sostenible de los bosques tropicales y la conservación y mejora de las reservas forestales de carbono,³⁶³ que ya ha logrado una reducción de 11 mil millones de toneladas de emisiones de CO² en 14 países hasta 2022.³⁶⁴ Los países pueden obtener pagos basados en resultados de diversas fuentes, entre ellas públicas y privadas, bilaterales y multilaterales, y otras.³⁶⁵ Estas fuentes incluyen el Fondo Verde para el Clima, el Gobierno de Noruega, el Gobierno de Alemania, el Programa REM Colombia—Visión Amazonía y la Iniciativa Forestal Centroafricana.³⁶⁶

Entre las salvaguardias comunes antes de poner en marcha un proyecto REDD+ se incluyen el consentimiento libre, previo e informado de las comunidades que residen dentro o cerca del proyecto, el reconocimiento de los derechos a la tierra y a los recursos, y las consultas de buena fe entre los Estados y las comunidades que dependen de los bosques.³⁶⁷ Esto se debe a que los proyectos REDD+ pueden interferir en el acceso de las comunidades (normalmente pueblos indígenas y comunidades locales) a los bosques y a los recursos forestales,³⁶⁸ desplazar a las comunidades,³⁶⁹ agudizar los conflictos por la tierra,³⁷⁰ y en última instancia, comercializar un bosque como proyecto de reducción de emisiones, en lugar de utilizar otros beneficios de ese recurso natural.³⁷¹ La Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas subraya la importancia del papel de los pueblos indígenas en la gestión de los bosques y señala que las salvaguardias REDD+ exigen “la participación plena y efectiva de... los pueblos indígenas y las comunidades locales”, lo que implica además la necesidad del consentimiento libre, previo e informado para llevar a cabo estos proyectos.³⁷²

D. La Mitigación Efectiva del CO2 y los Supercontaminantes Climáticos Es Fundamental para Dar Tiempo a LAC a Adaptarse, Crear Resiliencia y Proteger los Derechos

Aplicar estas acciones de mitigación ayudará a evitar los peores impactos del cambio climático, mientras que se dará tiempo y recursos materiales a los Estados para formular e implementar acciones equitativas, justas y sostenibles para ayudar a las personas y a las comunidades a hacer frente a los impactos inevitables.

ANEXO A: IMPACTOS DETALLADOS EN LAS AMERICAS

A. Cambios en el Clima y Fenómenos Meteorológicos Extremos

Olas de calor. Si no se toman medidas rápidas, es probable que las olas de calor masivas sigan aumentando en frecuencia e intensidad en la región de LAC, especialmente en los lugares más cercanos al ecuador. En 2021 y 2022, varios países de dicha región registraron temperaturas máximas sin precedentes.³⁷³ Entre 2016 y 2020, varios países experimentaron un aumento en el número promedio de días de exposición a olas de calor (en comparación con 1986-2005), incluyendo 9,3 días en Colombia, 11,2 días en Honduras y 15,2 días en Surinam.³⁷⁴ World Weather Attribution, una iniciativa puesta en marcha junto a científicos del clima para explicar cómo se han intensificado los fenómenos meteorológicos recientes debido al cambio climático, confirmó que el cambio climático hizo 60 veces más probable el récord de calor de principios de la temporada estival en Argentina y Paraguay, lo que provocó un aumento de los cortes de electricidad, incendios forestales, muertes relacionadas con el calor y disminuciones de las cosechas y la productividad laboral.³⁷⁵ Estas olas de calor aumentaron los incendios forestales en Argentina y Paraguay en un 283% y en un 258% respectivamente a principios de 2022.³⁷⁶ Además, el informe confirma que olas de calor similares aumentarán en frecuencia e intensidad con el calentamiento global añadido.³⁷⁷ La mejor y más rápida manera de reducir el ritmo de calentamiento a corto plazo es reducir las emisiones de supercontaminantes climáticos, como se discute en la Sección II *supra*.

En EE.UU., las olas de calor se producen con más frecuencia que antes en las grandes ciudades. Su frecuencia ha aumentado de forma constante, pasando de una media de dos olas de calor al año durante la década de 1960 a seis al año durante las décadas de 2010 y 2020.³⁷⁸ En Canadá, el calor extremo causó la muerte de casi 600 personas en Columbia Británica en 2021, y se ha producido un aumento significativo de los incendios forestales.³⁷⁹ En 2021, la región del noroeste del Pacífico, que abarca los estados estadounidenses de Oregón y Washington y las provincias canadienses de Columbia Británica y Alberta, experimentó una ola de calor sin precedentes. Los efectos de este suceso fueron catastróficos, incluyendo cientos de muertes atribuibles en todo el noroeste del Pacífico, mortalidad masiva de la vida marina, reducción del rendimiento de cultivos y frutas, inundaciones fluviales por el rápido deshielo de la nieve y los glaciares y un aumento sustancial de los incendios forestales —contribuyendo estos últimos a los deslizamientos de tierra ocurridos en los meses siguientes.³⁸⁰

De acuerdo con el IE6 del GTI, “[E]s prácticamente seguro que ha aumentado la frecuencia y la intensidad de los episodios de calor extremo (incluidas las olas de calor) en la mayoría de las regiones terrestres desde la década de 1950.... y hay un nivel de confianza alto en que el cambio climático inducido por el ser humano es la principal fuerza impulsora de estos cambios.”³⁸¹ Los impactos actuales del cambio climático ya han hecho que las olas de calor extremas en la región de LAC sean un 60% más probables; si las temperaturas globales aumentan 2°C las olas de calor en la región serán cuatro veces más severas—esta severidad sería imposible sin el calentamiento del Antropoceno.³⁸² Además, las temperaturas extremas ya han aumentado el riesgo de incendios forestales hasta niveles de riesgo extremo que duran una media de 7 a 10 días más.³⁸³ El calor extremo amenaza la vida, la salud, la seguridad hídrica y la seguridad alimentaria.

Huracanes y Ciclones. En 2021, LAC experimentó un número de ciclones tropicales superior a la media que causaron alrededor de US\$80 mil millones en daños a personas e infraestructuras.³⁸⁴ Este fue el sexto año consecutivo en el que la temporada de huracanes en el Atlántico fue superior a la media.³⁸⁵ La creciente intensidad y frecuencia de los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos desencadenan desplazamientos en la región, siendo Perú, Colombia y Guatemala los países que experimentan el mayor promedio de desplazamientos causados por huracanes extremos.³⁸⁶ Estos fenómenos meteorológicos ponen de relieve la necesidad de abordar el cambio climático con la mayor rapidez y eficacia posibles.

En EE.UU., en 2021, se produjeron 20 catástrofes meteorológicas y climáticas diferentes que costaron miles de millones de dólares. El costo total de estos sucesos fue de \$145 mil millones, lo que lo convierte en el tercer año más costoso registrado, por detrás de 2017 y 2005. 2021 fue el séptimo año consecutivo en el que se produjeron 10 o más catástrofes por un valor de 10 mil o más de miles de millones de dólares en Estados Unidos.³⁸⁷ En 2017, el huracán María causó el apagón más largo de la historia de Estados Unidos y provocó 2.975 víctimas fatales en el territorio estadounidense de Puerto Rico.³⁸⁸ El huracán Irma, que también azotó en 2017, provocó la destrucción del 25 % de los edificios en los Cayos de Florida y un 65 % sufrió daños significativos.³⁸⁹ En Canadá, el huracán Fiona (cuya calificación posteriormente bajó a tormenta Fiona) causó daños generalizados en las infraestructuras y provocó 660 millones de dólares solo en daños asegurados.³⁹⁰ Solo el aumento de la frecuencia de los huracanes podría elevar el gasto estadounidense en respuesta a desastres costeros entre \$22 y 94 mil millones anuales para finales de siglo.³⁹¹

Precipitaciones. Se prevé que las precipitaciones medias cambien significativamente, aumentando en el noroeste y el sureste de América del Sur, y disminuyendo en el noreste y el suroeste de América del Sur.³⁹² El aumento de las precipitaciones desencadena inundaciones y deslizamientos de tierra, que afectan a miles de personas y causan más daños. Sin embargo, la disminución de las precipitaciones afecta el suministro de agua y reduce la productividad y los ingresos agrícolas.³⁹³ Solo en 2019, las inundaciones causaron la mayoría de los 1,5 millones de desplazamientos forzados en las Américas.³⁹⁴ El Banco Mundial estima que, sin una acción climática concertada, para 2050, más de 17 millones de personas en América Latina y el Caribe podrían verse obligadas a desplazarse para escapar de los efectos de evolución lenta del cambio climático.³⁹⁵ Los riesgos de crisis hídricas adicionales por el aumento o la disminución de las precipitaciones subrayan la necesidad de una acción climática rápida. En 2022, el centro y el este de México experimentaron precipitaciones entre un 40% y un 60% por debajo de los niveles normales, mientras que el noroeste de México estuvo un 40% por encima de lo normal.³⁹⁶

En EE.UU., durante todo el periodo comprendido entre 1910 y 2020, la parte del país que experimentó precipitaciones extremas en un solo día aumentó a un ritmo de aproximadamente medio punto porcentual por década.³⁹⁷ En Canadá, dos días de intensas precipitaciones en Columbia Británica en 2021 provocaron la pérdida de al menos cinco vidas, aislaron por completo a la ciudad de Vancouver del resto de Canadá por carretera y ferrocarril, y la convirtieron en la catástrofe natural más costosa de la historia de esta provincia.³⁹⁸

Sequías. La frecuencia e intensidad de las sequías han aumentado en LAC, lo que ha provocado que 3,5 millones de personas necesiten asistencia humanitaria solo en la región del Corredor Seco

de Centroamérica.³⁹⁹ El Corredor Seco entró en su quinto año consecutivo de sequía en 2019 y se prevé que aumenten su duración entre un 12% y un 30%, su intensidad entre un 17% y un 42% y su frecuencia entre un 21% y un 42% para finales de siglo.⁴⁰⁰ En 2022, el 30% del territorio mexicano experimentó una sequía de moderada a extrema, y el 68% de Puerto Rico sufrió una sequía de moderada a grave.⁴⁰¹ En mayo de 2022, más de la mitad (56%) de México experimentó una sequía de moderada a excepcional.⁴⁰² En la Amazonia, la sequía extrema provocó un aumento de los incendios, incrementando la conversión de selva tropical en sabana.⁴⁰³ En 2022, Chile entró en el decimocuarto año de su mega sequía, la sequía más larga y grave del país en más de mil años.⁴⁰⁴ La energía hidroeléctrica actualmente suministra el 50% de la electricidad en América Latina; además, el agua es un insumo clave para otras formas de generación de energía.⁴⁰⁵ La escasez de agua probablemente conducirá a cortes de electricidad principalmente en áreas urbanas, tal como se observó cuando Venezuela no pudo operar la represa de Guri, el segundo centro hidroeléctrico más grande del mundo, en medio de una sequía.⁴⁰⁶ Durante el último año, Argentina—uno de los principales exportadores mundiales de soja y maíz, ha sufrido la peor sequía en más de 60 años, lo que ha afectado su producción agrícola y ha agravado la inflación y la crisis económica.⁴⁰⁷ El impacto de la sequía en la balanza de pagos de este país es un ejemplo de lo que puede esperar la región de la relación entre los fenómenos extremos y la economía. Ya se han sufrido pérdidas similares en Brasil y Paraguay, que experimentaron una pérdida de hasta el 70% en la producción de soja y el 43% en la de maíz; la pérdida causada por la sequía durante un año en Uruguay costó al sector agrícola y ganadero US\$56 millones.⁴⁰⁸ El aumento de la frecuencia y la intensidad de las sequías señala la gravedad de la necesidad de una acción climática intensiva.

En EE.UU., el aumento del calor y la reducción de la nieve a causa del cambio climático han amplificado las recientes sequías hidrológicas (grave escasez de agua) en California, la cuenca del río Colorado y el río Grande. En California, el aumento de las temperaturas intensificó la sequía entre 2011 y 2016, que se había iniciado tras años de escasas precipitaciones, causando escasez de agua a ecosistemas, ciudades, explotaciones agrícolas y generadores de energía.⁴⁰⁹ En Canadá, el cambio climático contribuyó a una sequía extrema en Columbia Británica en 2015 que fue inusual por su gravedad, alcance e impactos. En Alberta, las mismas condiciones de sequía llevaron al gobierno a declarar a dicha provincia zona de desastre agrícola.⁴¹⁰ Las implicancias de estas sequías tienen repercusiones de gran alcance dada la enorme influencia de Estados Unidos y Canadá en la economía mundial.

B. Océanos y Zonas Costeras

La región de LAC es especialmente vulnerable a los impactos del cambio climático debido a su dependencia de los ecosistemas costeros para obtener alimentos y medios de subsistencia. El aumento del nivel del mar, la acidificación de los océanos y los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos están provocando daños en las infraestructuras costeras, el desplazamiento de comunidades y la pérdida de biodiversidad.

Aumento del Nivel del Mar. En las tres últimas décadas, el nivel del mar ha aumentado a un ritmo superior al mundial en el Atlántico Sur y seguirá subiendo en los océanos que rodean a la región. El nivel del mar ha subido 2,21 mm al año en la vertiente del Pacífico de América del Sur; 3,23 mm al año en las costas del Atlántico Norte tropical, alrededor de América Central y el sur del Caribe; 3,60 mm al año en las costas del Atlántico Norte subtropical y el Golfo de México; y 3,66

mm al año en la costa atlántica de América del Sur.⁴¹¹ (En comparación, el promedio mundial de aumento del nivel del mar entre 1993 y 2022 fue de 3,4 mm al año.⁴¹²) Este fenómeno provocará más inundaciones costeras en las zonas bajas y la erosión de las costas. En las islas bajas del Caribe y las ciudades costeras, el aumento del nivel del mar plantea varios riesgos, que afectan, por ejemplo, los medios de subsistencia, la agricultura, la acuicultura y la economía. Estos riesgos subrayan la necesidad de una acción climática decisiva, rápida y eficaz.

Estados Unidos y Canadá también son vulnerables a los efectos del cambio climático en la zona costera. Las comunidades pesqueras de subsistencia, como las de Alaska, corren el riesgo de sufrir consecuencias nutricionales, infraestructurales, económicas y sanitarias para la lengua, la educación y las propias comunidades a medida que las zonas costeras sigan viéndose afectadas. Hay más de un trillón de dólares en bienes inmuebles a lo largo de la costa de Estados Unidos, todo lo cual está en riesgo de daños y degradación.⁴¹³ En Canadá, las comunidades costeras del norte, muchas de las cuales son indígenas, han experimentado algunos de los cambios climáticos más rápidos a nivel mundial, y los cambios previstos para la región seguirán siendo significativos.⁴¹⁴

Acidificación del Océano. Las emisiones de GEI y el aumento de la temperatura asociado también están alterando la química de los océanos, aumentando la acidez del agua de mar, con efectos devastadores para la vida marina en la región de LAC. En todo el Caribe, y en las aguas más frías del Pacífico hasta la Patagonia, la acidificación de los océanos está afectando la capacidad de organismos vivos, como los mariscos y los corales, para formar conchas y esqueletos, lo que perjudicará gravemente la seguridad alimentaria y los medios de subsistencia en la región. Estos efectos se ven agravados por la sobrepesca, la contaminación, el calentamiento de los océanos y la reducción de los niveles de oxígeno. La región depende en gran medida del mar para su alimentación y sustento, y sin una reducción significativa de las emisiones, las consecuencias serán catastróficas. El aumento de las temperaturas, la acidificación de los océanos y otros impactos del cambio climático están provocando la degradación de los arrecifes de coral en el Caribe.

En EE.UU., la acidificación de los océanos también supone una grave amenaza para la biodiversidad de zonas ecológicamente sensibles, como la costa de Alaska.⁴¹⁵ En Canadá, las frías aguas costeras del país pueden ser especialmente propensas a la acidificación debido a la presencia natural de aguas subsaturadas a poca profundidad (costa del Pacífico), o de grandes aportaciones de agua dulce (costa del Ártico).⁴¹⁶ En la región noreste del Océano Pacífico, por ejemplo, el horizonte de saturación es naturalmente poco profundo –tan sólo 100 metros por debajo de la superficie. Los científicos prevén que la profundidad de saturación será menor a medida que aumenten las concentraciones globales de CO₂ atmosférico durante el próximo siglo, lo que pondrá en riesgo de acidificación oceánica a los organismos que viven cerca de la superficie.⁴¹⁷

Arrecifes de Coral. Los arrecifes de coral prestan servicios ecosistémicos esenciales, como la protección frente a las mareas de tormenta y las olas, y el apoyo a la pesca y el turismo. Su pérdida tendrá importantes repercusiones económicas y ecológicas en las Américas en general. Incluso si el calentamiento global se limita a un aumento de 1,5°C, entre el 70% y el 90% de los arrecifes de coral de aguas cálidas desaparecerán; esta cifra aumenta hasta casi desaparecer, si no totalmente, cuando las temperaturas sube a 2°C.⁴¹⁸ La cubierta de corales vivos constructores de arrecifes del Caribe ha disminuido en más de un 80% en los últimos 50 años.⁴¹⁹ Dado que los arrecifes de coral

sustentan el 25% de la vida marina de nuestros océanos, la desaparición masiva de los mismos provocará inseguridad alimentaria en la mayor parte del mundo, especialmente en las poblaciones costeras.⁴²⁰

Los arrecifes de coral también actúan como amortiguadores naturales de las costas frente a las olas, las mareas de tormenta, las inundaciones y la erosión, proporcionando protección a millones de personas sólo en Estados Unidos que viven en zonas costeras quienes sufrirán efectos más graves sin la protección de los arrecifes de coral.⁴²¹ Se calcula que 1.000 millones de personas en todo el mundo se benefician de los servicios ecosistémicos que proporcionan los arrecifes de coral, incluidos los alimentos, la protección costera y los ingresos procedentes del turismo y la pesca.⁴²² Más allá de la protección y la seguridad alimentaria, los arrecifes de coral proporcionan un gran beneficio económico a través del turismo, que en algunos casos representa un tercio del PBI en el Caribe y hasta el 80% en las Maldivas.⁴²³ La pérdida de arrecifes de coral provocará pérdidas económicas de hasta US\$375 mil millones anuales como resultado de la pérdida de turismo y la destrucción por inundaciones y otras tormentas.⁴²⁴

Degradación Costera. La erosión de las costas es uno de los principales impactos del cambio climático en las zonas costeras de la región de LAC. El aumento del nivel del mar y la mayor frecuencia e intensidad de las tormentas están provocando la pérdida de playas, acantilados y humedales costeros.⁴²⁵ Dicha erosión está amenazando la infraestructura, como viviendas, carreteras y puertos, y también está afectando los medios de vida de las comunidades locales que dependen del turismo y la pesca. La erosión de las costas se debe a una combinación de factores naturales y humanos. Los factores naturales incluyen la acción de las olas, las mareas y las corrientes, mientras que los factores humanos incluyen el desarrollo costero, la extracción de arena y la deforestación. Este fenómeno tiene importantes repercusiones económicas y sociales. Disminuye el valor de las propiedades costeras, afecta los ingresos del turismo y provoca el desplazamiento de comunidades. La pérdida de humedales costeros, como los manglares, también reduce la protección que estos ofrecen contra las mareas de tormenta y las inundaciones.⁴²⁶ Muchas medidas, como la mitigación de los GEI, la financiación de infraestructuras de adaptación y la protección de manglares y humedales, reducirían significativamente los impactos y protegerían a las comunidades costeras.⁴²⁷

C. Glaciares y Montañas

Pérdida de Hielo. El nivel del mar está subiendo a un ritmo acelerado debido al deshielo de los glaciares y al calentamiento antropogénico.⁴²⁸ Entre 1992–1999 y 2010–2019, el ritmo de pérdida de glaciares y mantos de hielo se multiplicó por cuatro y, junto con la pérdida de masa glaciaria, fue el factor que más contribuyó al aumento del nivel del mar entre 2006 y 2018,⁴²⁹ poniendo en peligro a 900 millones de personas que viven en zonas costeras bajas—uno de cada diez habitantes de la Tierra.⁴³⁰ Desde la década de 1980, los glaciares de los Andes han disminuido entre un 30% y un 50% en total, y el sureste de los Andes ha experimentado la mayor pérdida de masa glaciaria de todo el mundo.⁴³¹ La disminución del suministro de agua debido al retroceso de los glaciares tendrá efectos socioeconómicos negativos, por ejemplo, afectará la producción de fruta en Argentina.⁴³² En América del Sur, los campos de hielo de la Patagonia son las mayores masas de hielo del hemisferio sur fuera de la Antártida y están perdiendo volumen rápidamente, provocando inundaciones y cambiando los ecosistemas fluviales.⁴³³ Los impulsores no climáticos están


exacerbando la vulnerabilidad de las comunidades costeras bajas ante el aumento del nivel del mar y los fenómenos extremos a nivel del mar.⁴³⁴

La reducción rápida de las emisiones es fundamental para evitar una mayor pérdida de hielo y, tal y como se explica en la [Sección II](#) *supra*, la reducción de las emisiones de supercontaminantes climáticos es la mejor y más rápida forma de frenar el ritmo de calentamiento a corto plazo —una reducción rápida puede disminuir el ritmo de aumento del nivel del mar en un 18% para 2050.⁴³⁵

ANNEX B: EL CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO EN CIFRAS: EMISIONES, IMPACTOS, SOLUCIONES Y BENEFICIOS


A. La Necesidad de Actuar Rápidamente Contra los Supercontaminantes Climáticos

Figura 1. Trayectoria de Temperatura Hacia la Ruptura de la Barrera de 1,5°C




Fuente: Xu Y., Ramanathan V., & Victor D. (2018) [Global warming will happen faster than we think](#), Comment, NATURE 564(7734): 30–32.

Figura 2. El Concepto de Rebasamiento Climático



Fuente: Climate Overshoot Commission (2023) [REDUCING THE RISKS OF CLIMATE OVERSHOOT](#), 27.


Figura 3. Consecuencias del Retraso en la Mitigación de los Contaminantes Climáticos de Vida Corta en la Temperatura



Fuente: Climate & Clean Air Coalition, [What are short-lived climate pollutants?](#), SLCP Infographics (última visita el 8 de septiembre de 2023).


B. Puntos de Inflexión Climáticos

Figura 4. Puntos Críticos de Inflexión Climáticos



Fuente: Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE, 575(7784): 592–595.


Figura 5. Rango de Calentamiento Global que Desencadenará Puntos de Inflexión



Fuente: Carrington D. (2022) [World on brink of five 'disastrous' climate tipping points, study finds](#), THE GUARDIAN.


Figura 6. Comprendiendo los Puntos de Inflexión

How can we think of tipping points?



Fuente: Rockström J. (2023) *Tipping Points and Feedback Loops*, in [THE CLIMATE BOOK: THE FACTS AND THE SOLUTIONS](#), Thunberg G. (ed.), 36.


Figura 7. Límites de Temperatura que Provocan Puntos de Inflexión



Fuente: Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) [Exceeding 1.5 °C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), SCIENCE 377(6611): 1–10, Figura 2.


C. Fuentes de Emisiones de Gases de Efecto Invernadero

Figura 8. Emisiones de Gases de Efecto Invernadero por Sector, LAC y el Mundo




Fuente: Vigna L. & Friedrich J. (8 de mayo de 2023) [9 Charts Explain Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Country](#), World Resources Institute.

Figura 9. Descripción General de los Contaminantes Climáticos de Vida Corta




Fuente: Climate & Clean Air Coalition, [What are short-lived climate pollutants?](#), SLCP Infographics (última visita el 8 de septiembre de 2023).

Figura 10. Fuentes de Emisiones de Metano, LAC



Fuente: Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2018) [Integrated Assessment of Short-Lived Climate Pollutants in Latin America and the Caribbean](#).


Figura 11. Fuentes de Emisiones de Carbono Negro, LAC



Fuente: Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2018) [Integrated Assessment of Short-Lived Climate Pollutants in Latin America and the Caribbean](#).


D. Ejemplos de Medidas de Mitigación de Supercontaminantes Climáticos

Figura 12. Medidas de Mitigación y Posibles Reducciones del Metano



Fuente: Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2018) [Integrated Assessment of Short-Lived Climate Pollutants in Latin America and the Caribbean](#).

Figura 13. Medidas de Carbono Negro y Posibles Reducciones



Fuente: Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2018) *Integrated Assessment of Short-Lived Climate Pollutants in Latin America and the Caribbean*.


E. Beneficios Colaterales de la Mitigación

Figura 14. Beneficios Anuales de la Mitigación de Contaminantes Climáticos de Vida Corta para 2030



Fuente: United States Agency for International Development (2022) *Short-Lived Climate Pollutants & USAID's Climate Strategy: Achieving Fast Mitigation*.


**Figura 0-15. Potenciales Empleos Creados a Través de la Transición Energética, 2020-2030
(miles de empleos creados)**



Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe & Organización Internacional del Trabajo (2018) [COYUNTURA LABORAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE: SOSTENIBILIDAD MEDIOAMBIENTAL CON EMPLEO EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE](#), N° 19 LC/TS.2018/85.

F. Riesgos y Vulnerabilidades Climáticas en LAC


Figura 16. Desastres Relacionados con el Tiempo, el Clima, y el Agua en LAC



Weather, climate and water-related disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2022. Impact numbers for some disaster occurrences may be lacking due to data unavailability. Source: CRED EM-DAT

Fuente: World Meteorological Organization (2023) [Climate change vicious cycle spirals in Latin America and the Caribbean](#).

Figura 17. Impactos Climáticos Observados y Proyectados para América Central y América del Sur



Fuente: Castellanos E., et al. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.).

Figura 18. Peligros Observados y Proyectados en América Central y América del Sur, Niveles Actuales Frente a un Aumento de 2–4°C





Figure 12.6 | Observed trends (WGI AR6 Tables 11.13, 11.14, 11.15) (Seneviratne et al, 2021) and summary of confidence in direction of projected change in climatic impact drivers, representing their aggregate characteristic changes for mid-century for RCP4.5, SSP3-44 4.5 and SRES A1B scenarios, or above within each AR6 region, approximately corresponding (for CIDs that are independent of SLR) to global warming levels between 2°C and 2.4°C (WGI AR6 Table 12.6) (Ranasinghe et al, 2021).

Fuente: Castellanos E., et al. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.).

Figura 19. Vulnerabilidades en LAC por Sector

(a) Vulnerability and confidence level by subregion and sector



(b) References used and vulnerability level attributed by subregion and sector

Sectors	Subregions							
	CA	NES	NSA	NWS	SAM	SES	SSA	SWS
Food systems	4,6,9,11,14,19,21,27,35,40,47	6,9,16,21,22,27,35,47	6,9,11,14,19,21,27,35,45,47	6,14,19,21,22,27,35,40,45	6,21,27,35,47	6,9,14,21,22,27,35,47	6,14,21,22,27,35,39,47	6,14,21,22,27,35,39,40,45
Cities and infrastructure	5,35	5,31,25	5,35	5,35	5,35	5,35	5,35	5,35
Population in poverty and their livelihoods	7,15,10,12,13,23,25,40	10,12,13,15,17,2,5,28,49	10,12,13,15,17,25,28,33	10,12,13,15,25,40	10,12,13,15,17,25	10,12,13,15,17,25,28	10,12,13,15,25	10,12,13,15,25,40,44
Water	26,35,41	26,35,48,49,50	24,26,35	24,26,35	24,26,35	24,26,35,41	24,26,35,39	24,26,35,39
Health	20,30,35	20,30,35,50	20,30,35	20,30,35	20,30,35	20,30,35	20,30,35	20,30,35
Terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems	29,35,38	2,29,32,35,37,38,42	2,29,35,37,38	2,8,24,29,35,37,38	2,29,35,37,38	29,35,38	24,29,35,38	3,18,24,29,35,38,46

Central America (CA) • Northwestern South America (NWS) • Northern South America (NSA) • South America Monsoon (SAM) • Northeastern South America (NES) • Southwestern South America (SWS) • Southeastern South America (SES) • Southern South America (SSA)

Figure 12.7 | Sectoral distribution of vulnerability levels to climate change for sub-regions. The vulnerability levels are based on studies that include: (a) databases with climate-change vulnerability indexes by country and sector, (b) studies that apply climate-change vulnerability indexes by sector at the local, national, regional or global scale, and (c) studies that define some vulnerability level based on the authors' expert judgment.

Panel (a) shows the vulnerability and confidence levels for each sub-region.

Panel (b) indicates the references used and the level of vulnerability by sub-region. The numbers within the table indicate the reference used for the assessment in the following order: (1) Aitken et al. (2016); (2) Anderson et al. (2018b); (3) Bañales-Seguel et al. (2018); (4) Bouroncle et al. (2017); (5) CAF (2014); (6) Carrão et al. (2016); (7) Donatti et al. (2019); (8) Eguiguren-Velepucha et al. (2016); (9) FAO (2020a); (10) FAO (2020b); (11) FAO (2021a); (12) FAO (2021b); (13) FAO (2021c); (14) FAO et al. (2021); (15) FAO and ECLAC (2020); (16) Ferreira Filho and Moraes (2015); (17) Filho et al. (2016); (18) Fuentes-Castillo et al. (2020); (19) FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crisis (2021); (20) Global Health Security Index (2019); (21) Godber and Wall (2014); (22) Handisyde et al. (2017); (23) Hannah et al. (2017); (24) Immerzeel et al. (2020); (25) Inform Risk Index (2021); (26) Koutroulis et al. (2019); (27) Krishnamurthy et al. (2014); (28) Lapola et al. (2019a); (29) Li et al. (2018); (30) Lin et al. (2020); (31) Mansur et al. (2016); (32) Martins et al. (2017); (33) Menezes et al. (2018); (34) Nagy et al. (2018); (35) ND-Gain (2020); (36) Northey et al. (2017); (37) Olivares et al. (2015); (38) Pacifici et al. (2015); (39) Qin et al. (2020); (40) Romeo et al. (2020); (41) Liu and Chen (2021); (42) Silva et al. (2019b); (43) Soto Winckler and Del Castillo Pantoja (2019); (44) Soto et al. (2019); (45) Tomby and Zhang (2019); (46) Venegas-González et al. (2018b); (47) Yeni and Alpas (2017); (48) Marengo et al. (2017); (49) Bedran-Martins et al. (2018); (50) Confalonieri et al. (2014a). Detailed methodology can be found in SM12.2.

Fuente: Castellanos E., et al. (2022) *Chapter 12: Central and South America*, in *CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY*, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.).

Figura 20. Riesgos Climáticos en América Central y América del Sur por Aumento de Temperatura Superior a 2°C





Figure 12.11 | Synthesis of key risks for the CSA region. The base map indicates the mean temperature change between the SSP2 4.5 scenario using CMIP6 model projections for 2081–2100 and a baseline period of 1986–2005 (WGI AR6 Atlas, Gutiérrez et al., 2021).

Fuente: Castellanos E., et al. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.).


G. La Adaptación al Cambio Climático en Cifras

Figura 21. Los Límites a la Adaptación




Fuente: 10 New Insights from Climate Science (2022) [Questioning the myth of endless adaptation](#).

Figura 22. Los Límites a la Adaptación




Fuente: Mechler R., et. al. (2020) [Loss and Damage and limits to adaptation: recent IPCC insights and implications for climate science and policy](#), SUSTAIN. SCI. 15: 1245–1251, 1249.

Figura 23. Los Costos de la Falta de Acción versus los Beneficios de la Adaptación




Fuente: European Environment Agency (2023) [Assessing the costs and benefits of climate change adaptation](#).

Figura 24. El Vínculo entre las Inversiones en Adaptación y los Costos Económicos del Cambio Climático



Fuente: European Environment Agency (2023) [Assessing the costs and benefits of climate change adaptation](#).

Figura 25. Los Tres Pilares de la Resiliencia



Fuente: Ramanathan V. & von Braun J. (eds.), [*Resilience of People and Ecosystems under Climate Stress*](#), Proceedings of a Conference Held at Casina Pio IV, Vatican City, 13-14 July 2022, Libreria Editrice Vaticana: Vatican City.

H. Videos (en inglés)

Explicaciones de los puntos de inflexión y los riesgos catastróficos

[How 16 Tipping Points Could Push Our Entire Planet Into Crisis | World Economic Forum](#)

[Climate Tipping Points by Tim Lenton | YouTube](#)

[How Close Are We to a Climate Change Tipping Point? | YouTube](#)

Los límites a la adaptación

["We're coming closer to limits of adaptation" Climate researcher Johan Rockström | YouTube](#)

Explicación de las causas del cambio climático: los contaminantes CO₂ y no-CO₂ y la importancia de los sumideros de carbono

[Project Drawdown presents the Drawdown Roadmap: The Science Behind the Roadmap | YouTube](#)

[The Benefits of Reducing Short-lived Climate Pollutants | Drew Shindell, Climate & Clean Air Coalition | Youtube](#)

[Climate Resilience: Why, When and How? | Professor V. Ramanathan | The Pontifical Academy of Sciences](#)

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¹ Goldstein A., Noon M. L., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Raghav S., McGreevey M., Stone C., Shrestha S., Golden Kroner R., Hole D., & Turner W. (2021) [IRRECOVERABLE CARBON: THE PLACES WE MUST PROTECT TO AVERT CLIMATE CATASTROPHE](#), Conservation International, 7 (“‘Irrecoverable carbon’ refers to the vast stores of carbon in nature that are vulnerable to release from human activity and, if lost, could not be restored by 2050 — when the world must reach net-zero emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change... There are high concentrations of irrecoverable carbon in the Amazon (31.5 Gt), the Congo Basin (8.1 Gt), and New Guinea (7.3 Gt). Other important irrecoverable carbon reserves are located in the Pacific Northwest of North America, the Valdivian forests of Chile, the mangroves and swamp forests of Guyana, the peatlands of Northern Scotland, Niger Delta’s mangroves, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, the Scandinavian and Siberian boreal forests, and the eucalyptus forest of Southeast Australia, among others.”). See also Goldstein A., *et al.* (2020) [Protecting irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 10(4): 287–295; and Noon M. L., Goldstein A., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Cook-Patton S. C., Spawn-Lee S. A., Wright T. M., Gonzalez-Roglich M., Hole D. G., Rockström J., & Turner W. R. (2021) [Mapping the irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. SUSTAIN. 5: 37–46.

² Forster P. M. ... Zhai P. (2023) [Indicators of Global Climate Change 2022: annual update of large-scale indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence](#), EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE DATA 15(6): 2295–2327, 2295 (“The indicators show that human-induced warming reached 1.14 [0.9 to 1.4] °C averaged over the 2013–2022 decade and 1.26 [1.0 to 1.6] °C in 2022.”); 2309 (“AR6 defined the current human-induced warming relative to the 1850–1900 baseline as the decade average of the previous 10-year period (see AR6 WGI Chap. 3). ...SR1.5 defined current human-induced warming as the average of a 30-year period centred on the current year, assuming the recent rate of warming continues (see SR1.5 Chap. 1). This definition is currently almost identical to the present-day single-year value of human-induced warming, differing by about 0.01 °C (see results in Sect. 7.4); the attribution assessment in SR1.5 was therefore provided as a single-year warming. This section also updates the SR1.5 single-year approach by providing a year 2022 value.”).

³ World Meteorological Organization (2023) [WMO GLOBAL ANNUAL TO DECADEAL CLIMATE UPDATE](#), 2 (“The annual mean global near-surface temperature for each year between 2023 and 2027 is predicted to be between 1.1°C and 1.8°C higher than the average over the years 1850–1900. • The chance of global near-surface temperature exceeding 1.5°C above preindustrial levels for at least one year between 2023 and 2027 is more likely than not (66%). It is unlikely (32%) that the five-year mean will exceed this threshold.”).

⁴ United Nations (1992) [UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE](#), art. 2 (“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”).

⁵ Here we distinguish between abrupt shifts, as in Drijfhout *et al.* (2015), and the more restrictive definition of “core climate tipping points” defined by Armstrong McKay *et al.* (2022) as “when change in part of the climate system becomes (i) selfperpetuating beyond (ii) a warming threshold as a result of asymmetry in the relevant feedbacks, leading to (iii) substantial and widespread Earth system impacts.” See Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) [Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), SCIENCE 377(6611): 1–10, 7 (“Current warming is ~1.1°C above preindustrial and even with rapid emission cuts warming will reach ~1.5°C by the 2030s (23). We cannot rule out that WAIS [West Antarctic Ice Sheet] and GrIS [Greenland Ice Sheet] tipping points have already been passed (see above) and several other tipping elements have minimum threshold values within the 1.1 to 1.5°C range. Our best estimate thresholds for GrIS, WAIS, REEF [low-latitude coral reefs], and North Atlantic subpolar gyre / Labrador-Irminger Sea convection abrupt permafrost thaw (PFAT) are ~1.5°C although WAIS and GrIS collapse may still be avoidable if GMST [Global Mean Surface Temperature] returns below 1.5°C within an uncertain overshoot time (likely decades) (94). ... The chance of triggering CTPs [Climate tipping points] is already

non-negligible and will grow even with stringent climate mitigation (SSP1-1.9 in Fig. 2, B and C). Nevertheless, achieving the Paris Agreement's aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C would clearly be safer than keeping global warming below 2°C (90) (Fig. 2). Going from 1.5 to 2°C increases the likelihood of committing to WAIS and GrIS collapse near complete warm-water coral die-off, and abrupt permafrost thaw; further, the best estimate threshold for LABC [North Atlantic subpolar gyre / Labrador-Irminger Sea convection] collapse is crossed. The likelihood of triggering AMOC [Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation] collapse, Boreal forest shifts, and extra-polar glacier loss becomes non-negligible at >1.5°C and glacier loss becomes likely by ~2°C. A cluster of abrupt shifts occur in ESM [Earth System Models] at 1.5 to 2°C (19). Although not tipping elements, ASSI [Arctic Summer Sea Ice] loss could become regular by 2°C, gradual permafrost thaw would likely become widespread beyond 1.5°C, and land carbon sink weakening would become significant by 2°C.”); and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2023) [AR6 SYNTHESIS REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2023](#), *Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Arias P., Bustamante M., Elgizouli I., Flato G., Howden M., Méndez C., Pereira J., Pichs-Madruga R., Rose S. K., Saheb Y., Sánchez R., Ürges-Vorsatz D., Xiao C., & Yassaa N. (eds.), 42 (“Risks associated with large-scale singular events or tipping points, such as ice sheet instability or ecosystem loss from tropical forests, transition to high risk between 1.5°C–2.5°C (*medium confidence*) and to very high risk between 2.5°C–4°C (*low confidence*). The response of biogeochemical cycles to anthropogenic perturbations can be abrupt at regional scales and irreversible on decadal to century time scales (*high confidence*). The probability of crossing uncertain regional thresholds increases with further warming (*high confidence*).”).

⁶ Drijfhout S., Bathiany S., Beaulieu C., Brovkin V., Claussen M., Huntingford C., Scheffer M., Sgubin G., & Swingedouw D. (2015) [Catalogue of abrupt shifts in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change climate models](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 112(43): E5777–E5786, E5777 (“Abrupt transitions of regional climate in response to the gradual rise in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations are notoriously difficult to foresee. However, such events could be particularly challenging in view of the capacity required for society and ecosystems to adapt to them. We present, to our knowledge, the first systematic screening of the massive climate model ensemble informing the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, and reveal evidence of 37 forced regional abrupt changes in the ocean, sea ice, snow cover, permafrost, and terrestrial biosphere that arise after a certain global temperature increase. Eighteen out of 37 events occur for global warming levels of less than 2°, a threshold sometimes presented as a safe limit.”). See also Wang S., Foster A., Lenz E. A., Kessler J. D., Stroeve J. C., Anderson L. O., Turetsky M., Betts R., Zou S., Liu W., Boos W. R., & Hausfather Z. (2023) [Mechanisms and Impacts of Earth System Tipping Elements](#), REV. GEOPHYS. 61(e2021RG000757): 1–81, 48 (“Earth system elements that this review indicates are at higher risk of crossing critical thresholds or undergoing substantial changes in response to warming this century under moderate (RCP4.5) emissions scenarios include loss of Arctic summer sea ice, loss of portions of the GIS, loss of portions of the West Antarctic Ice-sheet, Amazon rainforest dieback, boreal forest ecosystem shifts, some permafrost carbon release, and coral reef loss (Figure 14). In contrast, methane release from marine methane hydrates and strato-cumulus cloud deck evaporation will likely require longer timescales and higher emissions forcing in order to occur at large scales, while disruptions of tropical monsoons may be contingent on large shifts in other Earth system components and are unlikely to occur as a direct response to changes in aerosol forcing or land cover (see Section 2.6). Critical thresholds for weakening of the AMOC remain unclear and a transition of this system to a different state may not occur this century (see Section 2.1). While the GIS and WAIS may transgress critical thresholds this century (see Section 2.3), timescales of ice loss may require many centuries to millennia to run to completion (Bakker et al., 2016; Clark et al., 2016; Golledge et al., 2015; Huybrechts & De Wolde, 1999).”); Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE 575(7784): 592–595, 593 (“A further key impetus to limit warming to 1.5 °C is that other tipping points could be triggered at low levels of global warming. The latest IPCC models projected a cluster of abrupt shifts between 1.5 °C and 2 °C, several of which involve sea ice. This ice is already shrinking rapidly in the Arctic....”); Arias P. A., et al. (2021) [Technical Summary](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), *Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-71–TS-72 (“It is *likely* that under stabilization of global warming at 1.5°C, 2.0°C, or 3.0°C relative to 1850–1900, the AMOC will continue to weaken for several decades by about 15%, 20% and 30% of its strength and then recover to pre-decline values over several centuries (*medium confidence*). At sustained warming levels between 2°C and 3°C, there is limited evidence that the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets will be lost almost completely and irreversibly over multiple millennia; both the probability of their complete loss and the rate of

mass loss increases with higher surface temperatures (*high confidence*). At sustained warming levels between 3°C and 5°C, near-complete loss of the Greenland Ice Sheet and complete loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is projected to occur irreversibly over multiple millennia (*medium confidence*); with substantial parts or all of Wilkes Subglacial Basin in East Antarctica lost over multiple millennia (*low confidence*). Early-warning signals of accelerated sea-level-rise from Antarctica, could possibly be observed within the next few decades. For other hazards (e.g., ice sheet behaviour, glacier mass loss and global mean sea level change, coastal floods, coastal erosion, air pollution, and ocean acidification) the time and/or scenario dimensions remain critical, and a simple and robust relationship with global warming level cannot be established (*high confidence*)... The response of biogeochemical cycles to anthropogenic perturbations can be abrupt at regional scales and irreversible on decadal to century time scales (*high confidence*). The probability of crossing uncertain regional thresholds increases with climate change (*high confidence*). It is very *unlikely* that gas clathrates (mostly methane) in deeper terrestrial permafrost and subsea clathrates will lead to a detectable departure from the emissions trajectory during this century. Possible abrupt changes and tipping points in biogeochemical cycles lead to additional uncertainty in 21st century atmospheric GHG concentrations, but future anthropogenic emissions remain the dominant uncertainty (*high confidence*). There is potential for abrupt water cycle changes in some high-emission scenarios, but there is no overall consistency regarding the magnitude and timing of such changes. Positive land surface feedbacks, including vegetation, dust, and snow, can contribute to abrupt changes in aridity, but there is only *low confidence* that such changes will occur during the 21st century. Continued Amazon deforestation, combined with a warming climate, raises the probability that this ecosystem will cross a tipping point into a dry state during the 21st century (*low confidence*).”); and Lee J.-Y., Marotzke J., Bala G., Cao L., Corti S., Dunne J. P., Engelbrecht F., Fischer E., Fyfe J. C., Jones C., Maycock A., Mutemi J., Ndiaye O., Panickal S., & T. Zhou (2021) [Chapter 4: Future Global Climate: Scenario-Based Projections and Near-Term Information](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 4-96 (Table 4.10 lists 15 components of the Earth system susceptible to tipping points).

⁷ See Hoegh-Guldberg O., et al. (2018) [Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5°C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems](#), in [GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C](#), Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 262 (“Tipping points refer to critical thresholds in a system that, when exceeded, can lead to a significant change in the state of the system, often with an understanding that the change is irreversible. An understanding of the sensitivities of tipping points in the physical climate system, as well as in ecosystems and human systems, is essential for understanding the risks associated with different degrees of global warming. This subsection reviews tipping points across these three areas within the context of the different sensitivities to 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming. Sensitivities to less ambitious global temperature goals are also briefly reviewed. Moreover, an analysis is provided of how integrated risks across physical, natural and human systems may accumulate to lead to the exceedance of thresholds for particular systems. The emphasis in this section is on the identification of regional tipping points and their sensitivity to 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming, whereas tipping points in the global climate system, referred to as large-scale singular events, were already discussed in Section 3.5.2. A summary of regional tipping points is provided in Table 3.7.”); and Abram N., et al. (2019) [Chapter 1: Framing and Context of the Report](#), in [THE OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE](#), Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.), 1-81 (“While some aspects of the ocean and cryosphere might respond in a linear (i.e., directly proportional) manner to a perturbation by some external forcing, this may change fundamentally when critical thresholds are reached. A very important example for such a threshold is the transition from frozen water to liquid water at around 0 °C that can lead to rapid acceleration of ice-melt or permafrost thaw (e.g., Abram et al., 2013; Trusel et al., 2018). Such thresholds often act as tipping points, as they are associated with rapid and abrupt changes even when the underlying forcing changes gradually (Figure 1.1a, 1.1c). Tipping elements include, for example, the collapse of the ocean’s large-scale overturning circulation in the Atlantic (Section 6.7), or the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet though a process called marine ice sheet instability (Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3; Lenton, et al. 2008). Potential ocean and cryosphere tipping elements form part of the scientific case for efforts to limit climate warming to well below 2°C (IPCC, 2018).”).

⁸ Xu Y., Ramanathan V., & Victor D. G. (2018) [Global warming will happen faster than we think](#), Comment, NATURE 564(7734): 30–32, 30–31 (“But the latest IPCC special report underplays another alarming fact: global warming is accelerating. Three trends—rising emissions, declining air pollution and natural climate cycles—will combine over

the next 20 years to make climate change faster and more furious than anticipated. In our view, there's a good chance that we could breach the 1.5 °C level by 2030, not by 2040 as projected in the special report (see 'Accelerated warming'). The climate-modelling community has not grappled enough with the rapid changes that policymakers care most about, preferring to focus on longer-term trends and equilibria.”). See also Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2014) [TIME TO ACT TO REDUCE SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS](#), 25 (Figure: SLCP Climate Benefits, Avoided global warming [showing that the avoided global warming from rapid implementation of SLCP mitigation measures is 0.6°C by 2050]). Since the Xu, Ramanathan, and Victor Comment was published, the IPCC has updated its estimate for when 1.5 °C will be exceeded: see Arias P. A., et al. (2021) [Technical Summary](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-9 (“Timing of crossing 1.5°C global warming: Slightly different approaches are used in SR1.5 and in this Report. SR1.5 assessed a likely range of 2030 to 2052 for reaching a global warming level of 1.5°C (for a 30-year period), assuming a continued, constant rate of warming. In AR6, combining the larger estimate of global warming to date and the assessed climate response to all considered scenarios, the central estimate of crossing 1.5°C of global warming (for a 20-year period) occurs in the early 2030s, ten years earlier than the midpoint of the likely range assessed in the SR1.5, assuming no major volcanic eruption. (TS.1.3, Cross-Section Box TS.1)”).

⁹ Dreyfus G. B., Xu Y., Shindell D. T., Zaelke D., & Ramanathan V. (2022) [Mitigating climate disruption in time: A self-consistent approach for avoiding both near-term and long-term global warming](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 119(22): 1–8, 1, 5, 6 (“Aggressive decarbonization to achieve net-zero CO₂ emissions in the 2050s (as in the decarbon-only scenario) results in weakly accelerated net warming compared to the reference case, with a positive warming up to 0.03 °C in the mid-2030s, and no net avoided warming until the mid-2040s due to the reduction in co-emitted cooling aerosols (Figure 3a). By 2050, decarbonization measures result in very limited net avoided warming (0.07°C), consistent with Shindell and Smith, but rise to a likely detectable 0.25°C by 2060 and a major benefit of 1.4°C by 2100 (Table S5). In contrast, pairing decarbonization with mitigation measures targeting CH₄, BC, HFC, and N₂O (not an SLCP due to its longer lifetime) independent from decarbonization are essential to slowing the rate of warming by the 2030s to under 0.3°C per decade (Table 1, Figure 3b), similar to the 0.2°C to 0.25°C per decade warming prior to 2020. Recent studies suggest that rate of warming rather than level of warming controls likelihood of record-shattering extreme weather events. By 2050, the net avoided warming from the targeted non-CO₂ measures is 0.26°C, almost 4 times larger than the net benefit of decarbonization alone (0.07°C) (Table S5).”; “These non-CO₂ targeted measures when combined with decarbonization can provide net cooling by 2030 and reduce the rate of warming from 2030 to 2050 by about 50%, roughly half of which comes from methane, significantly larger than decarbonization alone over this time frame.”; “Moreover, decarbonization alone increases the warming rate in the near term (Table 1). Notably, the warming rate in the decarbonization scenario would not drop below the current rate of warming until the 2040s (Fig. 3B). Pairing decarbonization with measures targeting SLCP slows the rate of warming a decade or two earlier than decarbonization alone.”).

¹⁰ Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) [Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 114(39): 10315–10323, 10321 (“The SP [super pollutant] lever targets SLCPs. Reducing SLCP emissions thins the SP blanket within few decades, given the shorter lifetimes of SLCPs (weeks for BC to about 15 years for HFCs). The mitigation potential of the SP lever with a maximum deployment of current technologies ... is about 0.6 °C by 2050 and 1.2 °C by 2100 (SI Appendix, Fig. S5B and Table S1).”). See also Szopa S., Naik V., Adhikary B., Artaxo P., Berntsen T., Collins W. D., Fuzzi S., Gallardo L., Kiendler-Scharr A., Klimont Z., Liao H., Unger N., & Zanis P. (2021) [Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 821 (“Across the SSPs, the collective reduction of CH₄, ozone precursors and HFCs can make a difference of global mean surface air temperature of 0.2 with a very likely range of [0.1–0.4] °C in 2040 and 0.8 with a very likely range of [0.5–1.3] °C at the end of the 21st century (comparing SSP3-7.0 and SSP1-1.9), which is substantial in the context of the Paris Agreement. Sustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface temperature (*high confidence*) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (*high confidence*).”); and Dreyfus G. B., Xu Y., Shindell D. T., Zaelke D., & Ramanathan V. (2022) [Mitigating climate disruption in time: A self-consistent approach for avoiding both near-term and long-term global warming](#), PROC.

NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 119(22): 1–8, 5 (“Aggressive decarbonization to achieve net-zero CO₂ emissions in the 2050s (as in the decarb-only scenario) results in weakly accelerated net warming compared to the reference case, with a positive warming up to 0.03 °C in the mid-2030s, and no net avoided warming until the mid-2040s due to the reduction in co-emitted cooling aerosols (Figure 3a). By 2050, decarbonization measures result in very limited net avoided warming (0.07°C), consistent with Shindell and Smith, but rise to a likely detectable 0.25°C by 2060 and a major benefit of 1.4°C by 2100 (Table S5).”).

¹¹ Molina M., Ramanathan V., & Zaelke D. (2 April 2020) [Best path to net zero: Cut short-lived super-pollutants](#), BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (“Speed must become the key measure of all climate mitigation strategies: a speedy reduction of global warming before it leads to further, self-reinforcing climate change feedbacks and [tipping points](#); a speedy deployment of mitigation actions and technologies; and getting this all up to scale in a speedy manner. And let us be clear: By “speed,” we mean measures—including regulatory ones—that can begin within two-to-three years, be substantially implemented in five-to-10 years, and produce a climate response within the next decade or two.”). See also Molina M., Zaelke D., Sarma K. M., Andersen S. O., Ramanathan V., & Kaniaru D. (2009) [Reducing abrupt climate change risk using the Montreal Protocol and other regulatory actions to complement cuts in CO₂ emissions](#), Proc. Nat'l. Acad. Sci. 106(49): 20616–20621, 20616 (“Current emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) have already committed the planet to an increase in average surface temperature by the end of the century that may be above the critical threshold for tipping elements of the climate system into abrupt change with potentially irreversible and unmanageable consequences. This would mean that the climate system is close to entering if not already within the zone of “dangerous anthropogenic interference” (DAI). Scientific and policy literature refers to the need for “early,” “urgent,” “rapid,” and “fast-action” mitigation to help avoid DAI and abrupt climate changes. We define “fast-action” to include regulatory measures that can begin within 2–3 years, be substantially implemented in 5–10 years, and produce a climate response within decades. We discuss strategies for short-lived non-CO₂ GHGs and particles, where existing agreements can be used to accomplish mitigation objectives. Policy makers can amend the Montreal Protocol to phase down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) with high global warming potential. Other fast-action strategies can reduce emissions of black carbon particles and precursor gases that lead to ozone formation in the lower atmosphere, and increase biosequestration, including through biochar. These and other fast-action strategies may reduce the risk of abrupt climate change in the next few decades by complementing cuts in CO₂ emissions.”).

¹² See Copernicus Climate Services (9 January 2023) [2022 was a year of climate extremes, with record high temperatures and rising concentrations of greenhouse gases](#) (last visited 11 June 2023) (“2022 was the 5th warmest year – however, the 4th-8th warmest years are very close together. The last eight years have been the eight warmest on record. The annual average temperature was 0.3°C above the reference period of 1991-2020, which equates to approximately 1.2°C higher than the period 1850-1900. Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations increased by approximately 2.1 ppm, similar to the rates of recent years. Methane concentrations in the atmosphere increased by close to 12 ppb, higher than average, but below the last two years’ record highs. La Niña conditions persisted during much of the year, for the third year in a row”); National Aeronautics and Space Administration (12 January 2023) [NASA Says 2022 Fifth Warmest Year on Record, Warming Trend Continues](#); and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (12 January 2022) [2022 was world’s 6th-warmest year on record](#).

¹³ Rockström J., et al. (2021) [Identifying a Safe and Just Corridor for People and the Planet](#), EARTH’S FUTURE 9(4): 1–7, 1 (“Human development depends on safeguarding the stability of the planet (Steffen et al., [2018](#); Xu et al., [2020](#)). Current human activities, especially of high consuming wealthy societies, are threatening the stability of Earth’s life support systems and its capacity to support our future well-being in the Anthropocene (Steffen, Broadgate, et al., [2015](#)). Simultaneously, key human development needs remain, including attaining the UN Sustainable Development Goals for all by 2030, and ensuring continued human well-being for a world population of possibly 10 billion people in 2050. Addressing these challenges requires a full integration of people’s lives and the planet’s stability.”).

¹⁴ Guterres A. (15 May 2018) [Remarks at Austrian World Summit](#), United Nations, Speeches (“Climate change is, quite simply, an existential threat for most life on the planet – including, and especially, the life of humankind.”).

¹⁵ Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE, 575(7784): 592–595, 594 (“In our view, the clearest emergency would be if we were approaching a global cascade of tipping points that led to a new, less habitable, ‘hothouse’ climate state¹¹. Interactions could happen through ocean and atmospheric circulation or through feedbacks that increase greenhouse-gas levels and global temperature. Alternatively, strong cloud feedbacks could cause a global tipping point^{12,13}. We argue that cascading effects might be common. Research last year¹⁴ analysed 30 types of regime shift spanning physical climate and ecological systems, from collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet to a switch from rainforest to savanna. This indicated that exceeding tipping points in one system can increase the risk of crossing them in others. Such links were found for 45% of possible interactions¹⁴. In our view, examples are starting to be observed. ... If damaging tipping cascades can occur and a global tipping point cannot be ruled out, then this is an existential threat to civilization. No amount of economic cost–benefit analysis is going to help us. We need to change our approach to the climate problem. ... In our view, the evidence from tipping points alone suggests that we are in a state of planetary emergency: both the risk and urgency of the situation are acute....”). See also Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) [Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), SCIENCE 377(6611): 1–10, 7 (“Current warming is ~1.1°C above preindustrial and even with rapid emission cuts warming will reach ~1.5°C by the 2030s (23). We cannot rule out that WAIS and GrIS tipping points have already been passed (see above) and several other tipping elements have minimum threshold values within the 1.1 to 1.5°C range. Our best estimate thresholds for GrIS, WAIS, REEF, and abrupt permafrost thaw (PFAT) are ~1.5°C although WAIS and GrIS collapse may still be avoidable if GMST returns below 1.5°C within an uncertain overshoot time (likely decades) (94).”).

¹⁶ Dennis B. & Dance S. (31 July 2023) [It's not just hot. Climate anomalies are emerging around the globe](#), THE WASHINGTON POST (“But some events were so abnormal that they sent a wave of consternation through the scientific community. Antarctic sea ice is [at a historically low level](#) for this time of year, according to federal data. Sea surface temperatures across the North Atlantic have been “off the charts,” Europe’s Copernicus Climate Change Service reported, noting that the figures set records for this time of year “by a very large margin.” Water temperatures off the coast of South Florida rose to unfathomable levels in recent days, leading scientists to fear for the [fate of the only living coral barrier reef](#) in the continental United States.¶ “On the one hand, we knew these things were going to happen. These have been the predictions for a long time,” said Claudia Tebaldi, a scientist at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. ¶ And yet, she said, “this year, in particular, has seemed so extreme. ... The size of the anomalies is surprising.” ¶ For years, climate scientists have detailed again and again the many impacts that are likely as the world grows steadily hotter, such as more intense storms, more torrential rainfall, [fast-rising seas](#) and melting ice caps. ¶ But they also have been unequivocal that with more warming comes the possibility of unforeseen consequences — of rapid changes, irreversible collapses and other feedback loops.¶ More than a decade ago, [a study](#) from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine found that while many aspects of climate change and its effects “are expected to be approximately linear and gradual,” that won’t always be the case. ¶ “It is clear that the risk of surprises can be expected to increase with the duration and magnitude of the warming,” the authors wrote. ¶ That reality seems to be playing out.”).

¹⁷ Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) [Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 114(39): 10319–10323, 10320 (“Box 2. Risk Categorization of Climate Change to Society. ... [A] 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. ... This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ~1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of

extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO₂) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats.”). See also Xu C., Kohler T. A., Lenton T. M., Svenning J.-C., & Scheffer M. (2020) [Future of the human climate niche](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 117(21): 11350–11355, 11350 (“Here, we demonstrate that for millennia, human populations have resided in the same narrow part of the climatic envelope available on the globe, characterized by a major mode around ~11 °C to 15 °C mean annual temperature (MAT). ... We show that in a business-as-usual climate change scenario, the geographical position of this temperature niche is projected to shift more over the coming 50 y than it has moved since 6000 BP. ... Specifically, 3.5 billion people will be exposed to MAT ≥29.0 °C, a situation found in the present climate only in 0.8% of the global land surface, mostly concentrated in the Sahara, but in 2070 projected to cover 19% of the global land (Fig. 3). ... For instance, accounting for population growth projected in the SSP3 scenario, each degree of temperature rise above the current baseline roughly corresponds to one billion humans left outside the temperature niche, absent migration (SI Appendix, Fig. S14).”); Watts N., et al. (2021) [The 2020 report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: responding to converging crises](#), THE LANCET 397(10269): 129–170, 129 (“Vulnerable populations were exposed to an additional 475 million heatwave events globally in 2019, which was, in turn, reflected in excess morbidity and mortality (indicator 1.1.2). During the past 20 years, there has been a 53.7% increase in heat-related mortality in people older than 65 years, reaching a total of 296 000 deaths in 2018 (indicator 1.1.3). The high cost in terms of human lives and suffering is associated with effects on economic output, with 302 billion h of potential labour capacity lost in 2019 (indicator 1.1.4). India and Indonesia were among the worst affected countries, seeing losses of potential labour capacity equivalent to 4–6% of their annual gross domestic product (indicator 4.1.3).”);

¹⁸ Zachariah M., Philip S., Pinto I., Vahlberg M., Singh R., Otto F., Barnes C., & Kimutai J. (2023) [Extreme heat in North America, Europe and China in July 2023 made much more likely by climate change](#) (“In line with what has been expected from past climate projections and IPCC reports these events are not rare anymore today. North America, Europe and China have experienced heatwaves increasingly frequently over the last years as a result of warming caused by human activities, hence the current heat waves are not rare in today's climate with an event like the currently expected approximately once every 15 years in the US/Mexico region, once every 10 years in Southern Europe, and once in 5 years for China. • Without human induced climate change these heat events would however have been extremely rare. In China it would have been about a 1 in 250 year event while maximum heat like in July 2023 would have been virtually impossible to occur in the US/Mexico region and Southern Europe if humans had not warmed the planet by burning fossil fuels.”). Note also the record-breaking June 2021 heatwave in the Pacific Northwest (U.S. and Canada) would have been virtually impossible absent human-caused climate change and would have been much less detrimental to human health. See Philip S. Y., et al. (2021) [Rapid attribution analysis of the extraordinary heatwave on the Pacific Coast of the US and Canada](#), WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION, 2 (“Also, this heatwave was about 2°C hotter than it would have been if it had occurred at the beginning of the industrial revolution (when global mean temperatures were 1.2°C cooler than today.”); and Newburger E. (1 July 2021) [Historic heat wave linked to hundreds of deaths in Pacific Northwest and Canada](#), CNBC (“Dr. Jennifer Vines, Multnomah County’s health officer, said the preliminary cause of death was hyperthermia, an abnormally high body temperature resulting from an inability of the body to deal with heat. Many of the dead were found alone and without air conditioning.... “While it is too early to say with certainty how many of these deaths are heat related, it is believed likely that the significant increase in deaths reported is attributable to the extreme weather B.C. has experienced,” Lapointe said in a statement.”). In Western Europe, global warming made the 2019 heatwaves up to 100 times more likely. See Vautard R., et al. (2020) [Human contribution to the record-breaking June and July 2019 heatwaves in Western Europe](#), ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 15(9): 094077, 1–9, 5 (“For the France average, the heatwave was an event with a return period estimated to be 134 years. As for the June case, except for HadGEM-3A, which has a hot and dry bias, the changes in intensity are systematically underestimated, as they range from 1.1 °C (CNRM-CM6.1) to 1.6 °C (EC-EARTH). By combining information from models and observations, we conclude that the probability of such an event to occur for France has increased by a factor of at least 10 (see the synthesis in figure 3). This factor is very uncertain and could be two orders of magnitude higher. The change in intensity of an equally probable heatwave is between 1.5 degrees and 3 degrees. We found similar numerical results for Lille, with however an estimate of change in intensity higher in the observations, and models predict trend estimates that are consistently lower than observation trends, a fact that

needs further investigation beyond the scope of this attribution study. We conclude for these cases that such an event would have had an extremely small probability to occur (less than about once every 1000 years) without climate change in France. Climate change had therefore a major influence to explain such temperatures, making them about 100 times more likely (at least a factor of ten).”).

¹⁹ Dahl K. A., Abatzoglou J. T., Phillips C. A., Ortiz-Partida J. P., Licker R., Merner L. D., & Ekwurzel B. (2023) [Quantifying the contribution of major carbon producers to increases in vapor pressure deficit and burned area in western US and southwestern Canadian forests](#), ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 18(6): 064011, 1–11, 2 (“Vapor pressure deficit (VPD)—a measure of atmospheric water demand defined as the difference between the amount of water vapor in the air and the amount of water vapor that air would hold at saturation—has emerged as a key metric linking climate change and burned area (BA) due to its role in regulating ecosystem water dynamics (Grossiord et al 2020, Clarke et al 2022). Through the lens of regional wildfire risk, rising VPD ultimately translates to a greater likelihood that fuels will ignite and carry fire across a landscape. More than two-thirds of the observed summertime increase in VPD in the western US has been attributed to anthropogenic warming (Zhuang et al 2021). In turn, the increase in summertime VPD has driven increases in fuel aridity in the region, resulting in nearly a doubling of BA in western US forests during 1984–2015 (Abatzoglou and Williams 2016). Regionally, there is a strong and established interannual relationship between VPD and BA across forested subregions of the western US and southwestern Canada (Abatzoglou et al 2018, Williams et al 2019, Whitman et al 2022). In flammability-limited ecosystems like forests, area burned is exponentially related to VPD (Juang et al 2022).”).

²⁰ Night-time fire intensity has increased globally in the last two decades due to rising temperatures, causing more intense, longer-lasting, and larger fires. See Balch J. K., Abatzoglou J. T., Joseph M. B., Koontz M. J., Mahood A. L., McGlinchy J., Cattau M. E., & Williams A. P. (2022) [Warming weakens the night-time barrier to global fire](#), NATURE 602: 442–448, 442 (“Night-time provides a critical window for slowing or extinguishing fires owing to the lower temperature and the lower vapour pressure deficit (VPD). However, fire danger is most often assessed based on daytime conditions^{1,2}, capturing what promotes fire spread rather than what impedes fire. Although it is well appreciated that changing daytime weather conditions are exacerbating fire, potential changes in night-time conditions—and their associated role as fire reducers—are less understood. Here we show that night-time fire intensity has increased, which is linked to hotter and drier nights. Our findings are based on global satellite observations of daytime and night-time fire detections and corresponding hourly climate data, from which we determine landcover-specific thresholds of VPD (VPD_t), below which fire detections are very rare (less than 95 per cent modelled chance). Globally, daily minimum VPD increased by 25 per cent from 1979 to 2020. Across burnable lands, the annual number of flammable night-time hours—when VPD exceeds VPD_t —increased by 110 hours, allowing five additional nights when flammability never ceases. Across nearly one-fifth of burnable lands, flammable nights increased by at least one week across this period. Globally, night fires have become 7.2 per cent more intense from 2003 to 2020, measured via a satellite record. These results reinforce the lack of night-time relief that wildfire suppression teams have experienced in recent years. We expect that continued night-time warming owing to anthropogenic climate change will promote more intense, longer-lasting and larger fires.”); discussed in Dickie G. (19 July 2022) [Steamy nights in European heatwave worsen health and fire risks – experts](#), REUTERS.

²¹ The eastern coast of South Africa saw extreme flooding in 2022, which affected 40,000 people and caused US \$1.57 billion in property damage. A recent study shows that the probability of such extreme rainfall in the region has doubled due to human-induced climate change. See Pinto I., et al. (2022) [Climate change exacerbated rainfall causing devastating flooding in Eastern South Africa](#), WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION: 1–21, 2 (“40,000 people were impacted by the rainfall and subsequent floods- 435 deaths were reported from the affected areas, 55 injured and 54 people missing (Government of South Africa, 2022a). At least 13,500 houses were damaged or destroyed - among these, over 4,000 homes in informal settlements in eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality were destroyed, leaving 6278 people homeless and 7245 people in shelters (Ibid.). 630 schools were affected in the KZN province in the impacted areas, and 124 schools damaged, thus impacting around 270,000 students (Government of South Africa, 2022b). Critical infrastructure such as bridges and roads were also severely damaged, including two major highways (IFRC, 2022), and the mobile phone infrastructure of KwaZulu-Natal saw 400 towers impacted due to power outages and flooded fibre conduiting (Tech Central, 2022). In addition, large parts of Durban were left without electricity and water for days due to damage to water treatment and power plant stations (IFRC, 2022). The overall property damage

is estimated around 17 billion rand/US\$1.57 billion (IOL, 2022a).”; “...the probability of an event such as the rainfall that resulted in this disaster has approximately doubled due to human-induced climate change. The intensity of the current event has increased by 4-8%.”).

²² For example, the catastrophic flooding that inundated a third of Pakistan in 2022 was very likely made more severe by climate change, increasing rainfall, glacier melt, and extending a La Niña event in the Pacific for a rare third year. See Clarke B., Otto F., & Harrington L. (5 September 2022) [Pakistan floods: What role did climate change play?](#), THE CONVERSATION (“Clues as to the role of climate change can also come from aspects that contributed to this disaster. There are three main factors. ¶ First, extreme rainfall. A warmer atmosphere holds more moisture. For every degree the atmosphere warms it can hold about 6%-7% more moisture, which often results in more rain falling during the most extreme events (south Asia has warmed around 0.7°C since 1900). Had this event happened in a world where carbon dioxide concentrations were instead at pre-industrial levels, the rains probably would have been less intense. ¶ Second, the monsoon itself, which is highly complex and variable. It forms in south Asia in the summer, when air over land warms faster than air over the sea, which creates a flow of air onto the land. The winds bring great volumes of moisture that precipitate into deluges when they meet higher ground, especially the Himalayas. ¶ Unusual monsoon rains over Pakistan have some predictability. They occur when multiple phenomena coincide, including a La Niña event in the Pacific and large meanders in the high-altitude jet stream, as was the case in both 2010 and this year. ¶ There is emerging evidence that this confluence of factors may occur more regularly as the climate changes. If such trends continue, then flooding in Pakistan and other simultaneous extremes across the northern Hemisphere will happen more often in the future. ¶ Pakistan also experienced extended and brutal heatwaves in May and June this year, which were amplified by climate change. This heat amplified the monsoonal “thermal low”—a low-pressure system created by hot air rising rapidly—which greatly enhanced the flow of moisture-laden air onto southern Pakistan. ¶ Third, Pakistan has more than 7,000 glaciers in its northern mountainous regions. As these glaciers melt, their waters contribute to the flooding. This melting is driven to a large degree by climate change and is especially prominent this year as a result of the heatwave.”); Otto F. E. L., Zachariah M., Saeed F., Siddiqi A., & Shahzad K. (2022) [Climate change likely increased extreme monsoon rainfall, flooding highly vulnerable communities in Pakistan](#), WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION, 3 (“However, for the 5-day rainfall extreme, the majority of models and observations we have analysed show that intense rainfall has become heavier as Pakistan has warmed. Some of these models suggest climate change could have increased the rainfall intensity up to 50% for the 5-day event definition.”); and Trenberth K. (15 September 2022) [2022’s supercharged summer of climate extremes: How global warming and La Niña fueled disasters on top of disasters](#), THE CONVERSATION.

²³ Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) [Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), SCIENCE 377(6611): 1–10, 7 (“Current warming is ~1.1°C above preindustrial and even with rapid emission cuts warming will reach ~1.5°C by the 2030s (23). We cannot rule out that WAIS [West Antarctic Ice Sheet] and GrIS [Greenland Ice Sheet] tipping points have already been passed (see above) and several other tipping elements have minimum threshold values within the 1.1 to 1.5°C range. Our best estimate thresholds for GrIS, WAIS, REEF [low-latitude coral reefs], and North Atlantic subpolar gyre / Labrador-Irminger Sea convection abrupt permafrost thaw (PFAT) are ~1.5°C although WAIS and GrIS collapse may still be avoidable if GMST [Global Mean Surface Temperature] returns below 1.5°C within an uncertain overshoot time (likely decades) (94). ... The chance of triggering CTPs [Climate tipping points] is already non-negligible and will grow even with stringent climate mitigation (SSP1-1.9 in Fig. 2, B and C). Nevertheless, achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C would clearly be safer than keeping global warming below 2°C (90) (Fig. 2). Going from 1.5 to 2°C increases the likelihood of committing to WAIS and GrIS collapse near complete warm-water coral die-off, and abrupt permafrost thaw; further, the best estimate threshold for LABC [North Atlantic subpolar gyre / Labrador-Irminger Sea convection] collapse is crossed. The likelihood of triggering AMOC [Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation] collapse, Boreal forest shifts, and extra-polar glacier loss becomes non-negligible at >1.5°C and glacier loss becomes likely by ~2°C. A cluster of abrupt shifts occur in ESM [Earth System Models] at 1.5 to 2°C (19). Although not tipping elements, ASSI [Arctic Summer Sea Ice] loss could become regular by 2°C, gradual permafrost thaw would likely become widespread beyond 1.5°C, and land carbon sink weakening would become significant by 2°C.”).

²⁴ Boers N. & Rypdal M. (2021) [*Critical slowing down suggests that the western Greenland Ice Sheet is close to a tipping point*](#), Proc. Nat'l. Acad. Sci. 118(21): 1–7, 1 (“A crucial nonlinear mechanism for the existence of this tipping point is the positive melt-elevation feedback: Melting reduces ice sheet height, exposing the ice sheet surface to warmer temperatures, which further accelerates melting. We reveal early-warning signals for a forthcoming critical transition from ice-core-derived height reconstructions and infer that the western Greenland Ice Sheet has been losing stability in response to rising temperatures. We show that the melt-elevation feedback is likely to be responsible for the observed destabilization. Our results suggest substantially enhanced melting in the near future.”).

²⁶ Fox-Kemper B., et al. (2021) [*Chapter 9: Ocean, Cryosphere and Sea Level Change*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS*](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 1308–1309, 1302 (“[T]he main uncertainty related to high-end sea-level rise is “when” rather than “if” it arises: the upper limit of 1.02 m of *likely* sea-level range by 2100 for the SSP 5-8.5 scenario will be exceeded in any future warming scenario on time scales of centuries to millennia (*high confidence*), but it is uncertain how quickly the long-term committed sea level will be reached (Section 9.6.3.5). Hence, global-mean sea level might rise well above the *likely* range before 2100, which is reflected by assessments of ice-sheet contributions based on structured expert judgment (Bamber et al., 2019) leading to a 95th percentile of projected future sea-level rise as high as 2.3 m in 2100 (Section 9.6.3.3)... High-end sea-level rise can therefore occur if one or two processes related to ice-sheet collapse in Antarctica result in an additional sea-level rise at the maximum of their plausible ranges (Sections 9.4.2.5, 9.6.3.3; Table 9.7) or if several of the processes described in this box result in individual contributions to additional sea-level rise at moderate levels. In both cases, global-mean sea-level rise by 2100 would be substantially higher than the assessed *likely* range, as indicated by the projections including *low confidence* processes reaching in 2100 as high as 1.6 m at the 83rd percentile and 2.3 m at the 95th percentile (Section 9.6.3.3).”; “While ice-sheet processes in whose projection there is *low confidence* have little influence up to 2100 on projections under SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6 (Table 9.9), this is not the case under higher emissions scenarios, where they could lead to GMSL rise well above the *likely* range. In particular, under SSP5-8.5, *low confidence* processes could lead to a total GMSL rise of 0.6-1.6 m over this time period (17th-83rd percentile range of p-box including SEJ- and MICI-based projections), with 5th-95th percentile projections extending to 0.5-2.3 m (*low confidence*).”). See also Wang S., Foster A., Lenz E. A., Kessler J. D., Stroeve J. C., Anderson L. O., Turetsky M., Betts R., Zou S., Liu W., Boos W. R., & Hausfather Z. (2023) [*Mechanisms and Impacts of Earth System Tipping Elements*](#), REV. GEOPHYS. 61: 1–81, 19–20 (“As mentioned above, reduction of the GIS will likely require a millennium. Yet the weakening of ice shelf buttressing directly accelerates ice flow and discharge independent of MISI and MICI processes, with immediate implications for observed rates of sea-level rise. Consequently, under our current best understanding, Greenland and Antarctic ice-sheet collapse cannot be considered an abrupt or fast phenomenon in which most sea level impacts manifest within decades. Nevertheless, ice-sheet losses may contribute to regional sea level rise under RCP8.5 and worst-case scenarios that reaches 1–2 m for many cities globally by 2100, seriously threatening existing communities and infrastructure (Trisos et al., 2022). Over longer timescales, sustained high rates of global sea-level rise (>1 cm/yr by 2200, with further acceleration to up to a couple centimeters per year beyond) may broadly strain coastal adaptation efforts (Oppenheimer et al., 2019). At the same time, models indicate that strong climate mitigation may avert significant fractions of potential sea-level rise and prevent ice-sheet collapse across large regions. In several modeling studies the RCP2.6 scenario prevents collapse of the WAIS (Bulthuis et al., 2019; DeConto & Pollard, 2016) and may reduce the Antarctic contribution to global sea level rise by 2100 to 13 cm (Edwards et al., 2021)... Although significant uncertainties remain regarding the precise temperature thresholds that could trigger ice-sheet collapse, research to date suggests that aggressive climate mitigation could limit risks from ice-sheet instabilities (Table 4).”).

²⁷ Robinson A., Calov R., & Ganopolski A. (2012) [*Multistability and critical thresholds of the Greenland ice sheet*](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 2(6): 429–432, 429 (“Recent studies have focused on the short-term contribution of the Greenland ice sheet to sea-level rise, yet little is known about its long-term stability. The present best estimate of the threshold in global temperature rise leading to complete melting of the ice sheet is 3.1 °C (1.9–5.1 °C, 95% confidence interval) above the preindustrial climate, determined as the temperature for which the modelled surface mass balance of the present-day ice sheet turns negative. Here, using a fully coupled model, we show that this criterion systematically overestimates the temperature threshold and that the Greenland ice sheet is more sensitive to long-term climate change than previously thought. We estimate that the warming threshold leading to a monostable, essentially

ice-free state is in the range of 0.8–3.2 °C, with a best estimate of 1.6 °C. By testing the ice sheet’s ability to regrow after partial mass loss, we find that at least one intermediate equilibrium state is possible, though for sufficiently high initial temperature anomalies, total loss of the ice sheet becomes irreversible. Crossing the threshold alone does not imply rapid melting (for temperatures near the threshold, complete melting takes tens of millennia). However, the timescale of melt depends strongly on the magnitude and duration of the temperature overshoot above this critical threshold.”).

²⁸ Rantanen M., Karpechko A. Y., Lipponen A., Nordling K., Hyvärinen O., Ruosteenoja K., Vihma T. & Laaksonen A. (2022) [The Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979](#), COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRON. 3(168): 1–10, 3 (“During 1979–2021, major portions of the Arctic Ocean were warming at least four times as fast as the global average (Fig. 1c). The most extreme AA values occur in the sea areas near Novaya Zemlya, which were locally warming up to seven times as fast as the global average. These high warming rates are consistent with recent research⁴⁴, and evidently, the primary reason for such a high amplification ratio is the reduction of cold-season ice cover, which has been most pronounced in the Barents Sea^{44,45}. Furthermore, it has been found that changes in atmospheric circulation have amplified the warming in this area^{46,47}. In general, there are no regions within the Arctic Circle where AA⁴³ is smaller than two, apart from the northern North Atlantic.”); *discussed in* Budryk Z. (11 August 2022) [Arctic warming up to four times as fast as global average: study](#), THE HILL; and Fountain H. (11 August 2022) [Arctic Warming Is Happening Faster Than Described, Analysis Shows](#), THE NEW YORK TIMES. See also Jacobs P., Lenssen N. J. L., Schmidt G. A., & Rohde R. A. (2021) [The Arctic Is Now Warming Four Times As Fast As the Rest of the Globe](#), Presentation at the American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting, A13E-02 (“We demonstrate the Arctic is likely warming over 4 times faster than the rest of the world, some 3-4 times the global average, with higher rates found both for more recent intervals as well as more accurate latitudinal boundaries. These results stand in contrast to the widely-held conventional wisdom — prevalent across scientific and lay publications alike — that the Arctic is “only” warming around twice as fast as the global mean.”); *discussed in* Voosen P. (14 December 2021) [The Arctic is warming four times faster than the rest of the world](#), SCIENCE; and Chylek P., Folland C., Klett J. D., Wang M., Hengartner N., Lesins G., & Dubey M. K. (2022) [Annual Mean Arctic Amplification 1970–2020: Observed and Simulated by CMIP6 Climate Models](#), GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 49(13): 1–8, 1 (“While the annual mean Arctic Amplification (AA) index varied between two and three during the 1970–2000 period, it reached values exceeding four during the first two decades of the 21st century. The AA did not change in a continuous fashion but rather in two sharp increases around 1986 and 1999. During those steps the mean global surface air temperature trend remained almost constant, while the Arctic trend increased. Although the “best” CMIP6 models reproduce the increasing trend of the AA in 1980s they do not capture the sharply increasing trend of the AA after 1999 including its rapid step-like increase. We propose that the first sharp AA increase around 1986 is due to external forcing, while the second step close to 1999 is due to internal climate variability, which models cannot reproduce in the observed time.... Annual mean Arctic Amplification (AA) within the period 1970–2020 changed in steep steps around 1986 and 1999. It reached values over 4.0...”); *discussed in* Los Alamos National Laboratory (5 July 2022) [Arctic temperatures are increasing four times faster than global warming](#), PHYS.ORG.

²⁹ Kim Y.-H., Min S.-K., Gillett N. P., Notz D., & Malinina E. (2023) [Observationally-constrained projections of an ice-free Arctic even under a low emission scenario](#), NAT. COMMUN. 14: 3139, 5 (“Based on the GHG+ scaling factors, we produce observationally-constrained future changes in Arctic SIA under four SSP scenarios. Results indicate that the first sea ice-free September will occur as early as the 2030s–2050s irrespective of emission scenarios. Extended occurrences of an ice-free Arctic in the early summer months are projected later in the century under higher emissions scenarios.”). See also Bonan D. B., Schneider T., Eisenman I., & Wills R. C. J. (2021) [Constraining the Date of a Seasonally Ice-Free Arctic Using a Simple Model](#), GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 48(18): 1–12, 1 (“Under a high-emissions scenario, an ice-free Arctic will likely (>66% probability) occur between 2036 and 2056 in September and between 2050 and 2068 from July to October. Under a medium-emissions scenario, the “likely” date occurs between 2040 and 2062 in September and much later in the 21st century from July to October.”); Docquier D. & Koenigk T. (2021) [Observation-based selection of climate models projects Arctic ice-free summers around 2035](#), COMMUN. EARTH ENVIRON. 2(144): 1–8, 4, 6 (“In the high-emission scenario, five out of six selection criteria that include ocean heat transport provide a first ice-free Arctic in September before 2040 (range of multi-model means: 2032–2039), more than 20 years before the date of ice-free Arctic for the multi-model mean without model selection (i.e. 2061)”); “This model selection reveals that sea-ice area and volume reach lower values at the end of this century compared to the

multi-model mean without selection. This arises both from a more rapid reduction in these quantities through this century and from a lower present-day sea-ice area. Using such a model selection, the timing of an almost ice-free Arctic in summer is advanced by up to 29 years in the high-emission scenario, i.e. it could occur as early as around 2035.”); Peng G., Matthews J. L., Wang M., Vose R., & Sun L. (2020) [What Do Global Climate Models Tell Us about Future Arctic Sea Ice Coverage Changes?](#), CLIMATE 8(15): 1–24, 17 (“Excluding the values later than 2100, the averaged projected [first ice-free Arctic summer year (FIASY)] value for RCP4.5 was 2054 with a spread of 74 years; for RCP8.5, the averaged FIASY was 2042 with a spread of 42 years. ...which put the mean FIASY at 2037. The RCP8.5 projections tended to push FIASY earlier, except for those of the MICRO-ESM and MICRO-ESM-CHEM models. Those two models also tended to project earlier Arctic ice-free dates and longer durations.”); and Overland J. E. & Wang M. (2013) [When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free?](#), GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 40(10): 2097–2101, 2097 (“Three recent approaches to predictions in the scientific literature are as follows: (1) extrapolation of sea ice volume data, (2) assuming several more rapid loss events such as 2007 and 2012, and (3) climate model projections. Time horizons for a nearly sea ice-free summer for these three approaches are roughly 2020 or earlier, 2030 ± 10 years, and 2040 or later. Loss estimates from models are based on a subset of the most rapid ensemble members. ... Observations and citations support the conclusion that most global climate model results in the CMIP5 archive are too conservative in their sea ice projections. Recent data and expert opinion should be considered in addition to model results to advance the very likely timing for future sea ice loss to the first half of the 21st century, with a possibility of major loss within a decade or two.”). However, findings of ice-free September Arctic sea ice may be too early by a decade if models are not properly accounting for larger changes in atmospheric circulation, according to Topál D. & Ding Q. (2023) [Atmospheric circulation-constrained model sensitivity recalibrates Arctic climate projections](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANG. 1–9, 5 (“To showcase our point, we use the abovementioned method to constrain the timing of the first sea-ice-free September in the SMILEs and CMIP6 models. The cumulative probability density functions (CDFs) corresponding to the time of emergence of the first seasonally sea-ice-free Arctic^{52,53} (below 1 million km² in September) in the raw and the calibrated SIE time series in the model ensembles show prospects of a 9–11-year delay of the ‘likely’ (in IPCC⁵⁴ terms) probability ($P > 0.66$) of a September ice-free Arctic, such that an ice-free summer before 2050 is ‘as likely as not’ (in IPCC terms $0.33 < P < 0.66$) (Fig. 5c; Methods). This result is in contrast to estimates from previous studies that project ice-free September as early as mid-century³³. Our results are also at odds with a recent study, where the authors used Arctic temperatures as an emergent constraint on ice-free projections in CMIP6 (ref. 40).”).

³⁰ Bonan D. B., Schneider T., Eisenman I., & Wills R. C. J. (2021) [Constraining the Date of a Seasonally Ice-Free Arctic Using a Simple Model](#), GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 48(18): 1–12, 1 (“Under a high-emissions scenario, an ice-free Arctic will likely (>66% probability) occur between 2036 and 2056 in September and between 2050 and 2068 from July to October. Under a medium-emissions scenario, the “likely” date occurs between 2040 and 2062 in September and much later in the 21st century from July to October.”). However, findings of ice-free September Arctic sea ice may be too early by a decade if models are not properly accounting for larger changes in atmospheric circulation, according to Topál D. & Ding Q. (2023) [Atmospheric circulation-constrained model sensitivity recalibrates Arctic climate projections](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANG. 1–9, 5 (“To showcase our point, we use the abovementioned method to constrain the timing of the first sea-ice-free September in the SMILEs and CMIP6 models. The cumulative probability density functions (CDFs) corresponding to the time of emergence of the first seasonally sea-ice-free Arctic^{52,53} (below 1 million km² in September) in the raw and the calibrated SIE time series in the model ensembles show prospects of a 9–11-year delay of the ‘likely’ (in IPCC⁵⁴ terms) probability ($P > 0.66$) of a September ice-free Arctic, such that an ice-free summer before 2050 is ‘as likely as not’ (in IPCC terms $0.33 < P < 0.66$) (Fig. 5c; Methods). This result is in contrast to estimates from previous studies that project ice-free September as early as mid-century³³. Our results are also at odds with a recent study, where the authors used Arctic temperatures as an emergent constraint on ice-free projections in CMIP6 (ref. 40).”).

³¹ Pistone K., Eisenman I., & Ramanathan V. (2019) [Radiative Heating of an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean](#), GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. 46(13): 7474–7480, 7477 (“This heating of 0.71 W/m² is approximately equivalent to the direct radiative effect of emitting one trillion tons of CO₂ into the atmosphere (see calculation in Appendix A). As of 2016, an estimated 2.4 trillion tons of CO₂ have been emitted since the preindustrial period due to both fossil fuel combustion (1.54 trillion tons) and land use changes (0.82 trillion tons), with an additional 40 billion tons of CO₂ per year emitted from these sources during 2007–2016 (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Thus, the additional warming due to the complete loss of Arctic

sea ice would be equivalent to 25 years of global CO₂ emissions at the current rate.”). See also Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development (2019) [Plain Language Summary of Pistone K., et al.](#)

³² Wadhams P. (2017) [A FAREWELL TO ICE: A REPORT FROM THE ARCTIC](#), Oxford University Press, 107–108 (“Warm air over an ice-free Arctic also causes the snowline to retreat. ... This of the same magnitude as the sea ice negative anomaly during the same period, and the change in albedo is roughly the same between snow-covered land and snow-free tundra as it is between sea ice and open water. Nobody has yet published the calculations for tundra as Pistone and her colleagues did for sea ice, but the similarity of the magnitudes means that snowline retreat and sea ice retreat are each adding about the same amount to global warming.”).

³³ Gatti L. V., et al. (2021) [Amazonia as a carbon source linked to deforestation and climate change](#), NATURE 595(7867): 388–393, 388 (“Southeastern Amazonia, in particular, acts as a net carbon source (total carbon flux minus fire emissions) to the atmosphere. Over the past 40 years, eastern Amazonia has been subjected to more deforestation, warming and moisture stress than the western part, especially during the dry season... the intensification of the dry season and an increase in deforestation seem to promote ecosystem stress, increase in fire occurrence, and higher carbon emissions in the eastern Amazon. This is in line with recent studies that indicate an increase in tree mortality and a reduction in photosynthesis as a result of climatic changes across Amazonia.”). See also Brienen R. J. W., et al. (2015) [Long-term decline of the Amazon carbon sink](#), NATURE 519(7543): 344–348, 344 (“While this analysis confirms that Amazon forests have acted as a long-term net biomass sink, we find a long-term decreasing trend of carbon accumulation. Rates of net increase in above-ground biomass declined by one-third during the past decade compared to the 1990s. This is a consequence of growth rate increases levelling off recently, while biomass mortality persistently increased throughout, leading to a shortening of carbon residence times.”).

³⁴ Lovejoy T. E. & Nobre C. (2018) [Amazon's Tipping Point](#), SCI. ADV. 4(2): eaat2340, 1 (“We believe that negative synergies between deforestation, climate change, and widespread use of fire indicate a tipping point for the Amazon system to flip to nonforest ecosystems in eastern, southern and central Amazonia at 20–25% deforestation.”). See also Hoegh-Guldberg O., et al. (2018) [Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5 °C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems](#), in [GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](#), Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 3-263 (“Global warming of 3°C is projected to reduce the extent of tropical rainforest in Central America, with biomass being reduced by about 40%, which can lead to a large replacement of rainforest by savanna and grassland (Lyra et al., 2017). Overall, modelling studies (Huntingford et al., 2013; Nobre et al., 2016) and observational constraints (Cox et al., 2013) suggest that pronounced rainforest dieback may only be triggered at 3°C–4°C (*medium confidence*), although pronounced biomass losses may occur at 1.5°C– 2°C of global warming.”).

³⁵ Scientists Elena Shevliakova and Stephen Pacala presented their preliminary analysis at a [Princeton conference on safeguarding the Amazon](#); see Makhijani P. (23 October 2019) [A world without the Amazon? Safeguarding the Earth's largest rainforest is focus of Princeton conference](#), PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (“Building on the earlier work of Brazilian climate scientists such as Carlos Nobre, who spoke at the conference, Shevliakova and Pacala modeled the climate impacts by 2050 of deforesting the whole of the Amazon and replacing it with pasture. If the Amazon disappears altogether, even in the scenario in which the world is able to slash its carbon emissions, average temperatures worldwide would rise 0.25°C beyond the expected increase, the scientists noted. “We will be less likely to reach Paris Agreement goals, including climate change stabilization under 1.5°C,” Shevliakova said. In the Amazonian region, the model indicated that by completely eliminating the forest, the region would get up to 4.5°C hotter, making it practically uninhabitable. The effect on rainfall would be equally catastrophic: on average, it would rain 25% less in Brazil. As Shevliakova stated, “It’s a bad story any way you look at it.””). See also Cuadros A. (4 January 2023) [Has the Amazon Reached Its ‘Tipping Point’?](#), THE NEW YORK TIMES (“For all the slashing and burning of recent years, the ecosystem still stores about 120 billion tons of carbon in its trunks, branches, vines and soil — the equivalent of about ten years of human emissions. If all of that carbon is released, it could warm the planet by as much as 0.3 degrees Celsius. According to the Princeton ecologist Stephen Pacala, this alone would probably make the Paris Agreement — the international accord to limit warming since preindustrial times to 2 degrees — “impossible to achieve.” Which, in turn, may mean that other climate tipping points are breached around the world. As the British scientist Tim Lenton put it to me, “The Amazon feeds back to everything.”).

³⁶ Forster P. M., et al. (2023) [Indicators of Global Climate Change 2022: annual update of large-scale indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence](#), EARTH SYST. SCI. DATA 15(6): 2295–2327, 2313, 2312–2313 (Table 7 gives remaining carbon budget for a 50% likelihood to limit global warming to 1.5°C of 250 GtCO₂ (values rounded to closes 50 GtCO₂); “The GCB updates have previously started from the AR6 WGI estimate and subtracted the latest estimates of historical CO₂ emissions. The RCB estimates presented here consider the same updates in historical CO₂ emissions from the GCB as well as the latest available quantification of human-induced warming to date and a reassessment of non-CO₂ warming contributions.... RCB estimates consider projected reductions in non-CO₂ emissions that are aligned with a global transition to net zero CO₂ emissions. These estimates assume median reductions in non-CO₂ emissions between 2020–2050 of CH₄ (50 %), N₂O (25 %) and SO₂ (77 %). If these non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emission reductions are not achieved, the RCB will be smaller (see Supplement, Sect. S8). Note that the 50 % RCB is expected to be exhausted a few years before the 1.5 °C global warming level is reached due to the way it factors future warming from non-CO₂ emissions into its estimate.”). Compare with Friedlingstein P., et al. (2022) [Global Carbon Budget 2022](#), EARTH SYST. SCI. DATA 14(11): 4811–4900, 4814 (“The remaining carbon budget for a 50 % likelihood to limit global warming to 1.5, 1.7, and 2 °C has, respectively, reduced to 105 GtC (380 GtCO₂), 200 GtC (730 GtCO₂), and 335 GtC (1230 GtCO₂) from the beginning of 2023, equivalent to 9, 18, and 30 years, assuming 2022 emissions levels.”).

³⁷ Forster P. M., et al. (2023) [Indicators of Global Climate Change 2022: annual update of large-scale indicators of the state of the climate system and human influence](#), EARTH SYST. SCI. DATA 15(6): 2295–2327, 2312 (“The RCB is estimated by application of the WGI AR6 method described in Rogelj et al. (2019), which involves the combination of the assessment of five factors: (i) the most recent decade of human-induced warming, (ii) the transient climate response to cumulative emissions of CO₂ (TCRE), (iii) the zero emissions commitment (ZEC), (iv) the temperature contribution of non-CO₂ emissions and (v) an adjustment term for Earth system feedbacks that are otherwise not captured through the other factors. AR6 WGI reassessed all five terms (Canadell et al., 2021). The incorporation of factor (v) was further considered by Lamboll and Rogelj (2022).”).

³⁸ Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) [Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-739 (“The applicability of the linear feedback framework (Section 5.4.5.5) suggests that large-scale biogeochemical feedbacks are approximately linear in the forcing from changes in CO₂ and climate. Nevertheless, regionally the biosphere is known to be capable of producing abrupt changes or even ‘tipping points’ (Higgins and Scheiter, 2012; Lasslop et al., 2016).”).

³⁹ Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) [Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-67 (“There is low confidence in the estimate of the non-CO₂ biogeochemical feedbacks, due to the large range in the estimates of α for some individual feedbacks (Figure 5.29c), which can be attributed to the diversity in how models account for these feedbacks, limited process-level understanding, and the existence of known feedbacks for which there is not sufficient evidence to assess the feedback strength.”). See also Chen D., Rojas M., Samset B. H., Cobb K., Diongue Niang A., Edwards P., Emori S., Faria S. H., Hawkins E., Hope P., Huybrechts P., Meinshausen M., Mustafa S. K., Plattner G.-K., & Tréguier A.-M. (2021) [Chapter 1: Framing, Context and Methods](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 202 (“Such paleoclimate evidence has even fuelled concerns that anthropogenic GHGs could tip the global climate into a permanent hot state (Steffen et al., 2018). However, there is no evidence of such non-linear responses at the global scale in climate projections for the next century, which indicate a near-linear dependence of global temperature on cumulative GHG emissions (Section 1.3.5, Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and Chapter 7, Section 7.4.3.1). At the regional scale, abrupt changes and tipping points, such as Amazon forest dieback and permafrost collapse, have occurred in projections with Earth System Models (Drijfhout et al., 2015; Bathiany et al., 2020; Chapter 4, Section 4.7.3). In such simulations, tipping points occur in narrow regions of parameter space (e.g., CO₂ concentration or temperature increase), and for specific climate background states. This makes them difficult to predict using ESMs relying on parameterizations of known processes. In some cases, it is

possible to detect forthcoming tipping points through time-series analysis that identifies increased sensitivity to perturbations as the tipping point is approached (e.g., ‘critical slowing-down’, Scheffer et al., 2012.”); Bathiany S., Hidding J., & Scheffer M. (2020) [Edge Detection Reveals Abrupt and Extreme Climate Events](#), J. CLIM. 33(15): 6399–6421, 6416 (“Despite their societal relevance, our knowledge about the risks of future abrupt climate shifts is far from robust. Several important aspects are highly uncertain: future greenhouse gas emissions (scenario uncertainty), the current climate state (initial condition uncertainty), the question whether and how to model specific processes (structural uncertainty), and what values one should choose for parameters appearing in the equations (parametric uncertainty). Such uncertainties can be explored using ensemble simulations. For example, by running many simulations with different combinations of parameter values a perturbed-physics ensemble can address how parameter uncertainty affects the occurrence of extreme events (Clark et al. 2006). This strategy can be particularly beneficial for studying abrupt events as well since abrupt shifts are associated with region-specific processes, whereas models are usually calibrated to produce a realistic global mean climate at the expense of regional realism (Mauritsen et al. 2012; McNeall et al. 2016). The currently available model configurations are therefore neither reliable nor sufficient to assess the risk of abrupt shifts (Drijfhout et al. 2015). It is hence very plausible that yet-undiscovered tipping points can occur in climate models.”); McIntyre M. E. (2023) [Climate tipping points: A personal view](#), PHYSICS TODAY 76(3), 44–49, 45–46 (“Nearly all the climate system’s real complexity is outside the scope of any model, whether it’s a global climate model that aims to represent the climate system as a whole or a model that only simulates the carbon cycle, ice flow, or another subsystem.... Changes taking only a few years are almost instantaneous from a climate-system perspective. They’re a warning to take seriously the possibility of tipping points in the dynamics of the real climate system.”⁹ The warning is needed because some modelers have argued that tipping points are less probable for the real climate system than for the simplified, low-order climate models studied by dynamic-systems researchers.³ Other researchers, however, have suggested that such a tipping point may be reached sometime in the next few decades or even sooner.^{6,7} Some of its mechanisms resemble those of the Dansgaard–Oeschger warmings and would suddenly accelerate the rate of disappearance of Arctic sea ice. As far as I am aware, no such tipping points have shown up in the behavior of the biggest and most sophisticated climate models. The suggested tipping-point behavior depends on fine details that are not well resolved in the models, including details of the sea ice and the layering of the upper ocean. Also of concern are increases in the frequency and intensity of destructive weather extremes. Such increases have already been observed in recent years. Climate scientists are asking how much further the increases will go and precisely how they will develop. That question is, of course, bound up with the question of tipping points. A failure to simulate many of the extremes themselves, especially extremes of surface storminess, must count as another limitation of the climate models. The reasons are related to the resolution constraints of climate models.”); Spratt D. (19 April 2023) [Faster than forecast, climate impacts trigger tipping points in the Earth system](#), BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (“While observed warming has been close to climate model projections, the impacts have in many instances been faster and even more extreme than the models forecasted. William Ripple and his co-researchers show that many positive feedbacks are not fully accounted for in climate models.... In September 2022, Stockholm University’s David Armstrong McKay and his colleagues concluded that even global warming of 1-degree Celsius risks triggering some tipping points, just one data point in an alarming mountain of research on tipping points presented in the last year and a half.... Speaking in 2018, Steffen said that the dominant linear, deterministic framework for assessing climate change is flawed, especially at higher levels of temperature rise. Model projections that don’t include these feedback and cascading processes “become less useful at higher temperature levels... or, as my co-author John Schellnhuber says, we are making a big mistake when we think we can ‘park’ the Earth System at any given temperature rise – say 2°C – and expect it to stay there.”); and Spratt D. & Dunlop I. (2017) [What lies beneath? The scientific understatement of climate risks](#), 21 (“As discussed above, climate models are not yet good at dealing with tipping points. This is partly due to the nature of tipping points, where a particular and complex confluence of factors abruptly change a climate system characteristic and drive it to a different state. To model this, all the contributing factors and their forces have to be well identified, as well as their particular interactions, plus the interactions between tipping points. Researchers say that “complex, nonlinear systems typically shift between alternative states in an abrupt, rather than a smooth manner, which is a challenge that climate models have not yet been able to adequately meet.”).

⁴⁰ Forster P., Rosen D., Lamboll R., & Rogelj J. (11 November 2022) [Guest post: What the tiny remaining 1.5C carbon budget means for climate policy](#), CARBON BRIEF (“The [latest estimates](#) from the [Global Carbon Project](#) (GCP) show that total worldwide CO2 emissions in 2022 have reached near-record levels. The GCP’s estimates put the [remaining](#)

[carbon budget](#) for 1.5C – specifically, the amount of CO₂ that can still be emitted for a 50% chance of staying below 1.5C of warming – at 380bn tonnes of CO₂ (GtCO₂). At the current rate of emissions, this budget would be blown in just nine years. While that is a disconcertingly short amount of time, the budget for 1.5C may actually be even tighter. Combining the latest insights from the [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](#) (IPCC) with the GCP’s data, we estimate that the remaining 1.5C carbon budget could be just 260GtCO₂ – around 120GtCO₂ smaller. If emissions continued at current levels, this budget would run out in around six and half years.”).

⁴¹ Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) [Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), SCIENCE 377(6611): 1–10, 7 (“Current warming is ~1.1°C above preindustrial and even with rapid emission cuts warming will reach ~1.5°C by the 2030s (23). We cannot rule out that WAIS [West Antarctic Ice Sheet] and GrIS [Greenland Ice Sheet] tipping points have already been passed (see above) and several other tipping elements have minimum threshold values within the 1.1 to 1.5°C range. Our best estimate thresholds for GrIS, WAIS, REEF [low-latitude coral reefs], and North Atlantic subpolar gyre / Labrador-Irminger Sea convection abrupt permafrost thaw (PFAT) are ~1.5°C although WAIS and GrIS collapse may still be avoidable if GMST [Global Mean Surface Temperature] returns below 1.5°C within an uncertain overshoot time (likely decades) (94). ... The chance of triggering CTPs [Climate tipping points] is already non-negligible and will grow even with stringent climate mitigation (SSP1-1.9 in Fig. 2, B and C). Nevertheless, achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C would clearly be safer than keeping global warming below 2°C (90) (Fig. 2). Going from 1.5 to 2°C increases the likelihood of committing to WAIS and GrIS collapse near complete warm-water coral die-off, and abrupt permafrost thaw; further, the best estimate threshold for LABC [North Atlantic subpolar gyre / Labrador-Irminger Sea convection] collapse is crossed. The likelihood of triggering AMOC [Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation] collapse, Boreal forest shifts, and extra-polar glacier loss becomes non-negligible at >1.5°C and glacier loss becomes likely by ~2°C. A cluster of abrupt shifts occur in ESM [Earth System Models] at 1.5 to 2°C (19). Although not tipping elements, ASSI [Arctic Summer Sea Ice] loss could become regular by 2°C, gradual permafrost thaw would likely become widespread beyond 1.5°C, and land carbon sink weakening would become significant by 2°C.”).

⁴² Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE 575(7784): 592–595, 592 (“Models suggest that the Greenland ice sheet could be doomed at 1.5 °C of warming³, which could happen as soon as 2030. ... The world’s remaining emissions budget for a 50:50 chance of staying within 1.5 °C of warming is only about 500 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO₂. Permafrost emissions could take an estimated 20% (100 Gt CO₂) off this budget, and that’s without including methane from deep permafrost or undersea hydrates. If forests are close to tipping points, Amazon dieback could release another 90 Gt CO₂ and boreal forests a further 110 Gt CO₂. With global total CO₂ emissions still at more than 40 Gt per year, the remaining budget could be all but erased already. ... We argue that the intervention time left to prevent tipping could already have shrunk towards zero, whereas the reaction time to achieve net zero emissions is 30 years at best. Hence we might already have lost control of whether tipping happens. A saving grace is that the rate at which damage accumulates from tipping — and hence the risk posed — could still be under our control to some extent.”). See also Ripple W. J., Wolf C., Newsome T. M., Gregg J. W., Lenton T. M., Palomo I., Eikelboom J. A. J., Law B. E., Huq S., Duffy P. B., & Rockström J. (2021) [World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency 2021](#), BIOSCIENCE: biab079, 1–5, 1 (“There is also mounting evidence that we are nearing or have already crossed tipping points associated with critical parts of the Earth system, including the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, warm-water coral reefs, and the Amazon rainforest.”).

⁴³ Steffen W., et al. (2018) [Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 115(33): 8252–8259, 8253, 8256 (“Earth System dynamics can be described, studied, and understood in terms of trajectories between alternate states separated by thresholds that are controlled by nonlinear processes, interactions, and feedbacks. Based on this framework, we argue that social and technological trends and decisions occurring over the next decade or two could significantly influence the trajectory of the Earth System for tens to hundreds of thousands of years and potentially lead to conditions that resemble planetary states that were last seen several millions of years ago, conditions that would be inhospitable to current human societies and to many other contemporary species.... Hothouse Earth is likely to be uncontrollable and dangerous to many, particularly if we transition into it in only a century or two, and it

poses severe risks for health, economies, political stability (12, 39, 49, 50) (especially for the most climate vulnerable), and ultimately, the habitability of the planet for humans.”).

⁴⁴ Rockström J., *et al.* (2021) [Identifying a Safe and Just Corridor for People and the Planet](#), EARTH'S FUTURE 9(4): 1–7, 2 (“Critical to achieving a full integration of ‘safe’ and ‘just’ is to scientifically assess a safe and just corridor for human development on Earth (Figure 1), which we define as follows: Safe Earth system targets are those where biophysical stability of the Earth system is maintained and enhanced over time, thereby safeguarding its functions and ability to support humans and all other living organisms. Just Earth system targets are those where nature's benefits, risks, and related responsibilities are equitably shared among all human beings in the world. A safe and just corridor for people and the planet is where safe and just Earth system target ranges overlap. This corridor bounds pathways of future human development that are both safe and just over time. This safe and just corridor will provide high-level “outcome” goals and the context for companies, cities, governments, and other actors who want to take action by operationalizing scientifically guided sustainability in their ventures (Andersen *et al.*, 2020). Safe and just also implies that the Earth's natural resources, such as budgets for carbon, nutrients, water, and land, are finite (defined by safety) and have to be shared between people and with nature.”).

⁴⁵ Earth Commission (31 May 2023) [A just world on a safe planet: First study quantifying Earth System Boundaries live](#) (“Safe: 1.5°C to avoid high likelihood of multiple climate tipping points. NOT YET BREACHED; Just: 1°C to avoid high exposure to significant harm from climate change. BREACHED AT 1.2°C; **Safe and Just**: 1°C ”); *discussing* Rockström J., *et al.* (2023) [Safe and just Earth system boundaries](#), NATURE 619: 102–111.

⁴⁶ Arias P. A., *et al.* (2021) [Technical Summary](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., *et al.* (eds.), TS-9 (“Timing of crossing 1.5°C global warming: Slightly different approaches are used in SR1.5 and in this Report. SR1.5 assessed a likely range of 2030 to 2052 for reaching a global warming level of 1.5°C (for a 30-year period), assuming a continued, constant rate of warming. In AR6, combining the larger estimate of global warming to date and the assessed climate response to all considered scenarios, the central estimate of crossing 1.5°C of global warming (for a 20-year period) occurs in the early 2030s, ten years earlier than the midpoint of the likely range assessed in the SR1.5, assuming no major volcanic eruption. (TS.1.3, Cross-Section Box TS.1)”).

⁴⁷ Xu Y., Ramanathan V., & Victor D. G. (2018) [Global warming will happen faster than we think](#), NATURE 564(7734): 30–32, 31 (“In 2017, industrial carbon dioxide emissions are estimated to have reached about 37 gigatonnes². This puts them on track with the highest emissions trajectory the IPCC has modelled so far. This dark news means that the next 25 years are poised to warm at a rate of 0.25–0.32 °C per decade³. That is faster than the 0.2 °C per decade that we have experienced since the 2000s, and which the IPCC used in its special report.”). *See also* Hansen J. E., Sato M., Simons L., Nazarenko L. S., Sangha I., von Schuckmann K., Loeb N. G., Osman M. B., Jin Q., Kharecha P., Tselioudis G., Jeong E., Lacis A., Ruedy R., Russell G., Cao J., & Li J. (23 May 2023) [Global warming in the pipeline](#), IZV. ATMOS. OCEAN. PHYS. (preprint): 1–62, 39 (“With current policies, we expect climate forcing for a few decades post-2010 to increase 0.5–0.6 W/m² per decade and produce global warming at a rate of at least +0.27°C per decade. In that case, global warming should reach 1.5°C by the end of the 2020s and 2°C by 2050 (Fig. 25).”; Figure 25 caption reads “Edges of the predicted post-2010 accelerated warming rate (see text) are 0.36 and 0.27°C per decade.”); *and* Ritchie P. D. L., Alkhayuon H., Cox P. M., & Wieczorek S. (2023) [Rate-induced tipping in natural and human systems](#), EARTH SYST. DYNAM. 14(3): 669–683, 669–670 (“Large and abrupt changes in the state of an open system may occur when the external forcing exceeds some critical level (Scheffer, 2010; Lenton, 2011; Kuehn, 2011). The points in time, or in the level of forcing, at which such changes occur are commonly referred to as bifurcation-induced tipping points (Ashwin *et al.*, 2012). They have been identified in many domains, including ecosystems (Scheffer *et al.*, 1993, 2001, 2009; Siteur *et al.*, 2014; Dakos *et al.*, 2019; Pierini and Ghil, 2021) and the human brain (Rinzel and Ermentrout, 1998; Moehlis, 2008; Screen and Simmonds, 2010; Mitry *et al.*, 2013; Maturana *et al.*, 2020), and are of particular concern under anthropogenic climate change (Lenton *et al.*, 2008; Ashwin and von der Heydt, 2020; Arias *et al.*, 2021; Ritchie *et al.*, 2021; Boers and Rypdal, 2021; Boulton *et al.*, 2022). Furthermore, it has recently been recognised that critical levels can be exceeded temporarily without causing tipping (van der Bolt *et al.*, 2018; Ritchie *et al.*, 2019; Alkhayuon *et al.*, 2019; O’Keeffe and Wieczorek, 2020). This occurs when the time of exceedance is short compared to the inherent timescale of the system (O’Keeffe and Wieczorek, 2020; Ritchie *et*

al., 2021; Alkhayyon et al., 2023). However, there is another, less obvious potential consequence of changes in external forcing. When an external forcing changes faster than some critical rate rather than necessarily by a large amount, this can lead to rate-induced tipping points (Stocker and Schmittner, 1997; Luke and Cox, 2011; Wieczorek et al., 2011; Ashwin et al., 2012; Ritchie and Sieber, 2016; Siteur et al., 2016; Suchithra et al., 2020; Arumugam et al., 2020; Pierini and Ghil, 2021; Wieczorek et al., 2023; Longo et al., 2021; Kuehn and Longo, 2022; Kaur and Sharathi Dutta, 2022; Hill et al., 2022; Arnscheidt and Rothman, 2022). In contrast to bifurcation-induced tipping, rate-induced tipping occurs due to fast enough changes in external forcing and usually does not exceed any critical levels as a result of external forcing. Such tipping points are much less widely known and yet are arguably even more relevant to contemporary issues such as climate change (Lohmann and Ditlevsen, 2021; Clarke et al., 2021; O’Sullivan et al., 2022), ecosystem collapse (Scheffer et al., 2008; Vanselow et al., 2019; van der Bolt and van Nes, 2021; Neijnsens et al., 2021; Vanselow et al., 2022), and the resilience of human systems (Witthaut et al., 2021).”).

⁴⁸ Hansen J. E., *et al.* (23 May 2023) [Global warming in the pipeline](#), IZV ATMOS. OCEAN. PHYS. (preprint): 1–62, 39 (“With current policies, we expect climate forcing for a few decades post-2010 to increase 0.5-0.6 W/m² per decade and produce global warming at a rate of at least +0.27°C per decade. In that case, global warming should reach 1.5°C by the end of the 2020s and 2°C by 2050 (Fig. 25).”; Figure 25 caption reads “Edges of the predicted post-2010 accelerated warming rate (see text) are 0.36 and 0.27°C per decade.”).

⁴⁹ Xu Y., Ramanathan V., & Victor D. G. (2018) [Global warming will happen faster than we think](#), Comment, NATURE 564(7734): 30–32, 30–31 (“But the latest IPCC special report underplays another alarming fact: global warming is accelerating. Three trends—rising emissions, declining air pollution and natural climate cycles—will combine over the next 20 years to make climate change faster and more furious than anticipated. In our view, there’s a good chance that we could breach the 1.5 °C level by 2030, not by 2040 as projected in the special report (see ‘Accelerated warming’). The climate-modelling community has not grappled enough with the rapid changes that policymakers care most about, preferring to focus on longer-term trends and equilibria.”). Since Xu, Ramanathan, and Victor Comment was published, the IPCC has updated its estimate for when 1.5 °C will be exceeded: see Arias P. A., *et al.* (2021) [Technical Summary](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., *et al.* (eds.), TS-9 (“Timing of crossing 1.5°C global warming: Slightly different approaches are used in SR1.5 and in this Report. SR1.5 assessed a likely range of 2030 to 2052 for reaching a global warming level of 1.5°C (for a 30-year period), assuming a continued, constant rate of warming. In AR6, combining the larger estimate of global warming to date and the assessed climate response to all considered scenarios, the central estimate of crossing 1.5°C of global warming (for a 20-year period) occurs in the early 2030s, ten years earlier than the midpoint of the likely range assessed in the SR1.5, assuming no major volcanic eruption. (TS.1.3, Cross-Section Box TS.1)”).

⁵⁰ Drijfhout S., Bathiany S., Beaulieu C., Brovkin V., Claussen M., Huntingford C., Scheffer M., Sgubin G., & Swingedouw D. (2015) [Catalogue of abrupt shifts in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change climate models](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 112(43): E5777–E5786, E5777 (“Abrupt transitions of regional climate in response to the gradual rise in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations are notoriously difficult to foresee. However, such events could be particularly challenging in view of the capacity required for society and ecosystems to adapt to them. We present, to our knowledge, the first systematic screening of the massive climate model ensemble informing the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, and reveal evidence of 37 forced regional abrupt changes in the ocean, sea ice, snow cover, permafrost, and terrestrial biosphere that arise after a certain global temperature increase. Eighteen out of 37 events occur for global warming levels of less than 2°, a threshold sometimes presented as a safe limit.”). See also Wang S., Foster A., Lenz E. A., Kessler J. D., Stroeve J. C., Anderson L. O., Turetsky M., Betts R., Zou S., Liu W., Boos W. R., & Hausfather Z. (2023) [Mechanisms and Impacts of Earth System Tipping Elements](#), REV. GEOPHYS. 61(e2021RG000757): 1–81, 48 (“Earth system elements that this review indicates are at higher risk of crossing critical thresholds or undergoing substantial changes in response to warming this century under moderate (RCP4.5) emissions scenarios include loss of Arctic summer sea ice, loss of portions of the GIS, loss of portions of the West Antarctic Ice-sheet, Amazon rainforest dieback, boreal forest ecosystem shifts, some permafrost carbon release, and coral reef loss (Figure 14). In contrast, methane release from marine methane hydrates and strato-cumulus cloud deck evaporation will likely require longer timescales and higher emissions forcing in order to occur at large scales, while disruptions of tropical monsoons may be contingent on large shifts in other Earth system components

and are unlikely to occur as a direct response to changes in aerosol forcing or land cover (see Section 2.6). Critical thresholds for weakening of the AMOC remain unclear and a transition of this system to a different state may not occur this century (see Section 2.1). While the GIS and WAIS may transgress critical thresholds this century (see Section 2.3), timescales of ice loss may require many centuries to millennia to run to completion (Bakker et al., 2016; Clark et al., 2016; Golledge et al., 2015; Huybrechts & De Wolde, 1999).”); Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE 575(7784): 592–595, 593 (“A further key impetus to limit warming to 1.5 °C is that other tipping points could be triggered at low levels of global warming. The latest IPCC models projected a cluster of abrupt shifts between 1.5 °C and 2 °C, several of which involve sea ice. This ice is already shrinking rapidly in the Arctic....”); Arias P. A., et al. (2021) [Technical Summary](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), TS-71–TS-72 (“It is *likely* that under stabilization of global warming at 1.5°C, 2.0°C, or 3.0°C relative to 1850–1900, the AMOC will continue to weaken for several decades by about 15%, 20% and 30% of its strength and then recover to pre-decline values over several centuries (*medium confidence*). At sustained warming levels between 2°C and 3°C, there is limited evidence that the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets will be lost almost completely and irreversibly over multiple millennia; both the probability of their complete loss and the rate of mass loss increases with higher surface temperatures (*high confidence*). At sustained warming levels between 3°C and 5°C, near-complete loss of the Greenland Ice Sheet and complete loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet is projected to occur irreversibly over multiple millennia (*medium confidence*); with substantial parts or all of Wilkes Subglacial Basin in East Antarctica lost over multiple millennia (*low confidence*). Early-warning signals of accelerated sea-level-rise from Antarctica, could possibly be observed within the next few decades. For other hazards (e.g., ice sheet behaviour, glacier mass loss and global mean sea level change, coastal floods, coastal erosion, air pollution, and ocean acidification) the time and/or scenario dimensions remain critical, and a simple and robust relationship with global warming level cannot be established (*high confidence*)... The response of biogeochemical cycles to anthropogenic perturbations can be abrupt at regional scales and irreversible on decadal to century time scales (*high confidence*). The probability of crossing uncertain regional thresholds increases with climate change (*high confidence*). It is *very unlikely* that gas clathrates (mostly methane) in deeper terrestrial permafrost and subsea clathrates will lead to a detectable departure from the emissions trajectory during this century. Possible abrupt changes and tipping points in biogeochemical cycles lead to additional uncertainty in 21st century atmospheric GHG concentrations, but future anthropogenic emissions remain the dominant uncertainty (*high confidence*). There is potential for abrupt water cycle changes in some high-emission scenarios, but there is no overall consistency regarding the magnitude and timing of such changes. Positive land surface feedbacks, including vegetation, dust, and snow, can contribute to abrupt changes in aridity, but there is only *low confidence* that such changes will occur during the 21st century. Continued Amazon deforestation, combined with a warming climate, raises the probability that this ecosystem will cross a tipping point into a dry state during the 21st century (*low confidence*).”); and Lee J.-Y., Marotzke J., Bala G., Cao L., Corti S., Dunne J. P., Engelbrecht F., Fischer E., Fyfe J. C., Jones C., Maycock A., Mutemi J., Ndiaye O., Panickal S., & T. Zhou (2021) [Chapter 4: Future Global Climate: Scenario-Based Projections and Near-Term Information](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 4-96 (Table 4.10 lists 15 components of the Earth system susceptible to tipping points).

⁵¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2023) [AR6 SYNTHESIS REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2023](#), Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Arias P., Bustamante M., Elgizouli I., Flato G., Howden M., Méndez C., Pereira J., Pichs-Madruga R., Rose S. K., Saheb Y., Sánchez R., Ürgen-Vorsatz D., Xiao C., & Yassaa N. (eds.), 36 (“At 2°C of global warming, overall risk levels associated with the unequal distribution of impacts (RFC3), global aggregate impacts (RFC4) and large-scale singular events (RFC5) would be transitioning to high (*medium confidence*), those associated with extreme weather events (RFC2) would be transitioning to very high (*medium confidence*), and those associated with unique and threatened systems (RFC1) would be very high (*high confidence*) (Figure 3.3, panel a). With about 2°C warming, climate-related changes in food availability and diet quality are estimated to increase nutrition-related diseases and the number of undernourished people, affecting tens (under low vulnerability and low warming) to hundreds of millions of people (under high vulnerability and high warming), particularly among low-income households in low- and middle-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America (*high confidence*). For example,

snowmelt water availability for irrigation is projected to decline in some snowmelt dependent river basins by up to 20% (*medium confidence*). Climate change risks to cities, settlements and key infrastructure will rise sharply in the mid- and long-term with further global warming, especially in places already exposed to high temperatures, along coastlines, or with high vulnerabilities (*high confidence*).”; “RFC5: Large-scale singular events: relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems caused by global warming, such as ice sheet instability or thermohaline circulation slowing.”).

⁵² Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE 575(7784): 592–595, 594 (“In our view, the clearest emergency would be if we were approaching a global cascade of tipping points that led to a new, less habitable, ‘hothouse’ climate state¹¹. Interactions could happen through ocean and atmospheric circulation or through feedbacks that increase greenhouse-gas levels and global temperature.”). See also Wunderling N., Donges J. F., Kurths J., & Winkelmann R. (2021) [Interacting tipping elements increase risk of climate domino effects under global warming](#), EARTH SYST. DYN. 12(2): 601–619, 614 (“In this study, we show that this risk increases significantly when considering interactions between these climate tipping elements and that these interactions tend to have an overall destabilising effect. Altogether, with the exception of the Greenland Ice Sheet, interactions effectively push the critical threshold temperatures to lower warming levels, thereby reducing the overall stability of the climate system. The domino-like interactions also foster cascading, non-linear responses. Under these circumstances, our model indicates that cascades are predominantly initiated by the polar ice sheets and mediated by the AMOC. Therefore, our results also imply that the negative feedback loop connecting the Greenland Ice Sheet and the AMOC might not be able to stabilise the climate system as a whole.”); Klose A. K., Wunderling N., Winkelmann R., & Donges J. F. (2021) [What do we mean, ‘tipping cascade’?](#), ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 16(12): 125011, 1–12, 1 (“Here we illustrate how different patterns of multiple tipping dynamics emerge from a very simple coupling of two previously studied idealized tipping elements. In particular, we distinguish between a two phase cascade, a domino cascade and a joint cascade. A mitigation of an unfolding two phase cascade may be possible and common early warning indicators are sensitive to upcoming critical transitions to a certain degree. In contrast, a domino cascade may hardly be stopped once initiated and critical slowing down-based indicators fail to indicate tipping of the following element. These different potentials for intervention and anticipation across the distinct patterns of multiple tipping dynamics should be seen as a call to be more precise in future analyses of cascading dynamics arising from tipping element interactions in the Earth system.”); Rocha J. C., Peterson G., Bodin Ö., & Levin S. (2018) [Cascading regime shifts within and across scales](#), SCIENCE 362(6421): 1379–1383, 1383 (“A key lesson from our study is that regime shifts can be interconnected. Regime shifts should not be studied in isolation under the assumption that they are independent systems. Methods and data collection need to be further developed to account for the possibility of cascading effects. Our finding that ~45% of regime shift couplings can have structural dependence suggests that current approaches to environmental management and governance underestimate the likelihood of cascading effects.”); and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2023) [AR6 SYNTHESIS REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2023](#), Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Arias P., Bustamante M., Elgizouli I., Flato G., Howden M., Méndez C., Pereira J., Pichs-Madruga R., Rose S. K., Saheb Y., Sánchez R., Ürge-Vorsatz D., Xiao C., & Yassaa N. (eds.), 16 (“Human influence has likely increased the chance of compound extreme events since the 1950s. Concurrent and repeated climate hazards have occurred in all regions, increasing impacts and risks to health, ecosystems, infrastructure, livelihoods and food (*high confidence*). Compound extreme events include increases in the frequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts (*high confidence*); fire weather in some regions (*medium confidence*); and compound flooding in some locations (*medium confidence*). Multiple risks interact, generating new sources of vulnerability to climate hazards, and compounding overall risk (*high confidence*). Compound climate hazards can overwhelm adaptive capacity and substantially increase damage (*high confidence*).”).

⁵³ Drijfhout S., Bathiany S., Beaulieu C., Brovkin V., Claussen M., Huntingford C., Scheffer M., Sgubin G., & Swingedouw D. (2015) [Catalogue of abrupt shifts in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change climate models](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 112(43): E5777–E5786, E5784 (“Permafrost carbon release (51) and methane hydrates release (52) were not expected in CMIP5 simulations, because of missing biogeochemical components in those models capable of simulating such changes.”). See also Bathiany S., Hidding J., & Scheffer M. (2020) [Edge Detection Reveals Abrupt and Extreme Climate Events](#), J. CLIM. 33(15): 6399–6421, 6416 (“Despite their societal relevance, our knowledge about the risks of future abrupt climate shifts is far from robust. Several important aspects are highly

uncertain: future greenhouse gas emissions (scenario uncertainty), the current climate state (initial condition uncertainty), the question whether and how to model specific processes (structural uncertainty), and what values one should choose for parameters appearing in the equations (parametric uncertainty). Such uncertainties can be explored using ensemble simulations. For example, by running many simulations with different combinations of parameter values a perturbed-physics ensemble can address how parameter uncertainty affects the occurrence of extreme events (Clark et al. 2006). This strategy can be particularly beneficial for studying abrupt events as well since abrupt shifts are associated with region-specific processes, whereas models are usually calibrated to produce a realistic global mean climate at the expense of regional realism (Mauritsen et al. 2012; McNeall et al. 2016). The currently available model configurations are therefore neither reliable nor sufficient to assess the risk of abrupt shifts (Drijfhout et al. 2015). It is hence very plausible that yet-undiscovered tipping points can occur in climate models.”); Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) [Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-78 (“There is low confidence in the estimate of the non-CO₂ biogeochemical feedbacks, due to the large range in the estimates of α for some individual feedbacks (Figure 5.29c), which can be attributed to the diversity in how models account for these feedbacks, limited process-level understanding, and the existence of known feedbacks for which there is not sufficient evidence to assess the feedback strength.”); and Permafrost Pathways, [Course of Action: Mitigation Policy](#), Woodwell Climate Research Center (last visited 14 February 2023) (“Depending on how hot we let it get, carbon emissions from Arctic permafrost thaw are expected to be in the range of 30 to more than 150 billion tons of carbon (110 to more than 550 Gt CO₂) this century, with upper estimates on par with the cumulative emissions from the entire United States at its current rate. To put it another way, permafrost thaw emissions could use up between 25 and 40 percent of the remaining carbon budget that would be necessary to cap warming at the internationally agreed-upon 2 degrees Celsius global temperature threshold established in the Paris Agreement.... Despite the enormity of this problem, gaps in permafrost carbon monitoring and modeling are resulting in permafrost being left out of global climate policies, rendering our emissions targets fundamentally inaccurate. World leaders are in a race against time to reduce emissions and prevent Earth's temperature from reaching dangerous levels. The problem is, without including current and projected emissions from permafrost, this race will be impossible to finish.... 82% [o]f IPCC models do not include carbon emissions from permafrost thaw.”).

⁵⁴ Kemp L., Xu C., Depledge J., Ebi K. L., Gibbins G., Kohler T. A., Rockström J., Scheffer M., Schellnhuber H. J., Steffen W., & Lenton T. M. (2022) [Climate Endgame: Exploring catastrophic climate change scenarios](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 119(34): 1–9, 3 (“Third, climate change could exacerbate vulnerabilities and cause multiple, indirect stresses (such as economic damage, loss of land, and water and food insecurity) that coalesce into system-wide synchronous failures. This is the path of systemic risk. Global crises tend to occur through such reinforcing “synchronous failures” that spread across countries and systems, as with the 2007–2008 global financial crisis (44). It is plausible that a sudden shift in climate could trigger systems failures that unravel societies across the globe. The potential of systemic climate risk is marked: The most vulnerable states and communities will continue to be the hardest hit in a warming world, exacerbating inequities. Fig. 1 shows how projected population density intersects with extreme >29 °C mean annual temperature (MAT) (such temperatures are currently restricted to only 0.8% of Earth's land surface area). Using the medium-high scenario of emissions and population growth (SSP3-7.0 emissions, and SSP3 population growth), by 2070, around 2 billion people are expected to live in these extremely hot areas. Currently, only 30 million people live in hot places, primarily in the Sahara Desert and Gulf Coast (43). Extreme temperatures combined with high humidity can negatively affect outdoor worker productivity and yields of major cereal crops. These deadly heat conditions could significantly affect populated areas in South and southwest Asia(47). Fig. 2 takes a political lens on extreme heat, overlapping SSP3-7.0 or SSP5-8.5 projections of >29 °C MAT circa 2070, with the Fragile States Index (a measurement of the instability of states). There is a striking overlap between currently vulnerable states and future areas of extreme warming. If current political fragility does not improve significantly in the coming decades, then a belt of instability with potentially serious ramifications could occur.”). See also Stern N., Stiglitz J., & Taylor C. (2022) [The economics of immense risk, urgent action and radical change: towards new approaches to the economics of climate change](#), J. ECON. METHODOL. 29(3): 181–216, 181 (“Moreover, at the core of the standard IAM methodology is an analysis of intertemporal trade-offs; how much the current generation should sacrifice in order for future generations to be spared the devastation of climate change. Rising to the climate challenges does indeed involve deep normative questions, including how different generations' welfare is to be compared and

the rights of future generations. But the world has been much more focused than the IAMs on a different set of issues, the risks of catastrophic consequences. These potentially catastrophic risks are in large measure *assumed* away in the IAMs.”).

⁵⁵ Molina M., Zaelke D., Sarma K. M., Andersen S. O., Ramanathan V., & Kaniaru D. (2009) [Reducing abrupt climate change risk using the Montreal Protocol and other regulatory actions to complement cuts in CO₂ emissions](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 106(49): 20616–20621, 20616 (“Current emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) have already committed the planet to an increase in average surface temperature by the end of the century that may be above the critical threshold for tipping elements of the climate system into abrupt change with potentially irreversible and unmanageable consequences. This would mean that the climate system is close to entering if not already within the zone of “dangerous anthropogenic interference” (DAI). Scientific and policy literature refers to the need for “early,” “urgent,” “rapid,” and “fast-action” mitigation to help avoid DAI and abrupt climate changes. We define “fast-action” to include regulatory measures that can begin within 2–3 years, be substantially implemented in 5–10 years, and produce a climate response within decades. We discuss strategies for short-lived non-CO₂ GHGs and particles, where existing agreements can be used to accomplish mitigation objectives. Policy makers can amend the Montreal Protocol to phase down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) with high global warming potential. Other fast-action strategies can reduce emissions of black carbon particles and precursor gases that lead to ozone formation in the lower atmosphere, and increase biosequestration, including through biochar. These and other fast-action strategies may reduce the risk of abrupt climate change in the next few decades by complementing cuts in CO₂ emissions.”). See also Molina M., Ramanathan V. & Zaelke D. (2020) [Best path to net zero: Cut short-lived climate pollutants](#), BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (“And let us be clear: By “speed,” we mean measures—including regulatory ones—that can begin within two-to-three years, be substantially implemented in five-to-10 years, and produce a climate response within the next decade or two.”).

⁵⁶ Armstrong McKay D. I., Staal A., Abrams J. F., Winkelmann R., Sakschewski B., Loriani S., Fetzer I., Cornell S. E., Rockström J., & Lenton T. M. (2022) [Exceeding 1.5°C global warming could trigger multiple climate tipping points](#), SCIENCE 377(6611): eabn7950, 1–10, 7 (“The chance of triggering CTPs is already non-negligible and will grow even with stringent climate mitigation (SSP1-1.9 in Fig. 2, B and C). Nevertheless, achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C would clearly be safer than keeping global warming below 2°C (90) (Fig. 2). Going from 1.5 to 2°C increases the likelihood of committing to WAIS and GrIS collapse near complete warm-water coral die-off, and abrupt permafrost thaw; further, the best estimate threshold for LABC collapse is crossed. The likelihood of triggering AMOC collapse, Boreal forest shifts, and extra-polar glacier loss becomes non-negligible at >1.5°C and glacier loss becomes likely by ~2°C. A cluster of abrupt shifts occur in ESMs at 1.5 to 2°C (19). Although not tipping elements, ASSI loss could become regular by 2°C, gradual permafrost thaw would likely become widespread beyond 1.5°C, and land carbon sink weakening would become significant by 2°C.”). See also Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE 575(7784): 592–595, 594 (“In our view, the clearest emergency would be if we were approaching a global cascade of tipping points that led to a new, less habitable, ‘hothouse’ climate state¹¹. Interactions could happen through ocean and atmospheric circulation or through feedbacks that increase greenhouse-gas levels and global temperature. Alternatively, strong cloud feedbacks could cause a global tipping point^{12,13}. We argue that cascading effects might be common. Research last year¹⁴ analysed 30 types of regime shift spanning physical climate and ecological systems, from collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet to a switch from rainforest to savanna. This indicated that exceeding tipping points in one system can increase the risk of crossing them in others. Such links were found for 45% of possible interactions¹⁴. In our view, examples are starting to be observed. ... If damaging tipping cascades can occur and a global tipping point cannot be ruled out, then this is an existential threat to civilization. No amount of economic cost–benefit analysis is going to help us. We need to change our approach to the climate problem. ... In our view, the evidence from tipping points alone suggests that we are in a state of planetary emergency: both the risk and urgency of the situation are acute....”); Steffen W., *et al.* (2018) [Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 115(33): 8252–8259, 8254 (“This analysis implies that, even if the Paris Accord target of a 1.5 °C to 2.0 °C rise in temperature is met, we cannot exclude the risk that a cascade of feedbacks could push the Earth System irreversibly onto a “Hothouse Earth” pathway. The challenge that humanity faces is to create a “Stabilized Earth” pathway that steers the Earth System away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse Earth (Fig. 2). The human-created Stabilized Earth

pathway leads to a basin of attraction that is not likely to exist in the Earth System’s stability landscape without human stewardship to create and maintain it. Creating such a pathway and basin of attraction requires a fundamental change in the role of humans on the planet. This stewardship role requires deliberate and sustained action to become an integral, adaptive part of Earth System dynamics, creating feedbacks that keep the system on a Stabilized Earth pathway (Alternative Stabilized Earth Pathway).”; and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2023) [AR6 SYNTHESIS REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2023](#), *Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Arias P., Bustamante M., Elgizouli I., Flato G., Howden M., Méndez C., Pereira J., Pichs-Madruga R., Rose S. K., Saheb Y., Sánchez R., Ürges-Vorsatz D., Xiao C., & Yassaa N. (eds.), 36, 42 (“In terrestrial ecosystems, 3–14% of the tens of thousands of species assessed will likely face a very high risk of extinction at a GWL of 1.5°C. Coral reefs are projected to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C of global warming (high confidence). At this GWL, many low-elevation and small glaciers around the world would lose most of their mass or disappear within decades to centuries (high confidence). Regions at disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small island development states and Least Developed Countries (high confidence).”; “The likelihood of abrupt and irreversible changes and their impacts increase with higher global warming levels (*high confidence*). As warming levels increase, so do the risks of species extinction or irreversible loss of biodiversity in ecosystems such as forests (*medium confidence*), coral reefs (*very high confidence*) and in Arctic regions (*high confidence*). Risks associated with large-scale singular events or tipping points, such as ice sheet instability or ecosystem loss from tropical forests, transition to high risk between 1.5°C–2.5°C (*medium confidence*) and to very high risk between 2.5°C–4°C (*low confidence*). The response of biogeochemical cycles to anthropogenic perturbations can be abrupt at regional scales and irreversible on decadal to century time scales (*high confidence*). The probability of crossing uncertain regional thresholds increases with further warming (*high confidence*).”).

⁵⁷ Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) [Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 114(39): 10319–10323, 10320 (“Box 2. Risk Categorization of Climate Change to Society. ... [A] 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. ... This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ~1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO₂) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats.”). See also Xu C., Kohler T. A., Lenton T. M., Svenning J.-C., & Scheffer M. (2020) [Future of the human climate niche](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 117(21): 11350–11355, 11350 (“Here, we demonstrate that for millennia, human populations have resided in the same narrow part of the climatic envelope available on the globe, characterized by a major mode around ~11 °C to 15 °C mean annual temperature (MAT). ... We show that in a business-as-usual climate change scenario, the geographical position of this temperature niche is projected to shift more over the coming 50 y than it has moved since 6000 BP. ... Specifically, 3.5 billion people will be exposed to MAT ≥29.0 °C, a situation found in the present climate only in 0.8% of the global land surface, mostly concentrated in the Sahara, but in 2070 projected to cover 19% of the global land (Fig. 3). ... For instance, accounting for population growth projected in the SSP3 scenario, each degree of temperature rise above the current baseline roughly corresponds to one billion humans left outside the temperature niche, absent migration (SI Appendix, Fig. S14).”); Watts N., et al. (2021) [The 2020 report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: responding to converging crises](#), THE LANCET 397(10269): 129–170, 129 (“Vulnerable populations were exposed to an additional 475 million heatwave events globally in 2019, which was, in turn, reflected in excess

morbidity and mortality (indicator 1.1.2). During the past 20 years, there has been a 53.7% increase in heat-related mortality in people older than 65 years, reaching a total of 296 000 deaths in 2018 (indicator 1.1.3). The high cost in terms of human lives and suffering is associated with effects on economic output, with 302 billion h of potential labour capacity lost in 2019 (indicator 1.1.4). India and Indonesia were among the worst affected countries, seeing losses of potential labour capacity equivalent to 4–6% of their annual gross domestic product (indicator 4.1.3).”; Atwoli L., *et al.* (2021) [Call for emergency action to limit global temperature increases, restore biodiversity, and protect health](#), THE LANCET 398(10304): 939–941, 939 (“Harms disproportionately affect the most vulnerable, including children, older populations, ethnic minorities, poorer communities, and those with underlying health problems.”); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2023) [AR6 SYNTHESIS REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2023](#), *Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Arias P., Bustamante M., Elgizouli I., Flato G., Howden M., Méndez C., Pereira J., Pichs-Madruga R., Rose S. K., Saheb Y., Sánchez R., Ürge-Vorsatz D., Xiao C., & Yassaa N. (eds.), 36 (“In terrestrial ecosystems, 3–14% of the tens of thousands of species assessed will likely face a very high risk of extinction at a GWL of 1.5°C. Coral reefs are projected to decline by a further 70–90% at 1.5°C of global warming (high confidence). At this GWL, many low-elevation and small glaciers around the world would lose most of their mass or disappear within decades to centuries (high confidence). Regions at disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small island development states and Least Developed Countries (high confidence).”); and Berwyn B. (14 February 2023) [Sea Level Rise Could Drive 1 in 10 People from Their Homes, with Dangerous Implications for International Peace](#), UN Secretary General Warns, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS.

⁵⁸ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), *Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Masson-Delmotte V., *et al.* (eds.), SPM-19 (“With every additional increment of global warming, changes in extremes continue to become larger. For example, every additional 0.5°C of global warming causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes, including heatwaves (*very likely*), and heavy precipitation (*high confidence*), as well as agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions (*high confidence*). Discernible changes in intensity and frequency of meteorological droughts, with more regions showing increases than decreases, are seen in some regions for every additional 0.5°C of global warming (*medium confidence*). Increases in frequency and intensity of hydrological droughts become larger with increasing global warming in some regions (*medium confidence*). There will be an increasing occurrence of some extreme events unprecedented in the observational record with additional global warming, even at 1.5°C of global warming. Projected percentage changes in frequency are higher for rarer events (*high confidence*).”). See also Fischer E. M., Sippel S., & Knutti R. (2021) [Increasing probability of record-shattering climate extremes](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 11: 689–695, 689 (“Here, we show models project not only more intense extremes but also events that break previous records by much larger margins. These record-shattering extremes, nearly impossible in the absence of warming, are likely to occur in the coming decades. We demonstrate that their probability of occurrence depends on warming rate, rather than global warming level, and is thus pathway-dependent. In high-emission scenarios, week-long heat extremes that break records by three or more standard deviations are two to seven times more probable in 2021–2050 and three to 21 times more probable in 2051–2080, compared to the last three decades.”).

⁵⁹ Archer D., Eby M., Brovkin V., Ridgwell A., Cao L., Mikolajewicz U., Caldeira K., Matsumoto K., Munhoven G., Montenegro A., & Tokos K. (2009) [Atmospheric Lifetime of Fossil Fuel Carbon Dioxide](#), ANNU. REV. EARTH PLANET. SCI. 37(1): 117–34, (“The models presented here present a broadly coherent picture of the fate of fossil fuel CO₂ released to the atmosphere. Equilibration with the ocean will absorb most of it on a time scale of 2–20 centuries. Even if this equilibration were allowed to run to completion, a substantial fraction of the CO₂, 20–40%, would remain in the atmosphere awaiting slower chemical reactions with CaCO₃ and igneous rocks. The remaining CO₂ is abundant enough to continue to have a substantial impact of climate for thousands of years. The changes in climate amplify themselves somewhat by driving CO₂ out of the warmer ocean.... Nowhere in these model results or in the published literature is there any reason to conclude that the effects of CO₂ release will be substantially confined to just a few centuries. In contrast, generally accepted modern understanding of the global carbon cycle indicates that climate effects of CO₂ releases to the atmosphere will persist for tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of years into the future.”).

⁶⁰ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#), *Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the*

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., Skea J., Slade R., Al Khourdajie A., van Diemen R., McCollum D., Pathak M., Some S., Vyas P., Fradera R., Belkacemi M., Hasija A., Lisboa G., Luz S., & Malley J. (eds.), SPM-31 (“In modelled global low emission pathways, the projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term. In these mitigation pathways, the projected reductions of cooling aerosols are mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls.”). *See also* Szopa S., Naik V., Adhikary B., Artaxo P., Berntsen T., Collins W. D., Fuzzi S., Gallardo L., Kiendler-Scharr A., Klimont Z., Liao H., Unger N., & Zanis P. (2021) [Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6-8 (“Additional CH₄ and BC mitigation would contribute to offsetting the additional warming associated with SO₂ reductions that would accompany decarbonization (*high confidence*).”).

⁶¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#), Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., Skea J., Slade R., Al Khourdajie A., van Diemen R., McCollum D., Pathak M., Some S., Vyas P., Fradera R., Belkacemi M., Hasija A., Lisboa G., Luz S., & Malley J. (eds.), SPM-31 (“In modelled global low emission pathways, the projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term. In these mitigation pathways, the projected reductions of cooling aerosols are mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls.”). *See also* Szopa S., Naik V., Adhikary B., Artaxo P., Berntsen T., Collins W. D., Fuzzi S., Gallardo L., Kiendler-Scharr A., Klimont Z., Liao H., Unger N., & Zanis P. (2021) [Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 6-8 (“Additional CH₄ and BC mitigation would contribute to offsetting the additional warming associated with SO₂ reductions that would accompany decarbonization (*high confidence*).”); Ramanathan V. & Feng Y. (2008) [On avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system: Formidable challenges ahead](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 105(38): 14245–14250, 14248 (“Switching from coal to “cleaner” natural gas will reduce CO₂ emission and thus would be effective in minimizing future increases in the committed warming. However, because it also reduces air pollution and thus the ABC [Atmospheric Brown Cloud] masking effect, it may speed up the approach to the committed warming of 2.4°C (1.4–4.3°C).”); United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE](#), 254 (“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1; Box 6.1). When all measures are fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20-30 years (Box 6.2). In fact, sulfur dioxide (SO₂) is co-emitted with CO₂ in some of the most highly emitting activities, coal burning in large-scale combustion such as in power plants, for example, that are obvious targets for reduced usage under a CO₂-emissions mitigation strategy. Hence such strategies can lead to additional near-term warming (Figure 6.1), in a well-known temporary effect (e.g. Raes and Seinfeld, 2009), although most of the nearterm warming is driven by CO₂ emissions in the past. The CO₂-measures scenario clearly leads to long-term benefits however, with a dramatically lower warming rate at 2070 under that scenario than under the scenario with only CH₄ and BC measures (see Figure 6.1 and timescales in Box 6.2). Hence the near-term measures clearly cannot be substituted for measures to reduce emissions of long-lived GHGs. The near-term measures largely target different source sectors for emissions than the CO₂ measures, so that the emissions reductions of the short-lived pollutants are almost identical regardless of whether the CO₂ measures are implemented or not, as shown in Chapter 5. The near-term measures and the CO₂ measures also impact climate change over different timescales owing to the different lifetimes of these substances. In essence, the near-term CH₄ and BC measures are effectively uncoupled from CO₂ measures examined here.”); and Wanser K., Wong A., Karspeck A., & Esguerra N. (2023) [NEAR-TERM CLIMATE RISK AND INTERVENTION: A ROADMAP FOR RESEARCH, U.S. RESEARCH INVESTMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION](#), SilverLining, 12 (“Particles (i.e., aerosols) in the atmosphere generally increase the total amount of sunlight reflected to space by scattering incoming sunlight. Anthropogenic activities produce both GHGs and other particulate matter; while GHGs warm climate, aerosols have a cooling effect both by directly scattering sunlight (i.e., the aerosol direct effect) and indirectly as the aerosols interact with clouds, increasing their brightness

and/or their duration (i.e., the cloud–aerosol effect) ... The potential global cooling effect of all anthropogenic aerosols is estimated at 0.5–1.1°C (see Figure 6). Thus, these effects are potentially very large while also serving as a large source of uncertainty, making reducing these uncertainties among the highest priorities for climate research, particularly in the context of assessing near-term climate risk. Particles from emissions produced by human activities are also associated with significant adverse health and environmental effects. Actions are ongoing around the world to substantially reduce them, including recent regulation to substantially reduce sulfate emissions from ships. As the world reduces these particulate emissions, the loss of this cooling “shield” could lead to rapid substantial warming.”).

⁶² Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#), Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., Skea J., Slade R., Al Khourdajie A., van Diemen R., McCollum D., Pathak M., Some S., Vyas P., Fradera R., Belkacemi M., Hasija A., Lisboa G., Luz S., & Malley J. (eds.), SPM-30–SPM-31 (“Deep GHG emissions reductions by 2030 and 2040, particularly reductions of methane emissions, lower peak warming, reduce the likelihood of overshooting warming limits and lead to less reliance on net negative CO₂ emissions that reverse warming in the latter half of the century... Future non-CO₂ warming depends on reductions in non-CO₂ GHG, aerosol and their precursor, and ozone precursor emissions. In modelled global low emission pathways, the projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term. In these mitigation pathways, the projected reductions of cooling aerosols are mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls. Non-CO₂ GHG emissions at the time of net zero CO₂ are projected to be of similar magnitude in modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower. These non-CO₂ GHG emissions are about 8 [5–11] GtCO₂-eq per year, with the largest fraction from CH₄ (60% [55–80%]), followed by N₂O (30% [20–35%]) and F-gases (3% [2–20%]). [FOOTNOTE 52] Due to the short lifetime of CH₄ in the atmosphere, projected deep reduction of CH₄ emissions up until the time of net zero CO₂ in modelled mitigation pathways effectively reduces peak global warming. (*high confidence*) {3.3, AR6 WG I SPM D1.7}”).

⁶³ Dreyfus G. B., Xu Y., Shindell D. T., Zaelke D., & Ramanathan V. (2022) [Mitigating climate disruption in time: A self-consistent approach for avoiding both near-term and long-term global warming](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 119(22): 1–8, 5 (“Aggressive decarbonization to achieve net-zero CO₂ emissions in the 2050s (as in the decarb-only scenario) results in weakly accelerated net warming compared to the reference case, with a positive warming up to 0.03 °C in the mid-2030s, and no net avoided warming until the mid-2040s due to the reduction in co-emitted cooling aerosols (Figure 3a). By 2050, decarbonization measures result in very limited net avoided warming (0.07°C), consistent with Shindell and Smith, but rise to a likely detectable 0.25°C by 2060 and a major benefit of 1.4°C by 2100 (Table S5). In contrast, pairing decarbonization with mitigation measures targeting CH₄, BC, HFC, and N₂O (not an SLCP due to its longer lifetime) independent from decarbonization are essential to slowing the rate of warming by the 2030s to under 0.3°C per decade (Table 1, Figure 3b), similar to the 0.2°C to 0.25°C per decade warming prior to 2020. Recent studies suggest that rate of warming rather than level of warming controls likelihood of record-shattering extreme weather events. By 2050, the net avoided warming from the targeted non-CO₂ measures is 0.26°C, almost 4 times larger than the net benefit of decarbonization alone (0.07°C) (Table S5).”).

⁶⁴ Xu Y. & Ramanathan V. (2017) [Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 114(39): 10315–10323, 10321 (“The SP [super pollutant] lever targets SLCPs. Reducing SLCP emissions thins the SP blanket within few decades, given the shorter lifetimes of SLCPs (weeks for BC to about 15 years for HFCs). The mitigation potential of the SP lever with a maximum deployment of current technologies ... is about 0.6 °C by 2050 and 1.2 °C by 2100 (SI Appendix, Fig. S5B and Table S1).”). See also Szopa S., Naik V., Adhikary B., Artaxo P., Berntsen T., Collins W. D., Fuzzi S., Gallardo L., Kiendler-Scharr A., Klimont Z., Liao H., Unger N., & Zanis P. (2021) [Chapter 6: Short-lived climate forcers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 821 (“Across the SSPs, the collective reduction of CH₄, ozone precursors and HFCs can make a difference of global mean surface air temperature of 0.2 with a very likely range of [0.1–0.4] °C in 2040 and 0.8 with a very likely range of [0.5–1.3] °C at the end of the 21st century (comparing SSP3-7.0 and SSP1-1.9), which is substantial in the context of the Paris Agreement. Sustained methane mitigation, wherever it occurs, stands out as an option that combines near- and long-term gains on surface

temperature (*high confidence*) and leads to air quality benefits by reducing surface ozone levels globally (*high confidence*).”).

⁶⁵ Shindell D., et al. (2012) [Simultaneously Mitigating Near-Term Climate Change and Improving Human Health and Food Security](#), SCIENCE 335(6065): 183–189, 183–185 (“The global mean response to the CH₄ plus BC measures was $-0.54 \pm 0.05^{\circ}\text{C}$ in the climate model. ...Roughly half the forcing is relatively evenly distributed (from the CH₄ measures). The other half is highly inhomogeneous, especially the strong BC forcing, which is greatest over bright desert and snow or ice surfaces. Those areas often exhibit the largest warming mitigation, making the regional temperature response to aerosols and ozone quite distinct from the more homogeneous response to well-mixed greenhouse gases.... BC albedo and direct forcings are large in the Himalayas, where there is an especially pronounced response in the Karakoram, and in the Arctic, where the measures reduce projected warming over the next three decades by approximately two thirds and where regional temperature response patterns correspond fairly closely to albedo forcing (for example, they are larger over the Canadian archipelago than the interior and larger over Russia than Scandinavia or the North Atlantic).”). See also United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE](#), 254, 262 (“Evaluating global mean temperature change, it was found that the targeted measures to reduce emissions of methane and BC could greatly reduce warming rates over the next few decades (Figure 6.1; Box 6.1). When all measures are fully implemented, warming during the 2030s relative to the present would be only half as much as in the reference scenario. In contrast, even a fairly aggressive strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions, as for the CO₂-measures scenario, does little to mitigate warming until after the next 20-30 years (Box 6.2).”; “Large impacts of the measures examined here were also seen for the Arctic despite the minimal amount of emissions currently taking place there. This occurs due to the high sensitivity of the Arctic both to pollutants that are transported there from remote sources and to radiative forcing that takes place in areas of the northern hemisphere outside the Arctic. The 16 measures examined here, including the measures on pellet stoves and coal briquettes, reduce warming in the Arctic by 0.7 °C (range 0.2 to 1.3 °C) at 2040. This is a large portion of the 1.1 °C (range 0.7 to 1.7 °C) warming projected under the reference scenario for the Arctic, and hence implementation of the measures would be virtually certain to substantially slow, but not halt, the pace of Arctic climate change.”).

⁶⁶ Potential for mitigation from landfills (29-36 million metric tons CH₄ in 2030) and energy sector (circa 29-57 million metric tons CH₄ in 2030 from oil and gas; 12-25 MtCH₄ from coal). See United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) *Summary for Policymakers*, in [GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS](#), 6, 10. (“Oil, gas and coal: the fossil fuel sector has the greatest potential for targeted mitigation by 2030. Readily available targeted measures could reduce emissions from the oil and gas sector by 29–57 Mt/yr and from the coal sector by 12–25 Mt/yr. Up to 80 per cent of oil and gas measures and up to 98 per cent of coal measures could be implemented at negative or low cost; “Waste: existing targeted measures could reduce methane emissions from the waste sector by 29–36 Mt/yr by 2030”). Cutting black carbon and tropospheric ozone (which methane is a precursor of) can reduce air pollution levels and save up to 2.4 million lives every year and increase annual crop production by more than 50 million tons. See United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization (2011) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF BLACK CARBON AND TROPOSPHERIC OZONE](#), 193, 201 (“Implementing all measures could avoid 2.4 million premature deaths (within a range of 0.7–4.6 million) associated with reductions in PM_{2.5}, associated with 5.3–37.4 million years of life lost (YLL), based on the 2030 population.”; “Total global production gains of all crops ranges between 30 and 140 million tonnes (model mean: 52 million tonnes). The annual economic gains for all four crops in all regions ranges between US\$4billion and US\$33 billion, of which US\$2–28 billion in Asia.”).

⁶⁷ Shindell D. (14 June 2023) [Wildfire smoke and dirty air are also climate change problems: Solutions for a world on fire](#), MODERN SCIENCES (“[Black carbon](#) – the tiny particles in the air from wildfires and also from vehicles – along with [methane](#), [hydrofluorocarbons](#) and [tropospheric ozone](#), are known as [short-lived climate pollutants](#). They account for [around half of today’s global warming](#), contributing to rising sea levels and more frequent and extreme climatic events, including the devastating wildfires we’re increasingly seeing across the world. In addition, these pollutants have disastrous impacts on human health, food supplies and [biodiversity](#).”).

⁶⁸ Dreyfus G. B., Xu Y., Shindell D. T., Zaelke D., & Ramanathan V. (2022) [Mitigating climate disruption in time: A self-consistent approach for avoiding both near-term and long-term global warming](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 119(22): e2123536119, 1–8, 1 (“We find that mitigation measures that target only decarbonization are essential for strong long-term cooling but can result in weak near-term warming (due to unmasking the cooling effect of co-emitted aerosols) and lead to temperatures exceeding 2°C before 2050. In contrast, pairing decarbonization with additional mitigation measures targeting short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) and N₂O, slows the rate of warming a decade or two earlier than decarbonization alone and avoids the 2°C threshold altogether. These non-CO₂ targeted measures when combined with decarbonization can provide net cooling by 2030, reduce the rate of warming from 2030 to 2050 by about 50%, roughly half of which comes from methane, significantly larger than decarbonization alone over this timeframe.”)

⁶⁹ Goldstein A., Noon M. L., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Raghav S., McGreevey M., Stone C., Shrestha S., Golden Kroner R., Hole D., & Turner W. (2021) [IRRECOVERABLE CARBON: THE PLACES WE MUST PROTECT TO AVERT CLIMATE CATASTROPHE](#), Conservation International, 7 (“‘Irrecoverable carbon’ refers to the vast stores of carbon in nature that are vulnerable to release from human activity and, if lost, could not be restored by 2050 — when the world must reach net-zero emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change... There are high concentrations of irrecoverable carbon in the Amazon (31.5 Gt), the Congo Basin (8.1 Gt), and New Guinea (7.3 Gt). Other important irrecoverable carbon reserves are located in the Pacific Northwest of North America, the Valdivian forests of Chile, the mangroves and swamp forests of Guyana, the peatlands of Northern Scotland, Niger Delta’s mangroves, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, the Scandinavian and Siberian boreal forests, and the eucalyptus forest of Southeast Australia, among others.”). See also Griscom B. W., et al. (2017) [Natural climate solutions](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 114(44): 11645–11650, 11645 (“Better stewardship of land is needed to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goal of holding warming to below 2 °C; however, confusion persists about the specific set of land stewardship options available and their mitigation potential. To address this, we identify and quantify “natural climate solutions” (NCS): 20 conservation, restoration, and improved land management actions that increase carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas emissions across global forests, wetlands, grasslands, and agricultural lands. We find that the maximum potential of NCS—when constrained by food security, fiber security, and biodiversity conservation—is 23.8 petagrams of CO₂ equivalent (PgCO_{2e}) y⁻¹ (95% CI 20.3–37.4). This is ≥30% higher than prior estimates, which did not include the full range of options and safeguards considered here. About half of this maximum (11.3 PgCO_{2e} y⁻¹) represents cost-effective climate mitigation, assuming the social cost of CO₂ pollution is ≥100 USD MgCO_{2e}⁻¹ by 2030. Natural climate solutions can provide 37% of cost-effective CO₂ mitigation needed through 2030 for a >66% chance of holding warming to below 2 °C. One-third of this cost-effective NCS mitigation can be delivered at or below 10 USD MgCO₂⁻¹. Most NCS actions—if effectively implemented—also offer water filtration, flood buffering, soil health, biodiversity habitat, and enhanced climate resilience. Work remains to better constrain uncertainty of NCS mitigation estimates. Nevertheless, existing knowledge reported here provides a robust basis for immediate global action to improve ecosystem stewardship as a major solution to climate change.”); Goldstein A., et al. (2020) [Protecting irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 10(4): 287–295; and Noon M. L., Goldstein A., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Cook-Patton S. C., Spawn-Lee S. A., Wright T. M., Gonzalez-Roglich M., Hole D. G., Rockström J., & Turner W. R. (2021) [Mapping the irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. SUSTAIN. 5: 37–46.

⁷⁰ Griscom B. W., et al. (2017) [Natural climate solutions](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 114(44): 11645–11650, 11645 (“Better stewardship of land is needed to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goal of holding warming to below 2 °C; however, confusion persists about the specific set of land stewardship options available and their mitigation potential. To address this, we identify and quantify “natural climate solutions” (NCS): 20 conservation, restoration, and improved land management actions that increase carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas emissions across global forests, wetlands, grasslands, and agricultural lands. We find that the maximum potential of NCS—when constrained by food security, fiber security, and biodiversity conservation—is 23.8 petagrams of CO₂ equivalent (PgCO_{2e}) y⁻¹ (95% CI 20.3–37.4). This is ≥30% higher than prior estimates, which did not include the full range of options and safeguards considered here. About half of this maximum (11.3 PgCO_{2e} y⁻¹) represents cost-effective climate mitigation, assuming the social cost of CO₂ pollution is ≥100 USD MgCO_{2e}⁻¹ by 2030. Natural climate solutions can provide 37% of cost-effective CO₂ mitigation needed through 2030 for a >66% chance of holding warming to below 2 °C. One-third of this cost-effective NCS mitigation can be delivered at or below 10 USD

MgCO₂⁻¹. Most NCS actions—if effectively implemented—also offer water filtration, flood buffering, soil health, biodiversity habitat, and enhanced climate resilience. Work remains to better constrain uncertainty of NCS mitigation estimates. Nevertheless, existing knowledge reported here provides a robust basis for immediate global action to improve ecosystem stewardship as a major solution to climate change.”). See also Moomaw W. R., Masino S. A., & Faison E. K. (2019) [Intact Forests in the United States: Proforestation Mitigates Climate Change and Serves the Greatest Good](#), Perspective, *FRONT. FOR. GLOB. CHANGE* 2(27): 1–10, 1 (“Climate change and loss of biodiversity are widely recognized as the foremost environmental challenges of our time. Forests annually sequester large quantities of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂), and store carbon above and below ground for long periods of time. Intact forests—largely free from human intervention except primarily for trails and hazard removals—are the most carbon-dense and biodiverse terrestrial ecosystems, with additional benefits to society and the economy. ... The recent *1.5 Degree Warming Report* by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change identifies *reforestation* and *afforestation* as important strategies to increase negative emissions, but they face significant challenges: afforestation requires an enormous amount of additional land, and neither strategy can remove sufficient carbon by growing young trees during the critical next decade(s). In contrast, growing existing forests intact to their ecological potential—termed *proforestation*—is a more effective, immediate, and low-cost approach that could be mobilized across suitable forests of all types. Proforestation serves the greatest public good by maximizing co-benefits such as nature-based biological carbon sequestration and unparalleled ecosystem services such as biodiversity enhancement, water and air quality, flood and erosion control, public health benefits, low impact recreation, and scenic beauty.”); and World Wildlife Fund (2020) [LIVING PLANET REPORT 2020 – BENDING THE CURVE OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS](#), Almond R. E. A., Grooten M., & Petersen T. (eds.), 6 (“The global Living Planet Index continues to decline. It shows an average 68% decrease in population sizes of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish between 1970 and 2016. ... It matters because biodiversity is fundamental to human life on Earth, and the evidence is unequivocal – it is being destroyed by us at a rate unprecedented in history. Since the industrial revolution, human activities have increasingly destroyed and degraded forests, grasslands, wetlands and other important ecosystems, threatening human well-being. Seventy-five per cent of the Earth’s ice-free land surface has already been significantly altered, most of the oceans are polluted, and more than 85% of the area of wetlands has been lost.”).

⁷¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-5 (“The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–2019 [11] is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C. It is likely that well-mixed GHGs contributed a warming of 1.0°C to 2.0°C, other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural drivers changed global surface temperature by –0.1°C to 0.1°C, and internal variability changed it by –0.2°C to 0.2°C. It is very likely that well-mixed GHGs were the main driver[12] of tropospheric warming since 1979, and extremely likely that human-caused stratospheric ozone depletion was the main driver of cooling of the lower stratosphere between 1979 and the mid-1990s.”... Footnote 11: “The period distinction with A.1.2 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21] °C.” Footnote 12: “Throughout this SPM, ‘main driver’ means responsible for more than 50% of the change.”).

⁷² Dhakal S., Minx J. C., Toth F. L., Abdel-Aziz A., Figueroa Meza M. J., Hubacek K., Jonckheere I. G. C., Kim Y.-G., Nemet G. F., Pachauri S., Tan X. C., & Wiedmann T. (2022) [Chapter 2: Emissions Trends and Drivers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#), Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., Skea J., Slade R., Al Khourdajie A., van Diemen R., McCollum D., Pathak M., Some S., Vyas P., Fradera R., Belkacemi M., Hasija A., Lisboa G., Luz S., & Malley J. (eds.), 228 (“Global GHG emissions continued to rise since AR5, but the rate of emissions growth slowed (high confidence). GHG emissions reached 59 ± 6.6 GtCO₂-eq in 2019 (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.5). In 2019, CO₂ emissions from the FFI were 38 (±3.0) Gt, CO₂ from LULUCF 6.6 ± 4.6 Gt, CH₄ 11 ± 3.2 GtCO₂-eq, N₂O 2.7 ± 1.6 GtCO₂-eq and F-gases 1.4 ± 0.41 GtCO₂-eq. There is high confidence that average annual GHG emissions for the last decade (2010–2019) were the highest on record in terms of aggregate CO₂-eq emissions...”)

⁷³ United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) [GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS](#), 28 (“Fossil fuels: release during oil and gas extraction,

pumping and transport of fossil fuels accounts for roughly 23 per cent of all anthropogenic emissions, with emissions from coal mining contributing 12 per cent.”).

⁷⁴ United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) [GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS](#), 28 (“Agriculture: emissions from enteric fermentation and manure management represent roughly 32 per cent of global anthropogenic emissions. Rice cultivation adds another 8 per cent to anthropogenic emissions. Agricultural waste burning contributes about 1 per cent or less.”).

⁷⁵ United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) [GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS](#), 28 (“Waste: landfills and waste management represents the next largest component making up about 20 per cent of global anthropogenic emissions.”).

⁷⁶ Saunio M., *et al.* (2020) [The Global Methane Budget 2000–2017](#), EARTH SYST. SCI. DATA 12(3): 1561–1623, 1561 (“For the 2008–2017 decade, global methane emissions are estimated by atmospheric inversions (a top-down approach) to be 576 Tg CH₄ yr⁻¹ (range 550–594, corresponding to the minimum and maximum estimates of the model ensemble). Of this total, 359 Tg CH₄ yr⁻¹ or ~ 60 % is attributed to anthropogenic sources, that is emissions caused by direct human activity (i.e. anthropogenic emissions; range 336–376 Tg CH₄ yr⁻¹ or 50 %–65 %).”).

⁷⁷ World Meteorological Organization (2022) [SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF OZONE DEPLETION 2022: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#), GAW Report No. 278, 14 (“Global atmospheric abundances and emissions of most HFCs are increasing. CO₂-equivalent emissions of HFCs derived from observations increased by 18% from 2016 to 2020.”).

⁷⁸ World Meteorological Organization (2022) [SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF OZONE DEPLETION: 2022](#), GAW Report No. 278 (Figure 2-15).

⁷⁹ Bond T. C., *et al.* (2013) [Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment](#), J. GEOPHYS. RES. ATMOS. 118(11): 5380–5552, 5420 (“Major sources of BC are also major sources of PM_{2.5}, but the converse is not always true; major sources of PM_{2.5} may produce little BC if their emissions are primarily inorganic. Sources that are BC and OC emitters are shown in the table. Resuspended dust, secondary pollutants like sulfate and nitrate, or sea salt, could also be contributors to PM_{2.5} at some locations but are not included in Table 11.”); major sources in Table 11 include (in order of decreasing importance): transport (vehicle exhaust including gasoline and diesel); IN = industry including coal and oil and biomass burning; coal burning power plants; RE = residential energy; OB = open burning of biomass and refuse; SA = secondary aerosols; O = Others.

⁸⁰ Climate & Clean Air Coalition, [Black carbon](#) (last visited 18 July 2023).

⁸¹ Szopa S., Naik V., Adhikary B., Artaxo P., Bernsten T., Collins W. D., Fuzzi S., Gallardo L., Kiendler-Scharr A., Klimont Z., Liao H., Unger N., & Zanis P. (2021) [Chapter 6: Short-lived Climate Forcers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., *et al.* (eds.), 848 (“Knowledge of carbonaceous aerosol atmospheric abundance continues to rely on global models due to a lack of global-scale observations. For BC, models agree within a factor of two with measured surface mass concentrations in Europe and North America, but underestimate concentrations at the Arctic surface by one to two orders of magnitude, especially in winter and spring (Lee *et al.*, 2013; Lund *et al.*, 2018a).”).

⁸² Szopa S., Naik V., Adhikary B., Artaxo P., Bernsten T., Collins W. D., Fuzzi S., Gallardo L., Kiendler-Scharr A., Klimont Z., Liao H., Unger N., & Zanis P. (2021) [Chapter 6: Short-lived Climate Forcers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., *et al.* (eds.), 837–838 (“Based on limited isotopic evidence, Chapter 2 assesses that the global tropospheric ozone increased by less than 40% between 1850 and 2005 (low confidence) (Section 2.2.5.3). The CMIP6 models are in line with this increase of tropospheric ozone with an ensemble-mean value of 109 ± 25 Tg (model range) from 1850–1859 to 2005–2014 (Figure 6.4). This increase is higher than the AR5 value of 100 ± 25 Tg from 1850–2010 due to higher ozone precursor emissions in CMIP6.

However, the AR5 and CMIP6 values are close when considering the reported uncertainties. The uncertainties are equivalent in CMIP6 and AR5 despite enhanced inclusion of coupled processes in the CMIP6 ESMs (e.g., biogenic NMVOC emissions or interactive stratospheric ozone chemistry).”).

⁸³ United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) [GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS](#), 51–57 (“Long-term exposure to ozone can cause inflammation and allergic responses leading to respiratory mortality, as well as the development of a systemic oxidative, proinflammatory environment that can increase the risk of cardiovascular diseases. ... It should be noted that the larger impact of ozone on health has been reported in several previous studies. Malley et al. (2017) used the new health exposure relationships (Turner et al. 2016) along with modelled ozone distributions, and found a 125 per cent increase in respiratory deaths attributable to ozone exposure in 2010 compared to previous estimates – 1.04–1.23 million deaths compared to 0.40–0.55 million. ... Further to this, a bias-adjusted model recently reported total worldwide ozone-related premature deaths of 1.0 ± 0.3 million (Shindell et al. 2018). The value for respiratory-related premature deaths due to ozone was 0.6 ± 0.2 million for 2010, and 1.0 ± 0.3 million without bias adjustment, the latter being consistent with the value reported by Malley et al. (2017).”).

⁸⁴ Feng Z., Xu Y., Kobayashi K., Dai L., Zhang T., Agathokleous E., Calatayud V., Paoletti E., Mukherjee A., Agrawal M., Park R. J., Oak Y. J., & Yue X. (2022) [Ozone pollution threatens the production of major staple crops in East Asia](#), NAT. FOOD 3: 47–56, 47 (“East Asia is a hotspot of surface ozone (O₃) pollution, which hinders crop growth and reduces yields. Here, we assess the relative yield loss in rice, wheat and maize due to O₃ by combining O₃ elevation experiments across Asia and air monitoring at about 3,000 locations in China, Japan and Korea. China shows the highest relative yield loss at 33%, 23% and 9% for wheat, rice and maize, respectively. The relative yield loss is much greater in hybrid than inbred rice, being close to that for wheat. Total O₃-induced annual loss of crop production is estimated at US\$63 billion.”). See also United Nations Environment Programme & Climate & Clean Air Coalition (2021) [GLOBAL METHANE ASSESSMENT: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MITIGATING METHANE EMISSIONS](#), 68 (“Methane also plays a significant role in reducing crop yields and the quality of vegetation. Ozone exposure is estimated to result in yield losses in wheat, 7.1 per cent; soybean, 12.4 per cent; maize, 6.1 per cent; and rice, 4.4 per cent for near present-day global totals (Mills et al. 2018; Shindell et al. 2016; Avnery et al. 2011a)”; and Shindell D., Faluvegi G., Kasibhatla P., & Van Dingenen R. (2019) [Spatial Patterns of Crop Yield Change by Emitted Pollutant](#), EARTH’S FUTURE 7(2): 101–112, 101 (“Our statistical modeling indicates that for the global mean, climate and composition changes have decreased wheat and maize yields substantially whereas rice yields have increased. Well-mixed greenhouse gases drive most of the impacts, though aerosol-induced cooling can be important, particularly for more polluted area including India and China. Maize yield losses are most strongly attributable to methane emissions (via both temperature and ozone).”).

⁸⁵ Mar K. A., Unger C., Walderdorff L., & Butler T. (2022) [Beyond CO₂ equivalence: The impacts of methane on climate, ecosystems, and health](#), ENV. SCI. POL. 134: 127–136, 129 (“Methane is an important contributor to the formation of tropospheric O₃. In addition to acting as a greenhouse gas and being directly harmful to human health (see [Section 3.3](#)), it also harms plants by causing cellular damage within the leaves, adversely affecting plant production, reducing the rate of photosynthesis, and requiring increased resource allocation to detoxify and repair leaves ([Ashmore, 2005](#), [Sitch et al., 2007](#)). This results in an estimated \$11–\$18 billion worth of global crop losses annually ([Avnery et al., 2011](#)). Beyond this, however, O₃ damage to plants may significantly reduce the ability of terrestrial ecosystems to absorb carbon, negating some of the enhanced carbon uptake due to CO₂ fertilization that is expected to partially offset rising atmospheric CO₂ concentrations ([Sitch et al., 2007](#), [Ciais et al., 2013](#), [Arnell et al., 2010](#), [Ainsworth et al., 2012](#)).”).

⁸⁶ Dhakal S., Minx J. C., Toth F. L., Abdel-Aziz A., Figueroa Meza M. J., Hubacek K., Jonckheere I. G. C., Kim Y.-G., Nemet G. F., Pachauri S., Tan X. C., & Wiedmann T. (2022) [Chapter 2: Emissions Trends and Drivers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#), Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Shukla P. R., Skea J., Slade R., Al Khourdajie A., van Diemen R., McCollum D., Pathak M., Some S., Vyas P., Fradera R., Belkacemi M., Hasija A., Lisboa G., Luz S., & Malley J. (eds.), 233 (“Latin America and the Caribbean contributed 11% of GHG emissions growth since 1990 (2.2 GtCO₂-eq), and 5% (0.3 GtCO₂-eq) since 2010.”).

⁸⁷ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *et al.* (2022) [LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2022: TOWARDS A GREEN AND JUST TRANSITION](#), 30 (“LAC’s share in total GHG emissions (8.1%) (Figure 4) is proportional to its share in total world population (8.4%), slightly higher than its share in global GDP (6.4%) but lower than the per-capita emissions of other regions with similar development levels.”).

⁸⁸ International Monetary Fund (2021) [REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: WESTERN HEMISPHERE](#), 35 (“LAC, with the exception of the Caribbean, makes limited use of fossil fuels in electricity generation (renewable share of 60 percent) thanks to enabling policies and governments’ catalytic role in financing green technologies. The energy sector amounts to only 43 percent of total GHG emissions in LAC, well below the world average of 74 percent. LAC, however, stands out for its large share of emissions from agriculture, livestock, forestry, and change in land use (45 percent in LAC versus the world average of 14 percent).”).

⁸⁹ International Monetary Fund (2021) [REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: WESTERN HEMISPHERE](#), 35 (“LAC, with the exception of the Caribbean, makes limited use of fossil fuels in electricity generation (renewable share of 60 percent) thanks to enabling policies and governments’ catalytic role in financing green technologies. The energy sector amounts to only 43 percent of total GHG emissions in LAC, well below the world average of 74 percent. LAC, however, stands out for its large share of emissions from agriculture, livestock, forestry, and change in land use (45 percent in LAC versus the world average of 14 percent).”).

⁹⁰ Evans S. (5 October 2021) [Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?](#), CARBON BRIEF (“By the end of 2021, the US will have emitted more than 509GtCO₂ since 1850. At 20.3% of the global total, this is by far the largest share and is associated with some 0.2C of warming to date.”).

⁹¹ Rivera A., Movalia S., Pitt H., & Larsen K. (2022) [Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 1990-2020 and Preliminary 2021 Estimates](#), Rhodium Group, 3 (Figure 3).

⁹² Climate Watch, [US Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

⁹³ Evans S. (5 October 2021) [Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?](#), CARBON BRIEF (“Japan on 2.7% and Canada, with 2.6%, close out the top 10 largest contributors to historical emissions.”).

⁹⁴ Climate Watch, [US Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

⁹⁵ Evans S. (5 October 2021) [Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?](#), CARBON BRIEF (“By the end of 2021, the US will have emitted more than 509GtCO₂ since 1850. At 20.3% of the global total, this is by far the largest share and is associated with some 0.2C of warming to date.... Russia is third, with some 6.9% of global cumulative CO₂ emissions, followed by Brazil (4.5%) and Indonesia (4.1%). Notably, the chart above shows how the latter pair are in the top 10 largely as a result of their emissions from deforestation, despite relatively low totals from the use of fossil fuels.... Japan on 2.7% and Canada, with 2.6%, close out the top 10 largest contributors to historical emissions.”).

⁹⁶ Evans S. (5 October 2021) [Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?](#), CARBON BRIEF (“Russia is third, with some 6.9% of global cumulative CO₂ emissions, followed by Brazil (4.5%) and Indonesia (4.1%). Notably, the chart above shows how the latter pair are in the top 10 largely as a result of their emissions from deforestation, despite relatively low totals from the use of fossil fuels.... The rainforest nations of Brazil and Indonesia were also being deforested in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by settlers growing [rubber](#), [tobacco](#) and other cash crops. But deforestation began “[in earnest](#)” from around 1950, including for cattle ranching, logging and [palm-oil plantations](#).”).

⁹⁷ ClimateWatch, [Historical GHG Emissions](#) (last visited 18 July 2023).

⁹⁸ International Energy Agency (2023) [Methane Tracker Database](#).

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- ⁹⁹ International Energy Agency (2023) [Methane Tracker Database](#).
- ¹⁰⁰ International Energy Agency (2023) [Methane Tracker Database](#).
- ¹⁰¹ ClimateWatch, [Historical GHG Emissions](#) (last visited 18 July 2023).
- ¹⁰² Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), 3 (“Agriculture, transport, domestic and commercial refrigeration are the sectors that product the largest emissions of methane, particulate matter, black carbon, and HFCs.”).
- ¹⁰³ Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), 3 (“The results indicate a maximum potential reduction in warming of up to 0.9° C by 2050, if implementing SLCP measures across the LAC region.”).
- ¹⁰⁴ Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), 3 (“A number of SLCP measures has been identified that, by 2050, has the potential to reduce warming in LAC by up to 0.9 degrees Celsius, premature mortality from PM2.5 by at least 26 per cent annually, and avoid the loss of 3–4 million tonnes of four staple crops each year.”).
- ¹⁰⁵ ClimateWatch, [Historical GHG Emissions](#) (last visited 15 June 2023).
- ¹⁰⁶ Project on Organization, Development, Education and Research (2022) [The Gas Industry in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), 26, Graphic 11 (“Natural gas production in Latin America amounted to 182.94 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2020, representing 4.75% of total world production.[62]”).
- ¹⁰⁷ Shen L., Zavala-Araiza D., Gautam R., Omara M., Scarpelli T., Sheng J., Sulprizio M. P., Zhuang J., Zhang Y., Qu Z., Lu X., Hamburg S. P., Jacob D. (2021) [Unravelling a large methane emission discrepancy in Mexico using satellite observations](#), REM. SENS. ENVIRON. 260: 1–9, 1 (“Our results show that Mexico’s oil and gas sector has the largest discrepancy, with oil and gas emissions (1.3 ± 0.2 Tg a1) higher by a factor of two relative to bottom-up estimates—accounting for a quarter of total anthropogenic emissions. Our satellite-based inverse modeling estimates show that more than half of the oil/gas emissions in eastern Mexico are from the southern onshore basin (0.79 ± 0.13 Tg a1), pointing at high emission sources which are not represented in current bottom-up inventories (e.g., venting of associated gas, high-emitting gathering/processing facilities related to the transport of associated gas from offshore).
- ¹⁰⁸ International Energy Agency (2022) [Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas Operations](#) (“Taking average natural gas prices from 2017 to 2021 – before the recent price surge – the annual investment required is less than the total value of the captured methane that could be sold, meaning that related methane emissions from oil and gas could be reduced by almost 75% at an overall saving to the global oil and gas industry.”).
- ¹⁰⁹ International Energy Agency (2023) [Global Methane Tracker 2023: Strategies to reduce emissions from oil and gas operations](#) (“Even if there was no value to the captured gas, almost all available abatement measures would be cost effective in the presence of an emissions price of only about 15 USD/tCO₂-eq.”).
- ¹¹⁰ International Energy Agency (2023) [Global Methane Tracker 2023: Strategies to reduce emissions from oil and gas operations](#) (“The technologies and measures to prevent methane emissions from oil and gas operations are well known and have been deployed in multiple locations around the world. Key examples include leak detection and repair campaigns, installing emissions control devices, and replacing components that emit methane in their normal operations.”).
- ¹¹¹ Climate Watch, [US Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

¹¹² Alvarez. R. A., *et al.* (2018) [Assessment of methane emissions from the U.S. oil and gas supply chain](#), SCIENCE 361(6398): 186–188, 186 (“Methane emissions from the U.S. oil and natural gas supply chain were estimated by using ground-based, facility-scale measurements and validated with aircraft observations in areas accounting for ~30% of U.S. gas production. When scaled up nationally, our facility-based estimate of 2015 supply chain emissions is 13 ± 2 teragrams per year, equivalent to 2.3% of gross U.S. gas production. This value is ~60% higher than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency inventory estimate, likely because existing inventory methods miss emissions released during abnormal operating conditions. Methane emissions of this magnitude, per unit of natural gas consumed, produce radiative forcing over a 20-year time horizon comparable to the CO₂ from natural gas combustion. Substantial emission reductions are feasible through rapid detection of the root causes of high emissions and deployment of less failure-prone systems.”)

¹¹³ Alvarez. R. A., *et al.* (2018) [Assessment of methane emissions from the U.S. oil and gas supply chain](#), SCIENCE 361(6398): 186–188, 186 (“Component-based inventory estimates like the GHGI have been shown to underestimate facility-level emissions probably because of the technical difficulty and safety and liability risks associated with measuring large emissions from, for example, venting tanks such as those observed in aerial survey”).

¹¹⁴ Climate Watch, [US Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

¹¹⁵ Blanco-Donado E. P., Schneider I. L., Artaxo P., Lozano-Osorio J., Artaxo P., Portz L., & Oliveira M. L. S. (2022) [Source identification and global implications of black carbon](#), GEOSCI. FRONT. 13(101149): 1–13, 1 (“In Latin America and the Caribbean, the main sources of BC emission are vehicular traffic in urban areas and biomass burning from deforestation, cooking, and heating (Artaxoetal., 2013; Britoetal., 2013).”).

¹¹⁶ Rivas M. E., Suarez-Aleman A., & Serebesky T. (2019) [STYLIZED URBAN TRANSPORTATION FACTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), Technical Note No. IDB-TN-1640, Inter-American Development Bank, 5, 7, 10 (“Over the past 10 years, most of countries in LAC have increased their motorization rate, with the average annual growth rate in the region equaling 4.7 percent. In 2015, the average motorization for LAC reached 201 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants.”; “Some cities have witnessed a reduction in their public transportation shares by one-half. This passenger leakage to private transportation modes has an impact on public transportation performance, which in turn increases the leakage, generating a vicious circle between private and public transportation.”; “The productivity of urban transport has decrease in the region, which is exacerbated by a low cost recovery. The evidence shows that productivity of the public transport sector in LAC, expressed by different partial indicators, has stagnated or even decreased. This has resulted in rising costs in the public transport sector, as is also observed in other labor-intensive sectors. These rising costs can be attributed in part to difficulties associated with replacing labor with capital as well as a slowdown in technological advances. Public transportation faces two additional aggravating factors: vehicular congestion and the negative impact of a positive income elasticity with respect to the demand for private transportation).”).

¹¹⁷ Reherrmann F. & Pablo-Romero M. (2018) [Economic growth and transport energy consumption in the Latin American and Caribbean countries](#), ENERGY POL’Y 122: 518–527, 519 (“Therefore, the economic growth in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries may have a noticeable impact on the energy consumption in the transport sector. In this sense, in 2015, the transport sector accounted for 36.8% of total energy consumption (higher than the world percentage shown before), followed by the industrial and residential sectors, with 31.6% and 15.7%, respectively (IEA,2018). It should also be noted that this transport sector energy consumption continues to be based mainly on oil, accounting for 88.4% of total energy consumed, followed by biofuels, natural gas and electricity, with 7.8%, 3.5%, and 0.3%, respectively (IEA, 2018).”).

¹¹⁸ Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), Figure 1.6.

¹¹⁹ Brewer T. L. (2019) [Black carbon emissions and regulatory policies in transportation](#), ENERGY POLICY 129: 1047–1055, 1047 (“Globally, transportation accounts for approximately 19 percent of BC emissions, and diesel engines

contribute 90 percent of transportation's share (US EPA, 2017). The transportation sector in the United States is estimated to account for about 52 percent of US black carbon emissions, and diesel engines contribute about 90 percent of the transportation BC emissions”).

¹²⁰ Environment and Climate Change Canada (2021) [Black Carbon Inventory 2013-2021](#), 13 (“Transportation and Mobile Equipment is by far the largest source of black carbon in Canada, accounting for 15 kt (56%) of total emissions in 2021. Of the various sources in this category, off-road diesel engines account for 8.9 kt (34%) of total emissions in 2021. The other large source in this category is diesel engines used for on-road transport, which account for 2.4 kt (9.1%) of total emissions.”)

¹²¹ ClimateWatch, [Historical GHG Emissions](#) (last visited 15 June 2023).

¹²² International Center for Tropical Agriculture (14 May 2020) [Latin America's Latin America's livestock sector needs emissions reduction to meet 2030 targets](#), PHYS.ORG (“Livestock is a pivotal source of income for Latin American countries but the sector is one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in the region. Agriculture in Latin America produces 20 percent of the region's emissions, 70 percent of which comes from livestock, according to research by the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS).”); Arango J., Ruden A., Martinez-Baron D., Loboguerrero A.M., Berndt A., Chacon M., Torres, C.F., Oyhantcabal W., Gomez C.A., Ricci P., Ku-Vera J., Burkart S., Moorby J.M., Chirinda N. (2020) [Ambition Meets Reality: Achieving GHG Emission Reduction Targets in the Livestock Sector in Latin America](#), FRONT. SUST. FOOD SYST. 4(65): 1–9, 1–2 (“Despite its economic importance, the cattle sector is also a major source of GHG emissions, particularly as enteric methane emissions (Table 1). ... Previous studies have shown that emission reduction ambitions submitted under the Paris Agreement would lead to global GHG emission reductions of 52–58 GtCO₂ eq yr^{–1} by 2030. Unfortunately, this level of emission reductions will not limit global warming to 1.5° C (IPCC, 2018).”).

¹²³ Climate Watch, [US Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

¹²⁴ Climate Watch, [US Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

¹²⁵ Silva-Martinez R. D., Sanches-Pereira A., Ortiz W., Galindo M. F. G., & Coelho S. T. (2020) [The state-of-the-art of organic waste to energy in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), REN. ENERGY 156: 509–525, 516–517 (“In the Caribbean Islands, biomass from agricultural and forest residues is utilized to produce electricity through combustion techniques. In countries like the Dominican Republic [12] or Cuba, combustion is practiced to employ the energy content of residues such as sugarcane straw and bagasse, rice husk, coffee husk, and firewood [13]. In the British Virgin Islands most wastes are incinerated, despite the high costs involved [7]. Conversely, in Puerto Rico for example, there is no incineration of waste or residues, where all waste are landfilled or recycled [7]. In the case of Central America, currently sugarcane bagasse and straw are the only agricultural residues to produce energy at large scale [8]. ... In the case of South America, particularly in Brazil, bagasse from sugarcane is the main source of agro electricity with an operating power potential of more than 9 GW [17], considering that burning bagasse is still by far the least cost option in comparison with other thermochemical routes [18].”).

¹²⁶ Engelhardt V., Perez T., Donoso L., Muller T., & Wiedensohler A. (2022) [Black carbon and particulate matter mass concentrations in the Metropolitan District of Caracas, Venezuela: An assessment of temporal variation and contributing sources](#), ELEM. SCI ANTH. 10: 1–22, 1 (“The annual median for eBC and PM_{2.5} was 1.6 and 9.2 mgm^{–3}, respectively, in the urban site, while PM_{2.5} in the forest site was 6.6mgm^{–3}. To our knowledge, these are the first measurements of this type in the northernmost area of South America. eBC and PM_{2.5} sources identification during wet and dry seasons was obtained by percentiles of the conditional bivariate probability function(CBPF). CBPF showed seasonal variations of eBC and PM_{2.5} sources and that their contributions are higher during the dry season. Biomass burning events are a relevant contributing source of aerosols for both sites of measurements inferred by fire pixels from satellite data, the national fire department’s statistics data, and backward trajectories. Our results indicate that biomass burning might affect the atmosphere on a regional scale, contribute to regional warming, and have implications for local and regional air quality and, therefore, human health”).

¹²⁷ Gonçalves Jr. S. J., Magalhaes N., Charello R. C., Evangelista H., & Godoi R. H. M. (2022) [*Relative contributions of fossil fuel and biomass burning sources to black carbon aerosol on the Southern Atlantic Ocean Coast and King George Island \(Antarctic Peninsula\)*](#), AN. ACAD. BRAS. CIENC. 94(e20210805): 1–20, 16 (“It is plausible to assume that the most significant contribution of BC to the study, in general, is from fossil fuel combustion since in the summer for the Southern Hemisphere, there are slight burning spots from the surrounding continents. A thorough understanding of fire events and an accurate prediction of air masses and continual measurements for the determination of BC in the Antarctica atmosphere are deemed essential, especially in the period of the dry season in the regions of South America, which appears the most biomass burning events arise (around August to November).”).

¹²⁸ Booth M. S. (2018) [*Not Carbon Neutral: Assessing the Net Emissions Impact of Residues Burned for Bioenergy*](#), ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 13: 1–10, 8 (“For bioenergy to offer genuine climate mitigation, it is essential to move beyond the assumption of instantaneous carbon neutrality. The [net emissions impact (NEI)] approach provides a simple means to estimate net bioenergy emissions over time, albeit one that tends to underestimate actual impacts. The model finds that for plants burning locally sourced wood residues, from 41% (extremely rapid decomposition) to 95% (very slow decomposition) of cumulative direct emissions should be counted as contributing to atmospheric carbon loading by year 10. Even by year 50 and beyond, the model shows that net emissions are a significant proportion of direct emissions for many fuels.”). See also Sterman J. D., et al. (2018) [*Does Replacing Coal with Wood Lower CO₂ Emissions? Dynamic Lifecycle Analysis of Wood Bioenergy*](#), ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 13: 1–10, 8 (“Scenario 2 shows the realistic case with the combustion efficiency and supply chain emissions estimated for wood pellets (supplementary table S5), again assuming 25% of the biomass is harvested by thinning. Because production and combustion of wood generate more CO₂ than coal, the first impact of bioenergy use is an increase in atmospheric CO₂. Regrowth gradually transfers C from the atmosphere to biomass and soil C stocks, leading to a carbon debt payback time of 52 years; after 100 years CO₂ remains 62% above the zero C case.”).

¹²⁹ See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2019) [*Summary for Policymakers*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DESERTIFICATION, LAND DEGRADATION, SUSTAINABLE LAND MANAGEMENT, FOOD SECURITY, AND GREENHOUSE GAS FLUXES IN TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS*](#), Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), 27 (“Impacts on adaptation, desertification, land degradation and food security are maximum potential impacts, assuming carbon dioxide removal by BECCS at a scale of 11.3 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in 2050, and noting that bioenergy without CCS can also achieve emissions reductions of up to several GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ when it is a low carbon energy source {2.6.1; 6.3.1}. Studies linking bioenergy to food security estimate an increase in the population at risk of hunger to up to 150 million people at this level of implementation {6.3.5}. The red hatched cells for desertification and land degradation indicate that while up to 15 million km² of additional land is required in 2100 in 2°C scenarios which will increase pressure for desertification and land degradation, the actual area affected by this additional pressure is not easily quantified {6.3.3; 6.3.4}.”); Swift M. J. & Anderson J. M. (1994) [*Biodiversity and Ecosystem Function in Agricultural Systems*](#), in *BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM FUNCTION* 99, Schulze E. D. & Mooney H. A. (eds.), 15–41 (“The conversion of natural systems to intensive, arable monocropping reduces biodiversity in the plant, herbivore and decomposer subsystems. The isolation of biodiversity as a factor determining changes in ecosystem functioning is complicated, however, because each of these subsystems affects the others (Fig. 2.2) and also influences the physicochemical factors regulating soil processes. The response of the soil organism community to cultivations practices is varied (Figs. 2.6, 2.7), but in general agricultural soils are characterised by a lower species richness, including the disappearance of key functional groups.”); and Bauhus J., Kouki J., Paillet Y., Asbeck T., & Marchetti M. (2017) [*How does the forest-based bioeconomy impact forest diversity?*](#), in [*TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN FOREST-BASED BIOECONOMY*](#), Winkel G. (ed.), European Forest Institute, 67–76, 69 (“Around 25% of forest-dwelling species depend on dead wood and senescent trees for at least a part of their lifecycle. . . . Large amounts of dead wood and senescent trees, as well as tree cavities, are typical of mature and over-mature stages of forest development and are typically found in higher quantities and qualities in unmanaged forests. Conversely, forest management tends to truncate successional forest development cycles and to eliminate such elements. Shorter rotation lengths are likely to have the same – amplified – impact on forest biodiversity.”).

¹³⁰ See Sierra Club (2017) [*The Conventional Biomass Industry in California*](#) (“[L]ike coal generation, solid fuel biomass generation releases criteria pollutants (including oxides of nitrogen (NO_x), sulfur oxides (SO_x), and fine particulate matter) that cause negative human health impacts, including asthma, heart disease, and premature death.

In fact, biomass combustion is dirtier than coal generation with regards to particulate matter and NO_x. Biomass generation proponents state that solid fuel facilities reduce pollution as these plants filter out 99 percent of PM 2.5 pollution and 95 percent of black carbon emissions. However, this claim refers to the most technologically advanced plants. The majority of the existing solid fuel, conventional biomass incineration facilities in California were built in the late 1980s and are not based on the most advanced technology. Furthermore, as many as 75 percent of conventional biomass facilities across the United States have been found not to be compliant with public health laws.”); Arvesen A., et al. (2018) [Cooling aerosols and changes in albedo counteract warming from CO₂ and black carbon from forest bioenergy in Norway](#), SCI. REP. 8(3299): 1–12, 8 (“For combustion plant sizes > 1 MW, assumed emission factor values for dust, CO, NO_x and SO₂ are in compliance with current air pollution regulations in Norway (combustion plant sizes < 1 MW are not subject to regulatory emission limits)¹². The fractions of PM₁₀ that are black carbon and organic carbon are assumed to be 4.3% and 17%, respectively, for all combustion plant size classes¹³. For biogenic CO₂, we employ a generic emission factor of 1.8 kg CO₂ dry kg⁻¹.”); Cai H. & Wang M. Q. (2014) [Estimation of Emission Factors of Particulate Black Carbon and Organic Carbon from Stationary, Mobile, and Non-point Sources in the United States for Incorporation into GREET](#), Argonne National Laboratory, Technical Report ANL/ESD-14/6, 13, 31 (Table 15: Listing mean black carbon emissions from biomass-fired boilers as emitting 0.273 g/kWh compared with 0.009 g/kWh from coal-fired boilers; “For biomass-fired boilers, we relied on a source profile (ID 4704) with the highest quality rating in SPECIATE that was based on a study on source sampling of fine PM emissions from wood-fired industrial boilers by the National Risk Management Research Laboratory of the EPA (EPA 2014a).”); Pozzer A., Dominici F., Haines A., Witt C., Münzel T., & Lelieveld J. (2020) [Regional and global contributions of air pollution to risk of death from COVID-19](#), CARDIOVASC. RES. 116(14): 2247–2253, 2251 (“Our results suggest that air pollution is an important cofactor increasing the risk of mortality from COVID-19. This provides extra motivation for combining ambitious policies to reduce air pollution with measures to control the transmission of COVID-19.”); and Li H., Xu X.-L., Dai D.-W., Huang Z.-Y., Ma Z., & Guan Y.-J. (2020) [Air pollution and temperature are associated with increased COVID-19 incidence: A time series study](#), INT. J. INFECT. DIS. 97: 278–282, 278 (“First, a significant correlation was found between COVID-19 incidence and AQI in both Wuhan ($R^2 = 0.13, p < 0.05$) and XiaoGan ($R^2 = 0.223, p < 0.01$). Specifically, among four pollutants, COVID-19 incidence was prominently correlated with PM_{2.5} and NO₂ in both cities. In Wuhan, the tightest correlation was observed between NO₂ and COVID-19 incidence ($R^2 = 0.329, p < 0.01$). In XiaoGan, in addition to the PM_{2.5} ($R^2 = 0.117, p < 0.01$) and NO₂ ($R^2 = 0.015, p < 0.05$), a notable correlation was also observed between the PM₁₀ and COVID-19 incidence ($R^2 = 0.105, p < 0.05$). Moreover, temperature is the only meteorological parameter that constantly correlated well with COVID-19 incidence in both Wuhan and XiaoGan, but in an inverse correlation ($p < 0.05$).”).

¹³¹ Globally, large-scale deployment of BECCS would decrease food and water security and could intensify social conflicts, especially in low- and middle-income countries. See Canadell J. G., et al. (2021) [Chapter 5: Global Carbon and other Biogeochemical Cycles and Feedbacks](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](#), Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 5-108 (“Deployment of BECCS at the scales envisioned by many 1.5–2.0°C mitigation scenarios could threaten biodiversity and require large land areas, competing with afforestation, reforestation and food security (Smith et al. 2018; Anderson and Peters 2016)”). Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2019) [GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES](#), Brondizio E. S., Settele J., Díaz S., & Ngo H. T. (eds.), XXII (“[The] largescale deployment of intensive bioenergy plantations, including monocultures, replacing natural forests and subsistence farmlands, will likely have negative impacts on biodiversity and can threaten food and water security as well as local livelihoods, including by intensifying social conflict.”); and Hasegawa T., Sands R. D., Brunelle T., Cui Y., Frank S., Fujimori S., & Popp A. (2020) [Food security under high bioenergy demand toward long-term climate goals](#), CLIM. CHANGE 163: 1587–1601, 1598 (“Land-based mitigation options play an important role in the assessment of stringent climate mitigation policies (Popp et al. 2014b, 2017). Bioenergy should be in high demand because carbon is absorbed directly from the atmosphere (negative emission) when combined with carbon capture and storage. However, potential competition for land between food and bioenergy crop production is of concern. The large-scale use of bioenergy, to support stringent temperature ceilings of 2 or 1.5 °C by the end of this century, would change land dynamics, put pressure on land resources (Popp et al. 2014b), compete with food production, and increase the risk of hunger in middle- and low-income regions (Frank et al. 2017; Hasegawa et al. 2015a, 2018). The use of bioenergy to replace fossil fuels is addressed in other studies (e.g., Hasegawa et al. 2018; Bauer et al. 2018) but not in the context of food

security. This study provides an in-depth analysis of the relationship between bioenergy and use of land for meeting food demand.”). High implementation of BECCS could increase the population at risk of hunger by up to 150 million people. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2019) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DESERTIFICATION, LAND DEGRADATION, SUSTAINABLE LAND MANAGEMENT, FOOD SECURITY, AND GREENHOUSE GAS FLUXES IN TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS](#), Shukla P. R., et al. (eds.), 27 (“Impacts on adaptation, desertification, land degradation and food security are maximum potential impacts, assuming carbon dioxide removal by BECCS at a scale of 11.3 GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ in 2050, and noting that bioenergy without CCS can also achieve emissions reductions of up to several GtCO₂ yr⁻¹ when it is a low carbon energy source {2.6.1; 6.3.1}. Studies linking bioenergy to food security estimate an increase in the population at risk of hunger to up to 150 million people at this level of implementation {6.3.5}. The red hatched cells for desertification and land degradation indicate that while up to 15 million km² of additional land is required in 2100 in 2°C scenarios which will increase pressure for desertification and land degradation, the actual area affected by this additional pressure is not easily quantified {6.3.3; 6.3.4}.”).

¹³² Bioenergy facilities have been linked with environmental injustice, specifically the wood pellet industry in the U.S. See Purifoy D. (5 October 2020) [How Europe's Wood Pellet Appetite Worsens Environmental Racism in the South](#), SOUTHERLY (“From Northampton County to Alabama’s Black Belt, residents and activists say companies such as Enviva exploit mostly communities of color with promises to build up busted local economies with a “green energy” industry. Instead, communities hosting wood pellet facilities are not only further burdened by pollution and other local dangers, they are also entangled in yet another climate damaging trend — the destruction of biodiverse hardwood forests and the rise of monoculture tree plantations to produce energy that appears to pose climate threats similar to coal.”); Popkin G. (21 April 2021) [There's a Booming Business in America's Forests. Some Aren't Happy About It](#), THE NEW YORK TIMES (“Richie Harding, a pastor in Northampton County, took a dimmer view. He said he was incensed that Enviva had plopped its mill amid established neighborhoods. “Northampton County has a lot of land,” he said. “Why would you put it in the backyard of these people?” Pellet mills, which can emit volatile organic compounds and other hazardous air pollutants, are 50 percent more likely to be located near “environmental justice-designated” communities, defined as counties with above-average poverty levels and a population that’s at least 25 percent nonwhite, according to an analysis by the Dogwood Alliance, an environmental nonprofit based in Asheville. In November, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality fined Drax, the power company, \$2.5 million for air-quality violations at mills it operates there.”); Koester S. & Davis S. (2018) [Siting of Wood Pellet Production in Environmental Justice Communities in the Southeastern United States](#), ENVIRON. JUSTICE 11(2): 64–70, 70 (“By defining EJ communities as communities with high levels of poverty and large nonwhite populations, we showed that they are roughly 50% more likely than non-EJ communities to have a biomass pellet facility located in their community. In addition, North and South Carolina had wood pellet production facilities located exclusively in EJ communities. A contemporary instance of a biomass wood pellet production facility being placed in an EJ community is illustrated by our example of Richmond County, North Carolina, showing that residents’ right to EJ is being denied. This research details the continued pattern of energy projects and development being sited in areas where communities are economically, politically, and socially marginalized.”); Grunald M. (26 March 2021) [The ‘Green Energy’ That Might Be Ruining the Planet](#), POLITICO MAGAZINE (“U.S. pellet mills have often been located in predominantly minority communities, which has added an environmental justice angle to the politics of biomass. A local activist named Belinda Joyner, who is Black, once confronted a Black state regulator about Enviva’s expansion of the Northampton mill. Joyner told the regulator his agency was ignoring a minority community’s complaints about truck traffic and dust and a debarker that rattled at night as if someone had left a quarter in the dryer. The regulator said he was sympathetic, but as long as Enviva complied with air quality laws, he had no choice but to issue the permit.”); and Anderson P. & Powell K. (2018) [Dirty Deception: How the Wood Biomass Industry Skirts the Clean Air Act](#), Environmental Integrity Project, 4–5 (“[Environmental Integrity Project’s] survey reveals that these facilities emit dangerous amounts of air pollution, and further finds that state agencies consistently fall well short of their duty to ensure that these facilities control their pollution to the levels required by law, frequently due to misleading information supplied by the industry. As a result, many large pellet mills have been allowed to emit air pollution, especially volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and hazardous air pollutants at levels well above legal limits for years at a time.”).

¹³³ Climate Watch, [US Greenhouse Gas Emissions](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

¹³⁴ Piamonte C., Correal M., & Rihm A. (21 November 2022) [*If we talk about climate change, we MUST talk about waste*](#), Inter-American Development Bank (“In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), waste production continues to grow. Projections indicate that the region will produce 296 million tons of municipal solid waste by 2030, of which 52% is expected to be organic. Currently, LAC countries dispose of 56% of their waste in sanitary landfills – most of them without biogas capture systems – and 40% in inadequate disposal sites, while less than 4% of waste is valorized. This context not only increases the challenges for waste management in the region, but also poses a threat to methane mitigation.”),

¹³⁵ Climate Watch, [*US Greenhouse Gas Emissions*](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

¹³⁶ Climate Watch, [*US Greenhouse Gas Emissions*](#) (last visited 27 June 2023).

¹³⁷ United States Environmental Protection Agency (21 April 2023) [*Basic Information about Landfill Gas*](#), Landfill Methane Outreach Program (“Municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills are the third-largest source of human-related methane emissions in the United States, accounting for approximately 14.3 percent of these emissions in 2021. The methane emissions from MSW landfills in 2021 were approximately equivalent to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from nearly 23.1 million gasoline-powered passenger vehicles driven for one year or the CO₂ emissions from nearly 13.1 million homes’ energy use for one year. At the same time, methane emissions from MSW landfills represent a lost opportunity to capture and use a significant energy resource.”).

¹³⁸ Flerlage H., Velders G. J. M., & de Boer J. (2021) [*A review of bottom-up and top-down emission estimates of hydrofluorocarbons \(HFCs\) in different parts of the world*](#), CHEMOS. 283(131208): 1–16, 1 (“Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are widespread alternatives for the ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). They are used today in a variety of applications, mainly as refrigerants for cooling and air conditioning or as foam-blowing agents (Montzka et al., 2018).”).

¹³⁹ Flerlage H., Velders G. J. M., & de Boer J. (2021) [*A review of bottom-up and top-down emission estimates of hydrofluorocarbons \(HFCs\) in different parts of the world*](#), CHEMOS. 283(131208): 1–16, 2 (“HFCs do not deplete the ozone layer like chlorine- or bromine- containing analogues do (Ravishankara et al., 1994). Recent findings show an indirect depletion potential due to radiative forcing increasing tropospheric and stratospheric temperatures, which alters atmospheric circulation and accelerates the catalytic ozone destruction cycle (Hurwitz et al., 2015). While this effect has limited impact, HFCs being halocarbons, are potent greenhouse gases (Ramanathan, 1975). Global warming potentials (GWPs) express the effect of a substance on global warming relative to CO₂, based on the mass of the substance emitted. HFCs have GWPs of up to several thousands and thus significantly contribute to global radiative forcing (Montzka et al., 2015).”).

¹⁴⁰ Flerlage H., Velders G. J. M., & de Boer J. (2021) [*A review of bottom-up and top-down emission estimates of hydrofluorocarbons \(HFCs\) in different parts of the world*](#), CHEMOS. 283(131208): 1–16, 12 (“In Latin America and the Caribbean, 80% of HFC emissions are emitted by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (CCAP and UNEP, 2016).”).

¹⁴¹ Flerlage H., Velders G. J. M., & de Boer J. (2021) [*A review of bottom-up and top-down emission estimates of hydrofluorocarbons \(HFCs\) in different parts of the world*](#), CHEMOS. 283(131208): 1–16, 12 (“Emissions of HFC-134a according to government reports to the UNFCCC reached 3.9 Gg yr⁻¹ in 2015, while HFC-152a were reported to be 0 Gg yr⁻¹ in 2007–2015 (Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, 2017).”).

¹⁴² Sustainable Energy for All (2021) [*Chilling Prospects: Tracking Sustainable Cooling for All*](#), 19 (“In Latin America and the Caribbean, the number of those at highest risk in six countries high-impact countries for access to sustainable cooling grew slightly from 47.6 million people in 2020, to 48.8 million people in 2021. “).

¹⁴³ Sustainable Energy for All (2021) [*Chilling Prospects: Tracking Sustainable Cooling for All*](#), 19 (“Of those at highest risk, the vast majority are the urban poor, which increased by 500,000 people compared to the previous year.

Within the region, the most significant growth in the urban poor category was observed in Brazil (299,000 people) and Bolivia (55,000 people).”).

¹⁴⁴ Bayer E. (18 February 2021) [Consumers can transform Latin America's power systems: Here's how](#), INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (“By 2050, [two-thirds of the world's households](#) could have an AC unit. This means that AC stocks in Latin America and the Caribbean could [increase more than sixfold](#), putting a strain on transmission and local distribution grids. However, more energy efficient ACs could reduce the additional electricity system load, and the remaining load could be cycled to help avoid grid strain during peak hours.”).

¹⁴⁵ International Energy Agency (2018) [THE FUTURE OF COOLING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENT AIR CONDITIONING](#); discussed in Bayer, E. (18 February 2021) [Consumers can transform Latin America's power systems: Here's how](#), INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (“By 2050, two-thirds of the world's households could have an AC unit. This means that AC stocks in Latin America and the Caribbean could increase more than sixfold, putting a strain on transmission and local distribution grids.”).

¹⁴⁶ Yepez A. & Urteaga J.A. (20 April 2023) [Latin America and the Caribbean can mitigate climate change by tapping into its energy efficiency potential](#), Inter-American Development Bank (“The region's energy intensity, which means the amount of energy consumed per unit of gross domestic product, decreased at an average annual rate of [0.8%](#) from 2010 to 2018. Worldwide, energy intensity decreased at a rate of 2.1% per year, making Latin America and the Caribbean the region with the least improvement in this indicator.”).

¹⁴⁷ Porras F., Walter A., Soriano G., & Ramirez A.D. (2023) [On the adoption of stricter energy efficiency standards for residential air conditioners: Case study Guayaquil, Ecuador](#), HELIYON 9(3): e13893, 1–17, 3 (“The average MEPS (continuous line) for LATAM countries shown in Table 1 is approximately 30% below the average MEPS in the main manufacturing regions. The UNEP Model Regulations are voluntary guidelines for governments in developing countries considering a regulatory framework that requires new room air conditioners to be clean and efficient, following a sustainable pathway [12]. Fig. 1 also shows the current gap between LATAM MEPS and the UNEP Model Regulations (dashed line). The comparison indicates that LATAM MEPS should be increased by 67% to meet UNEP guidelines.”).

¹⁴⁸ Yepez A. & Urteaga J.A. (20 April 2023) [Latin America and the Caribbean can mitigate climate change by tapping into its energy efficiency potential](#), Inter-American Development Bank (“According to Inter-American Development Bank estimates, the region has the potential to save at least 20% of its energy consumption just by using more efficient lighting, refrigeration and air conditioning equipment, and motors and compressors. These steps would mitigate approximately 470 MtCO₂e, based on an estimated emission factor for the region of 0.34 TCO₂/MWh.”).

¹⁴⁹ Flerlage H., Velders G. J. M., & de Boer J. (2021) [A review of bottom-up and top-down emission estimates of hydrofluorocarbons \(HFCs\) in different parts of the world](#), CHEMOS. 283(131208): 1–16, 10 (“The global distribution of HFC emissions is quite inhomogeneous. Canada, Japan, Australia, and Russia account for about 20% of HFC emissions reported from Annex I countries, while the majority (about 80%) stem from the US and the EU”).

¹⁵⁰ United States Environmental Protection Agency (30 May 2023) [Phaseout of Ozone-Depleting Substances \(ODS\)](#) (“In the United States, ozone-depleting substances (ODS) are regulated as class I or class II controlled substances. Class I substances, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons, have a higher ozone depletion potential and have been phased out in the U.S.; with a few exceptions, this means no one can produce or import class I substances. Class II substances are all hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which are transitional substitutes for many class I substances. New production and import of most HCFCs were phased out as of 2020. The most common HCFC in use today is HCFC-22 or R-22, a refrigerant still used in existing air conditioners and refrigeration equipment.”).

¹⁵¹ Baccini A., Walker W., Carvalho L., Farina M., Sulla-Menashe D., & Houghton R. A. (2017) [Tropical forests are a net carbon source based on aboveground measurements of gain and loss](#), SCIENCE 358(6360): 230–234, 2–3 (“Our analysis reveals that degradation and disturbance account for 70, 81, and 46% of carbon losses, respectively, across tropical America, Africa, and Asia. For the tropics as a whole, D/D accounts for ~69% of total carbon losses. Although

this percentage is higher than previous estimates (22, 23), D/D are scale-dependent phenomena that can only be measured and interpreted relative to the resolution of the sample grid (i.e., 21.4 ha in this study; fig. S7).”).

¹⁵² Lovejoy T. E. & Nobre C. (2018) [Amazon's Tipping Point](#), SCI. ADV. 4(2): eaat2340, 1 (“We believe that negative synergies between deforestation, climate change, and widespread use of fire indicate a tipping point for the Amazon system to flip to nonforest ecosystems in eastern, southern and central Amazonia at 20–25% deforestation.”). See also Wang S., Foster A., Lenz E. A., Kessler J. D., Stroeve J. C., Anderson L. O., Turetsky M., Betts R., Zou S., Liu W., Boos W. R., & Hausfather Z. (2023) [Mechanisms and Impacts of Earth System Tipping Elements](#), REV. GEOPHYS. 61(e2021RG000757): 1–81, 28 (“Ultimately, current research cannot eliminate the possibility that changes across the boreal zone due to a warming climate could act as a net positive climate feedback, thanks to the potential for permafrost thaw and wildfires to liberate the soil carbon that makes up the majority of stored carbon across this ecosystem. Consequently, boreal forest dieback and shifts represent one of the more potentially immediate and significant climate system tipping elements (Table 7).”).

¹⁵³ Lovejoy T. E. & Nobre C. (2018) [Amazon's Tipping Point](#), SCI. ADV. 4(2): eaat2340, 1 (“We believe that negative synergies between deforestation, climate change, and widespread use of fire indicate a tipping point for the Amazon system to flip to nonforest ecosystems in eastern, southern and central Amazonia at 20–25% deforestation.”). See also Wang S., Foster A., Lenz E. A., Kessler J. D., Stroeve J. C., Anderson L. O., Turetsky M., Betts R., Zou S., Liu W., Boos W. R., & Hausfather Z. (2023) [Mechanisms and Impacts of Earth System Tipping Elements](#), REV. GEOPHYS. 61(e2021RG000757): 1–81, 28 (“Ultimately, current research cannot eliminate the possibility that changes across the boreal zone due to a warming climate could act as a net positive climate feedback, thanks to the potential for permafrost thaw and wildfires to liberate the soil carbon that makes up the majority of stored carbon across this ecosystem. Consequently, boreal forest dieback and shifts represent one of the more potentially immediate and significant climate system tipping elements (Table 7).”).

¹⁵⁴ Griscom B. W., et al. (2017) [Natural climate solutions](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 114(44): 11645–11650, 11645 (“Better stewardship of land is needed to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goal of holding warming to below 2 °C; however, confusion persists about the specific set of land stewardship options available and their mitigation potential. To address this, we identify and quantify “natural climate solutions” (NCS): 20 conservation, restoration, and improved land management actions that increase carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas emissions across global forests, wetlands, grasslands, and agricultural lands. We find that the maximum potential of NCS—when constrained by food security, fiber security, and biodiversity conservation—is 23.8 petagrams of CO₂ equivalent (PgCO_{2e}) y⁻¹ (95% CI 20.3–37.4). This is ≥30% higher than prior estimates, which did not include the full range of options and safeguards considered here. About half of this maximum (11.3 PgCO_{2e} y⁻¹) represents cost-effective climate mitigation, assuming the social cost of CO₂ pollution is ≥100 USD MgCO_{2e} y⁻¹ by 2030. Natural climate solutions can provide 37% of cost-effective CO₂ mitigation needed through 2030 for a >66% chance of holding warming to below 2 °C. One-third of this cost-effective NCS mitigation can be delivered at or below 10 USD MgCO₂ y⁻¹. Most NCS actions—if effectively implemented—also offer water filtration, flood buffering, soil health, biodiversity habitat, and enhanced climate resilience. Work remains to better constrain uncertainty of NCS mitigation estimates. Nevertheless, existing knowledge reported here provides a robust basis for immediate global action to improve ecosystem stewardship as a major solution to climate change.”). See also Moomaw W. R., Masino S. A., & Faison E. K. (2019) [Intact Forests in the United States: Proforestation Mitigates Climate Change and Serves the Greatest Good](#), PERSPECTIVE, FRONT. FOR. GLOB. CHANGE 2(27): 1–10, 1 (“Climate change and loss of biodiversity are widely recognized as the foremost environmental challenges of our time. Forests annually sequester large quantities of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂), and store carbon above and below ground for long periods of time. Intact forests—largely free from human intervention except primarily for trails and hazard removals—are the most carbon-dense and biodiverse terrestrial ecosystems, with additional benefits to society and the economy. ... The recent *1.5 Degree Warming Report* by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change identifies *reforestation* and *afforestation* as important strategies to increase negative emissions, but they face significant challenges: afforestation requires an enormous amount of additional land, and neither strategy can remove sufficient carbon by growing young trees during the critical next decade(s). In contrast, growing existing forests intact to their ecological potential—termed *proforestation*—is a more effective, immediate, and low-cost approach that could be mobilized across suitable forests of all types. Proforestation serves the greatest public good by maximizing co-benefits such as nature-based

biological carbon sequestration and unparalleled ecosystem services such as biodiversity enhancement, water and air quality, flood and erosion control, public health benefits, low impact recreation, and scenic beauty.”); and World Wildlife Fund (2020) [LIVING PLANET REPORT 2020 – BENDING THE CURVE OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS](#), Almond R. E. A., Grooten M., & Petersen T. (eds.), 6 (“The global Living Planet Index continues to decline. It shows an average 68% decrease in population sizes of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish between 1970 and 2016. ... It matters because biodiversity is fundamental to human life on Earth, and the evidence is unequivocal – it is being destroyed by us at a rate unprecedented in history. Since the industrial revolution, human activities have increasingly destroyed and degraded forests, grasslands, wetlands and other important ecosystems, threatening human well-being. Seventy-five per cent of the Earth’s ice-free land surface has already been significantly altered, most of the oceans are polluted, and more than 85% of the area of wetlands has been lost.”).

¹⁵⁵ Rockström J., Beringer T., Hole D., Griscom B., Mascia M. B., Folke C., & Creutzig F. (2021) [We Need Biosphere Stewardship That Protects Carbon Sinks and Builds Resilience](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(38): e2115218115, 1–8, 2 (“Using the reduced complexity climate model MAGICC6 (“Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change Version 6”), we examined changes in global mean temperature up till now and in the future under the RCP2.6 emission scenario—the only emission pathway that aligns with the Paris agreement—but assumed that ecosystems on land had stopped absorbing CO₂ from 1900 onwards. In such a world, global temperatures would have risen much faster (Fig. 1C, red line). In fact, we would have already crossed the 1.5 °C threshold, demonstrating that terrestrial ecosystems have reduced warming by at least 0.4 °C since 1900.”).

¹⁵⁶ Duffy K. A., Schwalm C. R., Arcus V. L., Koch G. W., Liang L. L., & Schipper L. A. (2021) [How close are we to the temperature tipping point of the terrestrial biosphere?](#), SCI. ADV. 7(3): eaay1052, 1–8, 1 (“The temperature dependence of global photosynthesis and respiration determine land carbon sink strength. While the land sink currently mitigates ~30% of anthropogenic carbon emissions, it is unclear whether this ecosystem service will persist and, more specifically, what hard temperature limits, if any, regulate carbon uptake. Here, we use the largest continuous carbon flux monitoring network to construct the first observationally derived temperature response curves for global land carbon uptake. We show that the mean temperature of the warmest quarter (3-month period) passed the thermal maximum for photosynthesis during the past decade. At higher temperatures, respiration rates continue to rise in contrast to sharply declining rates of photosynthesis. Under business-as-usual emissions, this divergence elicits a near halving of the land sink strength by as early as 2040.”). See also Hubau W., et al. (2020) [Asynchronous carbon sink saturation in African and Amazonian tropical forests](#), NATURE 579: 80–87, 85 (“In summary, our results indicate that although intact tropical forests remain major stores of carbon and are key centres of biodiversity¹¹, their ability to sequester additional carbon in trees is waning. In the 1990s intact tropical forests removed 17% of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions. This declined to an estimated 6% in the 2010s, because the pan-tropical weighted average per unit area sink strength declined by 33%, forest area decreased by 19% and anthropogenic CO₂ emissions increased by 46%. Although tropical forests are more immediately threatened by deforestation⁴⁶ and degradation⁴⁷, and the future carbon balance will also depend on secondary forest dynamics⁴⁸ and forest restoration plans⁴⁹, our analyses show that they are also affected by atmospheric chemistry and climatic changes. Given that the intact tropical forest carbon sink is set to end sooner than even the most pessimistic climate driven vegetation models predict^{4,5}, our analyses suggest that climate change impacts in the tropics may become more severe than predicted. Furthermore, the carbon balance of intact tropical forests will only stabilize once CO₂ concentrations and the climate stabilizes.”); and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-26 (“Based on model projections, under the intermediate scenario that stabilizes atmospheric CO₂ concentrations this century (SSP2-4.5), the rates of CO₂ taken up by the land and oceans are projected to decrease in the second half of the 21st century (*high confidence*). Under the very low and low GHG emissions scenarios (SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6), where CO₂ concentrations peak and decline during the 21st century, land and oceans begin to take up less carbon in response to declining atmospheric CO₂ concentrations (*high confidence*) and turn into a weak net source by 2100 under SSP1-1.9 (*medium confidence*). It is very unlikely that the combined global land and ocean sink will turn into a source by 2100 under scenarios without net negative emissions³² (SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, SSP5-8.5)... Additional ecosystem responses to warming not yet fully included in climate models, such as CO₂ and CH₄ fluxes from wetlands, permafrost thaw and wildfires, would further increase concentrations of these gases in the atmosphere (*high confidence*).”).

¹⁵⁷ Goldstein A., Noon M. L., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Raghav S., McGreevey M., Stone C., Shrestha S., Golden Kroner R., Hole D., & Turner W. (2021) [IRRECOVERABLE CARBON: THE PLACES WE MUST PROTECT TO AVERT CLIMATE CATASTROPHE](#), Conservation International, 7 (“‘Irrecoverable carbon’ refers to the vast stores of carbon in nature that are vulnerable to release from human activity and, if lost, could not be restored by 2050 — when the world must reach net-zero emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change... There are high concentrations of irrecoverable carbon in the Amazon (31.5 Gt), the Congo Basin (8.1 Gt), and New Guinea (7.3 Gt). Other important irrecoverable carbon reserves are located in the Pacific Northwest of North America, the Valdivian forests of Chile, the mangroves and swamp forests of Guyana, the peatlands of Northern Scotland, Niger Delta’s mangroves, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, the Scandinavian and Siberian boreal forests, and the eucalyptus forest of Southeast Australia, among others.”). See also Goldstein A., et al. (2020) [Protecting irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 10(4): 287–295; and Noon M. L., Goldstein A., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Cook-Patton S. C., Spawn-Lee S. A., Wright T. M., Gonzalez-Roglich M., Hole D. G., Rockström J., & Turner W. R. (2021) [Mapping the irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. SUSTAIN. 5: 37–46.

¹⁵⁸ Goldstein A., Noon M. L., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Raghav S., McGreevey M., Stone C., Shrestha S., Golden Kroner R., Hole D., & Turner W. (2021) [IRRECOVERABLE CARBON: THE PLACES WE MUST PROTECT TO AVERT CLIMATE CATASTROPHE](#), Conservation International, 7 (“‘Irrecoverable carbon’ refers to the vast stores of carbon in nature that are vulnerable to release from human activity and, if lost, could not be restored by 2050 — when the world must reach net-zero emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change... There are high concentrations of irrecoverable carbon in the Amazon (31.5 Gt), the Congo Basin (8.1 Gt), and New Guinea (7.3 Gt). Other important irrecoverable carbon reserves are located in the Pacific Northwest of North America, the Valdivian forests of Chile, the mangroves and swamp forests of Guyana, the peatlands of Northern Scotland, Niger Delta’s mangroves, Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, the Scandinavian and Siberian boreal forests, and the eucalyptus forest of Southeast Australia, among others.”). See also Goldstein A., et al. (2020) [Protecting irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 10(4): 287–295; and Noon M. L., Goldstein A., Ledezma J. C., Roehrdanz P. R., Cook-Patton S. C., Spawn-Lee S. A., Wright T. M., Gonzalez-Roglich M., Hole D. G., Rockström J., & Turner W. R. (2021) [Mapping the irrecoverable carbon in Earth’s ecosystems](#), NAT. SUSTAIN. 5: 37–46.

¹⁵⁹ Griscom B. W., et al. (2017) [Natural climate solutions](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 114(44): 11645–11650, 11645 (“Better stewardship of land is needed to achieve the Paris Climate Agreement goal of holding warming to below 2 °C; however, confusion persists about the specific set of land stewardship options available and their mitigation potential. To address this, we identify and quantify “natural climate solutions” (NCS): 20 conservation, restoration, and improved land management actions that increase carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas emissions across global forests, wetlands, grasslands, and agricultural lands. We find that the maximum potential of NCS—when constrained by food security, fiber security, and biodiversity conservation—is 23.8 petagrams of CO₂ equivalent (PgCO_{2e}) y⁻¹ (95% CI 20.3–37.4). This is ≥30% higher than prior estimates, which did not include the full range of options and safeguards considered here. About half of this maximum (11.3 PgCO_{2e} y⁻¹) represents cost-effective climate mitigation, assuming the social cost of CO₂ pollution is ≥100 USD MgCO_{2e}⁻¹ by 2030. Natural climate solutions can provide 37% of cost-effective CO₂ mitigation needed through 2030 for a >66% chance of holding warming to below 2 °C. One-third of this cost-effective NCS mitigation can be delivered at or below 10 USD MgCO₂⁻¹. Most NCS actions—if effectively implemented—also offer water filtration, flood buffering, soil health, biodiversity habitat, and enhanced climate resilience. Work remains to better constrain uncertainty of NCS mitigation estimates. Nevertheless, existing knowledge reported here provides a robust basis for immediate global action to improve ecosystem stewardship as a major solution to climate change.”). See also Moomaw W. R., Masino S. A., & Faison E. K. (2019) [Intact Forests in the United States: Reforestation Mitigates Climate Change and Serves the Greatest Good](#), Perspective, FRONT. FOR. GLOB. CHANGE 2(27): 1–10, 1 (“Climate change and loss of biodiversity are widely recognized as the foremost environmental challenges of our time. Forests annually sequester large quantities of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂), and store carbon above and below ground for long periods of time. Intact forests—largely free from human intervention except primarily for trails and hazard removals—are the most carbon-dense and biodiverse terrestrial ecosystems, with additional benefits to society and the economy. ... The recent 1.5 Degree Warming Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change identifies reforestation and afforestation as important strategies to increase negative emissions, but they face significant challenges: afforestation

requires an enormous amount of additional land, and neither strategy can remove sufficient carbon by growing young trees during the critical next decade(s). In contrast, growing existing forests intact to their ecological potential—termed *proforestation*—is a more effective, immediate, and low-cost approach that could be mobilized across suitable forests of all types. Proforestation serves the greatest public good by maximizing co-benefits such as nature-based biological carbon sequestration and unparalleled ecosystem services such as biodiversity enhancement, water and air quality, flood and erosion control, public health benefits, low impact recreation, and scenic beauty.”); and World Wildlife Fund (2020) [Living Planet Report 2020 – Bending the curve of biodiversity loss](#), Almond R. E. A., Grooten M., & Petersen T. (eds.), 5 (“The global Living Planet Index continues to decline. It shows an average 68% decrease in population sizes of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish between 1970 and 2016. ... It matters because biodiversity is fundamental to human life on Earth, and the evidence is unequivocal – it is being destroyed by us at a rate unprecedented in history. Since the industrial revolution, human activities have increasingly destroyed and degraded forests, grasslands, wetlands and other important ecosystems, threatening human well-being. Seventy-five per cent of the Earth’s ice-free land surface has already been significantly altered, most of the oceans are polluted, and more than 85% of the area of wetlands has been lost.”).

¹⁶⁰ Cuadros A. (4 January 2023) [Has the Amazon Reached Its ‘Tipping Point’?](#), THE NEW YORK TIMES (“For all the slashing and burning of recent years, the ecosystem still stores about 120 billion tons of carbon in its trunks, branches, vines and soil — the equivalent of about ten years of human emissions. If all of that carbon is released, it could warm the planet by as much as 0.3 degrees Celsius. According to the Princeton ecologist Stephen Pacala, this alone would probably make the Paris Agreement — the international accord to limit warming since preindustrial times to 2 degrees — “impossible to achieve.” Which, in turn, may mean that other climate tipping points are breached around the world. As the British scientist Tim Lenton put it to me, “The Amazon feeds back to everything.”).

¹⁶¹ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1693 (“**The positive feedback between climate change and land use change, particularly deforestation, is projected to increase the threat to the Amazon forest, resulting in the increase of fire occurrence, forest degradation (high confidence) and long-term loss of forest structure (medium confidence).** The combined effect of both impacts will lead to a long-term decrease in carbon stocks in forest biomass, compromising Amazonia’s role as a carbon sink, largely conditioned on the forest’s responses to elevated atmospheric CO₂ (medium confidence). The southern portion of the Amazon has become a net carbon source to the atmosphere in the past decade (high confidence).”). See also Gatti L. V., et al. (2021) [Amazonia as a carbon source linked to deforestation and climate change](#), NATURE 595: 388–393, 389, 390 (“Vertically averaged ΔVP values, which are proportional to surface flux, suggest that ALF-SE [southeastern Amazon] has the largest CO₂ emission to the atmosphere, followed by SAN-NE [northeastern Amazon]. By contrast, ΔVP values for the western sites RBA-SWC [southwestern-central Amazon] and TAB-TEF-NWC [northwestern-central Amazonia] indicate near-neutral C balance or C sinks.”; “Over the nine years studied (2010–2018), the FC_{NBE} value for ALF-SE [southeastern Amazon] indicates that it is a steadily increasing source [of carbon], at a rate of 0.036 ± 0.015 g C m⁻² d⁻¹ yr⁻¹ (Pearson’s correlation, $r = 0.68$, $P = 0.045$) (Extended Data Fig. 5a).”).

¹⁶² World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 7 (“The 2022 mean temperature in LAC was between the 12th and 21st highest on record, depending on the data set used, close to the 1991–2020 average (−0.06 °C to 0.10 °C) and 0.55 °C [0.46 °C to 0.70 °C] above the 1961–1990 average (Table 1). The annual mean temperature anomalies relative to 1991–2020 across the LAC region are shown in Figure 3 and Table 1 (see details regarding the data sets in the Data sets and methods section). Warming was less pronounced in the region in 2022 compared to 2021, and especially when compared to 2020 (which was one of the three warmest years on record). The 1991–2022 period shows the highest warmest trend (about 0.2 °C or higher per decade) since 1900 in the LAC region (compared with the previous 30-year periods of 1900–1930, 1931–1960, 1961–1990).”).

¹⁶³ Lovejoy T. E. & Nobre C. (2018) [Amazon's Tipping Point](#), SCI. ADV. 4(2): eaat2340, 1 (“We believe that negative synergies between deforestation, climate change, and widespread use of fire indicate a tipping point for the Amazon system to flip to nonforest ecosystems in eastern, southern and central Amazonia at 20–25% deforestation.”). See also Hoegh-Guldberg O., et al. (2018) [Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5 °C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems](#), in [GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C](#), Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 3-263 (“Global warming of 3°C is projected to reduce the extent of tropical rainforest in Central America, with biomass being reduced by about 40%, which can lead to a large replacement of rainforest by savanna and grassland (Lyra et al., 2017). Overall, modelling studies (Huntingford et al., 2013; Nobre et al., 2016) and observational constraints (Cox et al., 2013) suggest that pronounced rainforest dieback may only be triggered at 3°C–4°C (medium confidence), although pronounced biomass losses may occur at 1.5°C– 2°C of global warming.”).

¹⁶⁴ Taylor L. (5 September 2022) [The Amazon rainforest has already reached a crucial tipping point](#), NEW SCIENTIST (“Marlene Quintanilla at the Amazon Geo-Referenced Socio-Environmental Information Network (RAISG) and her colleagues, working in partnership with various groups, including the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon River Basin, used forest coverage data to map how much of the Amazon was lost between 1985 and 2020 and also looked at forest density, rainfall patterns and carbon storage. ...The report finds that 33 per cent of the Amazon remains pristine and 41 per cent of areas have low degradation and could restore themselves. But 26 per cent of areas have been found to have gone too far to restore themselves: 20 per cent is lost entirely and 6 per cent is highly degraded and would need human support to be restored.”). See also Lenton T. M., Rockstrom J., Gaffney O., Rahmstorf S., Richardson K., Steffen W., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2019) [Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against](#), Comment, NATURE, 575: 592–595, 593 (“Estimates of where an Amazon tipping point could lie range from 40% deforestation to just 30% forest-cover loss. About 17% has been lost since 1970. The rate of deforestation varies with changes in policy. Finding the tipping point requires models that include deforestation and climate change as interacting drivers, and that incorporate fire and climate feedbacks as interacting tipping mechanisms across scales.”).

¹⁶⁵ Douville H., et al. (2021) [Chapter 8: Water Cycle Changes](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 8-112 (“Both deforestation and drying are projected to increase by 2100, resulting in a worst-case scenario of up to a 50% loss in forest cover by 2050 (Soares-Filho et al., 2006; Boisier et al., 2015; Steege et al., 2015; Gomes et al., 2019).”).

¹⁶⁶ Wang-Erlandsson L., et al. (2022) [A planetary boundary for green water](#), NAT. REV. EARTH ENVIRON. 3: 380–392, 380 (“Green water — terrestrial precipitation, evaporation and soil moisture — is fundamental to Earth system dynamics and is now extensively perturbed by human pressures at continental to planetary scales. However, green water lacks explicit consideration in the existing planetary boundaries framework that demarcates a global safe operating space for humanity. In this Perspective, we propose a green water planetary boundary and estimate its current status. The green water planetary boundary can be represented by the percentage of ice-free land area on which root-zone soil moisture deviates from Holocene variability for any month of the year. Provisional estimates of departures from Holocene-like conditions, alongside evidence of widespread deterioration in Earth system functioning, indicate that the green water planetary boundary is already transgressed. Moving forward, research needs to address and account for the role of root-zone soil moisture for Earth system resilience in view of ecohydrological, hydroclimatic and sociohydrological interactions.”); discussed in Stockholm Resilience Center (26 April 2022) [Freshwater boundary exceeds safe limits](#) (“Now researchers have explored the water boundary in more detail. The authors argue that previous assessments did not sufficiently capture the role of green water and particularly soil moisture for ensuring the resilience of the biosphere, for securing land carbon sinks, and for regulating atmospheric circulation. “The Amazon rainforest depends on soil moisture for its survival. But there is evidence that parts of the Amazon are drying out. The forest is losing soil moisture as a result of climate change and deforestation,” says Arne Tobian, second author and PhD candidate at the Stockholm Resilience Centre and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. “These changes are potentially pushing the Amazon closer to a tipping point where large parts could switch from rainforest to savannah-like states,” he adds.”).

¹⁶⁷ Boulton C. A., Lenton T. M., & Boers N. (2022) [Pronounced loss of Amazon rainforest resilience since the early 2000s](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANG. 12(3): 271–78, 277 (“Other factors, including rising atmospheric temperatures in response

to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, may additionally have negative effects on Amazon resilience (and are contributing to the warming of northern tropical Atlantic SSTs; Fig. 6a). Furthermore, the rapid change in climate is triggering ecological changes but ecosystems are having difficulties in keeping pace. In particular, the replacement of drought-sensitive tree species by drought-resistant ones is happening slower than changes in (hydro)meteorological conditions⁵⁰, potentially reducing forest resilience further. In summary, we have revealed empirical evidence that the Amazon rainforest has been losing resilience since the early 2000s, risking dieback with profound implications for biodiversity, carbon storage and climate change at a global scale. We further provided empirical evidence suggesting that overall drier conditions, culminating in three severe drought events, combined with pronounced increases in human land-use activity in the Amazon, probably played a crucial role in the observed resilience loss. The amplified loss of Amazon resilience in areas closer to human land use suggests that reducing deforestation will not just protect the parts of the forest that are directly threatened but also benefit Amazon rainforest resilience over much larger spatial scales.”).

¹⁶⁸ Lenton T. M., Held H., Kriegler E., Hall J. W., Lucht W., Rahmstorf S., & Schellnhuber H. J. (2008) [Tipping elements in the Earth's climate system](#), PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 105(6): 1786–1793, 1790 (“A large fraction of precipitation in the Amazon basin is recycled, and, therefore, simulations of Amazon deforestation typically generate 20–30% reductions in precipitation (78), lengthening of the dry season, and increases in summer temperatures (79) that would make it difficult for the forest to reestablish, and suggest the system may exhibit bistability.”). *See also* Staal A., Fetzer I., Wang-Erlandsson L., Bosmans J. H. C., Dekker S. C., van Nes E. H., Rockström J., & Tuinenburg O. A. (2020) [Hysteresis of tropical forests in the 21st century](#), NAT. COMMUN. 11(4978): 1–8, 5 (“Whether the Amazon in particular is an important global ‘tipping element’ in the Earth system is a question of great scientific and societal interest^{36,37}. Despite our incomplete understanding of Amazon tipping, it is generally considered to be true that the forest’s role in the hydrological cycle is so large that deforestation and/or climate change may trigger a tipping point^{2,36–38}. More recently, the possibility of fire-induced tipping has also been suggested^{5,6}. Although fire occurs at a local scale, a considerable portion of the Amazon would be susceptible to this kind of tipping; by accounting for the feed-backs at both local and regional scales, it becomes more likely that the Amazon is a tipping element. Although under the current climate a majority of the Amazon forest still appears resilient to disturbance (also see ref. 39), we show that this resilience may deteriorate as a result of redistributions of rainfall due to global climate change.”).

¹⁶⁹ Gatti L. V., *et al.* (2021) [Amazonia as a carbon source linked to deforestation and climate change](#), NATURE 595(7867): 388–393, 388 (“Southeastern Amazonia, in particular, acts as a net carbon source (total carbon flux minus fire emissions) to the atmosphere. Over the past 40 years, eastern Amazonia has been subjected to more deforestation, warming and moisture stress than the western part, especially during the dry season... the intensification of the dry season and an increase in deforestation seem to promote ecosystem stress, increase in fire occurrence, and higher carbon emissions in the eastern Amazon. This is in line with recent studies that indicate an increase in tree mortality and a reduction in photosynthesis as a result of climatic changes across Amazonia.”). *See also* Brienen R. J. W., *et al.* (2015) [Long-term decline of the Amazon carbon sink](#), NATURE 519(7543): 344–348, 344 (“While this analysis confirms that Amazon forests have acted as a long-term net biomass sink, we find a long-term decreasing trend of carbon accumulation. Rates of net increase in above-ground biomass declined by one-third during the past decade compared to the 1990s. This is a consequence of growth rate increases levelling off recently, while biomass mortality persistently increased throughout, leading to a shortening of carbon residence times.”).

¹⁷⁰ United States Congressional Research Service (2023) [U.S. Forest Carbon Data: In Brief](#), 2 (“Carbon flux is the net annual change in carbon stocks. The flux estimate for any given year (e.g., 2020) is the change between stock estimates for that year (2020) and the following year (2021). Negative flux values indicate more carbon was removed from the atmosphere and sequestered than was released in that year (e.g., net carbon sink); net negative flux is typically called *net sequestration* (or sometimes just *sequestration*). Positive flux values indicate more carbon was released than was sequestered in that year (e.g., *net carbon source*). According to the *Inventory*, U.S. forests were a net carbon sink in 2021, having sequestered 794 MMT CO₂ equivalents (or 216 MMT of carbon) that year (see **Figure 3** for net sequestration by MMT CO₂ equivalents, **Table 2** for flux data by MMT CO₂ equivalents, and **Table 3** for flux data by MMT of carbon). This total represents an offset of approximately 13% of the gross greenhouse gas emissions from the United States in 2021.”)

¹⁷¹ Zhuang Y., Fu R., Santer B. D., Dickinson R. E., & Hall A. (2021) [*Quantifying contributions of natural variability and anthropogenic forcings on increased fire weather risk over the western United States*](#), EARTH ATMOS. PLANET. SCI. 118(45): e2111875118, 1–9, 7 (“Overall, we find that over the period 1979 to 2020, anthropogenic warming has contributed at least twice as much as natural variability to the rapid increase of fire weather risk. Our observational analogue-based attribution approach complements the estimates we obtain from global climate model simulations (10, 16, 28). Both methods constrain the range of the true contribution of anthropogenic forcing to the observed increase of VPD over the WUS. We estimate this range to be 0.33 to 0.42 hPa/decade or 68 to 88% of the observed trend. We have shown here that VPD is a robust, physically meaningful proxy for fire risk. During two specific extreme events—the August Complex fire and the California Creek fire in 2020—VPD values exceeded the highest values observed previously for similar atmospheric circulation patterns. For the August Complex “Gigafire” in the WUS, anthropogenic warming likely explains 50% of the unprecedented high VPD anomalies in the month of the fire’s occurrence (August 2020). On the August 16, 2020 start date of the August Complex fire and the September 4, 2020 start date of the California Creek fire, anthropogenic forcing likely contributed 32 and 52%, respectively, to the unprecedented high VPD’ at the beginning of these two extreme fire events”).

¹⁷² Natural Resources Canada (2022) [*THE STATE OF CANADA’S FORESTS: ANNUAL REPORT 2022*](#), 27 (“With almost 362 million hectares (ha), Canada ranks as the country with the third- largest forest area in the world. Much of this forest grows in the boreal zone. There, over 280 million hectares of forest are interspersed with lakes, wetlands and other ecosystem types. According to Canada’s National Deforestation Monitoring System, the forest area of Canada is stable, with less than half of 1% deforested since 1990.”).

¹⁷³ Fletcher R. (12 February 2019) [*Canada’s forests actually emit more carbon than they absorb — despite what you’ve heard on Facebook*](#), CBC NEWS (“That’s because our trees, in particular, have actually hurt our bottom line. For the past 15 years, they’ve been “more of a source than a sink,” said Dominique Blain, a director in the science and technology branch of Environment and Climate Change Canada. Canada’s managed forests were a net contributor of roughly 78 megatonnes of emissions in 2016, the most recent year on record.”).

¹⁷⁴ Wieting J. (2019) [*Hidden, ignored and growing: B.C.’s forest carbon emissions*](#), Sierra Club British Columbia, 1 (“These massive and growing forest emissions are a result of destructive logging, pine beetle outbreaks and wildfires. B.C.’s forests stopped absorbing more carbon than they release in the early 2000s. Uncounted forest emissions are now often greater than the total amount of emissions that are actually counted.”).

¹⁷⁵ Caesar L., Rahmstorf S., Robinson A., Feulner G., & Saba V. (2018) [*Observed fingerprint of a weakening Atlantic Ocean overturning circulation*](#), NATURE 556: 191–196, 195 (“We have also defined an improved SST-based AMOC index, which is optimized in its regional and seasonal coverage to reconstruct AMOC changes. Analysis of an ensemble of CMIP5 model simulations confirms that this index can very well reconstruct the long-term trend of the AMOC. We calibrated the observed AMOC decline to be 3 ± 1 Sv (around 15%) since the mid-twentieth century, and reconstructed the evolution of the AMOC for the period 1870–2016. For recent decades, our reconstruction of the AMOC evolution agrees with the results of several earlier studies using different methods, suggesting that our AMOC index can also reproduce interdecadal variations. Our findings show that in recent years the AMOC appears to have reached a new record low, consistent with the record-low annual SST in the subpolar Atlantic (since observations began in 1880) reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for 2015. Surface temperature proxy data for the subpolar Atlantic suggest that “the AMOC weakness after 1975 is an unprecedented event in the past millennium”⁷. This is consistent with the coral nitrogen-15 data that led Sherwood et al.²⁸ to conclude that “the persistence of the warm, nutrient-rich regime since the early 1970s is largely unique in the context of the last approximately 1,800yr”. Although long-term natural variations cannot be ruled out entirely^{29,30}, the AMOC decline since the 1950s is very likely to be largely anthropogenic, given that it is a feature predicted by climate models in response to rising CO₂ levels. This declining trend is superimposed by shorter-term (interdecadal) natural variability”).

¹⁷⁶ Whitmarsh F., Zika J., & Czaja A. (2015) [*Ocean heat uptake and the global surface temperature record*](#), Briefing paper No. 14, Grantham Institute, 2 (“It is likely that changes in the ocean have contributed significantly to the pause. Due to its large mass and high heat capacity, the ocean absorbs a substantial amount of heat. It is estimated that the

earth gained 274 ZJ of heat energy between 1971 and 2010, of which around 90% was taken up by the ocean (figure 3)28,ii. According to one estimate, the top 2000 m of the ocean took up 240 ZJ of heat energy between 1955 and 2010, but only increased in temperature by about 0.09°C due to its high heat capacity¹⁴. If the lower 10 km of the atmosphere were able to absorb this same quantity of heat it would warm by 36°C.”).

¹⁷⁷ United Nations (2022) [THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2022](#), 53 (“Sea levels have already risen faster than in any preceding century. Projections show that sea level could rise 30 to 60 centimetres by 2100, even if greenhouse gas emissions are sharply reduced and global warming is limited to well below 2 °C. A rising sea level would lead to more frequent and severe coastal flooding and erosion. Ocean warming will also continue with increasingly intense and frequent marine heatwaves, ocean acidification and reduced oxygen. About 70 to 90 per cent of warm-water coral reefs will disappear even if the 1.5 °C threshold is reached; they would die off completely at the 2 °C level. These impacts are expected to occur at least throughout the rest of this century, threatening marine ecosystems and the more than 3 billion people who rely on the ocean for their livelihoods.”).

¹⁷⁸ Subramaniam A., Yager P. L., Carpenter E. J., Mahaffey C., Bjorkman K., Cooley S., Kustka A. B., Montoya J. P., Sanudo-Wilhelmy S. A., Shipe R., & Capone D. G. (2008) [Amazon River enhances diazotrophy and carbon sequestration in the tropical North Atlantic Ocean](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 105(30): 10460–10465, 10460 (“The fresh water discharged by large rivers such as the Amazon is transported hundreds to thousands of kilometers away from the coast by surface plumes. The nutrients delivered by these river plumes contribute to enhanced primary production in the ocean, and the sinking flux of this new production results in carbon sequestration. Here, we report that the Amazon River plume supports N₂ fixation far from the mouth and provides important pathways for sequestration of atmospheric CO₂ in the western tropical North Atlantic (WTNA). We calculate that the sinking of carbon fixed by diazotrophs in the plume sequesters 1.7 Tmol of C annually, in addition to the sequestration of 0.6 Tmol of C yrl of the new production supported by NO₃ delivered by the river.”).

¹⁷⁹ Subramaniam A., Yager P. L., Carpenter E. J., Mahaffey C., Bjorkman K., Cooley S., Kustka A. B., Montoya J. P., Sanudo-Wilhelmy S. A., Shipe R., & Capone D. G. (2008) [Amazon River enhances diazotrophy and carbon sequestration in the tropical North Atlantic Ocean](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 105(30): 10460–10465, 10460 (“More importantly, our simulations caution against extreme exploitation of rivers for its far-reaching consequences on climate.”).

¹⁸⁰ Brodeur J., Cannizzo Z., Cross J., Davis J., DeAngelo B., Harris J., Kinkade C., Peth J., Samek K., Schub A., Stedman S.-M., Theuerkauf S., Vaughan L., & Wenzel L. (2022) [NOAA Blue Carbon White Paper](#), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1 (“While coastal blue carbon habitats have been shown to sequester up to ten times as much carbon per equivalent area as tropical forests (4), making them some of the most efficient natural carbon sinks in the world, they cover only a relatively small portion (<1%) of the Earth’s surface. In the United States, it is estimated that coastal blue carbon habitats sequester a net quantity of 4.8 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon dioxide annually...”).

¹⁸¹ United States White House (2021) [Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad](#), Briefing Room (“Sec. 216. Conserving Our Nation’s Lands and Waters. (a) The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall submit a report to the Task Force within 90 days of the date of this order recommending steps that the United States should take, working with State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, agricultural and forest landowners, fishermen, and other key stakeholders, to achieve the goal of conserving at least 30 percent of our lands and waters by 2030.”).

¹⁸² United States Environmental Protection Agency (2019) [INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990-2017](#).

¹⁸³ Blue Carbon Canada, [Evaluating the Current and Future Capacity for Natural Climate Solutions in Canada’s Oceans](#) (last visited 7 July 2023).

¹⁸⁴ Issifu I., Alava J. J., Lam V. W. Y., & Sumaila U. R. (2022) [Impact of Ocean Warming, Overfishing and Mercury on European Fisheries: A Risk Assessment and Policy Solution Framework](#), FRONT. MAR. SCI. 8: 1–13, 2 (“A combination of climate-related stresses and widespread over-exploitation of fisheries reduces the scope for adaptation and increases risks of stock collapse (Allison et al., 2009). Overfishing makes marine fisheries production more vulnerable to ocean warming by compromising the resilience of many marine species to climate change, and continued warming will hinder efforts to rebuild overfished populations (Free et al., 2019). It can also exacerbate the mercury levels in some fish species.”).

¹⁸⁵ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries (2023) [STATUS OF STOCKS 2022: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF U.S. FISHERIES](#), 10 (“Incorporating environmental data into stock assessments also provides essential data for fisheries managers. Researchers studying Pacific cod in Alaska recently found that bottom temperatures of 3-6 degrees Celsius are ideal for young fish to survive to adulthood. Incorporating bottom temperature data into stock assessments has allowed better predictions of Pacific cod spawning and improved planning for fishing seasons. Studies on the East Coast yielded similar findings. By incorporating bottom temperatures into stock assessments, scientists recently discovered that “cold pools” were essential to the survival of young yellowtail flounder off southern New England and the Mid-Atlantic. These findings show that integrating environmental data into stock assessments provides more accurate estimates of current and future stock size, giving fishery managers better tools to set appropriate catch limits.”).

¹⁸⁶ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries (2023) [STATUS OF STOCKS 2022: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF U.S. FISHERIES](#), 3 (“NMFS manages 492 stocks or stock complexes in 45 fishery management plans. At the end of 2022, the overfishing list included 24 stocks, the overfished list included 48 stocks, and two stocks were rebuilt. One of those stocks is considered rebuilt based on changes to its reference points. Since 2000, 49 stocks have been rebuilt.”).

¹⁸⁷ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-10 (“It is *virtually certain* that hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s, while cold extremes (including cold waves) have become less frequent and less severe, with *high confidence* that human-induced climate change is the main driver[14] of these changes. Some recent hot extremes observed over the past decade would have been *extremely unlikely* to occur without human influence on the climate system. Marine heatwaves have approximately doubled in frequency since the 1980s (*high confidence*), and human influence has *very likely* contributed to most of them since at least 2006.”).

¹⁸⁸ Cissé G., McLeman R., Adams H., Aldunce P., Bowen K., Campbell-Lendrum D., Clayton S., Ebi K. L., Hess J., Huang C., Liu Q., McGregor G., Semenza J., & Tirado M. C. (2022) [Chapter 7: Health, Wellbeing, and the Changing Structure of Communities](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintonbeck K., Alegria A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1060 (“The global magnitude of climate-sensitive diseases was estimated in 2019 to be 39,503,684 deaths (69.9% of total annual deaths) and 1,530,630,442 DALYs (Vos et al., 2020). Of these, cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) comprised the largest proportion of climate-sensitive diseases (32.8% of deaths and 15.5% DALYs). The next largest category consists of respiratory diseases – with chronic respiratory disease contributing to 7% of deaths and 4.1% of DALYs and respiratory infection and tuberculosis contributing to 6.5% of deaths and 6% of DALYs.”).

¹⁸⁹ V20 Finance Ministers (12 November 2022) [New Health Data Shows Unabated Climate Change Will Cause 3.4 Million Deaths Per Year by Century End](#), Press Release (“Unabated climate change will cause 3.4 million deaths per year by the end of the Century, new data presented to COP27 today shows. Health-related deaths of the over-65s will increase by 1,540%, and in India alone there will be 1 million additional heat-related deaths by 2090, if no action to limit warming is taken, the data shows.”).

¹⁹⁰ Yglesias-González M., Palmeiro-Silva Y., Sergeeva M., Cortés S., Hurtado-Epstein A., Buss D. F., Hartinger S. M., & Red de Clima y Salud de América Latina y el Caribe (2022) [Code Red for Health response in Latin America and the Caribbean: Enhancing peoples' health through climate action](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 11(100248): 1–8, 3 (“Dengue cases have almost tripled from 2000–2009 (6.78 million) to 2010–2019 (16.52 million) and the largest record of cases occurred in 2019.”); citing Pan American Health Organization & World Health Organization, Dengue, PLISA Health Information for the Americas (last visited 24 May 2023)

¹⁹¹ Colón-González F. J., Harris I., Osborn T. J., São Bernardo C. S., Peres C. A., Hunter P. R., Warren R., van Vuurene D., & Lake I. R. (2018) [Limiting global-mean temperature increase to 1.5–2 °C could reduce the incidence and spatial spread of dengue fever in Latin America](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 115(24): 6243–6248, 6244 (“The number of dengue cases for the 2050s period was, on average, 260% larger than the 1961–1990 baseline scenario with about 6.9 million extra cases per year”).

¹⁹² Rosenberg R., Lindsey N., Fischer M., Gregory C. J., Hinckley A. F., Mead P. S., Paz-Bailey G., Waterman S. H., Drexler N. A., Kersh G. J., Hooks H., Partridge S. K., Visser S. N., Beard C. B., & Petersen L. R. (2018) [Vital Signs: Trends in Reported Vectorborne Disease Cases — United States and Territories, 2004–2016](#), MORB. MORTAL WKLY. REP. 67(17): 496–501, 496 (“A total 642,602 cases were reported. The number of annual reports of tickborne bacterial and protozoan diseases more than doubled during this period, from >22,000 in 2004 to >48,000 in 2016. Lyme disease accounted for 82% of all tickborne disease reports during 2004–2016. The occurrence of mosquito borne diseases was marked by virus epidemics. Transmission in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa accounted for most reports of dengue, chikungunya, and Zika virus diseases; West Nile virus was endemic, and periodically epidemic, in the continental United States.”).

¹⁹³ Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2021) [THE HEALTH COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE: HOW CANADA CAN ADAPT, PREPARE, AND SAVE LIVES](#), III (“Warming temperatures from climate change are creating ideal conditions for the spread of the ticks that carry Lyme disease into many parts of Canada where they have never been seen. We project that, under a low-emissions future, additional cases of Lyme disease due to demographic change and climate change will rise to about 8,500 annually by mid-century and 9,900 by the end of the century, up from an average of about 600 cases per year.”).

¹⁹⁴ Zhao Q., et al. (2021) [Global, regional, and national burden of mortality associated with non-optimal ambient temperatures from 2000 to 2019: a three-stage modelling study](#), LANCET PLAN. HEALTH 5(7): E415–E425, E416 (“We found that 5 083 173 deaths were associated with non- optimal temperatures per year, accounting for 9·43% of all deaths and equating to 74 excess deaths per 100 000 residents.”).

¹⁹⁵ Takashasi K., Honda Y., & Emori S. (2007) [Assessing Mortality Risk from Heat Stress due to Global Warming](#), J. RISK RES. 10(3): 339–354, 353 (“Assuming that no adaptation or acclimation takes place, when the rates of change of excess mortality due to heat stress are examined by country, the results of our calculations show increases of approximately 100% to 1000%.”).

¹⁹⁶ Zhao Q., et al. (2021) [Global, regional, and national burden of mortality associated with non-optimal ambient temperatures from 2000 to 2019: a three-stage modelling study](#), LANCET PLAN. HEALTH 5(7): E415–E425, E418 (Table 1).

¹⁹⁷ Huang C., Barnett A. G., Wang X., Vaneckova P., FitzGerald G., & Tong S. (2011) [Projecting Future Heat-Related Mortality under Climate Change Scenarios: A Systematic Review](#), ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSPECT. 119(12): 1681–1690, 1683 (“In three cities in Canada, Doyon et al. (2008) projected a significant increase in temperature-related mortality in summer that was not offset by a significant but smaller estimated decrease in fall and winter mortality. Cheng et al. (2009b) projected that heat-related mortality in four Canadian cities would more than double by the 2050s and triple by the 2080s, and that cold-related mortality could decrease by 45–60% by the 2050s and by 60–70% by the 2080s.”).

¹⁹⁸ Shindell D., Zhang Y., Scott M., Ru M., Stark K., & Ebi K. L. (2020) [The Effects of Heat Exposure on Human Mortality Throughout the United States](#), GEOHEALTH 4(4): 1–11, 8 (“Finally, the World Health Organization projected

increases in heat-related deaths in North America under a fairly high-warming scenario, with totals of 7,300 additional deaths in the 2030s and 16,000 in the 2050s relative to 1961–1990 without adaptation (World Health Organization, 2014). These increases are qualitatively similar to results obtained here, but difficult to compare quantitatively owing to methodological differences. In particular, the World Health Organization study included only persons aged 65 and older, used the same ERF everywhere, and analyzed impacts in different years and over a larger area.”).

¹⁹⁹ Tuholske C., Caylor K., Funk C., Verdin A., Sweeney S., Grace K., Peterson P., & Evans T. (2021) [Global urban population exposure to extreme heat](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(41): 1–9, 1 (“Here, we leverage fine-resolution temperature and population data to measure urban extreme heat exposure for 13,115 cities from 1983 to 2016. Globally, urban exposure increased nearly 200%, affecting 1.7 billion people. Total urban warming elevated exposure rates 52% above population growth alone.”).

²⁰⁰ Li D., Yuan J., & Kopp R. E. (2020) [Escalating global exposure to compound heat-humidity extremes with warming](#), ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 15(6): 1–11, 1 (“Maintaining the current population distribution, this exposure is projected to increase to 508 million with 1.5 °C of warming, 789 million with 2.0 °C of warming, and 1.22 billion with 3.0 °C of warming (similar to late-century warming projected based on current mitigation policies.”).

²⁰¹ Tuholske C., Caylor K., Funk C., Verdin A., Sweeney S., Grace K., Peterson P., & Evans T. (2021) [Global urban population exposure to extreme heat](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(41): 1–9, Appendix (Table S2).

²⁰² Feron S., Cordero R. R., Damiani A., Llanillo P. J., Jorquera J., Sepulveda E., Asencio V., Laroze D., Labbe F., Carrasco J., & Torres G. (2018) [Observations and Projections of Heat Waves in South America](#), SCI. REP. 9(8173): 1–15, 12 (“Under the RCP4.5 scenario, by mid-century, the number of HWs per season (HWN) is expected to at least double in southern SA, while they may increase 5–10 times or more in the Atacama Desert and along the coastline of northern SA. Indeed, by mid-century HWN estimates are expected to range from less than 2 in southern SA to more than 3 in northern SA and the Atacama Desert.”).

²⁰³ Tuholske C., Caylor K., Funk C., Verdin A., Sweeney S., Grace K., Peterson P., & Evans T. (2021) [Global urban population exposure to extreme heat](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(41): 1–9, Appendix (Table S2).

²⁰⁴ First Street Foundation (2022) [THE SIXTH NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT: HAZARDOUS HEAT](#), 4 (“The results indicate that the incidence of extreme heat is growing across the country, both in absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, the incidence of heat that exceeds the threshold of the National Weather Service’s (NWS) highest category for heat, called “Extreme Danger” (Heat Index above 125°F) is expected to impact about 8 million people this year, increasing to about 107 million people in 2053, an increase of 13 times over 30 years. This increase in “Extreme Danger Days” is concentrated in the middle of the country, in areas where there are no coastal influences to mitigate extreme temperatures.”).

²⁰⁵ Parsons L. A., Jung J., Masuda Y. J., Vargas Zeppetello L. R., Wolff N. H., Kroeger T., Battisti D. S., & Spector J. T. (2021) [Tropical deforestation accelerates local warming and loss of safe outdoor working hours](#), ONE EARTH 4(12): 1730–1740, 1734 (“Our results indicate that recent tropical deforestation is associated with losses of >0.5 h per day of safe work time for \$2.8 million outdoor workers. To contextualize our findings, we compare these results with the findings from the 2019 Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change,²⁴ which reports that humid heat exposure in 2018 led to 133.6 billion potential global lost work hours (an increase of \$45 billion global lost work hours since 2000).

²⁰⁶ Parsons L. A., Jung J., Masuda Y. J., Vargas Zeppetello L. R., Wolff N. H., Kroeger T., Battisti D. S., & Spector J. T. (2021) [Tropical deforestation accelerates local warming and loss of safe outdoor working hours](#), ONE EARTH 4(12): 1730–1740, Supplemental Information, Figure 6.

²⁰⁷ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 24 (“In 2021, average potential income loss from heat-related labour capacity reduction represented 1.60% of national GDPs

in SA, with Venezuela having the highest total potential loss as a proportion of GDP (10.6%) and Chile the lowest (0.02%) (Fig. 8). Total potential income losses that year amounted to US\$22 billion (0.68% of the regional GDP). The highest potential income losses are estimated to occur in the construction and agriculture sectors, where the work demands more physical power, and where workers are the most exposed to the elements and have limited capacity to shelter. In 2021, the countries with the highest total losses were Brazil and Venezuela with US\$11.2 and US\$4.8 billion, respectively.”).

²⁰⁸ Environmental Protection Agency (2015) [CLIMATE CHANGE AND LABOR](#), 28 (“In 2100, over 1.8 billion labor hours across the workforce are projected to be lost due to unsuitable working conditions (95% confidence interval of 1.2-2.4 billion). These lost hours would be very costly, totalling over \$170 billion in lost wages in 2100 (95% confidence interval of \$110-\$220 billion”).

²⁰⁹ Rentschler J. & Leonova N. (2022) [AIR POLLUTION AND POVERTY: PM2.5 EXPOSURE IN 211 COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES](#), Policy Research Working Paper 10005, World Bank, 1 (“This study contributes (i) updated global exposure estimates for the World Health Organizations’s 2021 revised fine particulate matter (PM2.5) thresholds, and (ii) estimates of the number of poor people exposed to unsafe PM2.5 concentrations. It shows that 7.28 billion people, or 94 percent of the world population, are directly exposed to unsafe average annual PM2.5 concentrations. Low- and middle-income countries account for 80 percent of people exposed to unsafe PM2.5 levels”).

²¹⁰ Silva R. A., et al. (2018) [Future Global Mortality from Changes in Air Pollution Attributable to Climate Change](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANG. 7(9): 647–651, 650 (“We estimate 3,340 (–30,300 to 47,100) ozone-related deaths in 2030, relative to 2000 climate, and 43,600 (–195,000 to 237,000) in 2100 (14% of the increase in global ozone-related mortality). For PM2.5, we estimate 55,600 (–34,300 to 164,000) deaths in 2030 and 215,000 (–76,100 to 595,000) in 2100 (countering by 16% the global decrease in PM2.5-related mortality.”).

²¹¹ van der Wall E. E. (2015) [Air pollution: 6.6 million premature deaths in 2050!](#), NETH. HEART J. 23(12): 557–558, 557 (“Model projections based on a business-as-usual emission scenario indicate that the contribution of outdoor air pollution to premature mortality could double by 2050. The authors of the Nature paper foresee therefore that, if no further interventions are undertaken, the annual toll from polluted air may lead to 6.6 million premature deaths by 2050, with the biggest increase in Asia.”).

²¹² Glavinskas V. (4 May 2023) [A game-changing partnership takes on air pollution in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (“Around 80% of people in Latin America live in cities. And because pollution in those cities is high, it means about 500 million people are breathing air that exceeds the World Health Organization’s guidelines for pollutants like nitrogen dioxide, soot and ground-level ozone”).

²¹³ American Lung Association Ozone Pollution Trends (*last visited* 7 August 2023) (“Exposure to unhealthy levels of ozone air pollution makes breathing difficult for more Americans all across the country than any other single pollutant. In the years 2019, 2020 and 2021, some 103 million people lived in the 124 counties that earned an F for ozone. More than 30% of the nation’s population, including 23.6 million children, 15.4 million people age 65 or older, and millions in other groups at high risk of health harm, are exposed to high levels of ozone on enough days to earn the air they breathe a failing grade.”).

²¹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2023) [2022 GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT](#), 11 (*see* Global figures at a glance, showing internal displacements in 2021: 38 million internal displacements (14.4m by conflict and violence, 23.7m by disasters)).

²¹⁵ Institute for Economics & Peace (2020) [ECOLOGICAL THREAT REGISTER 2020: UNDERSTANDING ECOLOGICAL THREATS, RESILIENCE AND PEACE](#), 7 (“One hundred and forty-one countries are exposed to at least one ecological threat, with 19 countries facing four or more threats. 6.4 billion people live in countries which are exposed to medium to high ecological threats. An estimated 1.2 billion people are at risk of displacement by 2050.”).

²¹⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2023) [2022 GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT](#), 11 (see Global figures at a glance, showing internal displacements in 2021: The Americas (381,000 by conflict and violence, 1,659,000 by disasters)).

²¹⁷ World Bank (2018) [Internal Climate Migration in Latin America](#), Groundswell Policy Note #3, 2 (“Latin America could see up to 10.6 million climate migrants by 2050.”).

²¹⁸ Wing I. S., De Cian E., & Mistry M. N. (2021) [Global vulnerability of crop yields to climate change](#), J. ENVIRON. ECON. MANAG. 109(102462): 1–18, 17 (“Projecting climatically-driven changes in crop yields, by combining our estimated responses over the period 1981–2011 with temperature and precipitation fields from an ensemble of climate model simulations, we find substantial agreement among ESMs on crop yield declines of <10% by mid-century and <25% by century’s end especially for soybeans, maize, and winter wheat.”).

²¹⁹ Banerjee O., Cicowiez M., Rios A. R., & De Lima C. Z. (2021) [Climate change impacts on agriculture in Latin America and the Caribbean: An application of the integrated economic-environmental modeling \(IEEM\) platform](#), IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-01289, Inter-American Development Bank, 17 (“The yield impacts derived from Prager et al. (2020) are as follows: by 2050, the simple average across all countries is -19.0 percent for bean, -17.2 percent for maize, -1.8 percent for rice, +14.2 percent for soybean, and -4.8 percent for wheat. These yield impacts are implemented as productivity shocks in IEEM and introduced linearly between 2021 and 2050 (see Figure 3.1). Together, these five crops represent between 0.7 (Barbados) and 89.5 (Paraguay) percent of the total cultivated area in the LAC countries modeled (see Figure 3.2).”).

²²⁰ Bárcena A., Samaniego J., Peres W., & Alatorre J. E. (2020) [THE CLIMATE EMERGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE PATH AHEAD – RESIGNATION OR ACTION?](#), Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean Books No. 160, 122 (“The Caribbean relies heavily on economic activities such as tourism and agriculture, which are particularly sensitive to climatic conditions (ECLAC, 2010). Agriculture generates a large number of jobs, and the rural population continues to constitute a substantial percentage of the total population (ECLAC/MINURVI/UN-HABITAT, 2016). It is therefore relevant that, in different climate scenarios, yields of cassava, banana, sweet potato and tomato plantations are predicted to fall by between 1% and 30% by 2050, with rice crop yields ranging from a 3% decrease to a 2% increase. Lower yields would have negative consequences in a number of areas, such as growth in output and investment in agriculture, the external sector, poverty reduction and food security (Clarke and others, 2013; ECLAC, 2015a).”).

²²¹ Lesk C., Coffel E., Winter J., Ray D., Zscheischler J., Seneviratne S. I., & Horton R. (2021) [Stronger temperature–moisture couplings exacerbate the impact of climate warming on global crop yields](#), NAT. FOOD 2: 683–691, 686 (“We project that such heightened crop heat sensitivities due to changing temperature–moisture couplings will worsen the impacts of warming on maize and soy yields across most of the globe (Fig. 5a and Supplementary Fig. 2). In the multimodel median, these additional yield impacts ($\Delta\Delta Y$) amount to regional maize (soy) losses of 7% (9%) in the United States ...”). See also Climate Matters (20 September 2021) [Climate Change and Crops](#) (“Climate models show that in many areas, drought and heat will align more often in the future, worsening crop damages as the climate warms. The researchers estimate that U.S. yields may decline from current averages by 7% for corn and 9% for soybean after 2050.”).

²²² Vergara W., Rios A. R., Paliza L. M. G., Gutman P., Isbell P., Suding P. H., & Samaniego J. (2013) [The climate and development challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean: options for climate-resilient, low-carbon development](#), Inter-American Development Bank, 13 (“Based on recent analysis and new estimates, the projected yearly economic damages in LAC caused by some of the major physical impacts associated with this likely rise of 2° C over preindustrial levels are estimated to gradually increase and reach approximately \$ 100 billion annually by 2050—or approximately 2.2 percent of 2010 gross domestic product (GDP, \$4.6 trillion)”).

²²³ Smith A. B. (10 January 2023) [2022 U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters in historical context](#), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“In broader context, the total cost of U.S. billion-dollar disasters over the last 5 years (2018–2022) is \$595.5 billion, with a 5-year annual cost average of \$119.1 billion, the latter of which is

nearly triple the 43-year inflation adjusted annual average cost. The U.S. billion-dollar disaster damage costs over the last 10-years (2013-2022) were also historically large: at least \$1.1 trillion from 152 separate billion-dollar events.”).

²²⁴ Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2023) [Tip of the Iceberg: Executive Summary](#), i (“Over the past five decades, the costs of weather-related disasters like floods, storms, and wildfires in Canada have risen from tens of millions of dollars to billions of dollars annually. Between 2010 and 2019, insured losses for catastrophic weather events totaled over \$18 billion, and the number of catastrophic events was over three times higher than in the 1980s.”).

²²⁵ Deloitte (2022) [TURNING POINT: A NEW ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES](#), 15 (“Climate damage to the US economy could cost \$14.5 trillion over the next 50 years”).

²²⁶ Kőmüves Z. (24 August 2021) [IPCC report: the macroeconomic impacts of climate action and inaction](#), Cambridge Econometrics (“These numbers mean alarmingly high damages even in a couple of decades, but due to the exponential shape of the damage function, losses can grow by up to 65% and 30% of GDP by 2100 in the two scenarios, respectively.”).

²²⁷ World Bank (2022) [CONSOLIDATING THE RECOVERY: SEIZING GREEN GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES](#), Semiannual Report for Latin America and the Caribbean, x (“Climate change poses important challenges to the region’s economies. On average, 1.7 percent of annual GDP has been lost in Latin American countries due to climate related disasters over the last two decades (CELAC, SRE, and Global Center on Adaptation 2021). An analysis of the impact of extreme weather events in the past two decades shows that eight Caribbean nations figure among the top twenty globally in losses as a percentage of GDP, and five in terms of deaths per capita.”).

²²⁸ (6 March 2023) [Climate change could cost Latin America 16% of GDP this century, says Moody’s](#), REUTERS (“If no new policy action is taken, Moody’s foresees a steady deterioration in GDP, losing 10% by 2075 and ending the century down 16% as the region loses production capacity starting this year and losses mount at increasing rates.”); [discussing Coutino A. \(2023\) LATIN AMERICA UNDER THE RISK OF CLIMATE CHANGE](#), Moody’s.

²²⁹ Canada Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (2022) [Global greenhouse gas emissions and Canadian GDP](#), 4 (“We estimate that the 0.9-degree Celsius average increase in Canada’s surface temperature and 2.5 per cent average increase in precipitation (relative to the 1961-1990 reference levels) have lowered the level of Canadian real GDP in 2021 by 0.8 per cent”).

²³⁰ Office of Management and Budget (2022) [Chapter 3. Long-Term Budget Outlook](#), in [ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2024](#), 33 (“In analysis by the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) suggests that U.S. GDP will be nearly 2.5 percent lower by the middle of the century under current policies relative to a no-further-warming counterfactual, with losses accelerating in the second half of the century.”).

²³¹ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1698, 1700 (“The main climate impact drivers like extreme heat, drought, relative SLR [sea level rise], coastal flooding, erosion, marine heatwaves, ocean aridity (*high confidence*) and aridity, drought and wildfires will increase by midcentury (*medium confidence*) (Figure 12.6, WGI AR6 Table 12.6, Ranasinghe et al., 2021).”; “Warming and drier conditions are projected through the reduction of total annual precipitation, extreme precipitation and consecutive wet days and an increase in consecutive dry days (Chou et al., 2014). Heatwaves will increase in frequency and severity in places close to the equator like Colombia (Guo et al., 2018; Feron et al., 2019), with a decrease but strong wetting in coastal areas, pluvial and river flood and mean wind increase (Mora et al., 2014). Models project a *very likely* 2°C GWL [global warming level] increase in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes and decrease in the intensity and frequency of cold extremes. Nevertheless, models project inconsistent changes in the region for extreme precipitation (*low confidence*) (Figure 12.6; WGI AR6 Table 12.14) (Ranasinghe et al., 2021). The

main climate impact drivers in the region, like extreme heat, mean precipitation and coastal and oceanic drivers, will increase and snow, ice and permafrost will decrease with *high confidence* (WGI AR6 Table 12.6) (Ranasinghe et al., 2021).”).

²³² Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuvi N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1692–1693 (“Extreme precipitation events, which result in floods, landslides and droughts, are projected to intensify in magnitude and frequency due to climate change (*medium confidence*). Floods and landslides pose a risk to life and infrastructure; a 1.5°C increase would result in an increase of 100–200% in the population affected by floods in Colombia, Brazil and Argentina, 300% in Ecuador and 400% in Peru (*medium confidence*).”).

²³³ Mycoo M., Wairiu M., Campbell D., Duvat V., Golbuu Y., Maharaj S., Nalau J., Nunn P., Pinnegar J., & Warrick O. (2022) [Chapter 15: Small Islands](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 2050, 2052 (“Compared to larger landmasses, many climate change-driven impacts and risks are amplified for small islands. This is due largely to their boundedness (surrounded by ocean), their comparatively small land areas, and often their remoteness from more populated parts of the world, which restricts the global connectivity of islands. This is true on all types of islands (Figure 15.2). 15.3.1 Synthesis of Observed and Projected Changes in the Physical Basis There is increased evidence of warming in the small islands, particularly in the latter half of the 20th century (*high confidence*). The diversity of metrics and timescales used across studies makes it impossible to provide explicit comparisons; however, Table 15.1 provides a summary of observed changes. Some phenomena have no demonstrable trends in a region because of limited observed data, these include TC frequency in the northeastern Pacific and Indian oceans (Walsh et al., 2016); other phenomena are too variable to detect an overarching trend, including rainfall in regions where inter-annual and decadal variabilities such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, North Atlantic Oscillation, Pacific Decadal Variability, Atlantic Multidecadal Variability are dominant (Jones et al., 2015; McGree et al., 2019). There are also marked regional variations in the rates of SLR (Merrifield and Maltrud, 2011; Palanisamy et al., 2012; Esteban et al., 2019) and relative SLR (RSLR; that is, incorporating land movement). Various factors, including interannual and decadal sea level variations associated with low-frequency modulation of ENSO and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and vertical land motion contribute to both relative sea level variations and related uncertainties. Increased distant-source swell height from extra-tropical cyclones (ETCs) also contributes to ESLs (Mentaschi et al., 2017; Vitousek et al., 2017). Together, these stressors increase ESLs and their impacts, including coastal erosion and marine flooding and their impacts on both ecosystems and ecosystem services and human activities (Section 15.3.3.1 and Table 15.3). Like observed impacts, projected impacts include some high confidence assessments, which are distributed across a diversity of models, timescales and metrics. Generalised trends, and specific projections when available, are provided in Table 15.2. However, actual values and spatial distribution of precipitation changes remain uncertain as they are strongly model dependent (Paeth et al., 2017). Furthermore, the current capabilities of climate models, to adequately represent variability in climate drivers including ENSO, and the topography of small islands limit confidence in these future changes (Cai et al., 2015a; Harter et al., 2015; Guilyardi et al., 2016).”; Table 15.1).

²³⁴ Mycoo M., Wairiu M., Campbell D., Duvat V., Golbuu Y., Maharaj S., Nalau J., Nunn P., Pinnegar J., & Warrick O. (2022) [Chapter 15: Small Islands](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 2045 (“A sense of urgency is prevalent among small islands in the combating of climate change and in adherence to the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Small islands are increasingly affected by increases in temperature, the growing impacts of tropical cyclones (TCs), storm surges, droughts, changing precipitation patterns, sea level rise (SLR), coral bleaching and

invasive species, all of which are already detectable across both natural and human systems (very high confidence).”).

²³⁵ Mycoo M., Wairiu M., Campbell D., Duvat V., Golbuu Y., Maharaj S., Nalau J., Nunn P., Pinnegar J., & Warrick O. (2022) [*Chapter 15: Small Islands*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*](#), Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Lösschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 2050, 2052 (“Most of the research that has been conducted on exposure and vulnerability from climate change demonstrates that factors including those that are geopolitical and political, environmental, socioeconomic and cultural together conspire to increase exposure and vulnerability of small islands (Box 15.1; Betzold, 2015; McCubbin et al., 2015; Duvat et al., 2017b; Otto et al., 2017; Weir et al., 2017; Taupo et al., 2018; Barclay et al., 2019; Hay et al., 2019a; Ratter et al., 2019; Salmon et al., 2019; Bordner et al., 2020; Douglass and Cooper, 2020; Duvat et al., 2020a). Additional pressures on coastal and marine environments, including overexploitation of natural resources, may further exacerbate possible impacts in the future (Bell et al., 2013; Pinnegar et al., 2019; Siegel et al., 2019). ... Furthermore, these factors exacerbate climate change-induced problems such as coastal flooding and erosion faced by small islands. These impacts continue to worsen, putting small islands at increasingly higher risk to the impacts of climate change (Box 15.1). There are multiple stressors that affect the vulnerability of small islands to climate change (McNamara et al., 2019).”).

²³⁶ Mycoo M., Wairiu M., Campbell D., Duvat V., Golbuu Y., Maharaj S., Nalau J., Nunn P., Pinnegar J., & Warrick O. (2022) [*Chapter 15: Small Islands*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*](#), Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Lösschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 2099 (“Agriculture and fisheries are heavily influenced by climate, which means a change in occurrence of TCs, air temperature, ocean temperature and/or rainfall can have considerable impacts on the production and availability of crops and seafood and therefore the health and welfare of island inhabitants. Projected impacts of climate change on agriculture and fisheries in some cases will enhance productivity, but in many cases could undermine food production, greatly exacerbating food insecurity challenges for human populations in small islands. Small islands mostly depend on rain-fed agriculture, which is likely to be affected in various ways by climate change, including loss of agricultural land through floods and droughts, and contamination of freshwater and soil through salt-water intrusion, warming temperatures leading to stresses of crops, and extreme events such as cyclones. In some islands, crops that have been traditionally part of people’s diet can no longer be cultivated due to such changes. For example, severe rainfall during planting seasons can damage seedlings, reduce growth and provide conditions that promote plant pests and diseases. Changes in the frequency and severity of TCs or droughts will pose challenges for many islands. For example, more pronounced dry seasons, warmer temperatures and greater evaporation could cause plant stress reducing productivity and harvests. The impacts of drought may hinder insects and animals from pollinating crops, trees and other vegetative food sources on tropical islands. For instance, many agroforestry crops are completely dependent on insect pollination, and it is, therefore, important to monitor and recognise how climate change is affecting the number and productivity of these insects. Coastal agroforest systems in small islands are important to national food security but rely on biodiversity (e.g., insects for pollination services). Biodiversity loss from traditional agroecosystems has been identified as one of the most serious threats to food and livelihood security in islands. Ecosystem-based adaptation practices and diversification of crop varieties are possible solutions.”).

²³⁷ Mycoo M., Wairiu M., Campbell D., Duvat V., Golbuu Y., Maharaj S., Nalau J., Nunn P., Pinnegar J., & Warrick O. (2022) [*Chapter 15: Small Islands*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*](#), Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Lösschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 2046 (“Reef island and coastal area habitability in small islands is expected to decrease because of increased temperature, extreme sea levels and degradation of buffering ecosystems, which will increase human exposure to sea-related hazards (high confidence). Climate and non-climate drivers of reduced habitability are context specific. On small islands, coastal land loss attributable to higher sea level, increased extreme precipitation and wave impacts and increased aridity have contributed to food and water insecurities that are

likely to become more acute in many places (high confidence). In the Caribbean, additional warming by 0.2°–1.0°C, could lead to a predominantly drier region (5–15% less rain than present day), a greater occurrence of droughts along with associated impacts on agricultural production and yield in the region. Crop suitability modelling on several commercially important crops grown in Jamaica found that even an increase of less than +1.5°C could result in a reduction in the range of crops that farmers may grow. Most Pacific Island Countries could experience $\geq 50\%$ declines in maximum fish catch potential by 2100 relative to 1980–2000 under both an RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenario {15.3.4.3, 15.3.4.4}.”).

²³⁸ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuvi N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegria A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1691 (“**Central and South America (CSA) are highly exposed, vulnerable and strongly impacted by climate change, a situation amplified by inequality, poverty, population growth and high population density, land use change particularly deforestation with the consequent biodiversity loss, soil degradation, and high dependence of national and local economies on natural resources for the production of commodities (high confidence¹).** Profound economic, ethnic and social inequalities are exacerbated by climate change. High levels of widespread poverty, weak water governance, unequal access to safe water and sanitation services and lack of infrastructure and financing reduce adaptation capacity, increasing and creating new population vulnerabilities (high confidence).... **The scientific evidence since the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) increased the confidence in the synergy among fire, land use change, particularly deforestation, and climate change, directly impacting human health, ecosystem functioning, forest structure, food security and the livelihoods of resource-dependent communities (medium confidence).** Regional increases in temperature, aridity and drought increased the frequency and intensity of fire. On average, people in the region were more exposed to high fire danger between 1 and 26 additional days depending on the sub-region for the years 2017–2020 compared to 2001–2004 (high confidence).”).

²³⁹ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuvi N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegria A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1722–1723 (Table 12.6).

²⁴⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2020) [NATURAL DISASTERS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2000-2019](#), 2 (“Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is the second most disaster-prone region in the world 152 million affected by 1,205 disasters (2000-2019)*”).

²⁴¹ Herring S., Hoell A., Christidis N., & Stott P. (2023) [EXPLAINING EXTREME EVENTS FROM A CLIMATE PERSPECTIVE](#), American Meteorological Society.

²⁴² Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-10 (“It is *virtually certain* that hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s, while cold extremes (including cold waves) have become less frequent and less severe, with *high confidence* that human-induced climate change is the main driver[14] of these changes. Some recent hot extremes observed over the past decade would have been *extremely unlikely* to occur without human influence on the climate system. Marine heatwaves have approximately doubled in frequency since the 1980s (*high confidence*), and human influence has *very likely* contributed to most of them since at least 2006.”). See also Kotz M., Wenz L., & Levermann A. (2021) [Footprint of greenhouse forcing in daily temperature variability](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(32): e2103294118, 1–8, 1 (“Assessing historical changes to daily temperature variability in comparison with those from state-of-the-art climate

models, we show that variability has changed with distinct global patterns over the past 65 years, changes which are attributable to rising concentrations of greenhouse gases. If these rises continue, temperature variability is projected to increase by up to 100% at low latitudes and decrease by 40% at northern high latitudes by the end of the century.”).

²⁴³ Fischer E. M., Sippel S., & Knutti R. (2021) [Increasing probability of record-shattering climate extremes](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 11: 689–685, 689 (“Here, we show models project not only more intense extremes but also events that break previous records by much larger margins. These record-shattering extremes, nearly impossible in the absence of warming, are likely to occur in the coming decades. We demonstrate that their probability of occurrence depends on warming rate, rather than global warming level, and is thus pathway-dependent. In high-emission scenarios, week-long heat extremes that break records by three or more standard deviations are two to seven times more probable in 2021–2050 and three to 21 times more probable in 2051–2080, compared to the last three decades. In 2051–2080, such events are estimated to occur about every 6–37 years somewhere in the northern midlatitudes.”).

²⁴⁴ Balch J. K., Abatzoglou J. T., Joseph M. B., Koontz M. J., Mahood A. L., McGlinchy J., Cattau M. E., & Williams A. P. (2022) [Warming weakens the night-time barrier to global fire](#), NATURE 602: 442–448, 442 (“Night-time provides a critical window for slowing or extinguishing fires owing to the lower temperature and the lower vapour pressure deficit (VPD). However, fire danger is most often assessed based on daytime conditions^{1,2}, capturing what promotes fire spread rather than what impedes fire. Although it is well appreciated that changing daytime weather conditions are exacerbating fire, potential changes in night-time conditions—and their associated role as fire reducers—are less understood. Here we show that night-time fire intensity has increased, which is linked to hotter and drier nights. Our findings are based on global satellite observations of daytime and night-time fire detections and corresponding hourly climate data, from which we determine landcover-specific thresholds of VPD (VPD_i), below which fire detections are very rare (less than 95 per cent modelled chance). Globally, daily minimum VPD increased by 25 per cent from 1979 to 2020. Across burnable lands, the annual number of flammable night-time hours—when VPD exceeds VPD_c—increased by 110 hours, allowing five additional nights when flammability never ceases. Across nearly one-fifth of burnable lands, flammable nights increased by at least one week across this period. Globally, night fires have become 7.2 per cent more intense from 2003 to 2020, measured via a satellite record. These results reinforce the lack of night-time relief that wildfire suppression teams have experienced in recent years. We expect that continued night-time warming owing to anthropogenic climate change will promote more intense, longer-lasting and larger fires.”); discussed in Dickie G. (19 July 2022) [Steamy nights in European heatwave worsen health and fire risks – experts](#), REUTERS.

²⁴⁵ Hicke J. A., Lucatello S., Mortsch L. D., Dawson J., Domínguez Aguilar M., Enquist C. A. F., Gilmore E. A., Gutzler D. S., Harper S., Holsman K., Jewett E. B., Kohler T. A., & Miller K. (2022) [Chapter 14: North America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1931 (“Without limiting warming to 1.5°C, key risks to North America are expected to intensify rapidly by mid-century (high confidence). These risks will result in irreversible changes to ecosystems, mounting damages to infrastructure and housing, stress on economic sectors, disruption of livelihoods, and issues with mental and physical health, leisure and safety. Immediate, widespread and coordinated implementation of adaptation measures aimed at reducing risks and focused on equity have the greatest potential to maintain and improve the quality of life for North Americans, ensure sustainable livelihoods and protect the long-term biodiversity, and ecological and economic productivity, in North America (high confidence). Enhanced sharing of resources and tools for adaptation across economic, social, cultural and national entities enables more effective short- and long-term responses to climate change. {14.2, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7}”).

²⁴⁶ George Washington University (2018) [ASCERTAINMENT OF THE ESTIMATED EXCESS MORTALITY FROM HURRICANE MARÍA IN PUERTO RICO](#), Milken Institute School of Public Health, 9 (“Results from the preferred statistical model, shown below, estimate that excess mortality due to Hurricane María using the displacement scenario is estimated at 1,271 excess deaths in September and October (95% CI: 1,154-1,383), 2,098 excess deaths from September to December (95% CI: 1,872-2,315), and, 2,975 (95% CI: 2,658-3,290) excess deaths for the total study period of September 2017 through February 2018.”).

²⁴⁷ Deloitte (2022) [TURNING POINT: A NEW ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES](#), 6 (“If global average warming reaches around 3°C by century’s end, Deloitte’s analysis indicates that economic damages would grow and compound, affecting every industry and region in the country. Failing to take sufficient action could result in economic losses to the US economy of \$14.5 trillion (in present-value terms¹¹) over the next 50 years. In this climate-damaged future, the economy would lose nearly 4% of GDP¹²—\$1.5 trillion in 2070 alone.”).

²⁴⁸ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries (19 August 2021) [Social Indicators for Coastal Communities](#) (Table: Environmental Justice in Commercial Fishing Communities).

²⁴⁹ See Jina A. (2021) [Climate Change and the U.S. Economic Future](#), U.S. Energy & Climate Roadmap: Policy Insight, Energy Policy Institute of Chicago, 17 (“The aggregate picture masks substantial local differences in these impacts. Figure 6 shows damages at the county level as a proportion of that county’s income level in 2080-2099 under a high emissions scenario. As expected, the colder, more northerly parts of the United States have much lower damages than the rest of the country. In southern, coastal states, meanwhile, there is an overall high negative impact, as they experience higher temperatures and exposure to enhanced coastal damages from storms and sea level rise. ... The pattern of damages in Figure 6 also reveals another potential impact of climate change: an increase in inequality across the country. Figure 7 ranks counties by income level, and then plots damages in groups that gather together income deciles from poorest to wealthiest. The pattern of damages is strongly correlated with income levels, and the poorest counties suffer the largest damages. Indeed, the poorest third of counties are projected to experience damages of between 2 and 20 percent of county income under a high emissions scenario. This aspect of climate impacts in the United States has the potential to substantially widen the income gap between rich and poor parts of the country, saddling those areas that may already have fewer resources to adapt with larger damages.”); and Sawyer D., Ness R., Lee C., & Miller S. (2022) [DAMAGE CONTROL: REDUCING THE COSTS OF CLIMATE IMPACTS IN CANADA](#), Canadian Climate Institute, 60–61 (“Low-income households will see the largest reductions in real household income. While high-income households lose more income in absolute terms, the share of real income lost by low-income households is higher. By mid-century, the lowest-income households are projected to face income losses, relative to the reference case, of 5.8 per cent under high-emissions and 4.8 per cent under the low-emissions scenario (Figure 11). This compares to losses of 4 per cent and 3.2 per cent for the highest-income households in the same period. By the end of the century, the impacts on real household income cut deep into affordability. Low-income households face real income cuts on average of 23 per cent in the high-emissions scenario, and 12 per cent under low-emissions. Even the median group faces significant income losses of 9 to 19 per cent under low- and high-emissions scenarios, respectively.⁹ The disproportionate losses for low-income households are driven by lower baseline levels of income, resulting in the same dollar amount of lost income comprising a higher share of total income lost compared to high-income households. As well, there is a higher share of income coming from low-income employment in the service sector that is impacted heavily by damages to infrastructure and supply chain disruptions. Finally, the lower-income groups tend to spend more of their income on transportation services and housing, both of which are highly climate-sensitive. Other equity-deserving groups, such as Indigenous people, racialized people, recent immigrants, and women, are disproportionately represented in low-income groups (Statistics Canada 2021; Statistics Canada 2022).¹⁰ Therefore, climate change impacts risk exacerbating inequality across multiple dimensions.”).

²⁵⁰ Hicke J. A., Lucatello S., Mortsch L. D., Dawson J., Domínguez Aguilar M., Enquist C. A. F., Gilmore E. A., Gutzler D. S., Harper S., Holsman K., Jewett E. B., Kohler T. A., & Miller K. (2022) [Chapter 14: North America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1932 (“**Climate hazards are projected to intensify further across North America (very high confidence)**. Heatwaves over land and in the ocean, as well as wildfire activity, will intensify; subarctic snowpack, glacial mass and sea ice will decline (virtually certain); and sea level rise will increase at geographically differential rates (virtually certain). Humidity-enhanced heat stress, aridification and extreme precipitation events that lead to severe flooding, erosion, debris flows and ultimately loss of ecosystem function, life and property are projected to intensify (high confidence). {14.2}”).

²⁵¹ United States Office of Management and Budget (2022) [FEDERAL BUDGET EXPOSURE TO CLIMATE RISKS](#), 277 (“The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assessments found that the Federal Government could spend between an additional \$25 billion to \$128 billion annually due to just six climate-related financial risks included in this report—disaster relief, flood insurance, crop insurance, healthcare expenditures, wildland fire suppression spending, and flood risk at Federal facilities – and considering only a limited scope of total potential damages to those programs. Table 21-1 summarizes quantified annual estimated expenditures of these assessed programs (in 2020\$) in projected ranges to mid- and late-century. Many other risks to the Federal budget are apparent but have not yet been quantified, such as the risks to national security, changes to ecosystems, and infrastructure expenditures which can each have wide-ranging and diffuse effects to the budget”).

²⁵² International Monetary Fund (2022) [WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: COUNTERING THE COST-OF-LIVING CRISIS](#), 71 (“Decades of procrastination have transformed what could have been a smooth transition to a more carbon-neutral society into what will likely be a more challenging one. By the end of the decade, the global economy needs to emit 25 percent less greenhouse gases than in 2022 to have a fighting chance to reach the goals set in Paris in 2015 and avert catastrophic climate disruptions. Because the energy transition needed to accomplish this has to be rapid, it is bound to involve some costs in the next few years. While there is little consensus on the expected near-term macroeconomic consequences of climate change policies, this chapter’s central message is that if the right measures are implemented immediately and phased in gradually over the next eight years, the costs will remain manageable and are dwarfed by the innumerable long-term costs of inaction. Different assumptions regarding the speed at which electricity generation can transition toward low-carbon technologies put these costs somewhere between 0.15 and 0.25 percentage point of GDP growth and an additional 0.1 to 0.4 percentage point of inflation a year with respect to the baseline, if budget-neutral policies are assumed. To avoid amplifying these costs, it is important that both climate and monetary policies be credible. Stop-and-go policies and further procrastinating on the grounds that “now is not the time” will only exacerbate the toll.”).

²⁵³ Trust S., Joshi S., Lenton T., & Oliver J. (2023) [THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLIMATE SCENARIOS: LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF COMMONLY USED CLIMATE-CHANGE SCENARIOS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES](#), Institute and Faculty of Actuaries & University of Exeter, 3 (“Dr Sarah Ivory University of Edinburgh There is a problem with the current climate-scenario modelling which means it does not accurately depict the future we know is coming, or the financial implications of this. Climate scenario users in financial services have two pathways forward. To spend all of your time understanding why existing models are wrong and tweaking them is equivalent to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. To build new models which get political buy-in on climate action is equivalent to launching the life boats. It still won’t save all of us, but it’s the best option we have.”).

²⁵⁴ Trust S., Joshi S., Lenton T., & Oliver J. (2023) [THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLIMATE SCENARIOS: LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF COMMONLY USED CLIMATE-CHANGE SCENARIOS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES](#), Institute and Faculty of Actuaries & University of Exeter, 6 (“There is a disconnect between climate science and the economic models that underpin financial services climate-scenario modelling, where model parsimony has cost us real-world efficacy. Real-world impacts of climate change, such as the impact of tipping points (both positive and negative, transition and physical-risk related), sea-level rise and involuntary mass migration, are largely excluded from the damage functions of public reference climate-change economic models. Some models implausibly show the hot-house world to be economically positive, whereas others estimate a 65% GDP loss or a 50–60% downside to existing financial assets if climate change is not mitigated, stating these are likely to be conservative estimates.”).

²⁵⁵ Morrison A. (3 July 2023) [Climate scenario models in financial services significantly underestimate climate risk](#), UNIVERSITY OF EXETER (“This severely limits the usefulness of the models to business leaders and policy makers, who may reasonably believe these models effectively capture risk levels, unaware that many of the most severe climate impacts have not been considered.”); *discussing* Trust S., Joshi S., Lenton T., & Oliver J. (2023) [THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLIMATE SCENARIOS: LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF COMMONLY USED CLIMATE-CHANGE SCENARIOS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES](#), Institute and Faculty of Actuaries & University of Exeter.

²⁵⁶ Kőműves Z. (24 August 2021) [IPCC report: the macroeconomic impacts of climate action and inaction](#), CAMBRIDGE ECONOMETRICS (“These large damage estimates are still likely to understate the true losses, since our

method is based on the observed relationship between temperature and economic output, and we focus only on the impacts of gradual warming on productivity. They do not account for tipping points or other unprecedented changes in the climate system. Given the high uncertainty around increasing climate sensitivity in the future and carbon-cycle feedbacks it is near impossible to get accurate estimates. Natural factors are not the only uncertainty to account for. Escalating climate impacts could bring disruption of value chains, trade, and geopolitical crises as well.”).

²⁵⁷ World Meteorological Organization (22 May 2023) [Economic costs of weather-related disasters soars but early warnings save lives](#), Press Release 22052023 (“Over sixty percent of economic losses due to weather-, climate- and water-related disasters were reported for developed economies. However, the economic losses were equivalent to less than 0.1% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in respective economies in more than four fifths of these disasters. No disasters were reported with economic losses greater than 3.5% of the respective GDPs. In Least Developed Countries, 7% of disasters for which economic losses were reported had an impact equivalent to more than 5% of the respective GDPs, with several disasters causing economic losses up to nearly 30%. In Small Island Developing States, 20% of disasters with reported economic losses led to an impact equivalent to more than 5% of the respective GDPs, with some disasters causing economic losses above 100%.”); *discussing* World Meteorological Organization (2023) [ATLAS OF MORTALITY AND ECONOMIC LOSSES FROM WEATHER, CLIMATE AND WATER-RELATED HAZARDS](#).

²⁵⁸ World Bank Group (2022) [A Roadmap for Climate Action in Latin America and the Caribbean 2021 - 2025](#), 1 (“In rankings of the impacts of extreme weather events from 2000 to 2019, five Caribbean nations figure among the top 20 globally in terms of fatalities per capita, while in terms of economic losses as a share of GDP eight of the top 20 countries are in the Caribbean”).

²⁵⁹ World Meteorological Organization (22 May 2023) [Economic costs of weather-related disasters soars but early warnings save lives](#), Press Release 22052023 (“North America, Central America and Caribbean: A reported 2 107 weather-, climate- and water-related resulted in 77 454 deaths and US\$ 2.0 trillion in economic losses.”); *discussing* World Meteorological Organization (2023) [ATLAS OF MORTALITY AND ECONOMIC LOSSES FROM WEATHER, CLIMATE AND WATER-RELATED HAZARDS](#).

²⁶⁰ Vergara W., Rios A. R., Paliza L. M. G., Gutman P., Isbell P., Suding P. H., & Samaniego J. (2013) [The climate and development challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean: options for climate-resilient, low-carbon development](#), Inter-American Development Bank, 14 (“Based on recent analysis and new estimates, the projected yearly economic damages in LAC caused by some of the major physical impacts associated with this likely rise of 2° C over pre industrial levels are estimated to gradually increase and reach approximately \$100 billion annually by 2050 or approximately 2.2 percent of 2010 gross domestic product (GDP, \$4.6 trillion)”).

²⁶¹ World Bank Group (2022) [A ROADMAP FOR CLIMATE ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2021-2025](#), 1 (“In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) the rapidly changing climate is increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather-related events. The year 2020 saw the most catastrophic fire season over the Pantanal region and a record number of storms during the Atlantic cyclone season. Eta and Iota, two category 4 hurricanes, affected more than 8 million people in Central America, causing tens of billions of dollars in damage. In Honduras, annual average losses due to climate-related shocks are estimated at 2.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In rankings of the impacts of extreme weather events from 2000 to 2019, five Caribbean nations figure among the top 20 globally in terms of fatalities per capita, while in terms of economic losses as a share of GDP eight of the top 20 countries are in the Caribbean.1 Extreme precipitation events, which result in floods and landslides, are projected to intensify in magnitude and frequency due to climate change, with a 1.5o C increase in mean global temperature projected to result in an increase of up to 200 percent in the population affected by floods in Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina; 300 percent in Ecuador; and 400 percent in Peru.2 Climate shocks reduce the income of the poorest 40 percent by more than double the average of the LAC population and could push an estimated 2.4–5.8 million people in the region into extreme poverty by 2030.3”).

²⁶² Barcena A., Samaniego J., Wilson P., & Alatorre J. E. (2020) [THE CLIMATE EMERGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE PATH AHEAD – RESIGNATION OR ACTION?](#), Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, 122 (“The Caribbean relies heavily on economic activities such as tourism and agriculture, which are

particularly sensitive to climatic conditions (ECLAC, 2010). Agriculture generates a large number of jobs, and the rural population continues to constitute a substantial percentage of the total population (ECLAC/MINURVI/UN-HABITAT, 2016). It is therefore relevant that, in different climate scenarios, yields of cassava, banana, sweet potato and tomato plantations are predicted to fall by between 1% and 30% by 2050, with rice crop yields ranging from a 3% decrease to a 2% increase. Lower yields would have negative consequences in a number of areas, such as growth in output and investment in agriculture, the external sector, poverty reduction and food security (Clarke and others, 2013; ECLAC, 2015a).”).

²⁶³ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuví N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegria A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1732 (“In several regions of CSA, water scarcity is a serious challenge to local livelihoods and economic activities. Regions that are (seasonally) dry, partly with large populations and increasing water demand, exhibit particularly significant water stress. These include the Dry Corridor in CA, coastal areas of Peru (SWS) and northern Chile (SWS), the Bolivian-Peruvian Altiplano (NWS, SAM), the Dry Andes of Central Chile (SWS), Western Argentina and Chaco in northwestern Paraguay (SES) and Sertão in northeastern Brazil (NES) (high confidence) (Kummu et al., 2016; Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016; Schoolmeester et al., 2018). In NWS and SWS, downstream areas are increasingly affected by decreasing and unreliable river runoff due to rapid glacier shrinkage (high confidence) (Table SM12.6; Carey et al., 2014; Drenkhan et al., 2015; Buytaert et al., 2017). Many regions in CSA rely heavily on hydroelectric energy, and as a result of rising energy demand, hydropower capacity is constantly being extended (Schoolmeester et al., 2018). Worldwide, SA features the second-fastest growth rate, with about 5.2 GW additional annual capacity installed in 2019 (IHA, 2020). This development requires additional water storage options, which entail the construction of large dams and reservoirs with important social-ecological implications. River fragmentation and corresponding loss of habitat connectivity due to dam constructions have been described for, for example, the NSA, SAM, NES and SES (high confidence) (Grill et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2018a), with important implications for freshwater biota, such as fish migration (medium confidence) (Pelicice et al., 2015; Herrera-R et al., 2020). Furthermore, examples in, for instance, NWS (Carey et al., 2012; Duarte-Abadía et al., 2015; Hommes and Boelens, 2018) and SWS (Muñoz et al., 2019b) showcase unresolved water-related conflicts between local villagers, peasant communities, hydropower operators and governmental institutions in a context of distrust and lack of water governance (high confidence)”).

²⁶⁴ Deloitte (2022) [TURNING POINT: A NEW ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES](#), 17 (“The losses to the US would rapidly increase and compound as temperatures continue to rise. The US economy would be smaller and less productive, and there would be fewer job opportunities. Over the next 50 years, nearly 900,000 job opportunities would disappear on average, every year, due to climate damages. In 2070 alone, insufficient climate action would result in more than 2 million fewer jobs across the US.”).

²⁶⁵ Sawyer D., Ness R., Lee C., & Miller S. (2022) [DAMAGE CONTROL: REDUCING THE COSTS OF CLIMATE IMPACTS IN CANADA](#), Canadian Climate Institute, 60 (“Low-income households will see the largest reductions in real household income. While high-income households lose more income in absolute terms, the share of real income lost by low-income households is higher. By mid-century, the lowest-income households are projected to face income losses, relative to the reference case, of 5.8 per cent under high-emissions and 4.8 per cent under the low-emissions scenario (Figure 11). This compares to losses of 4 per cent and 3.2 per cent for the highest-income in the same period. By the end of the century, the impacts on real household income cut deep into affordability. Low-income households face real income cuts on average of 23 per cent in the high-emissions scenario, and 12 per cent under low-emissions. Even the median group faces significant income losses of 9 to 19 percent”).

²⁶⁶ See generally Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Pan American Health Organization, United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, & World Food Programme (2023) [REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION – LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022: TOWARDS IMPROVING AFFORDABILITY OF HEALTHY DIETS](#).

²⁶⁷ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [*The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act*](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 6 (“The region hosts most of the LAC population (66%) and of roughly 6% of the global population.”).

²⁶⁸ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [*The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act*](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 2 (“Of particular concern in SA, where 168.7 million people are affected by moderate or severe food insecurity, climate change will put additional pressure on food systems. The changing environmental conditions, including more intense and lengthy droughts, extreme weather events, higher temperatures, and increased atmospheric CO₂ concentrations, affect the growth, yield, and nutritional content of several crops, including four staple crops (wheat, rice, maize, and soybean). In 2021, the duration of the growth season of these four crops followed a downward trend, exposing potential threats to crop yields. The average duration of the growing season for spring wheat, winter wheat, maize, soybean, and rice had decreased by 2.5%, 2.2%, 1.6%, 1.3% and 0.4%, respectively, compared to a 1981–2010 baseline (indicator 1.4). These impacts threaten the livelihoods of people depending on the agricultural sector and, ultimately, pose an acute menace to food security in the region.”).

²⁶⁹ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [*The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act*](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 2 (“Of particular concern in SA, where 168.7 million people are affected by moderate or severe food insecurity, climate change will put additional pressure on food systems. The changing environmental conditions, including more intense and lengthy droughts, extreme weather events, higher temperatures, and increased atmospheric CO₂ concentrations, affect the growth, yield, and nutritional content of several crops, including four staple crops (wheat, rice, maize, and soybean). In 2021, the duration of the growth season of these four crops followed a downward trend, exposing potential threats to crop yields. The average duration of the growing season for spring wheat, winter wheat, maize, soybean, and rice had decreased by 2.5%, 2.2%, 1.6%, 1.3% and 0.4%, respectively, compared to a 1981–2010 baseline (indicator 1.4). These impacts threaten the livelihoods of people depending on the agricultural sector and, ultimately, pose an acute menace to food security in the region.”).

²⁷⁰ Mycoo M., Wairiu M., Campbell D., Duvat V., Golbuu Y., Maharaj S., Nalau J., Nunn P., Pinnegar J., & Warrick O. (2022) [*Chapter 15: Small Islands*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*](#), Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Lösschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 2058–2060 (“SLR undermines the long-term persistence of freshwater-dependent ecosystems on islands (Goodman et al., 2012) and is one of the greatest threats to the goods and services these environments provide (Box 16.1; Mitsch and Hernandez, 2013). Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2019) posit that as sea level rises, managing the risk of salinisation of freshwater resources will become increasingly important. On Roi-Namur, Marshall Islands, Storlazzi et al. (2018) found that the availability of freshwater is impacted by the compounding effect of SLR and coastal flooding. In other Pacific atolls, Terry and Chui (2012) showed that freshwater resources could be significantly affected by a 0.40-m SLR. Similar impacts are anticipated for some Caribbean countries (Stennett-Brown et al., 2017). Such changes in SLR could increase salinity in estuarine and aquifer water, affecting ground and surface water resources for drinking and irrigation water (Mycoo, 2018a) across the region (high confidence). SLR also affects groundwater quality (Bailey et al., 2016), salinity (Gingerich et al., 2017) and water-table height (Masterson et al., 2014).”).

²⁷¹ Mycoo M., Wairiu M., Campbell D., Duvat V., Golbuu Y., Maharaj S., Nalau J., Nunn P., Pinnegar J., & Warrick O. (2022) [*Chapter 15: Small Islands*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*](#), Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Lösschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 2065 (“Climate change impacts on freshwater systems frequently exacerbate existing pressure, especially in locations already experiencing water scarcity (Section 15.3.3.2 and Cross-Chapter Box INTERREG in Chapter 16; Schewe et al., 2014; Holding et al., 2016; Karnauskas et al., 2016), making water security a key risk (KR4 in Figure 15.5) in small islands. Small islands are usually environments where demand

for resources related to socioeconomic factors such as population growth, urbanisation and tourism already place increasing pressure on limited freshwater resources. In many small islands, water demand already exceeds supply. For example, in the Caribbean, Barbados is utilising close to 100% of its available water resources and St. Lucia has a water supply deficit of approximately 35% (Cashman, 2014).... The Caribbean and Pacific regions have historically been affected by severe droughts (Peters, 2015; FAO, 2016; Barkey and Bailey, 2017; Paeniu et al., 2017; Trotman et al., 2017; Anshuka et al., 2018) with significant physical impacts and negative socioeconomic outcomes. Water quality is affected by drought as well as water availability. The El Niño related 2015–2016 drought in Vanuatu led to reliance on small amounts of contaminated water left at the bottom of household tanks (Iese et al., 2021a). The highest land disturbance percentages have coincided with major droughts in Cuba (de Beurs et al., 2019). Drought has been shown to have an impact on rainwater harvesting in the Pacific (Quigley et al., 2016) and Caribbean (Aladenola et al., 2016), especially in rural areas where connections to centralised public water supply have been difficult. Increasing trends in drought are apparent in the Caribbean (Herrera and Ault, 2017) although trends in the western Pacific are not statistically significant (McGree et al., 2016).”).

²⁷² Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegria A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1712 (“Despite the observed increase in rainfall in the region, between 2014 and 2016 Brazil endured a water crisis that affected the population and economy of major capital cities in the SES region (Blunden and Arndt, 2014; Nobre et al., 2016a). Extremely long dry spells have become more frequent in southeastern Brazil, affecting 40 million people and the economies in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte, which are the industrial centres of the country (medium confidence: medium evidence, medium agreement) (PBMCI, 2014; Nobre et al., 2016a; Cunningham et al., 2017; Marengo et al., 2017, 2020b; Lima and Magaña Rueda, 2018).”). See also Nobre C. A., et al. (2016) [Some Characteristics and Impacts of the Drought and Water Crisis in Southeastern Brazil during 2014 and 2015](#), J. WATER RES. PROTECT. 8(2): 562–262, 259 (“Mean discharge in the summer (Nov–Mar) of 2014 was 17.9 m³/s and in 2015 it was 24.0 m³/s, far below the average summer discharge, 59.8 m³/s (70.0% and 60%, respectively), for the period 1930–2013. The 1953/54 rainfall deficit prompted construction of the Cantareira Reservoir system [19]. After this, longer-term planning by regional governments has fallen short, and many residents are already enduring sporadic water cutoffs, some lasting for many days. The Cantareira reservoir system reached critical conditions in early 2015. Storage levels were only 5% of its 1.3 billion m³ capacity in January 2015 and 15% at the end of the rainy season in March 2015.”).

²⁷³ Vicedo-Cabrera A. M., et al. (2021) [The burden of heat-related mortality attributable to recent human-induced climate change](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANG. 11: 492–500, Supplementary Materials (Supplementary Table 4).

²⁷⁴ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 2 (“The changing environmental conditions are also affecting the geographical distribution of infectious diseases. The region is endemic for dengue, which is responsible for a high burden of disease and frequent epidemic cycles across the region. The climate suitability for dengue transmission reached its highest level in recent years, with an increase of 35.3% in 2012–2021 compared to the 1951–1960 baseline (indicator 1.3). Estimated fitness for dengue transmission between 1951 and 2021 increased over time in all countries where the mosquito is found (except Argentina and Suriname). Adding to climate-related pressures, urbanisation, and mobility in countries such as Brazil and Peru have increased dengue spread to higher latitudes and less populated areas. Climate change can also lead to viral sharing among previously geographically isolated wildlife species, leading to cross-species transmission and disease emergence. Compounding the increase in dengue risk posed by climate changes, temperate Southern Cone countries are highly vulnerable to severe dengue outcomes, mainly driven by rapid urbanisation. Argentina and Uruguay experienced increased vulnerability between 1990 and 2019 (indicator 2.3).”).

²⁷⁵ Yglesias-González M., Palmeiro-Silva Y., Sergeeva M., Cortés S., Hurtado-Epstein A., Buss D. F., Hartinger S. M., & Red de Clima y Salud de América Latina y el Caribe (2022) [Code Red for Health response in Latin America](#)

[and the Caribbean: Enhancing peoples' health through climate action](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 11(100248): 1–8, 3 (“Dengue cases have almost tripled from 2000-2009 (6.78 million) to 2010-2019 (16.52 million) and the largest record of cases occurred in 2019.”); citing Pan American Health Organization & World Health Organization, [Dengue](#), PLISA Health Information for the Americas (last visited 24 May 2023).

²⁷⁶ Kephart J. L., Avila-Palencia I., Bilal U., Gouveia N., Caiaffa W. T., & Diez Roux A. V. (2021) [COVID-19, Ambient Air Pollution, and Environmental Health Inequities in Latin American Cities](#), J. URBAN HEALTH. 98(3): 428–432, 428 (“High levels of air pollution in many Latin American cities in the past may have primed many residents for more severe infection and mortality from COVID-19 by contributing to the development of chronic diseases. Many of the chronic diseases associated with long-term, cumulative exposure to air pollution appear to be correlated with a higher vulnerability to severe COVID-19 outcomes, including hospitalization, need for critical care, and death [^{1,2}]. A recent study in the USA reported that a long-term increase of only 1 µg/m³ PM_{2.5} was associated with an 8% increase in COVID-19 death rate [³]. In addition to cumulative exposures, it is plausible that short-term air pollution exposures interact with SARS-CoV-2 infection itself [⁴], possibly via their effects on inflammation-related processes. However, the effect of immediate changes in air pollution on COVID-19-related mortality is yet to be tested.”).

²⁷⁷ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuvi N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1722 (Table 12.6).

²⁷⁸ World Bank (2015) [INDIGENOUS LATIN AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE FIRST DECADE](#), 9 (“The number of indigenous persons living in poverty has fallen, but the gap separating them from other Latin Americans has either remained stagnant or widened. Poverty, in fact, afflicts 43 percent of the indigenous population in the region—more than twice the proportion of non-indigenous people—while 24 percent of all indigenous people live in extreme poverty, 2.7 times more than the proportion of non-indigenous people.”).

²⁷⁹ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Indigenous Peoples, [Climate Change](#) (last visited 11 July 2023) (“Indigenous peoples are among the first to face the direct consequences of climate change, due to their dependence upon, and close relationship, with the environment and its resources. Climate change exacerbates the difficulties already faced by indigenous communities including political and economic marginalization, loss of land and resources, human rights violations, discrimination and unemployment. ... Climate change poses threats and dangers to the survival of indigenous communities worldwide, even though indigenous peoples contribute the least to greenhouse emissions. In fact, indigenous peoples are vital to, and active in, the many ecosystems that inhabit their lands and territories and may therefore help enhance the resilience of these ecosystems. In addition, indigenous peoples interpret and react to the impacts of climate change in creative ways, drawing on traditional knowledge and other technologies to find solutions which may help society at large to cope with impending changes.”). See also Human Rights Council (30 April 2012) [Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Study on the role of languages and culture in the promotion and protection of the rights and identity of indigenous peoples](#), United Nations General Assembly, Fifth session, A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/3, 16 (“As the Independent Expert in the field of cultural rights has noted, protecting cultures can be challenging “especially in societies where people feel that their cultural heritage is under threat, due in particular to the dynamism or dominance of other cultures, globalization and development processes and/or the dominant position of corporate actors in the field of culture and leisure.”⁶³ Moreover, loss of lands, territories and resources can limit the ability of indigenous cultures to adapt organically. Because of these changes and obstacles, there must be a conscious effort to maintain traditional values and instil cultural strength, pride and dignity.”).

²⁸⁰ See Riehl A. (26 November 2018) [The impact of climate change on language loss](#), THE CONVERSATION (“While approximately 7,000 languages are spoken in the world today, [only about half are expected to survive](#) this century. A number of factors contribute to this loss: increasing globalization, which pushes countries and individuals to shift to national or international languages for economic reasons; lack of support for regional languages in educational systems

and mass media; persecution of minority linguistic groups by governments and disruption of communities during war and emigration. ... One stressor that may be the tipping point for some communities is [climate change](#). Many small linguistic communities are located on islands and coastlines vulnerable to hurricanes and a rise in sea levels. Other communities are settled on lands where increases in temperature and fluctuations in precipitation can threaten traditional farming and fishing practices. These changes will force communities to relocate, creating [climate change refugees](#). The resultant dispersal of people will lead to the splintering of linguistic communities and increased contact with other languages. These changes will place additional pressures on languages that are already struggling to survive.”); and Sustainability for All (15 May 2023) [The Silent Death Of The World’s Languages, Another Consequence Of Climate Change](#), ACCIONA (“The reasons why [indigenous languages](#) are disappearing do not strictly obey linguistic processes such as the (non) transmission between generations, political conflicts or lack of legal recognition. The **climate crisis** is also a determining factor. Many small **linguistic communities are located on islands or coasts** which are vulnerable to hurricanes or **rising sea levels**. Other communities are settled in lands where rising temperatures and rainfall fluctuations can threaten traditional farming and fishing practices. These changes oblige the communities to relocate, creating **climate change refugees**. The catastrophes caused 23.7 million internal displacements in 2021, most of which were due to meteorological phenomena. The resulting migration of people causes linguistic communities to fragment and greater contact with other languages. These changes have repercussions on minority languages, which were already struggling to survive.”).

²⁸¹ See generally Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014) [GUARANTEEING INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: PROGRESS IN THE LAST DECADE AND REMAINING CHALLENGES](#), United Nations.

²⁸² International Labour Office (2017) [INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM VICTIMS TO CHANGE AGENTS THROUGH DECENT WORK](#), 7 (“It is important to highlight that the risks that climate change poses for indigenous peoples differ from the risks that it poses for other groups in society, including the poor (in their entirety). This is because indigenous peoples share six characteristics that, in combination, are not present in any other group. Thus they are especially vulnerable to the direct impacts of climate change; to the impacts of environmental destruction that leads to climate change; and to mitigation and adaptation measures. First, indigenous peoples are among the poorest of the poor, the stratum most vulnerable to climate change. Second, they depend on renewable natural resources most at risk to climate variability and extremes for their economic activities and livelihoods. Third, they live in geographical regions and ecosystems that are most exposed to the impacts of climate change, while also sharing a complex cultural relationship with such ecosystems. Fourth, high levels of exposure and vulnerability to climate change force indigenous peoples to migrate, which in most cases is not a solution and can instead exacerbate social and economic vulnerabilities. Fifth, gender inequality, a key factor in the deprivation suffered by indigenous women, is magnified by climate change. Sixth, and lastly, many indigenous communities continue to face exclusion from decision-making processes, often lacking recognition and institutional support. This limits their access to remedies, increases their vulnerability to climate change, undermines their ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and consequently poses a threat to the advances made in securing their rights.”).

²⁸³ Hagen I., Huggel C., Ramajo L., Chacón N., Ometto J. P., Postigo J. C., & Castellanos E. J. (2022) [Climate change-related risks and adaptation potential in Central and South America during the 21st century](#), ENV. RES. LETT. 17(3): 1–26, 4 (“Indigenous communities often lack access to infrastructure and public service systems, as well as territorial autonomy and self-determination, and are often forced to occupy climate risk prone areas such as low-lying coastlines, steep slopes and floodplains (González [2015](#), World Bank Group [2015](#)).”).

²⁸⁴ Sobrevila C. (2008) [THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION: THE NATURAL BUT OFTEN FORGOTTEN PARTNERS](#), World Bank, xi–xii, 3 (“Many or most of the world’s major centers of biodiversity coincide with areas occupied or controlled by Indigenous Peoples. Traditional Indigenous Territories encompass up to 22 percent of the world’s land surface and they coincide with areas that hold 80 percent of the planet’s biodiversity. Also, the greatest diversity of indigenous groups coincides with the world’s largest tropical forest wilderness areas in the Americas (including Amazon), Africa, and Asia, and 11 percent of world forest lands are legally owned by Indigenous Peoples and communities. This convergence of biodiversity-significant areas and indigenous territories presents an enormous opportunity to expand efforts to conserve biodiversity beyond parks, which tend to benefit from most of the funding for biodiversity conservation.”). See also Oswald-Spring Ú. (2022) [The Impact of Climate Change](#)

[on the Gender Security of Indigenous Women in Latin America](#), in ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, Madhanagopal D., Beer C. T., Nikku B. R., & Pelsner A. J. (eds.), 117 (“with a global representation of only 5%, indigenous people protect 80% of the biodiversity on the planet. Women are especially active in environmental care and ecosystem restoration. However, the dominant mindset in the North American political scenario has prioritized military security over environmental conflicts. Their reference object was the state. The values at risk are sovereignty and territorial integrity, reducing interest in people and nature. Gender security focuses on women, indigenous and vulnerable groups, analysing gender relations, equity, and empowerment to overcome the patriarchal worldview and institutions represented by transnational corporations, churches, and authoritarian governments. Latin America, especially Central America and Mexico (Mesoamerica), are highly affected by climate change. Indigenous women are also the poorest in the whole region. They have a limited capacity for adaptation and little governmental support. They often live in abrupt mountain regions or have migrated into unsafe slums of megacities.”; “The global indigenous population of approximately 300 million people is composed of about 5,000 distinct indigenous cultures worldwide, living in every climate from the Arctic Circle to the tropical rain forests. Although Indigenous Peoples make up only 4 percent of the world’s population, they represent 95 percent of the world’s cultural diversity.”).

²⁸⁵ See Ramos E. P., & Dias K. M. (2021) [Gender, Migration, Climate Change and Disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), UN Women; and Revelo L. A. (2022) [Women’s Autonomy and Gender Equality at the Centre of Climate Action in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), UN Women.

²⁸⁶ See Ramos E. P., & Dias K. M. (2021) [Gender, Migration, Climate Change and Disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), UN Women; and Revelo L. A. (2022) [Women’s Autonomy and Gender Equality at the Centre of Climate Action in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), UN Women.

²⁸⁷ Boyer A. E., Meijer S. S., & Gilligan M. (2020) [ADVANCING GENDER IN THE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING THE TRIPLE NEXUS OF GENDER INEQUALITY, STATE FRAGILITY, AND CLIMATE VULNERABILITY](#), International Union for Conservation of Nature & United States Agency for International Development, 21 (“Research highlights another devastating gender-related issue in the aftermath of disasters, particularly those that lead to displacement and economic loss, and increased instances of domestic and sexual violence.⁹⁸ Social stress due to loss of resources, unemployment, and livelihoods in a post-disaster context can strain household power dynamics and increase instances of intimate partner violence (IPV).⁹⁹ Women and girls, members of the LGBT community, and people who do not conform with societal gender norms report increased instances of sexual violence and GBV in post-disaster contexts in emergency shelters that are overcrowded, unsafe, unfamiliar, and lack privacy.^{100, 101} Additionally, when aid workers who are not sensitized to gender issues, or where emergency shelters do not provide adequate resources, there is a risk of exacerbating gender inequalities, as evidenced by instances where LGBT people were turned away or arrested for trying to access emergency shelters in disaster situations.¹⁰²”). See also Ramos E. P., & Dias K. M. (2021) [Gender, Migration, Climate Change and Disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), UN Women; Revelo L. A. (2022) [Women’s Autonomy and Gender Equality at the Centre of Climate Action in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), UN Women; and Felisi E. (27 June 2021) [Gender and Sexual Minorities: The Invisible Victims of Climate Change](#), REPORTOUT.

²⁸⁸ Renshaw N., Adoo-Kissi-Debrah R., Kumar A., Massawudu Musah L., & Burson J. (2022) [A healthy future for children and adolescents](#), THE LANCET 400(10358): 1100–1101, 1100 (“Today, over 90% of children breathe dangerously polluted air, and in low-income and middle-income countries this figure is 98%.”); citing World Health Organization (2021) [WHO GLOBAL AIR QUALITY GUIDELINES: PARTICULATE MATTER \(PM_{2.5} AND PM₁₀\), OZONE, NITROGEN DIOXIDE, SULFUR DIOXIDE AND CARBON MONOXIDE](#).

²⁸⁹ World Health Organization (2018) [AIR POLLUTION AND CHILD HEALTH: PRESCRIBING CLEAN AIR](#), 5, 12–13 (“• Some 543 000 deaths in children under 5 years and 52 000 deaths in children aged 5–15 years were attributed to the joint effects of ambient and household air pollution in 2016. • Together, household air pollution from cooking and ambient air pollution cause more than 50% of acute lower respiratory tract infection (ALRI) in children under 5 years in LMICs. • Of the total number of deaths attributable to the joint effects of household and ambient air pollution worldwide in 2016, 9% were in children.”; “There is strong evidence that exposure to ambient air pollution can negatively affect children’s mental and motor development.... There is robust evidence that exposure to air pollution damages children’s lung function and impedes their lung function growth, even at lower levels of exposure. Studies

have found compelling evidence that prenatal exposure to air pollution is associated with impairment of lung development and lung function in childhood. Conversely, there is evidence that children experience better lung function growth in areas in which ambient air quality has improved.... There is substantial evidence that exposure to ambient air pollution increases the risk of children for developing asthma and that breathing pollutants exacerbates childhood asthma as well.”).

²⁹⁰ United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2 December 2022) [9 Out Of 10 Children in Latin America and The Caribbean are Exposed to at Least Two Climate and Environmental Shocks](#) (“The Children’s Climate Risk Index (CCRI) reveals that in Latin America and the Caribbean: 55 million children are exposed to water scarcity; 60 million children are exposed to cyclones; 85 million children are exposed to Zika; 115 million children are exposed to Dengue; 45 million children are exposed to heatwaves; 105 million children are exposed to air pollution. While nearly every child around the world is at risk from at least one of these climate and environmental hazards, the data reveal the worst affected countries face multiple and often overlapping shocks that threaten to erode development progress and deepen child deprivations.”).

²⁹¹ United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (2022) [THE COLDEST YEAR OF THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM THE ESCALATING IMPACTS OF HEATWAVES](#), 24 (“There are deep and terrible effects of failing to limit global heating to 1.7 degrees. Although exposure to high heatwave duration is expected to increase in both emission scenarios, the difference in projections between low and very high emission scenarios means that by 2050, over 370 million more children will be exposed to high heatwave duration under the very high emission scenario.”).

²⁹² Cissé G., McLeman R., Adams H., Aldunce P., Bowen K., Campbell-Lendrum D., Clayton S., Ebi K. L., Hess J., Huang C., Liu Q., McGregor G., Semenza J., & Tirado M. C. (2022) [Chapter 7: Health, Wellbeing, and the Changing Structure of Communities](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1053 (“Older adults (generally defined as persons aged 65 and older) are disproportionately vulnerable to the health impacts associated with climate change and weather extremes.”).

²⁹³ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 2 (“In the last ten years, the more frequent and intense heatwaves have increasingly put the health and survival of children under one year old and adults above 65 years at risk. On average, children <1 year were exposed to 2.35 million more person-days of heatwaves each year, and adults above 65 years exposed to 12.3 million more person-days, as compared to a 1996–2005 baseline (indicator 1.1.1).”).

²⁹⁴ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 2 (“In the last ten years, the more frequent and intense heatwaves have increasingly put the health and survival of children under one year old and adults above 65 years at risk. On average, children <1 year were exposed to 2.35 million more person-days of heatwaves each year, and adults above 65 years exposed to 12.3 million more person-days, as compared to a 1996–2005 baseline (indicator 1.1.1).”).

²⁹⁵ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 2 (“Since the year 2000, the estimated number of heat-related deaths has increased continuously among people over 65 in almost all countries.”).

²⁹⁶ Hartinger S. M., et al. (2023) [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 8 (“Indicator 1.1.2: heat-related mortality—headline finding: the estimated number of heat-related deaths has increased, on average, by 160% in the 2017–2021 period compared to the 2000–2004 period.”).

²⁹⁷ Bryant N., Stone R., Connelly C., & Boerner K. (2022) [*The Impact of Climate Change: Why Older Adults are Vulnerable*](#), LeadingAge LTSS Center, University of Massachusetts Boston, 4 (“Researchers have examined how several aspects of climate change—including extreme heat or cold, poor air quality, and extreme weather disasters—affect the health of older Americans. For example, heat waves, hurricanes, and flooding are all associated with higher risk of hospitalization and higher mortality rates for people 65 and older, compared to people under the age of 65. In addition, older adults may be at increased risk for: → The psychological health effects of weather events. → Negative physical and mental health outcomes resulting from air pollution, wildfires, and droughts. → Disruption of services due to forced evacuations. These interruptions can worsen preexisting conditions for people with chronic illness.”).

²⁹⁸ World Bank (2022) [*CONSOLIDATING THE RECOVERY: SEIZING GREEN GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES*](#), Latin America and the Caribbean Semiannual Report, 29 (“All in all, the combined effects of climate change in LAC are projected to push between 2.4 million and 5.8 million people into extreme poverty by 2030 (Jafino et al. 2020), mostly due to health-related effects—the increasing prevalence of child stunting, vector-borne diseases, and diarrhea—resulting from lack of access to safe water and sanitation, excessive heat, and more frequent droughts and floods (figure 2.5).”).

²⁹⁹ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [*Chapter 12: Central and South America*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY*](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1746 (“In IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR), AR4 and AR5, WGII recognised higher risks associated with poor living conditions, substandard housing, inadequate services, location of hazardous sites stemming from a lack of alternatives and the need to work more seriously on strengthening governance structures involving residents and community organisations, among others (Wilbanks et al., 2007; Revi et al., 2014). The AR5 CSA chapter stated that poverty levels remained high (45% for CA and 30% for SA in 2010) despite years of sustained economic growth. Poor and vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected in negative ways by climate change (Section 8.2.1.4; Section 8.2.2.3; SR15 Section 5.2 and Section 5.2.1, Roy et al., 2018) due to physical exposure derived from their place of residence or work, illiteracy, low income and skills, political and institutional marginalisation tied to a lack of recognition of informal settlements and employment, poor access to good-quality services and infrastructure, resources and information and other factors (very high confidence) (UN-Habitat, 2018; SR15 Sections 5.2.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.4, Roy et al., 2018).”).

³⁰⁰ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [*Chapter 12: Central and South America*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY*](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1765.

³⁰¹ Kumari Rigaud K., de Sherbinin A., Jones B., Bergmann J., Clement V., Ober K., Schewe J., Adamo S., McCusker B., Heuser S., & Midgley A. (2018) [*GROUNDSWELL: PREPARING FOR INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION*](#), The World Bank, xxi (“Under all three scenarios in this report, there is an upward trend of internal climate migration in SubSaharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America by 2050. In the worst-case or “pessimistic” scenario, the number of internal climate migrants could reach more than 143 million (around 86 million in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million in South Asia, and 17 million in Latin America) by 2050 (Figure 1). The poorest people and the poorest countries are the hardest hit. ... Across all scenarios, climate change is a growing driver of internal migration. Climate change impacts (crop failure, water stress, sea level rise) increase the probability of migration under distress, creating growing challenges for human development and planning. Vulnerable people have the fewest opportunities to adapt locally or to move away from risk and, when moving, often do so as a last resort. Others, even more vulnerable, will be unable to move, trapped in increasingly unviable areas. Internal climate migration will intensify over the next several decades and could accelerate after 2050 under the pessimistic scenario due to stronger climate impacts combined with steep population growth in many regions.”).

³⁰² World Bank (2018) [Internal Climate Migration in Latin America](#), Groundswell Policy Note #3, 4 (Table 1).

³⁰³ World Bank (2018) [Internal Climate Migration in Latin America](#), Groundswell Policy Note #3, 6 (“Lower global emissions reduce climate pressure on ecosystems and livelihoods and broaden the opportunities for people to stay in place or move under better circumstances. In Latin America, under the more climate-friendly scenario, there would be up to 87 percent less climate migrants—with numbers reduced from a high of 17.1 million under the pessimistic reference scenario to 2.2–9.4 million under this scenario.”).

³⁰⁴ Center for Puerto Rican Studies (2018) [New Estimates: 135,000+ Post-Maria Puerto Ricans Relocated to Stateside](#), Centro DS2018-01, 1 (“Based on school enrollment data, we estimate that more than 135,000 Puerto Ricans relocated to the United States six months after Hurricane Maria landed in Puerto Rico. Prior estimates of the magnitude of this exodus are based on movement of passenger or projections based on recent migration trends from Puerto Rico to the United States.”).

³⁰⁵ Cantor D. J. (2018) [CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND DISASTERS: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 22 (“At the regional level, including in the Americas, there are several regional integration processes that have developed agreements that either allow for free movement based on supranational forms of ‘citizenship’ of the pertinent entity (i.e. erasing national boundaries between member States) or allow for favourable migration treatment between member States. They may offer a legal basis for international movement by persons affected by a disaster. Nonetheless, given their close ties to national laws and policies in the pertinent blocs, they will be addressed further in relation to each of the regions in turn.”).

³⁰⁶ See for example Campa A. (21 May 2022) [Climate Migrants Lack a Clear Path to Asylum in the US](#), INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS; and Limoges B. (24 April 2021) [‘I’m trapped here’: Haitian asylum seekers languish in Mexico](#), AL JAZEERA.

³⁰⁷ Gemenne F., Zickgraf C., Hut E., & Castillo Betancourt T. (2021) [Forced displacement related to the impacts of climate change and disasters](#), Reference Paper for the 70th Anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Prepared for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 5 (“Throughout the 1990s, public debates were dominated by an alarmist narrative claiming that the world should prepare for millions of ‘climate refugees’ in the coming decade. This narrative geared policy debates in two directions. First, the regular use of the expression ‘climate refugees’ led many experts or organisations to point out that the term was a misnomer because the 1951 Geneva Convention made no mention of environmental phenomena as a basis for international protection needs. This absence of an explicit reference to environmental factors in existing legal instruments prompted many initiatives to create an international legal status for ‘climate refugees’: resolutions were voted in parliaments, expert groups were set up, and lawyers debated whether this new status should be created through a new convention or an amendment to the Geneva Convention (Gemenne 2015). For many activists, politicians and civil society organisations, this lack of international status was the key reason why policies were blind to the environmental drivers of human mobility, and therefore the first priority. It soon appeared that such a status in international law was not just a political no-go area, but also a response that would not meet the needs of the displaced, as most were internally displaced and therefore ineligible to an international status (McAdam 2011). In spite of this, an international status for ‘climate refugees’ continues to be a key demand of many prominent activists, parliamentarians and civil society organisations, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, who insist this would be the most appropriate way to protect the displaced. Others, however, argue that persons who are suddenly displaced due to climate or disasters qualify for international protection and that there is no need for a new category (UNHCR 2018)”).

³⁰⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2022) [Climate Change, Displacement and Human Rights](#), 1 (“The climate crisis is already amplifying vulnerability and driving displacement, which impacts a broad array of human rights, including the rights to education, adequate standard of living and health of those displaced. Highly climate vulnerable countries host 40% of refugees and are home to 70% of people internally displaced by conflict or violence. While these populations are often highly exposed and vulnerable to climate-related shocks, they have fewer resources and support to adapt to an increasingly hostile environment. This raises concerns about the right to equality

and non-discrimination. At the same time, human mobility can protect people and their human rights. This may be through well-prepared and timely emergency evacuations, assisting communities to plan for relocation to safer settlement areas as a measure of last resort, or facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration through regular pathways to prevent displacement from occurring. The freedom and capacity to move is part of upholding human rights and can contribute to climate change adaptation. Extreme weather, which is becoming more frequent and intense with climate change, greatly impacts displaced persons. Recent floods in Sudan were some of the worst observed in decades. Alganaa refugee camp in Sudan's White Nile State was submerged by flood waters in November 2021, leaving 35,000 South Sudanese refugees in need of urgent assistance.”). *See also* United States White House (2021) [REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON MIGRATION](#), 7 (“Extreme weather events⁹ and conflict are the top two drivers of forced displacement globally, together responsible for the annual movement of nearly 30 million people from their homes.¹⁰ There is a strong correlation between countries and regions most vulnerable to climate change and those that are fragile and/or experiencing conflict or violence. Climate-related impacts may further stress vulnerable communities, increasing the risk of conflict and displacement in the absence of effective prevention efforts, and vice versa. Climate-related impacts also pose an increased risk to marginalized communities displaced by conflict related to the impacts of climate change. This risk is more acute in regions with weak governance and dispute resolution infrastructure, and in growing peri-urban areas where many migrants are heading. Climate change can cause or exacerbate resource scarcity, which may drive conflict directly as well as induce migration of populations in vulnerable situations attempting to secure safety or livelihoods elsewhere.¹¹ Moreover, changes to biodiversity have strong intersections with climate change that also can affect migration, and threaten food and economic security.¹² The subsequent movement of large numbers of people, by force or by choice, brings new groups into contact with one another, potentially shifting power balances, causing further resource scarcity, or igniting tensions between previously separated groups. ¹³ Where climate-related migrations occur within or near population centers, or in locations important for political or economic stability, such as within many nations’ coastal zones, the destabilizing forces associated with climate change may result in outsized affects overall.”).

³⁰⁹ Alvarez J. A., Arena M., Brousseau A., Faruquee H., Corugedo E. W. F., Guajardo J., Peraza G., & Yepez J. (2022) [Regional Spillovers from the Venezuelan Crisis: Migration Flows and Their Impact on Latin America and the Caribbean](#), International Monetary Fund Departmental Papers, 4 (“The destination and composition of Venezuela’s migrant flows changed as the crisis intensified. Most migrants have settled in other Latin American countries, while some have migrated to other regions, mainly to the United States and Spain. Colombia has received the largest number of migrants, totaling 2.5 million or about 5 percent of the Colombian population in August 2022.¹⁴ Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have also received sizable flows, with the combined number of migrants exceeding 2 million (more than 3 percent of the local population on average).”).

³¹⁰ *See* International Crisis Group (2022) [HARD TIMES IN A SAFE HAVEN: PROTECTING VENEZUELAN MIGRANTS IN COLOMBIA](#), Latin America Report No. 94.

³¹¹ Global Witness (2022) [DECADE OF DEFIANCE: TEN YEARS OF REPORTING LAND AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM WORLDWIDE](#), 16 (“Global Witness started reporting on the killings of Land and Environmental Defenders in 2012.³¹ Since then, 1733 defenders have been killed trying to protect their land and resources: that’s an average of one defender killed approximately every two days over ten years.”).

³¹² Global Witness (2022) [DECADE OF DEFIANCE: TEN YEARS OF REPORTING LAND AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM WORLDWIDE](#), 23–26 (“In Brazil, where 342 defenders have been killed over the last decade, the Gini index (the most widely used indicator of inequality) of land ownership distribution is 0.73, placing Brazil among the countries with the greatest land inequality in the world. Research has shown that inequality is greater in the states with highest agricultural commodity production, such as in Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Bahia and in the MATOPIBA region (which comprises the Cerrado biome areas of the states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí and Bahia). Attacks against defenders are also high in these states according to Global Witness data. For example, in Mato Grosso, nine farm workers were tortured and killed in 2017 by hired assassins in an area of illegal deforestation.⁵⁹ The same study also points out that 10% of the largest properties occupy 73% of the agricultural area of Brazil. In all Brazilian states, the 10% of the largest properties own more than 50% of the area. In six states and MATOPIBA, the 10% of the largest properties own more than 70% of the area.⁶⁰ 44 of the 342 defenders killed in Brazil over the last decade were

protesting against agribusiness. Colombia has the highest concentration of landholdings in Latin America, with the largest 1% of landholdings concentrated over 81% of land, leaving only 19% of land distributed among the remaining 99% of farms.⁶¹”).

³¹³ Glazebrook T. & Opoku E. (2018) [Defending the Defenders: Environmental Protectors, Climate Change and Human Rights](#), ETHICS ENVIRON. 23(2): 83–109.

³¹⁴ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuví N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1693 (“**The most widely reported obstacle to adaptation in terrestrial, freshwater, ocean and coastal ecosystems is financing (high confidence)**. There is also a significant gap in identifying limits to adaptation and weak institutional capacity for implementation. This hinders the development of comprehensive adaptation programmes, even under adequate funding.”).

³¹⁵ Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#).

³¹⁶ Clean Air Task Force, [Oil and Gas Mitigation Program](#) (last visited 13 June 2023) (“Venting is even more harmful than flaring, since methane warms the climate so powerfully, and VOC and toxic pollutants are released unabated. Venting of this gas should be prohibited in all cases as an absolutely unnecessary source of harmful air pollution. There are numerous lowcost (and usually profitable) ways to utilize natural gas from oil wells. Flaring should be a last resort: only in the most extreme cases should oil producers be allowed to flare gas, and it should be strictly a temporary measure. Rules prohibiting venting of natural gas can easily reduce emissions by 95%.”).

³¹⁷ These include precision farming using variable rate technology and nitrogen inhibitors to suppress microbial activity that produces N₂O: Balafoutis A., Beck B., Fountas S., Vangeyete J., van der Wal T., Soto I., Gómez-Barbero M., Barnes A., & Eory V. (2017) [Precision Agriculture Technologies Positively Contributing to GHG Emissions Mitigation, Farm Productivity and Economics](#), SUSTAINABILITY 9(8): 1339, 1–28, 9 (“Tekin (2010) estimated that VRNA can increase wheat production between 1% and 10% offering savings in nitrogen fertilisation between 4% and 37%.”).

³¹⁸ Höglund-Isaksson L., Gómez-Sanabria A., Klimont Z., Rafaj P., & Schöpp W. (2020) [Technical potentials and costs for reducing global anthropogenic methane emissions in the 2050 timeframe—results from the GAINS model](#), ENVIRON. RES. COMM. 2(2): 1–21, 16–17 (“An additional almost 10 percent of baseline emissions in 2050 could be removed at a marginal cost below 20 €/t CO₂eq by implementing proper waste and wastewater handling in China, India and the rest of South-East Asia. This would likely come with considerable co-benefits in the form of reduced air and water pollution.”).

³¹⁹ United States Climate Alliance (2018) [FROM SLCP CHALLENGE TO ACTION: A ROADMAP FOR REDUCING SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS TO MEET THE GOALS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT](#), 15 (“Significant opportunities for reducing methane emissions from landfills and capturing value can be seized by reducing food loss and waste, diverting organic waste to beneficial uses, and improving landfill management. These and other actions collectively could reduce methane emissions from waste by an estimated 40-50 percent by 2030 (Appendix A). Such efforts could add value in our states by reducing emissions of volatile organic compounds and toxic air contaminants from landfills, recovering healthy food for human consumption in food insecure communities, supporting healthy soils and agriculture, generating clean energy and displacing fossil fuel consumption, and providing economic opportunities across these diverse sectors. Many of these benefits will accrue in low-income and disadvantaged communities.”). See also Geyik Ö., Hadjikakou M., & Bryan B. A. (2022) Climate-friendly and nutrition-sensitive interventions can close the global dietary nutrient gap while reducing GHG emissions, Nat. Food. 4: 61–73, 61 (“Here, we estimate the non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emissions resulting from closing the world’s dietary nutrient gap—that between country-level

nutrient supply and population requirements—for energy, protein, iron, zinc, vitamin A, vitamin B12 and folate under five climate-friendly intervention scenarios in 2030. We show that improving crop and livestock productivity and halving food loss and waste can close the nutrient gap with up to 42% lower emissions (3.03 Gt CO₂eq yr⁻¹) compared with business-as-usual supply patterns with a persistent nutrient gap (5.48 Gt CO₂eq yr⁻¹).”).

³²⁰ In the U.S. alone, natural gas stoves emit 28.1 Gg of methane a year, among other climate pollutants that are hazardous to the environment and human health: see Lebel E. D., Finnegan C. J., Ouyang Z., & Jackson R. B. (2022) [Methane and NO_x Emissions from Natural Gas Stoves, Cooktops, and Ovens in Residential Homes](#), ENVIRON. SCI. TECHNOL. 56(4): 2529–2539, 2529 (“Natural gas stoves in >40 million U.S. residences release methane (CH₄)—a potent greenhouse gas—through post-meter leaks and incomplete combustion. We quantified methane released in 53 homes during all phases of stove use: steady-state-off (appliance not in use), steady-state-on (during combustion), and transitory periods of ignition and extinguishment. We estimated that natural gas stoves emit 0.8–1.3% of the gas they use as unburned methane and that total U.S. stove emissions are 28.1 [95% confidence interval: 18.5, 41.2] Gg CH₄ year⁻¹. More than three-quarters of methane emissions we measured originated during steady-state-off. Using a 20-year timeframe for methane, annual methane emissions from all gas stoves in U.S. homes have a climate impact comparable to the annual carbon dioxide emissions of 500 000 cars. In addition to methane emissions, co-emitted health-damaging air pollutants such as nitrogen oxides (NO_x) are released into home air and can trigger respiratory diseases. In 32 homes, we measured NO_x (NO and NO₂) emissions and found them to be linearly related to the amount of natural gas burned ($r^2 = 0.76$; $p < 0.01$). Emissions averaged 21.7 [20.5, 22.9] ng NO_x J⁻¹, comprised of 7.8 [7.1, 8.4] ng NO₂ J⁻¹ and 14.0 [12.8, 15.1] ng NO J⁻¹. Our data suggest that families who don’t use their range hoods or who have poor ventilation can surpass the 1-h national standard of NO₂ (100 ppb) within a few minutes of stove usage, particularly in smaller kitchens.”).

³²¹ Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), 111 (Table 3.2).

³²² Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), 111 (Table 3.2).

³²³ Climate & Clean Air Coalition & United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN](#), 111 (Table 3.2).

³²⁴ Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “New regulations that limit methane emissions from fugitive sources—like the drilling, extraction, and transportation process—will be applied in the near term to the oil and gas sector.”). See also Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., Walter D. (May 2022), [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), 3 (“To reach net zero, our analysis shows that at least 60 percent of the natural gas that’s now being used would need to be replaced by zero-carbon energy sources, primarily in the power, manufacturing, chemicals, and buildings sectors. And methane emissions from venting and from fugitive leaks in oil and gas production would need to be curbed by nearly 80 percent by 2030.”).

³²⁵ Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “Just 7 percent of our energy is supplied by non-hydro renewables. Diversifying supply chains for materials vital to renewable infrastructure could increase the usage of renewables. Biogenic, low-carbon fuel innovations could be used in transport sectors where electricity isn’t viable”; “Model for a net-zero future in Canada” Figure); (“Small modular reactors are promising for powering remote communities and off-grid industrial projects. At scale, however, modular reactors are currently unproven. Deploying them could involve lower initial capital costs compared with their large-reactor counterparts.”).

³²⁶ Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 6 (Exhibit 4).

³²⁷ Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “As an alternative fuel, hydrogen is plentiful, non-toxic, efficient, and safe. Clean hydrogen could boost the resilience of Canada’s energy sector through various applications in the industrial sector, transportation, and buildings. New technologies can be scaled to create fresh market demand for low-carbon hydrogen, and to decarbonize those sectors that cannot yet be fully electrified. Support for hydrogen end-use technologies could provide resource-based provinces the opportunity to lead the transition to a low-carbon future.”).

³²⁸ Environment and Climate Change Canada (2017) [STRATEGY ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS – 2017](#), 7–9 (Figure 1; “Regulatory measures to address wood-burning appliances are limited at both federal and provincial/territorial levels. Some provinces regulate the sale of new wood-burning appliances, while some municipalities have by-laws relating to residential wood combustion, including emission standards, bans on certain types of appliances, or restrictions on the use of wood-burning appliances during smog days. Measures to address emissions from existing sources are limited to wood stove change-out programs or rebates for certain new appliances in some provinces and territories.”).

³²⁹ Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 3 (“To reach net zero, our analysis shows that at least 60 percent of the natural gas that’s now being used would need to be replaced by zero-carbon energy sources, primarily in the power, manufacturing, chemicals, and buildings sectors. And methane emissions from venting and from fugitive leaks in oil and gas production would need to be curbed by nearly 80 percent by 2030.”).

³³⁰ Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 6–7 (Renewable power. In a net-zero scenario, the country’s energy system would be reconfigured. Indeed, the United States has set a target to create a “carbon-pollution-free power sector by 2035.”⁵ Energy consumption would shift away from fossil fuels, which provide 90 percent of primary energy today, and toward renewables, which would produce just over 75 percent of primary energy in 2050. This shift would result in more than 35 percent of the emissions reduction that is needed in 2025 and more than onequarter of the reduction in 2030. To expand the use of renewable power, the United States would install 40 gigawatts per year of renewable capacity in 2025. By 2030, the installation rate for renewables would reach 100 gigawatts per year, three times what it is now, as utilities tap the best solar resources from Texas to California and wind resources in the Midwest. Utilities would also build out power grids and modernize them with flexibility resources including storage and dispatchable low-carbon power (for example, gas power plants with carbon capture, utilization, and storage) to prevent interruptions in electricity supply. Makers of renewable-electricity and storage equipment would expand production capacity to meet this demand, supporting \$300 billion of capital investment per year by 2025.”). See also Tai H., Samandari H., Pachthod D., Polymeneas E., Bolano A., Prat M. P., & Lodesani F. (2022) [THE ENERGY TRANSITION: A REGION-BY-REGION AGENDA FOR NEAR-TERM ACTION](#), 48 (“However, the current trajectory is not at the pace and scale the global pathway requires to limit warming to 1.5°C. There are six high-priority measures that could be taken to help the United States embark on a more orderly energy transition. . . Securing access to adequate land with high load factors for the deployment of renewables.”).

³³¹ Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “Loss of carbon contained in soils and terrestrial systems—primarily due to land-use change— perpetuates the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere at the same time as it limits the inherent ability of ecosystems to withdraw that same carbon when necessary. Decisive action in the short term can restore lost and degraded habitats, as well as protect the longevity of ecological functions and ecosystem services. With a commitment to long-term funding, protected areas can be properly stewarded. Indigenous knowledge and practices in sustainable land and resource management can also be applied to achieve a net-zero future. There is much to be learnt from Indigenous practices in sustainable resource management; from traditions that dictate taking from the land only what’s needed, and only what nature can replace.”). See also Robertson G. P., Hamilton S. K., Paustian K., & Smith P. (2022) [Land-based Climate Solutions for the United States](#), GLOB. CHANGE BIOL. 28: 4912–4919, 4913 (“Efforts to curb emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) have fallen well short of those needed to meet the international goal of limiting warming to 1.5 or even 2°C by the end of the century (IPCC, 2018). Consequently, we now face an urgent need for negative emissions technologies (NETs) capable of removing GHGs from the atmosphere. NETs fall into

three broad categories (Field & Mach, 2017): improved ecosystem stewardship or nature-based solutions, whereby more carbon is stored in ecosystems via practices like reforestation and afforestation, conservation agriculture, and wetland restoration; biological carbon capture with geologic storage as in bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and ocean fertilization; and non-biological technologies such as enhanced rock weathering and direct air capture. Several NETs, including conservation agriculture and bioenergy, can also contribute to GHG avoidance by substituting renewable inputs for fossil fuel use.”); and Fargione J. E., *et al.* (2018) [Natural Climate Solutions for the United States](#), SCI. ADV. 4(11): 1–14, 1 (“Natural climate solutions (NCS), a portfolio of discrete land stewardship options, are the most mature approaches available for carbon conservation and uptake compared to nascent carbon capture technologies and could complement increases in zero-carbon energy production and energy efficiency to achieve needed climate change mitigation.”).

³³² Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “CCUS is the process of capturing carbon dioxide emissions at sources like power plants, cement-production facilities, manufacturing operations, and oil sands, and either reusing or storing it so it will not enter the atmosphere. With five large-scale commercial projects now in operation, Canada has the second-largest CCUS capacity in the world. Most CCUS technologies, however, are still in the early stages of development. They would benefit from scaled demonstration and continued innovation to refine the technology and manage costs.”).

³³³ Robertson G. P., Hamilton S. K., Paustian K., & Smith P. (2022) [Land-based Climate Solutions for the United States](#), GLOB. CHANGE BIOL. 28: 4912–4919, 4913 (“Efforts to curb emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) have fallen well short of those needed to meet the international goal of limiting warming to 1.5 or even 2°C by the end of the century (IPCC, 2018). Consequently, we now face an urgent need for negative emissions technologies (NETs) capable of removing GHGs from the atmosphere. NETs fall into three broad categories (Field & Mach, 2017): improved ecosystem stewardship or nature-based solutions, whereby more carbon is stored in ecosystems via practices like reforestation and afforestation, conservation agriculture, and wetland restoration; biological carbon capture with geologic storage as in bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and ocean fertilization; and non-biological technologies such as enhanced rock weathering and direct air capture. Several NETs, including conservation agriculture and bioenergy, can also contribute to GHG avoidance by substituting renewable inputs for fossil fuel use.”).

³³⁴ Robertson G. P., Hamilton S. K., Paustian K., & Smith P. (2022) [Land-based Climate Solutions for the United States](#), GLOB. CHANGE BIOL. 28: 4912–4919, 4913 (“Efforts to curb emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) have fallen well short of those needed to meet the international goal of limiting warming to 1.5 or even 2°C by the end of the century (IPCC, 2018). Consequently, we now face an urgent need for negative emissions technologies (NETs) capable of removing GHGs from the atmosphere. NETs fall into three broad categories (Field & Mach, 2017): improved ecosystem stewardship or nature-based solutions, whereby more carbon is stored in ecosystems via practices like reforestation and afforestation, conservation agriculture, and wetland restoration; biological carbon capture with geologic storage as in bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and ocean fertilization; and non-biological technologies such as enhanced rock weathering and direct air capture. Several NETs, including conservation agriculture and bioenergy, can also contribute to GHG avoidance by substituting renewable inputs for fossil fuel use.”). See also Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; (“An area in which Canada is an emerging world leader, clean DAC is contingent on the scale and progress of advancements in this technology. Since DAC consumes energy, its economic and environmental viability depends its proximity to renewable energy sources.”).

³³⁵ Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 6 (Exhibit 4).

³³⁶ Nisbet-Jones P. B. R., Fernandez J. M., Fisher R. E., France J. L., Lowry D., Waltham D. A., Woolley Maisch C. A., & Nisbet E. G. (2021) [Is the destruction or removal of atmospheric methane a worthwhile option?](#), PHILOS. TRANS. R. SOC. A 380(2215): 1–12, 5 (“Methane is relatively difficult to oxidize compared to other hydrocarbons. The major destruction options include (i) thermal-catalytic oxidation, which is typically with metal catalysts; (ii) photocatalytic oxidation; (iii) biological uptake by aerobic methanotrophic bacteria or their bio-engineered methane-oxidising enzymes and (iv) removal by uptake on zeolites or porous polymers, with the added benefit of not emitting CO₂

waste.”). See also Ming T., Li W., Yuan Q., Davies P., de Richter R., Peng C., Deng Q., Yuan Y., Caillol S., & Zhou N. (2022) [Perspectives on removal of atmospheric methane](#), ADV. APPL. ENER. 5(100086): 1–9, 1 (“This article reviews proposed methods for atmospheric methane removal at a climatically significant scale. These methods include enhancement of natural hydroxyl and chlorine sinks, photocatalysis in solar updraft towers, zeolite catalyst in direct air capture devices, and methanotrophic bacteria.”).

³³⁷ Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “Canada must invest more in technologies that improve energy efficiencies for transportation, buildings, industrial, and agricultural and forestry operations. Near-term investment in sustainable retrofits for buildings and homes will be needed to improve that resilience to climate events. Policies to incentivize both residential and commercial retrofits can be accelerated and expanded to encourage the widespread adoption of technology that improves energy efficiencies in buildings.”; “Canada must invest more in technologies that improve energy efficiencies for transportation, buildings, industrial, and agricultural and forestry operations. Policies to incentivize both eco-friendly retrofits can be expanded to accelerate the adoption of technology that improves energy efficiencies in buildings.”). See also Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 2 (“Reducing emissions from existing facilities and infrastructure is a major part of the decarbonization agenda. Much of the necessary reduction can come from retrofitting emissions-intensive assets, such as chemical, manufacturing, and power plants, through electrification, the use of low-emissions energy sources (such as hydrogen and biofuels), and carbon capture.”).

³³⁸ Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 2 (“Reducing emissions from existing facilities and infrastructure is a major part of the decarbonization agenda. Much of the necessary reduction can come from retrofitting emissions-intensive assets, such as chemical, manufacturing, and power plants, through electrification, the use of low-emissions energy sources (such as hydrogen and biofuels), and carbon capture.”).

³³⁹ Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 10 (“As mentioned earlier, hundreds of US-based companies have set net-zero targets for themselves. Many of these targets apply to the emissions from not only their own operations but also their suppliers and the use of their products. Similarly, the White House issued an executive order in December 2021, calling for the federal government to buy zeroemissions goods and services in categories ranging from electricity to vehicles to building materials. Commitments such as these could put pressure on businesses to decarbonize, even if they themselves have not yet set emissions targets (Exhibit 7).”).

³⁴⁰ Deloitte, [How Canada can decarbonize by 2050](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “Turning electricity into a major source of power will require more infrastructure support and investment, like expanding and modernizing electricity grids to make widespread electric vehicle use affordable. Increased investments in electric buses and rail could encourage cleaner-energy transit systems.”).

³⁴¹ Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [NAVIGATING AMERICA’S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 5–6, 12 (“Some changes will be possible only if other entities also make changes; for example, mass uptake of electric vehicles depends significantly on the utility sector expanding grid capacity to support charging networks. In these cases, companies may find it helpful to join other organizations in addressing shared needs, such as the need for industrial-scale networks in hydrogen production and distribution.”).

³⁴² Environment and Climate Change Canada (2017) [STRATEGY ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS – 2017](#), 8 (“Based on an assessment of current measures related to black carbon emissions, key mitigation gaps for black carbon include existing on- and off-road mobile diesel sources, stationary diesel engines and wood-burning appliances. In the case of on- and off- road mobile diesel sources, current federal regulatory measures focus on fuels as well as new vehicles and engines. These have and will continue to result in black carbon emission reductions as fleets turn over. However, due to the long lifetimes of diesel vehicles, turnover of the in-use fleet is slow, and fleets are still dominated

by engines pre-dating the most recent emissions standards. Although some provinces and territories have implemented measures focusing on existing vehicles, on- and off- road diesel vehicles and engines continue to be Canada's largest source of black carbon emissions.”).

³⁴³ Balafoutis A., Beck B., Fountas S., Vangeyte J., van der Wal T., Soto I., Gómez-Barbero M., Barnes A., & Eory V. (2017) [*Precision Agriculture Technologies Positively Contributing to GHG Emissions Mitigation, Farm Productivity and Economics*](#), SUSTAINABILITY 9(8): 1339, 1–28, 9 (“Tekin (2010) estimated that VRNA can increase wheat production between 1% and 10% offering savings in nitrogen fertilisation between 4% and 37%.”). See also Butler A. H., Daniel J. S., Portmann R. W., Ravishankara A. R., Young P. J., Fahey D. W., & Rosenlof K. H. (2016) [*Diverse policy implications for future ozone and surface UV in a changing climate*](#), ENV. RES. LETT. 11(6): 064017, 1–7, 4 (“A key point is that if the world were to achieve reductions of CO₂ and CH₄ concentrations to RCP 2.6 levels, N₂O mitigation would become important to avoid exacerbation of both climate change and ozone layer depletion.”).

³⁴⁴ Deloitte, [*How Canada can decarbonize by 2050*](#) (last visited 28 June 2023) (“Model for a net-zero future in Canada”; “Canada must invest more in technologies that improve energy efficiencies for transportation, buildings, industrial, and agricultural and forestry operations.”). See also Clune R., Corb L., Glazener W., Henderson K., Pinner D., & Walter D. (2022) [*NAVIGATING AMERICA'S NET-ZERO FRONTIER: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS LEADERS*](#), McKinsey Sustainability, 6 (Exhibit 4).

³⁴⁵ Pérez-Domínguez I., del Prado A., Mittenzwei K., Hristov J., Frank S., Tabeau A., Witzke P., Havlik P., van Meijl H., Lynch J., Stehfest E., Pardo G., Barreiro-Hurle J., Koopman J. F. L., & Sanz-Sánchez M. J. (2021) [*Short- and Long-term Warming Effects of Methane May Affect the Cost-effectiveness of Mitigation Policies and Benefits of Low-meat Diets*](#), NAT. FOOD 2: 970–980, 970 (“Methane’s short atmospheric life has important implications for the design of global climate change mitigation policies in agriculture. Three different agricultural economic models are used to explore how short- and long-term warming effects of methane can affect the cost-effectiveness of mitigation policies and dietary transitions. Results show that the choice of a particular metric for methane’s warming potential is key to determine optimal mitigation options, with metrics based on shorter-term impacts leading to greater overall emission reduction. Also, the promotion of low-meat diets is more effective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions compared to carbon pricing when mitigation policies are based on metrics that reflect methane’s long-term behaviour. A combination of stringent mitigation measures and dietary changes could achieve substantial emission reduction levels, helping reverse the contribution of agriculture to global warming.”).

³⁴⁶ Environment and Climate Change Canada (2017) [*STRATEGY ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS – 2017*](#), 10 (“Forthcoming federal, provincial and territorial measures under development to address oil and gas sources will address the largest mitigation gap for this SLCP. The key remaining mitigation gaps for methane are for municipal solid waste landfills and agriculture sources (enteric fermentation in particular).”).

³⁴⁷ Lin J., Khanna N., Liu X., Wang W., Gordon J., & Dai F. (2022) [*Opportunities to Tackle Short-lived Climate Pollutants and Other Greenhouse Gases for China*](#), SCI. TOTAL ENVIRON. 842(156842): 1–17, 11 (“Outside of the energy sector, the United States has also seen some federal and state action in reducing methane emissions from landfills. In 2010, the California Air Resources Board adopted a rule requiring methane controls on all landfills with >450 tons of waste in place, restricting flares, and requiring ongoing monitoring and reporting mandates for all landfills (California Air Resources Board, 2021a). California’s 2015 SLCP Bill (SB-1383) also included quantitative goals for diverting organic waste from landfills to reduce methane emissions (California Senate, 2016b).”).

³⁴⁸ Environment and Climate Change Canada (2017) [*STRATEGY ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS – 2017*](#), 10 (“Forthcoming federal, provincial and territorial measures under development to address oil and gas sources will address the largest mitigation gap for this SLCP. The key remaining mitigation gaps for methane are for municipal solid waste landfills and agriculture sources (enteric fermentation in particular).”).

³⁴⁹ Lin J., Khanna N., Liu X., Wang W., Gordon J., & Dai F. (2022) [*Opportunities to Tackle Short-lived Climate Pollutants and Other Greenhouse Gases for China*](#), SCI. TOTAL ENVIRON. 842 (156842): 1–17, 11 (“Outside of the energy sector, the United States has also seen some federal and state action in reducing methane emissions from

landfills. In 2010, the California Air Resources Board adopted a rule requiring methane controls on all landfills with >450 tons of waste in place, restricting flares, and requiring ongoing monitoring and reporting mandates for all landfills (California Air Resources Board, 2021a).”).

³⁵⁰ Moomaw W. R., Masino S. A., & Faison E. K. (2019) [*Intact Forests in the United States: Proforestation Mitigates Climate Change and Serves the Greatest Good*](#), FRONT. FOR. GLOB. CHANGE 2(27): 1–10, 1 (“The recent 1.5 Degree Warming Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change identifies reforestation and afforestation as important strategies to increase negative emissions, but they face significant challenges: afforestation requires an enormous amount of additional land, and neither strategy can remove sufficient carbon by growing young trees during the critical next decade(s). In contrast, growing existing forests intact to their ecological potential—termed proforestation—is a more effective, immediate, and low-cost approach that could be mobilized across suitable forests of all types. Proforestation serves the greatest public good by maximizing co-benefits such as nature-based biological carbon sequestration and unparalleled ecosystem services such as biodiversity enhancement, water and air quality, flood and erosion control, public health benefits, low impact recreation, and scenic beauty.”).

³⁵¹ Penniman L. (2021) *Black Gold*, in [ALL WE CAN SAVE: TRUTH, COURAGE, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS](#), Johnson A. E. & Wilkinson K. K. (eds.), One World, 305 (“Our ancestral practices are bolstered by Western science and listed among the most substantive solutions to global warming, per Project Drawdown’s analysis....”).

³⁵² Sobrevilla C. (2008) [THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION: THE NATURAL BUT OFTEN FORGOTTEN PARTNERS](#), World Bank, xii (“Traditional Indigenous Territories encompass up to 22 percent of the world’s land surface and they coincide with areas that hold 80 percent of the planet’s biodiversity. Also, the greatest diversity of indigenous groups coincides with the world’s largest tropical forest wilderness areas in the Americas (including Amazon), Africa, and Asia, and 11 percent of world forest lands are legally owned by Indigenous Peoples and communities. This convergence of biodiversity-significant areas and indigenous territories presents an enormous opportunity to expand efforts to conserve biodiversity beyond parks, which tend to benefit from most of the funding for biodiversity conservation”). See also United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2021) [STATE OF THE WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: RIGHTS TO LANDS, TERRITORIES AND RESOURCES](#), ST/ESA/375, 163 (“According to a World Bank report, traditional indigenous territories constitute up to 22 per cent of the world’s land surface.⁵⁴⁰ A recent report maintains that indigenous peoples and local communities customarily claim and manage more than 50 per cent of the world’s land but legally own just 10 per cent, which means that at least 40 per cent of the world’s land — around 5 billion hectares — remains unprotected and vulnerable to commercial pressures, including land-grabbing by powerful entities such as Governments and corporations, as well as environmental destruction.”).

³⁵³ Veit P., Gibbs D., & Reyter K. (6 January 2023) [Indigenous Forests Are Some of the Amazon’s Last Carbon Sinks](#), WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (“Our analysis of carbon emissions and removals finds that Indigenous forests in all nine Amazonian countries were net carbon sinks between 2001 and 2021, collectively emitting an average of 120 million tonnes of CO₂e per year and removing 460 million tonnes CO₂/year, making them a net sink of 340 million tonnes of CO₂e/year.⁴ However, the relative magnitudes of emissions and removals — known as carbon fluxes — varied greatly between countries.”).

³⁵⁴ Stevens C., Winterbottom R., Springer J., & Raytar K. (2014) [SECURING RIGHTS, COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE](#), World Resources Institute & Rights and Resources Initiative, 10 (“There is strong evidence that strengthening community forest rights is associated with healthy forests. For example, a recent study measured carbon in 30 community forests over three to four years, covering Guinea Bissau, India, Mali, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, and Tanzania. The 30 community forests showed an overall average increase in forest carbon storage of 4.9 tonnes per hectare per year.¹⁶ In three forests, total carbon stock decreased due to illegal clear-cutting for cropland by non-community members.¹⁷ A separate analysis of 80 forests in 10 countries across Latin America, East Africa, and South Asia found that community forest management is associated with high levels of carbon storage.¹⁸”). See also Rights and Resources Initiative (2015) [WHO OWNS THE WORLD’S LAND? A GLOBAL BASELINE OF FORMALLY RECOGNIZED INDIGENOUS AND COMMUNITY LAND RIGHTS](#), 22 (“The success of policies to mitigate climate change and promote forest restoration also hinge on secure community tenure. Comparative global research has found that legal forest rights for Indigenous Peoples and local communities and government protection of those rights tend to lower

deforestation and carbon emissions, whereas deforestation rates tend to be higher where communities' land rights are not secure.¹⁹²"); and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2021) [STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: RIGHTS TO LANDS, TERRITORIES AND RESOURCES](#), ST/ESA/375, 27 ("Recognizing indigenous rights to lands, territories and resources can contribute to political stability, economic growth and sustainable development at the broader global level. Acknowledgement of such rights carries environmental benefits. It has been noted that recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to lands, territories and resources promotes the protection of ecosystems, waterways, biological diversity, and the general maintenance of natural resources.⁹² Respect for such rights can actually contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation. Studies point to lower deforestation in forests that are inhabited by indigenous peoples and in which their relevant rights are recognized.⁹³ Evidence of the relationship between indigenous peoples and their lands, territories and resources suggests that acknowledgement of and respect for indigenous rights in this regard would likely be conducive to promoting the Sustainable Development Goals.⁹⁴").

³⁵⁵ Stevens C., Winterbottom R., Springer J., & Raytar K. (2014) [SECURING RIGHTS, COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE](#), World Resources Institute & Rights and Resources Initiative, 27 ("These findings are supported by a WRI deforestation analysis for the Brazilian Amazon. From 2000 to 2012, forest loss was only 0.6 percent inside Indigenous Lands compared with 7.0 percent outside. (See Figure 4.) Figure 5 shows a section of the Brazilian Amazon under intense deforestation pressure. Forest loss between 2000 and 2012 is clustered close to, but rarely inside, the borders of Indigenous Lands.").

³⁵⁶ Stevens C., Winterbottom R., Springer J., & Raytar K. (2014) [SECURING RIGHTS, COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE](#), World Resources Institute & Rights and Resources Initiative, 29 ("The Brazilian government generally protects Indigenous Peoples' forest rights, but Indigenous Peoples often forcefully defend their own forest by expelling loggers, ranchers, and other intruders.⁶⁷ Indigenous Lands are the only areas of the Amazon with roads cutting across them that have not succumbed to deforestation.⁶⁸ The roads do not always go around Indigenous Lands, but the deforestation does. As a result, community forests in the Brazilian Amazon tend to be relatively carbon-rich, containing 36 percent more carbon per hectare than areas of the Brazilian Amazon outside Indigenous Lands (see Figure 4).⁶⁹ WRI analysis of deforestation and carbon stock found that 27 times more CO₂ emissions were produced outside Indigenous Lands than inside from 2000 to 2012. Forest cover loss of 22.5 million hectares in the Brazilian Amazon outside Indigenous Lands resulted in 8.7 billion tonnes of CO₂ emitted during those years. In the same period, 311 million tonnes of CO₂ emissions were produced from deforestation of about 677,000 hectares of forest on Indigenous Lands.").

³⁵⁷ Stevens C., Winterbottom R., Springer J., & Raytar K. (2014) [SECURING RIGHTS, COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE](#), World Resources Institute & Rights and Resources Initiative, 29 ("Brazil's Indigenous Lands therefore play a significant role in keeping CO₂ emissions from the atmosphere. One estimate suggests that Indigenous Lands and government-protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon could prevent 27.2 million hectares of deforestation by 2050, an area slightly larger than the United Kingdom. If the carbon in this large forest area were emitted as CO₂, it would amount to approximately 12 billion tonnes of CO₂ ⁷⁰—the equivalent of about three years' worth of CO₂ emissions from all Latin American and Caribbean countries.⁷¹").

³⁵⁸ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2019) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [THE OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE](#), *Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Pörtner H.-O., et al. (eds.), SPM-30 ("Restoration of vegetated coastal ecosystems, such as mangroves, tidal marshes and seagrass meadows (coastal 'blue carbon' ecosystems), could provide climate change mitigation through increased carbon uptake and storage of around 0.5% of current global emissions annually (*medium confidence*). Improved protection and management can reduce carbon emissions from these ecosystems.").

³⁵⁹ Soares M. O., Bezerra L. E. A., Copertino M., Lopes B. D., de Souza Barros K. V., Rocha-Barreira C. A., Maia R. C., Beloto N., & Cotovicz Jr. L. C. (2022) [Blue Carbon Ecosystems in Brazil: Overview and an Urgent Call for Conservation and Restoration](#), FRONT. MAR. SCI. 9: 1–16, 1 ("While terrestrial ecosystems have been the focus of nature-based solutions, the role of coastal and marine ecosystems remains unaccounted for in several national emission inventories and not included in the National Determined Contributions (NDC) ([Duarte, 2017](#)). Over the last decade,

ocean and terrestrial ecosystems have sequestered approximately 52% of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions, with average rates of approximately 2.5 ± 0.6 and 3.4 ± 0.9 GtC year⁻¹, respectively (Friendlingstein et al., 2019). However, some processes and ecosystems, such as coastal areas, are not fully accounted for in the global carbon budget. The CO₂ that is captured from the atmosphere and sequestered in coastal and marine environments, mostly vegetated ecosystems such as mangroves, salt marshes, and seagrass meadows, is collectively known as blue carbon (BC) and consists of both organic and inorganic forms (Nellemann et al., 2009).”).

³⁶⁰ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, [Coastal Blue Carbon](#) (last visited 15 June 2023) (“Current studies suggest that mangroves and coastal wetlands annually sequester carbon at a rate ten times greater than mature tropical forests. They also store three to five times more carbon per equivalent area than tropical forests. Most coastal blue carbon is stored in the soil, not in above-ground plant materials as with tropical forests.”).

³⁶¹ Chatting M., Al-Maslamani I., Walton M., Skov M. W., Kennedy H., Husrevoglu Y. S., & Le Vay L. (2022) [Future Mangrove Carbon Storage Under Climate Change and Deforestation](#), FRONT. MAR. SCI. 9: 1–14, 7 (“Our projections showed that, globally, increases in total C stocks (biomass + soil) induced by climate change would exceed emissions from mangrove deforestation between 2012 and 2095 (Table 3). Under a “business as usual” climate scenario these net gains represent an increase of $7.05 \pm 7.89\%$ (SSP245) or $7.71 \pm 9.47\%$ under a high-end scenario (SSP585) of present day global total C stocks. Total global losses from mangrove deforestation from 2012 to 2095 (Table 1) were estimated to be $61.4 \pm 10.1\%$ (SSP245) or $55.6 \pm 9.1\%$ (SSP585) of the potential gains in C stocks due to climate change. In contrast, CSR were forecast to decline by $2.60 \pm 3.57\%$ under scenario SSP245 and by $6.44 \pm 3.63\%$ under scenario SSP585 (Table 1).”).

³⁶² The Economist Group (8 November 2021) [Checking in on ocean-based climate solutions](#), ECONOMIST IMPACT, 5–6 (“The potential of the ocean for accelerating decarbonisation, however, merits increased priority in the global climate-change discourse. The High-Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy (HLP), a multilateral group comprising representatives from 14 oceanic countries, estimates that by 2050 ocean-based climate mitigation and carbon storage options could make up 21% of the emissions reductions needed to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Put differently, this equates to more than all current global emissions from coal-fired power plants worldwide.”).

³⁶³ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, [What is REDD+](#) (last visited 18 July 2023) (“‘REDD’ stands for ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The ‘+’ stands for additional forest-related activities that protect the climate, namely sustainable management of forests and the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.”).

³⁶⁴ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, [What is REDD+](#) (last visited 18 July 2023) (“The REDD+ Success Story... The UN Climate Change secretariat has been undertaking REDD+ technical assessments for 10 years. In total, 60 developing countries have reported REDD+ activities to the UN Climate Change secretariat. As a result of REDD+ activities, 14 of these countries reported a reduction of almost 11 billion tons of carbon dioxide, almost twice the amount of net greenhouse gas emissions from the United States in 2021, and are now eligible to seek results-based finance.”).

³⁶⁵ United Nations-REDD Programme, [REDD+ MRV and results-based payments](#) (last visited 18 July 2023) (“In this context, the COP affirmed that the progression of developing country Parties towards results-based actions occurs in the context of the provision of adequate and predictable support for all phases of REDD+ implementation. The COP also reaffirmed that results-based finance provided to developing country Parties for the full implementation of REDD+ may come from a variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources.”).

³⁶⁶ United Nations-REDD Programme, [Lima REDD+ Information Hub](#) (last visited 18 July 2023) (See table column title “Entity paying for results” to review groups that are financing results of REDD+ projects).

³⁶⁷ United Nations-REDD Programme (2013) [GUIDELINES ON FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT](#), Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development Programme, & United Nations Environment Program, 11

(“Consistent with international law, States are required to recognize and carry out their duties and obligations to give effect to the requirement of FPIC as applicable to indigenous peoples; and recognizing the right of forest-dependent communities to effectively participate in the governance of their nations, at a minimum States are required to consult forest-dependent communities in good faith regarding matters that affect them *with a view to agreement*. Appreciating that international law, jurisprudence and State practice is still in its infancy with respect to *expressly* recognizing and requiring an affirmative obligation to secure FPIC from all forest-dependent communities, a blanket application of FPIC is not required for all forest-dependent communities... States should evaluate the circumstances and nature of the forest-dependent community in question, on a case by case basis, through among others a rights-based analysis, and secure FPIC from communities that share common characteristics with indigenous peoples and whose underlying substantive rights are significantly implicated.”).

³⁶⁸ Barletti J. P. S., Vigil N. H., & Larson A. M. (2023) [*Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?*](#), Center for International Forestry Research & International Center for Research in Agroforestry, 2 (“Critics and grassroots sceptics (e.g. the ‘No rights, no REDD’ movement) centred on two key issues: the potential restrictions in communities’ access to forests and forest resources – including potential land grabbing associated with REDD+ as a new source of income – and the attribution of carbon rights that would allow for the commercialization of emission reductions (Corbera et al. 2011; Patel et al. 2013).”).

³⁶⁹ Barletti J. P. S., Vigil N. H., & Larson A. M. (2023) [*Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?*](#), Center for International Forestry Research & International Center for Research in Agroforestry, 4 (“Physical and/or economic displacement is to be “avoided” rather than prohibited and, in most cases, displacements are only considered as such if they involve formally recognized communities. Most standards require compensation or restitution for resettlement that improves or at least restores livelihood levels, although not all require consultations with the affected groups to inform or guide these processes, which, for IPs, infringes upon UNDRIP-recognized rights to self-determination.”).

³⁷⁰ Barletti J. P. S., Vigil N. H., & Larson A. M. (2023) [*Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?*](#), Center for International Forestry Research & International Center for Research in Agroforestry, 4 (“Scheba and Rakotonarivo (2016) report REDD+-related land-use conflicts in Tanzania as part of the wider REDD+ effort. Raftopoulos (2016) reports on one REDD+ project that led to the enclosure of common forests, sparking conflicts between and within villages over land ownership and access; this followed an announcement that community compensation would depend on the area of forest protected (see Ngendakumana et al. (2013) for a similar case in Cameroon). In this context, Beymer-Farris et al. (2012) reveal how punitive conservation efforts have been supported by a discourse that portrays Indigenous Peoples as recent migrants that destroy forests, reflecting a complex and contested history regarding both indigeneity and migration.”). *See also* Bezner Kerr R., Hasegawa T., Lasco R., Bhatt I., Deryng D., Farrell A., Gurney-Smith H., Ju H., Lluch-Cota S., Meza F., Nelson G., Neufeldt H., & Thornton P. (2022) [*Chapter 5: Food, Fibre, and Other Ecosystem Products*](#), in [*CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY*](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 5-757 (Table 5.8 Challenges and solutions for REDD+).

³⁷¹ Barletti J. P. S., Vigil N. H., & Larson A. M. (2023) [*Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?*](#), Center for International Forestry Research & International Center for Research in Agroforestry, 2 (“Critics and grassroots sceptics (e.g. the ‘No rights, no REDD’ movement) centred on two key issues: the potential restrictions in communities’ access to forests and forest resources – including potential land grabbing associated with REDD+ as a new source of income – and the attribution of carbon rights that would allow for the commercialization of emission reductions (Corbera et al. 2011; Patel et al. 2013).”).

³⁷² Barletti J. P. S., Vigil N. H., & Larson A. M. (2023) [*Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?*](#), Center for International Forestry Research & International Center for Research in Agroforestry, 1 (“Despite mention of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in UNFCCC decisions regarding REDD+, including the Cancun safeguards, initiatives have not placed importance on

the wide scope of rights it recognizes; if respect for UNDRIP were more central – with specific requirements and indicators to monitor progress – standards could catalyse a rights-responsive transformation in climate actions.”). See also United Nations-REDD Programme (2013) [GUIDELINES ON FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT](#), Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development Programme, & United Nations Environment Program, 15 (“Further, in the context of REDD+, although the term ‘FPIC’ is not expressly referred to in the Cancun Agreements or in the Appendix on REDD+ safeguards, FPIC is addressed indirectly because the text ‘note[s]’ that the General Assembly has adopted UNDRIP (which itself sets out the principle of FPIC). Securing FPIC is a means to meet the Cancun Agreements’ requirement of countries to promote and support ‘respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities’ and to ensure ‘the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, inter alia, indigenous peoples and local communities.’”).

³⁷³ See World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 16 (“A large area centred around the central-northern part of Argentina, southern Bolivia, central Chile, and most of Paraguay and Uruguay experienced record-breaking temperatures during two consecutive heatwaves in late November and early December 2022. In Chile, forest fires caused significant damage to the flora and fauna after the burning of the Chilean Palm, a species native to the Valparaíso region.⁵⁸ In the Bolivian Amazon, during the heatwave from 25 to 30 November, the city of Cobija recorded 37.7 °C on 28 November (the mean monthly maximum is 30.8 °C).⁵⁹”); and World Meteorological Organization (2022) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2021](#), No. 1295, 20 (“Heatwaves were reported in many parts of the LAC region. In Argentina, several locations recorded 6–8 days in a row with heatwave conditions. An all-time temperature record was set in Cipolletti (43.8 °C) and Maquinchao (38.9 °C) on 22 January.⁵⁵ In west-central Brazil, in August 2021, exceptionally high temperatures were reported⁵⁶ over several days. For example, in Cuiabá, in the state of Mato Grosso, maximum temperatures reached 41 °C on 24 and 25 August (about 7 °C above normal), accompanied by critically low humidity levels, mainly in the central regions (relative humidity of approximately 8%–11%). On 21 September, Aragarças/Goiás reached 43.0 °C, the highest value for September at this station (the previous highest value was 41.5 °C on 14 September 2019). In Chile, up to 18 heatwave episodes during the year affected different regions of the country.⁵⁷ Some of them were very intense, including those that affected the Santiago region from 11 to 13 April (with a maximum temperature of 31.4 °C), and Valdivia from 2 to 5 February (37.3 °C) and then from 7 to 10 February (35.1 °C). On 27 February, Puerto Williams, Chile (considered the southern-most town in the world), registered its highest temperature on record, since 1961, of 26.1 °C (the previous record being 26.0 °C on 22 December 1984).⁵⁸ In Paraguay, a heatwave occurred from 18 to 20 September, with temperatures reaching 38.2 °C in Pedro Juan Caballero. In Peru, on 13 April, Jepelacio (northern Amazonia) reached 34.2 °C (the previous highest temperature was 33.6 °C on 23 November 2016).”).

³⁷⁴ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuví N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1708 (Table 12.2).

³⁷⁵ World Weather Attribution (21 December 2022) [Climate change made record breaking early season heat in Argentina and Paraguay about 60 times more likely](#) (“The 2022 heatwave has led to large-scale power outages, wildfires and, in combination with the ongoing drought, poor harvests. It is estimated to have led to an increase in heat-related deaths, with the impacts unequally distributed across In different cities and municipalities across South America, people living in some areas – often poorer neighbourhoods – experience higher temperatures than others, as they lack green space, adequate thermal insulation from heat, electricity, shade, and water which can be lifelines during heatwaves.... We find that human-caused climate change made the event about 60 times more likely. Alternatively, a heatwave with a similar probability would be about 1.4°C less hot in a world that had not been warmed by human activities.”); discussing Rivera J. A., et al. (2022) [CLIMATE CHANGE MADE RECORD BREAKING EARLY SEASON HEAT IN ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY ABOUT 60 TIMES MORE LIKELY](#), World Weather Attribution.

³⁷⁶ World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 17 (“The prolonged dry conditions associated with high temperatures led to record wildfires in January and February in Argentina and Paraguay. There was an increase of 283% and 258%, respectively, in the number of hotspots detected when compared to the 2001–2021 average.⁶¹ From January to March 2022, wildfire emissions were the highest in the last 20 years in Paraguay and northern Argentina.”).

³⁷⁷ World Weather Attribution (21 December 2022) [Climate change made record breaking early season heat in Argentina and Paraguay about 60 times more likely](#) (“With future global warming, heatwaves like this will become even more common and hotter. If global mean temperatures rise an additional 8°C, to a total warming of 2°C, a heatwave as hot as this one would be about 4 times more likely than it is now, while a heatwave that happens approximately once in 20 years would be 0.7–1.2°C hotter than this one.”); *discussing* Rivera J. A., *et al.* (2022) [CLIMATE CHANGE MADE RECORD BREAKING EARLY SEASON HEAT IN ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY ABOUT 60 TIMES MORE LIKELY](#), World Weather Attribution.

³⁷⁸ United States Environmental Protection Agency (1 August 2022) [Climate Change Indicators: Heat Waves](#) (Figure 1).

³⁷⁹ Government of Canada (24 January 2022) [Extreme heat events: Overview](#) (“Many places in Canada face extreme heat events, often called “heat waves.” These events involve high temperatures and high humidity. A changing climate can mean longer and more intense heat events that can be dangerous for your health. Heat events frequently cause death. Heat wave tragedies have killed more than: ... 595 people in British Columbia (2021)...”)

³⁸⁰ White R. H., *et al.* (2023) [The unprecedented Pacific Northwest heatwave of June 2021](#), NAT. COMMUN. 14(727): 1–20, 1 (“In late June 2021 a heatwave of unprecedented magnitude impacted the Pacific Northwest region of Canada and the United States. Many locations broke all time maximum temperature records by more than 5 °C, and the Canadian national temperature record was broken by 4.6 °C, with a new record temperature of 49.6 °C. Here, we provide a comprehensive summary of this event and its impacts. Upstream diabatic heating played a key role in the magnitude of this anomaly. Weather forecasts provided advanced notice of the event, while sub-seasonal forecasts showed an increased likelihood of a heat extreme with lead times of 10–20 days. The impacts of this event were catastrophic, including hundreds of attributable deaths across the Pacific Northwest, mass mortalities of marine life, reduced crop and fruit yields, river flooding from rapid snow and glacier melt, and a substantial increase in wildfires—the latter contributing to landslides in the months following. These impacts provide examples we can learn from and a vivid depiction of how climate change can be so devastating.”).

³⁸¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., *et al.* (eds.), SPM-10 (“It is *virtually certain* that hot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s, while cold extremes (including cold waves) have become less frequent and less severe, with *high confidence* that human-induced climate change is the main driver^[14] of these changes. Some recent hot extremes observed over the past decade would have been *extremely unlikely* to occur without human influence on the climate system. Marine heatwaves have approximately doubled in frequency since the 1980s (*high confidence*), and human influence has *very likely* contributed to most of them since at least 2006.”). *See also* Kotz M., Wenz L., & Levermann A. (2021) [Footprint of greenhouse forcing in daily temperature variability](#), PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 118(32): 1–8, 1 (“Assessing historical changes to daily temperature variability in comparison with those from state-of-the-art climate models, we show that variability has changed with distinct global patterns over the past 65 years, changes which are attributable to rising concentrations of greenhouse gases. If these rises continue, temperature variability is projected to increase by up to 100% at low latitudes and decrease by 40% at northern high latitudes by the end of the century.”).

³⁸² World Weather Attribution (21 December 2022) [Climate change made record breaking early season heat in Argentina and Paraguay about 60 times more likely](#) (“The 2022 heatwave has led to large-scale power outages, wildfires and, in combination with the ongoing drought, poor harvests. It is estimated to have led to an increase in heat-related deaths, with the impacts unequally distributed across In different cities and municipalities across South

America, people living in some areas – often poorer neighbourhoods – experience higher temperatures than others, as they lack green space, adequate thermal insulation from heat, electricity, shade, and water which can be lifelines during heatwaves.... We find that human-caused climate change made the event about 60 times more likely. Alternatively, a heatwave with a similar probability would be about 1.4°C less hot in a world that had not been warmed by human activities.”); *discussing* Rivera J. A., *et al.* (2022) [CLIMATE CHANGE MADE RECORD BREAKING EARLY SEASON HEAT IN ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY ABOUT 60 TIMES MORE LIKELY](#), World Weather Attribution.

³⁸³ Hartinger S. M., *et al.* (2023) [The 2022 South America report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: trust the science. Now that we know, we must act](#), LANCET REG. HEALTH AM. 20(100470): 1–35, 20 (“Population exposure to wildfire danger has increased in the past decade driven by the high temperatures and increased incidence of drought in many areas, making wildfire occurrence and spread more likely, and hampering control efforts. This is particularly relevant in SA, which faces a dangerous interplay between intentional human-made wildfires -more closely linked to land use changes and deforestation, as in the Amazon, the Pantanal, and El Chaco - as well as climate-driven ones, such as the 2022's wildfire in Argentina, and Paraguay. Regionally, the population exposure to very high or extremely high wildfire danger in SA has increased in nine of out 12 countries, with a regional average increase of seven more days in 2018–2021 compared to the baseline. However, the number of exposure days across countries vary, Uruguay, Paraguay saw an increase of 3–4 exposure days, vs Argentina and Chile 14–20 days of exposure (indicator 1.2)”).

³⁸⁴ World Meteorological Organization (2022) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2021](#), No. 1295, 14 (“The 2021 Atlantic hurricane season was very active, with 21 named storms – well above the 1981–2010 average of 14 – including seven hurricanes, of which four were major hurricanes. With about US\$ 80 billion in damage (much of which occurred in the United States of America, associated with Hurricane Ida), it was also one of the costliest seasons. It was the sixth consecutive above-normal Atlantic hurricane season and the seventh consecutive year with a named storm forming before the official start to the season on 1 June (Tropical Storm Ana formed on 22 May). On 30 June, Tropical Storm Elsa (later Hurricane Elsa) became the earliest fifth named storm on record. Hurricane Elsa would become the first hurricane of the season on 2 July, and affected several territories in the Caribbean, including Barbados, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Martinique, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, the Cayman Islands and Cuba, before moving into Florida/United States.²⁶”).

³⁸⁵ World Meteorological Organization (2022) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2021](#), No. 1295, 14 (“The 2021 Atlantic hurricane season was very active, with 21 named storms – well above the 1981–2010 average of 14 – including seven hurricanes, of which four were major hurricanes. With about US\$ 80 billion in damage (much of which occurred in the United States of America, associated with Hurricane Ida), it was also one of the costliest seasons. It was the sixth consecutive above-normal Atlantic hurricane season and the seventh consecutive year with a named storm forming before the official start to the season on 1 June (Tropical Storm Ana formed on 22 May). On 30 June, Tropical Storm Elsa (later Hurricane Elsa) became the earliest fifth named storm on record. Hurricane Elsa would become the first hurricane of the season on 2 July, and affected several territories in the Caribbean, including Barbados, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Martinique, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, the Cayman Islands and Cuba, before moving into Florida/United States.²⁶”).

³⁸⁶ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1751 (“The most common climatic drivers include tropical storms and hurricanes, heavy rains, floods and droughts. Positive climatic conditions also can facilitate migration. Peru, Colombia and Guatemala are among the countries with the largest average displacements caused by hydro-meteorological causes; Brazil had 295,000 people displaced because of disasters in 2019.... Hurricanes have been seen as positive triggers for international migration in CA. The highlands of Peru see different patterns, including daily circular migration to combine the scarce income from agricultural production with urban income, rather than abandoning farm land.” (citations omitted)).

³⁸⁷ Smith A. B. (24 January 2022) [2021 U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters in historical context](#), Beyond the Data, CLIMATE.GOV (“In broader context, the total cost of U.S. billion-dollar disasters over the last 5 years (2017–2021) is \$742.1 billion, with a 5-year annual cost average of \$148.4 billion, both of which are new records and nearly triple the 42-year inflation adjusted annual average cost. The U.S. billion-dollar disaster damage costs over the last 10-years (2012–2021) were also historically large: at least \$1.0 trillion from 142 separate billion-dollar events. It is concerning that 2021 was another year in a series of years where we had a high frequency, a high cost, and large diversity of extreme events that affect people's lives and livelihoods—concerning because it hints that the extremely high activity of recent years is becoming the new normal. 2021 (red line) marks the seventh consecutive year (2015–21) in which 10 or more separate billion-dollar disaster events have impacted the U.S. The 1980–2021 annual average (black line) is 7.4 events (CPI-adjusted); the annual average for the most recent 5 years (2017–2021) is 17.2 events (CPI-adjusted).”).

³⁸⁸ George Washington University (2018) [ASCERTAINMENT OF THE ESTIMATED EXCESS MORTALITY FROM HURRICANE MARÍA IN PUERTO RICO](#), Milken Institute School of Public Health, 9 (“Results from the preferred statistical model, shown below, estimate that excess mortality due to Hurricane María using the displacement scenario is estimated at 1,271 excess deaths in September and October (95% CI: 1,154–1,383), 2,098 excess deaths from September to December (95% CI: 1,872–2,315), and, 2,975 (95% CI: 2,658–3,290) excess deaths for the total study period of September 2017 through February 2018.”). See also Rodríguez-Madera S. L., Varas-Díaz N., Padilla M., Grove K., Rivera-Bustelo K., Ramos J., Contreras-Ramírez V., Rivera-Rodríguez S., Vargas-Molina R., & Santini J. (2021) [The impact of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico's health system: post-disaster perceptions and experiences of health care providers and administrators](#), GLOB. HEALTH RES. POLICY 6(44): 2 (“The published literature addressing the effects of Hurricane Maria on the Island has exposed the severe vulnerabilities of its health care system [15–19], including lethal gaps in access to medication by patients with chronic diseases (e.g., renal disease, diabetes, respiratory diseases) [11, 20–24] and the interruption of life-sustaining treatments (e.g., dialysis, chemotherapy) [3, 15, 16]. In fact, these failures were partly responsible for the more than 3000 deaths ascribed to the natural disaster [25].”).

³⁸⁹ Cangialosi J. P., Latto A. S., & Berg R. (2021) [Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Irma](#), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Hurricane Center, 16 (“Estimates from FEMA indicate that 25% of buildings were destroyed, 65% were significantly damaged, and 90% of houses sustained some damage. Approximately 75% of the residents in the Keys evacuated before Irma.”).

³⁹⁰ Insurance Bureau of Canada (19 October 2022) [Hurricane Fiona causes \\$660 million in insured damage](#) (“Hurricane Fiona is estimated to have caused \$660 million in insured damage, according to initial estimates from Catastrophe Indices and Quantification Inc. (CatIQ).”).

³⁹¹ United States Office of Management and Budget (2022) [FEDERAL BUDGET EXPOSURE TO CLIMATE RISKS](#), 280 (“Based on methodology modifications to update results from CBO (2016),^{37,38} OMB estimates that annual Federal spending increases on coastal disaster response spending are projected to range from \$4–\$32 billion (2020 USD) annually,³⁹ with a mean of \$15 billion, in 2050.⁴⁰ By 2075 these annual increases due to projected hurricane frequency reach \$22–\$94 billion (2020\$), with a mean increase of \$50 billion. The method for developing these estimates takes into consideration the increased frequency of hurricanes impacting U.S. coastal areas as well as growth in coastal development and real GDP.”).

³⁹² World Meteorological Organization (2022) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2021](#), No. 1295, 10–11 (“Rainfall in central Mexico was around 40%–60% above normal, while north-west Mexico and Baja California recorded rainfall around 20% below normal (Figure 4a). In the north Atlantic coast and over the Yucatán peninsula, Guatemala and El Salvador, rainfall anomalies ranged from 50% below normal to 20% above normal (Figure 4b). Below normal rainfall was recorded in Belize and Nicaragua, while Costa Rica and much of Panama recorded above-normal rainfall. In the Caribbean region, below-normal rainfall was recorded in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and the small Caribbean islands (Figure 4c). For example, in much of Guadeloupe, annual rainfall was 10%–50% below normal. In South America (Figure 4d), rainfall anomalies of between 20% and 60% below normal were recorded over the central and southern regions of Chile, and 30% to 50% below normal over the south-

western Andes of Peru. Below-normal rainfall was dominant over the Paraná–La Plata Basin in south-eastern Brazil, northern Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, suggesting a late onset and weak South American Monsoon. Below-normal rainfall conditions dominated the semiarid region of north-east Brazil and the Caribbean coast of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Conversely, the western side of Colombia, central Amazonia, French Guyana, Suriname and Guyana recorded above-normal rainfall for the year. Some of the observed rainfall patterns were in line with the typical rainfall patterns associated with La Niña conditions.”).

³⁹³ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuví N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), *Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1708 (“Observed precipitation reduction in the Cerrado region impacted main water supply reservoirs for important cities in the Brazilian central region, leading to a water crisis in 2016/2017 (Government of Brazil, 2020) and affecting hydropower energy generation (Ribeiro Neto et al., 2016).”).

³⁹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020) [2020 GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT](#), 52 (“Floods triggered the majority of the 1.5 million disaster displacements recorded in the Americas in 2019, as rivers burst their banks and forced whole communities to flee (see Figure 16). Wildfires also displaced significant numbers of people in the US and Mexico, and burned large tracts of Amazon rainforest in Brazil and Bolivia. Indigenous communities may well have been displaced by the Amazon fires, but information was hard to come by.”).

³⁹⁵ World Bank Group (2022) [A ROADMAP FOR CLIMATE ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2021-2025](#), 2 (“Without concerted climate action, by 2050 over 17 million people in LAC could be forced to move to escape slow onset climate impacts, 10 swelling migration to cities and potentially increasing urban population growth by up to 10 percent. This would increase the load on basic services in the poorest urban neighborhoods most exposed to flooding, landslides and other climate impacts that are becoming increasingly frequent and severe. At the same time, endemic and emerging climate-sensitive infectious diseases are projected to increase over the coming decades through the expanded distribution of vectors.”).

³⁹⁶ World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 9 (“Rainfall in central and eastern Mexico was around 40%–60% below normal, while in north-west Mexico and the Yucatán Peninsula, rainfall was 40% above normal (Figure 6a). Baja California recorded precipitation that was around 20% below normal in the extreme south, and around 10% to 20% above normal in the rest of the region. In most of Central America, except for some locations in Guatemala, precipitation was between 10% and 40% above normal”).

³⁹⁷ United States Environmental Protection Agency (2021) [Climate Change Indicators: Heavy Precipitation](#), 6 (“EPA has determined that the time series in [Figure 1](#) has an increasing trend of approximately 0.5 percentage points per decade ($p < 0.001$) and the time series in Figure 2 has an increasing trend of approximately 0.2 percentage points per decade ($p = 0.007$). Both of these trends were calculated by ordinary least-squares regression, which is a common statistical technique for identifying a first-order trend, and both trends are statistically significant to a 95-percent confidence level.”).

³⁹⁸ Gillett N. P., Cannon A. J., Malinina E., Schnorbus M., Anslow F., Sun Q., Kirchmeier-Young M., Zwiers F., Seiler C., Zhang X., Flato G., Wan H., Li G., & Castellan A. (2022) [Human influence on the 2021 British Columbia floods](#), *WEATHER CLIM. EXTREM.* 36(100441): 1–13, 1 (“A strong atmospheric river made landfall in southwestern British Columbia, Canada on November 14th, 2021, bringing two days of intense precipitation to the region. The resulting floods and [landslides](#) led to the loss of at least five lives, cut Vancouver off entirely from the rest of Canada by road and rail, and made this the costliest natural disaster in the province's history. Here we show that when characterised in terms of storm-averaged water vapour transport, the variable typically used to characterise the intensity of atmospheric rivers, westerly atmospheric river events of this magnitude are approximately one in ten year events in the current climate of this region, and that such events have been made at least 60% more likely by the effects

of human-induced climate change. Characterised in terms of the associated two-day precipitation, the event is substantially more extreme, approximately a one in fifty to one in a hundred year event, and the probability of events at least this large has been increased by a best estimate of 45% by human-induced climate change. The effects of this precipitation on [streamflow](#) were exacerbated by already wet conditions preceding the event, and by rising temperatures during the event that led to significant snowmelt, which led to streamflow maxima exceeding estimated one in a hundred year events in several basins in the region. Based on a large ensemble of simulations with a hydrological model which integrates the effects of multiple climatic drivers, we find that the probability of such extreme streamflow events in October to December has been increased by human-induced climate change by a best estimate of 120–330%. Together these results demonstrate the substantial human influence on this compound extreme event, and help motivate efforts to increase resiliency in the face of more frequent events of this kind in the future.”).

³⁹⁹ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1698 (“Of the 47 million Central Americans in 2015, 40% lived in rural areas, with Belize being the least urbanised (54% rural) and Costa Rica the most (21% rural); 10.5 million lived in the Dry Corridor region, an area recently exposed to severe droughts that have resulted in 3.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.”) (citations omitted). See also Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2016) [Dry Corridor Central America: Situation Report](#), 1 (“The Dry Corridor in Central America, in particular Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, is experiencing one of the worst droughts of the last ten years with over 3.5 million in need of humanitarian assistance.”).

⁴⁰⁰ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1699 (“In 2019, the region [Dry Corridor in South America] entered its fifth consecutive drought year, with 1.4 million people in need of food aid. Seasonal-scale droughts are projected to lengthen by 12–30%, intensify by 17–42% and increase in frequency by 21–42% in RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios by the end of the century.”) (citations omitted).

⁴⁰¹ World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 15, 16 (“Drought affected several countries in the LAC region during 2022. In Central America, Costa Rica reported unusually dry conditions, mainly along the southern Caribbean coast (with associated meteorological drought conditions).⁴² In Mexico, the north-east states of Nuevo León and Tamaulipas were the most affected by drought in 2022. According to the Drought Monitor,⁴³ around 30% of Mexico experienced moderate to extreme drought during the whole of 2022, which is in agreement with the Integrated Drought Index (IDI) maps presented in Figure 9. By May 2022, about 56 % of Mexico was affected by moderate to exceptional drought.”; “Drought affected Puerto Rico, and by mid-June, 68% of the territory was experiencing a moderate to severe drought; this was the largest area of drought for the island in the 23-year US Drought Monitor (USDM) record.”).

⁴⁰² World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 15 (“In Mexico, the north-east states of Nuevo León and Tamaulipas were the most affected by drought in 2022. According to the Drought Monitor,⁴³ around 30% of Mexico experienced moderate to extreme drought during the whole of 2022, which is in agreement with the Integrated Drought Index (IDI) maps presented in Figure 9. By May 2022, about 56 % of Mexico was affected by moderate to exceptional drought.”).

⁴⁰³ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cui N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group

II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1704, 1706 (“Exposure of the Brazilian Amazon to severe to extreme drought has increased from 8% in 2004/2005 to 16% in 2009/2010 and 16% in 2015/2016 (Anderson et al., 2018b); a similar trend is reported in other regions (Table 12.3). During the extreme drought of 2015/2016 in the Amazonian forests, 10% or more of the area showed negative anomalies of the minimum cumulative water deficit (Anderson et al., 2018b). This extreme drought also caused an increase in the occurrence and spread of fires in the basin (*medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement*) (Arago et al., 2018; Lima et al., 2018; Silva Junior et al., 2019; Bilbao et al., 2020). Exposure to anomalous fires in ecosystems such as savannahs, which are more fire-prone, increases the exposure and vulnerability of adjacent forest ecosystems not adapted to fire, such as seasonally flooded forests (Bilbao et al., 2020; Flores and Holmgren, 2021).”; “Droughts in 2009/2010 and 2015/2016 increased tree mortality rate in Amazon forests (Doughty et al., 2015; Feldpausch et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2018b), while productivity showed no consistent change; some authors reported a drop in productivity (Feldpausch et al., 2016), while others found no significant changes (Brienen et al., 2015; Doughty et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the combined effect of increasing tree mortality with variations in growth results in a long-term decrease in C stocks in forest biomass, compromising the role of these forests as a C sink (*high confidence*) (Brienen et al., 2015; Rammig, 2020; Sullivan et al., 2020) (Figure 12.9). Under the RCP8.5 scenario for 2070, drought will increase the conversion of rainforest to savannah (*medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement*) (Anadón et al., 2014; Olivares et al., 2015; Sampaio et al., 2019). The transformation of rainforest into savannah will bring forth biodiversity loss and alterations in ecosystem functions and services (*medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement*) (Anadón et al., 2014; Olivares et al., 2015; Sampaio et al., 2019). In the Amazon basin, the synergistic effects of deforestation, fire, expansion of the agricultural frontier, infrastructure development, extractive activities, climate change and extreme events may exacerbate the risk of savannisation (*medium confidence: medium evidence, high agreement*) (Nobre et al., 2016b; Bebbington et al., 2019; Sampaio et al., 2019; Rammig, 2020).”).

⁴⁰⁴ World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 15–16 (“Drought also affected the west coast of subtropical South America, including Chile, where the last year with above average rainfall was 2006.51 The year 2022 was the fourth-driest year on record for Chile, which is experiencing a 14-year-long megadrought, the region’s longest and most severe drought in more than 1 000 years.”).

⁴⁰⁵ Desbureaux S. & Rodella A. S. (2019) [DROUGHT IN THE CITY: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WATER SCARCITY IN LATIN AMERICAN METROPOLITAN AREAS](#), WORLD DEV. 114: 13–27, 18–19 (“Generating electricity is highly water intensive (Fthenakis & Kim, 2010) and several examples over the last years have highlighted the threat water scarcity can represent for electricity provision in the region.² When excessive rainfall is followed by floods or [landslides](#), large wet shocks might also cause an increase in power outages because of the damages on infrastructures. We use enterprise surveys to explore the link between droughts and the occurrence of water outages for firms.”).

⁴⁰⁶ Desbureaux S. & Rodella A. S. (2019) [Drought in the City: The Economic Impact Of Water Scarcity In Latin American Metropolitan Areas](#), WORLD DEV. 114: 13–27, 25 (“There are several reasons to expect such a negative impact of droughts on cities’ economies. Hydropower still generates more than 50 percent of electricity in Latin America (Al-mulali, Fereidouni, & Lee, 2014). Generally speaking, water is one of the principal inputs to generate electricity, even beyond hydropower.² Consequently, [water scarcity](#) can lead to electric shutdowns as was recently seen in India or in Brazil.³ Using Enterprise Surveys for 22 Latin American and Caribbean Countries, we highlight that droughts significantly increase [power outages](#) for firms.”) See also O’Malley I. (13 March 2023) [Scientists Confirm Global Floods and Droughts Worsened by Climate Change](#), PBS (“Water stress is expected to significantly affect poor, disenfranchised communities as well as ecosystems that have been underfunded and exploited. For example, the United Nations has said that Somalia is experiencing its longest and most severe drought, an event that has caused the deaths of millions of livestock and widespread hunger. Venezuela, a country that has faced years of political and economic crises, resorted to nationwide power cuts during April 2016 as a result of the drought conditions affecting water levels of the Guri Dam.”).

⁴⁰⁷ Gillespie P. & Gilbert J. (12 April 2023) [Argentina's Epic Drought Is Pushing Economic Crisis to New Extremes](#), BLOOMBERG; and Sigal L. & Raszewski E. (9 March 2023) [Argentina's 'unprecedented' drought pummels farmers and economy](#), REUTERS.

⁴⁰⁸ Souza Gomes M., Fonseca de Albuquerque Cavalcanti I., & Muller G. V. (2021) [2019/2020 Drought Impacts on South America and Atmospheric and Oceanic Influences](#), WEATHER CLIM. EXTREMES 34(100404): 1–13, 2–3 (“Soybean was the most affected crop in Rio Grande do Sul, with yield losses above 70% in some areas and from 57 to 40% in other areas compared to previous year's yields. Maize losses were the greatest in the state of Santa Catarina, reaching 43% in some localities, and 15% in the state of Parana, compared to previous year's yields.”; “Loss caused by the 2019–2020 drought in the agricultural and cattle ranching sector were estimated at US\$ 546 million, mainly because of soybean failure, but also because of decreased yields in maize and sorghum (MAGyP, 2020).”).

⁴⁰⁹ Gonzalez P., Breshears D. D., Brooks K. M., Brown H. E., Elias E. H., Gunasekara A., Huntly N., Maldonado J. K., Mantua N. J., Margolis H. G., McAfee S., Middleton B. R., & Udall B. H. (2018) [Chapter 25: Southwest](#), in [IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT](#), Vol. II, Reidmiller D. R., Avery C. W., Easterling D. R., Kunkel K. E., Lewis K. L. M., Maycock T. K., & Stewart B. C. (eds.), U.S. Global Change Research Program, 1101–1184, 1111–1112 (“Higher temperatures intensified the recent severe drought in California and are amplifying drought in the Colorado River Basin. In California, the higher temperatures intensified the 2011–2016 drought, 14,56,97,98,99 which had been initiated by years of low precipitation, 57,58 causing water shortages to ecosystems, cities, farms, and energy generators. In addition, above-freezing temperatures through the winter of 2014–2015 led to the lowest snowpack in California (referred to as a warm snow drought) on record. 47,55,98,100 Through increased temperature, climate change may have accounted for one-tenth to one-fifth of the reduced soil moisture from 2012 to 2014 during the recent California drought. 14”).

⁴¹⁰ Szeto K., Zhang X., White R. E., & Brimelow J. (2016) [The 2015 Extreme Drought in Western Canada](#), BULL. AM. METEOROL. SOC. 97(12): S42–S46, S42 (“Although drought is common over western Canada (Bonsal et al. 2011), the drought that affected the area during the spring and summer of 2015 (Fig. 9.1a) was unusual in terms of its severity, extent, and impacts. British Columbia (B.C.) and Alberta were the most severely affected provinces. Vast areas in southern B.C. were assigned the highest possible (Level-4) drought rating by the B.C. government, several extreme-low streamflow advisories, and extreme wildfire risk ratings. Stringent water restrictions were in place by the end of June (AFCC 2016). In Alberta, conditions were even drier, and the Alberta government declared the province an Agricultural Disaster Area by early August. The extreme dry and warm conditions also created one of the most active and longest wildfire seasons for western Canada, and some rivers ran at their lowest recorded flows since measurements began 80 to 100 years ago (CMOS 2016). The extreme heat and dryness the region experienced in 2015 have raised concerns as to whether or not anthropogenic climate change (ACC) has increased the risk of extreme droughts in the area; this is the question we attempt to address in this paper.”).

⁴¹¹ World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 11 (“The sea level in the Latin America and Caribbean region has increased at a higher rate than the global mean in the South Atlantic and the subtropical North Atlantic, and at a lower rate than the global mean in the eastern Pacific over the last three decades. 14 Sea-level rise threatens a large portion of the Latin American and Caribbean population who live in coastal areas by contaminating freshwater aquifers, eroding shorelines, inundating low-lying areas, and increasing the risks of storm surges. 15 High-precision satellite altimetry data covering the period from January 1993 to June 2022 indicate that during this period, the rates of sea-level change on the Atlantic side of South America were higher than those on the Pacific side (Figure 8 (right) and Table 2). 16 In the South American Pacific region, the rate of change was 2.21 mm ± 0.1 mm per year, and along the west coast of Mexico and Central America, it was 1.92 mm ± 0.1 mm per year, both lower than the global average of 3.37 mm ± 0.32 mm per year during this period. The sea level on the Pacific side of South America is highly influenced by ENSO, and smaller increases are observed during La Niña. Along the Atlantic coast of South America, south of the equator, the rate of change from January 1993 to June 2022, 3.66 mm ± 0.1 mm per year, was higher than the global average. A comparable rate was also observed in the subtropical North Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico (3.60 mm ± 0.1 mm per year). In the tropical North Atlantic, around Central America and the southern Caribbean, the rate was 3.23 mm ± 0.1 mm per year during this period (Figure 8 (left) and Table 2).”).

⁴¹² World Meteorological Organization (2023) [STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2022](#), No. 1322, 11 (“In 2022, the global mean sea level (GMSL) continued to rise. The average GMSL rise is estimated to be 3.4 mm ± 0.3 mm per year over the 30 years (1993–2022) of the satellite altimeter record; however, the rate doubled between the first decade of the record (1993–2002) and the last (2013–2022), during which the rate exceeded 4 mm per year.”).

⁴¹³ Fleming E., Payne J., Sweet W., Craghan M., Haines J., Hart J. F., Stiller H., & Sutton-Grier A. (2018) [Chapter 8: Coastal Effects](#), in [IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT](#), Vol. II, Reidmiller D. R., Avery C. W., Easterling D. R., Kunkel K. E., Lewis K. L. M., Maycock T. K., & Stewart B. C. (eds.), U.S. Global Change Research Program, 322–352, 327 (“Although storms, floods, and erosion have always been hazards, in combination with rising sea levels they now threaten approximately \$1 trillion in national wealth held in coastal real estate (Figure 8.1)²⁵ and the continued viability of coastal communities that depend on coastal water, land, and other resources for economic health and cultural integrity (Ch. 15: Tribes, KM 1 and 2). The effects of the coastal risks posed by a changing climate already are and will continue to be experienced in both intersecting and distinct ways, and coastal areas are already beginning to take actions to address and ameliorate these risks (Figure 8.2).”).

⁴¹⁴ Ford J. D., Couture N., Bell T., & Clark D. G. (2017) [Climate change and Canada's north coast: research trends, progress, and future directions](#), ENVIRON. REV. 26: 82–92, 83 (“Inhabited primarily by Indigenous populations living in small remote communities, Canada’s northern coastline is vast, representing more than 70% of all Canadian coasts. The north coast is a “hotspot” for climate change, with the region experiencing some of the most rapid climate change anywhere globally, and projected future climate changes for the region will continue to be significant (Larsen and Anisimov 2014). Many communities have a high sensitivity to climate change as they are situated on lowlying coasts, they have infrastructure built on permafrost, they have economies strongly linked to natural resources, they have a high dependence on land-based harvesting activities, and they experience socio-economic disadvantages (AMAP 2011; Arctic Council 2013; Lemmen et al. 2008; Mason and Agan 2015). In light of the risks posed by climate change, adaptation is emerging as an important component of climate policy in northern Canada, and encompasses a variety of strategies, actions, and behaviors that make households, communities, and economic sectors more resilient to climate change (J.D. Ford et al., in press; Labbé et al. 2017).”).

⁴¹⁵ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2020) [OCEAN, COASTAL, AND GREAT LAKES ACIDIFICATION RESEARCH PLAN: 2020-2029](#), Jewett E. B., Osborne E. B., Arzayus K. M., Osgood K., DeAngelo B. J., & Mintz J. M. (eds.), 38 (“Given the inherent vulnerability of the Arctic’s simple food web, OA introduces a significant addition- al risk factor to ecosystems already experiencing multiple stressors.”).

⁴¹⁶ Fisheries and Oceans Canada Centre of Expertise on the State of the Oceans (2012) [CANADA’S STATE OF THE OCEANS REPORT, 2012](#), 10 (“Canada’s cold coastal waters may be particularly prone to acidification due to the natural occurrence of undersaturated waters at shallow depths (Pacific coast), or large freshwater input (Arctic coast). Freshwater input from runoff and ice melt reduces the ocean’s capacity to buffer against changes in pH. Runoff may also contain organic matter from land which can also increase acidification.”)

⁴¹⁷ Fisheries and Oceans Canada Centre of Expertise on the State of the Oceans (2012) [CANADA’S STATE OF THE OCEANS REPORT, 2012](#), 11 (“ In summer along the west coast of Canada, acidic water from depths of 100 to 200 metres upwells onto the continental shelf and into the ocean surface layer. This upwelling water is acidic due to a high concentration of dissolved inorganic carbon. However, the exposure of the continental shelf to this water is expected to be intermittent since the uptake of CO₂ by phytoplankton and outgassing of CO₂ to the atmosphere remove the excess dissolved inorganic carbon. Nonetheless the combination of undersaturated water at relatively shallow depths and winds that favour upwelling make the British Columbia shelf particularly vulnerable. Over the last century, the depth below which the aragonitic shells of saturation depth or horizon (Ω) — has become shallower by, typically, a 30-50 metres. In the Northeast Pacific Ocean, the saturation horizon is naturally shallow – as little as 100 metres below the surface. Scientists expect the saturation depth to become shallower as global atmospheric CO₂ concentrations increase over the coming century, putting organisms close to the surface at risk from ocean acidification.”).

⁴¹⁸ Hoegh-Guldberg O., et al. (2018) [Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5°C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems](#), in [GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C](#), Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), 3-263 (“**Ocean ecosystems are already experiencing large-scale changes, and critical thresholds are expected to be reached at 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming (high confidence)**). In the transition to 1.5°C of warming, changes to water temperatures are expected to drive some species (e.g., plankton, fish) to relocate to higher latitudes and cause novel ecosystems to assemble (*high confidence*). Other ecosystems (e.g., kelp forests, coral reefs) are relatively less able to move, however, and are projected to experience high rates of mortality and loss (*very high confidence*). For example, multiple lines of evidence indicate that the majority (70–90%) of warm water (tropical) coral reefs that exist today will disappear even if global warming is constrained to 1.5°C (*very high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4} **Current ecosystem services from the ocean are expected to be reduced at 1.5°C of global warming, with losses being even greater at 2°C of global warming (high confidence)**. The risks of declining ocean productivity, shifts of species to higher latitudes, damage to ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, and mangroves, seagrass and other wetland ecosystems), loss of fisheries productivity (at low latitudes), and changes to ocean chemistry (e.g., acidification, hypoxia and dead zones) are projected to be substantially lower when global warming is limited to 1.5°C (*high confidence*). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}”)

⁴¹⁹ Harvey F. (1 August 2013) [Caribbean Has Lost 80% of its Coral Reef Cover in Recent Years](#), THE GUARDIAN (“The Catlin scientific survey will undertake the most comprehensive survey yet of the state of the region’s reefs, starting in Belize and moving on to Mexico, Anguilla, Barbuda, St Lucia, Turks & Caicos, Florida and Bermuda. The Catlin scientists said the state of the regions’ reefs would act as an early warning of problems besetting all of the world’s coral. As much as 80% of Caribbean coral is reckoned to have been lost in recent years, but the survey should give a more accurate picture of where the losses have had most effect and on the causes.”).

⁴²⁰ Wiener J. (4 September 2021) [Food Security Should Open the Conversation About Biodiversity for Coral Reef-Dependent Countries](#), IUCN CROSSROADS (“Our very survival, especially those of us from Small Island Developing States (SIDS), is directly linked to the health of our reefs; writes Jean Wiener of Fondation pour la Protection de la Biodiversité Marine (FoProBiM) (Haiti), an IUCN Member organisation. As global citizens, we understand the ecosystemic value of our coral reefs. This fraction of our ocean floor supports 25% of our ocean’s marine life, providing food security for most of the world and supporting the livelihoods for coastal populations.”).

⁴²¹ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (20 January 2023) [How do coral reefs protect lives and property?](#), NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE (“The coral reef structure buffers shorelines against waves, storms, and floods, helping to prevent loss of life, property damage, and erosion. When reefs are damaged or destroyed, the absence of this natural barrier can increase the damage to coastal communities from normal wave action and violent storms.”).

⁴²² United States Environmental Protection Agency (11 May 2023) [Basic Information about Coral Reefs](#) (“Coral reefs are among the most biologically diverse and valuable ecosystems on Earth. An estimated 25 percent of all marine life, including over 4,000 species of fish, are dependent on coral reefs at some point in their life cycle. An estimated 1 billion people worldwide benefit from the many ecosystem services coral reefs provide including food, coastal protection, and income from tourism and fisheries. Healthy coral reefs provide: Habitat, feeding, spawning, and nursery grounds for over 1 million aquatic species, including commercially harvested fish species. Food for people living near coral reefs, especially on small islands. Recreation and tourism opportunities, such as fishing, scuba diving, and snorkeling, which contribute billions of dollars to local economies. Protection of coastal infrastructure and prevention of loss of life from storms, tsunamis, floods, and erosion. Sources of new medicines that can be used to treat diseases and other health problems. All of the services provided by coral reefs translate into tremendous economic worth. By one estimate, the total net benefit per year of the world’s coral reefs is \$29.8 billion. Tourism and recreation account for \$9.6 billion of this amount, coastal protection for \$9.0 billion, fisheries for \$5.7 billion, and biodiversity, representing the dependence of many different marine species on the reef structure, for \$5.5 billion (Cesar, Burke and Pet-Soede, 2003).”).

⁴²³ United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [Coral reefs: We continue to take more than we give](#) (“The value of a single hectare of coral reef in terms of tourism, shoreline protection and fisheries is, on average, \$130,000 per

year, and as much as \$1.25 million where the tourism sector is large. Travel and tourism, much of it dependent on reefs, contribute a third of the GDP in the Caribbean for example, and as much as 80 percent in the Maldives.”).

⁴²⁴ United Nations Environment Programme (2018) [Coral reefs: We continue to take more than we give](#) (“Coral reef ecosystems provide society with resources and services worth \$375 billion per year. They house 25 percent of all marine life, feeding hundreds of millions of people; they enable discovery of new pharmaceuticals and provide work and income through the tourism and fisheries industries.”).

⁴²⁵ Climate Adaption Science Centers (27 January 2022) [Coastal Erosion: Coastal Erosion is More Severe Under Climate Change](#), United States Geographical Survey (“Detailed Description - More storms and higher seas from climate change create more winds, waves, and floods, leading to coastal erosion. Hurricanes can wash away sandy barrier islands, leaving coastlines and islands unprotected from future storm surges.”).

⁴²⁶ Barragán Muñoz J. M. (2020) [Progress of coastal management in Latin America and the Caribbean](#), OCEAN COAST. MANAG. 184(105009): 1–13, 1 (“From an environmental, social and economic point of view, coastal areas in LAC are of key importance. Ecosystems such as mangroves, coral reefs and lagoons that are of particular interest for the conservation of biodiversity are located in coastal marine areas (Elbers, 2011; FAO, 2012; UNEP WCMC, 2016). From a demographic point of view, population concentration in cities within coastal zones has increased dramatically. Between 1945 and 2014 the number of Cities and Coastal Agglomerations (CCA) in LACs has gone from 42 to 420 (Barragán and De Andrés, 2016). During the same period, the population of these CACs has risen from 20 to 180 million (only 140 million people live in cities in the remaining interior territory”).

⁴²⁷ The World Bank (14 April 2014) [Promoting Climate Change Action in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) (“Within LAC, the Bank continues to provide technical and financial support geared toward scaling up climate change mitigation and adaptation actions and leveraging co-benefits. On mitigation, countries utilize sector actions, including energy, waste, transport, forestry, agriculture, and sustainable use of resources in urban area. Adaptation offers myriad opportunities to enhance resilience to climate change impacts through (i) natural disaster preparedness; (ii) enhanced technologies and sector capacities to mitigate risks of extreme weather and hydrology change in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, transport, and energy; and (iii) new financial products to boost resilience.”).

⁴²⁸ Oppenheimer M., Glavovic B. C., Hinkel J., van de Wal R., Magnan A. K., Abd-Elgawad A., Cai R., Cifuentes-Jara M., DeConto R. M., Ghosh T., Hay J., Isla F., Marzeion B., Meyssignac B., & Sebesvari Z. (2019) [Chapter 4: Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low-Lying Islands, Coasts and Communities](#), in [THE OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE](#), *Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Masson-Delmotte V., Zhai P., Tignor M., Poloczanska E., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Nicolai M., Okem A., Petzold J., Rama B., & Weyer N. M. (eds.), 323 (“Global mean sea level (GMSL) is rising (virtually certain¹) and accelerating (high confidence²). The sum of glacier and ice sheet contributions is now the dominant source of GMSL rise (very high confidence). GMSL from tide gauges and altimetry observations increased from 1.4 mm yr⁻¹ over the period 1901–1990 to 2.1 mm yr⁻¹ over the period 1970–2015 to 3.2 mm yr⁻¹ over the period 1993–2015 to 3.6 mm yr⁻¹ over the period 2006–2015 (high confidence). The dominant cause of GMSL rise since 1970 is anthropogenic forcing (high confidence). {4.2.2.1.1, 4.2.2.2}”).

⁴²⁹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) [Summary for Policymakers](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS](#), *Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Masson-Delmotte V., et al. (eds.), SPM-14 (“Heating of the climate system has caused global mean sea level rise through ice loss on land and thermal expansion from ocean warming. Thermal expansion explained 50% of sea level rise during 1971–2018, while ice loss from glaciers contributed 22%, ice sheets 20% and changes in land water storage 8%. The rate of ice sheet loss increased by a factor of four between 1992–1999 and 2010–2019. Together, ice sheet and glacier mass loss were the dominant contributors to global mean sea level rise during 2006–2018. (high confidence).”).

⁴³⁰ United Nations (14 February 2023) [Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council Debate on “Sea-level Rise: Implications for International Peace and Security](#), Statements (“The danger is especially acute for nearly 900

million people who live in coastal zones at low elevations — that’s one out of ten people on earth. Some coastlines have already seen triple the average rate of sea-level rise.”).

⁴³¹ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuvi N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1691, 1714 (“Global warming has caused glacier loss in the Andes from 30% to more than 50% of their area since the 1980s. Glacier retreat, temperature increase and precipitation variability, together with land use changes, have affected ecosystems, water resources and livelihoods through landslides and flood disasters (*very high confidence*). In several areas of the Andes, flood and landslide disasters have increased, and water availability and quality and soil erosion have been affected by both climatic and non-climatic factors (*high confidence*).”; “The glaciers of the southern Andes (including the SWS and SSA regions) show the highest glacier mass loss rates worldwide (*high confidence*) contributing to SLR (Jacob et al., 2012; Gardner et al., 2013; Dussaillant et al., 2018; Braun et al., 2019; Zemp et al., 2019). Since 1985, the glacier area loss in the sub-region is in a range of 20 up to 60% (Braun et al., 2019; Reinthaler et al., 2019b).”).

⁴³² Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuvi N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1712 (“In Argentina, projected changes in the hydrology of Andean rivers associated with glacier retreat are predicted to have negative impacts on the region’s fruit production (*low evidence, medium agreement*) (Barros et al., 2015).”).

⁴³³ Castellanos E., Lemos M. F., Astigarraga L., Chacón N., Cuvi N., Huggel C., Miranda L., Moncassim Vale M., Ometto J. P., Peri P. L., Postigo J. C., Ramajo L., Roco L., & Rusticucci M. (2022) [Chapter 12: Central and South America](#), in [CLIMATE CHANGE 2022: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY](#), Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Tignor M., Poloczanska E. S., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Craig M., Langsdorf S., Löschke S., Möller V., Okem A., & Rama B. (eds.), 1718 (“Patagonian ice fields in SA are the largest bodies of ice outside of Antarctica in the Southern Hemisphere. They are losing volume due partly to rapid changes in their outlet glaciers, which end up in lakes or the ocean, becoming the largest contributors to eustatic SLR in the world per unit area (Foresta et al., 2018; Moragues et al., 2019; Zemp et al., 2019). Most calving glaciers in the southern Patagonia ice field retreated during the last century (*high confidence*). Upsala glacier retreat generated slope instability, and a landslide movement destroyed the western edge in 2013. The Upsala Argentina Lake has become potentially unstable and may generate new landslides (Moragues et al., 2019). The climate effect on the summer stratification of piedmont lakes is another issue in connection with glacier dynamics (Isla et al., 2010). Between 41° and 56° South latitude, the absolute glacier area loss was 5450 km² (19%) in the last approximately 150 years, with an annual area reduction increase of 0.25% yr⁻¹ for the period 2005– 2016 (Meier et al., 2018). The small glaciers in the northern part of the Northern Patagonian Ice Field had over all periods the highest rates of 0.92% a⁻¹. In this sub-region, increased melting of ice is leading to changes in the structure and functioning of river ecosystems and in freshwater inputs to coastal marine ecosystems (*medium confidence: low evidence, high agreement*) (Aguayo et al., 2019). In addition, in the case of coastal areas, the importance of tides and rising sea levels in the behaviour of river floods has been demonstrated (Jal.n- Rojas et al., 2018).”).

⁴³⁴ Oppenheimer M., Glavovic B. C., Hinkel J., van de Wal R., Magnan A. K., Abd-Elgawad A., Cai R., Cifuentes-Jara M., DeConto R. M., Ghosh T., Hay J., Isla F., Marzeion B., Meyssignac B., & Sebesvari Z. (2019) [Chapter 4: Sea Level Rise and Implications for Low-Lying Islands, Coasts and Communities](#), in [THE OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE](#), Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pörtner H.-O., Roberts D. C., Masson-Delmotte V., Zhai P., Tignor M., Poloczanska E., Mintenbeck K., Alegría A., Nicolai M., Okem A.,

Petzold J., Rama B., & Weyer N. M. (eds.), 323 (“Non-climatic anthropogenic drivers, including recent and historical demographic and settlement trends and anthropogenic subsidence, have played an important role in increasing low-lying coastal communities’ exposure and vulnerability to SLR and extreme sea level (ESL) events (very high confidence). In coastal deltas, for example, these drivers have altered freshwater and sediment availability (high confidence). In low-lying coastal areas more broadly, human-induced changes can be rapid and modify coastlines over short periods of time, outpacing the effects of SLR (high confidence). Adaptation can be undertaken in the short-to medium-term by targeting local drivers of exposure and vulnerability, notwithstanding uncertainty about local SLR impacts in coming decades and beyond (high confidence). {4.2.2.4, 4.3.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.3} Coastal ecosystems are already impacted by the combination of SLR, other climate-related ocean changes, and adverse effects from human activities on ocean and land (high confidence). Attributing such impacts to SLR, however, remains challenging due to the influence of other climate-related and non-climatic drivers such as infrastructure development and human-induced habitat degradation (high confidence). Coastal ecosystems, including saltmarshes, mangroves, vegetated dunes and sandy beaches, can build vertically and expand laterally in response to SLR, though this capacity varies across sites (high confidence). These ecosystems provide important services that include coastal protection and habitat for diverse biota. However, as a consequence of human actions that fragment wetland habitats and restrict landward migration, coastal ecosystems progressively lose their ability to adapt to climate-induced changes and provide ecosystem services, including acting as protective barriers (high confidence). {4.3.2.3}”).

⁴³⁵ Hu A., Xu Y., Tebaldi C., Washington W. M., & Ramanathan V. (2013) [*Mitigation of short-lived climate pollutants slows sea-level rise*](#), NAT. CLIM. CHANGE 3: 730–734, 732 (“In comparison with the BAU case, mitigation of SLCPs can reduce the SLRfull rate by about 18% (from 1.1 cm yr⁻¹ to about 0.9 cm yr⁻¹), and the SLRther rate by about 48% (from 0.29 cm yr⁻¹ to 0.15 cm yr⁻¹), with negligible effect from CO2 reduction before 2050. By 2100, however, CO2 mitigation can reduce the SLRfull rate by about 24% (from 2.1 to 1.6 cm yr⁻¹), and the SLRther rate_{SEP} by about 25% (from 0.4 to 0.3 cm yr⁻¹). The SLCP mitigation would contribute about 24% of the SLRfull rate reduction, and 54% of the SLRther rate at 2100. With mitigation of both SLCPs and CO2, the projected SLR rate is reduced by close to 50% for SLRfull, and 67% for SLRther by 2100.”).