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**Paths to Power:
Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States**

Andrew Hurrell

Andrew F. Cooper

Guadalupe González González

Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes

Srini Sitaraman

Latin American Program
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Preface

These papers were presented for the first time on May 13, 1999 at a seminar hosted by the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center, titled Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Brazil, Canada, India, and Mexico. They were subsequently revised for publication, and Andrew Hurrell's commentary was revised to prose for inclusion as an excellent introduction to the papers.

The authors are: Ricardo Sennes, of the University of São Paulo; Andrew Cooper of Waterloo University; Srinivasan of the University of Illinois at Champagne; and Guadalupe González of the University of California at San Diego and the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas in Mexico City. The Latin American Program would like to thank all of them for the high quality of their research and their diligence in preparing the papers for publication.

Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions

Andrew Hurrell

The papers on Brazil, Canada, Mexico and India represent a very interesting set of cases and raise a range of important questions. In these remarks I will touch on three sets of issues. First, I will say something about the category of intermediate powers and how these particular countries relate to that category. Second, I will make some general points about the relationship of intermediate powers to international institutions. And third, I would like to highlight some of the major changes that are taking place in the role and functioning of international institutions and examine how these changes have affected the foreign policy strategies and possible 'paths to power' of the countries under consideration.

The Category

Many people have tried to construct a theory of middle powers but without conspicuous success. On the one hand, it has proved very hard to decide what the shared attributes of middle powers should be and which states are to be included in the category. On the other, it has proved harder still to associate a set of plausible shared attributes (GNP, military resources etc) with common patterns of foreign policy behaviour. Putative middle powers end up as a very diverse group subject to a wide range of external circumstances. It has been very difficult to identify common patterns as to what they *will* do; and indeed as to what they *can* do (consider in our sample the degree to which India has sought to develop sizeable military capabilities whilst Brazil has largely downplayed hard military power). There are, then, few, if any, common patterns of behaviour as to how a particular group of middle or intermediate powers will behave internationally, because the variation in the types of states involved, the categories of power that they possess, and the arenas within which they operate are all so various.

Attempts at what one might call a tight and rigorous theory of middle-powers have therefore have led to a dead-end. One potentially promising way of rescuing the concept is to go down a constructivist route -- to see middle powers not as a category defined by some set of objective attributes or by objective geopolitical or geoeconomic circumstances; but rather as a self-created identity or ideology. This is, for example, a potentially promising way of making sense of Canadian 'middle-powermanship' with its emphasis on responsibility, morality, and multilateralism. Middle-powermanship, on this view, becomes an embedded guiding narrative, a particular foreign policy ideology that can be traced historically, that is rooted within and around particular parts of the bureaucracy, and that can be perhaps related to broader trends or tendencies in the domestic politics of the country. Elements of the foreign policies of Australia and the Scandinavian countries may well lend themselves to this kind of analysis. However, even in Canada (as Andrew Cooper's paper reminds us) the notion of Canada as the quintessential middle-power is no longer automatic and unchallenged.

The Brazil paper does edge in a constructivist direction, talking as it does of a states which 'intuitively occupy' a certain position or which 'distinguish themselves' as a particular kind of power. The India paper is still more heavily constructivist, stressing the degree to which

Indian defence policy needs to be understood in terms of historically formed identities and patterns of self-understanding. Yet none of this leads necessarily towards the notion of middle or intermediate powers. To think in terms of constructed identities and historically conceived roles does not necessarily point towards some self-understanding of middle powers or intermediate status.

In the Indian case, as the paper makes very clear, we find a powerful discourse which emphasises not the country's intermediate status but rather its historic civilization and distinctive culture; its project to become a great power; and its role as the natural leader of a closed region in which outside interference is deeply resented. Power is conceived within this discourse both in material and moral terms. The post-independence Nehru project was about modernization and material development (of which the nuclear programme formed a logical part) and about the creation of a regionally and internationally powerful country. But it also involved the development of a moral and moralizing foreign policy which saw India as the representative of a particular set of values and principles of international legitimacy. Indeed we see the same combination of morality and hard self-interest that is so characteristic of the United States and which may be one of the reasons why their relations have often been so strained.

In the case of Brazil the picture is more varied. At times there has been an important self-image of the country as a rising power that, as the official discourse of the 1970s put it, sought to unfreeze the structures of world power to allow the country's upward ascent. The foreign policy analogue to ISI development policy was the consistent emphasis on the pursuit of national autonomy, the politicization of international economic relations and complaints against the 'freezing of the international power structure', the strengthening of coalitions especially with other developing countries; the rejection of a policy of 'automatic alignment' with the US; and the pursuit of technological nationalism. Thus the self-perception of Brazil as an important actor destined to play a more important international role, both within the region and beyond, has remained an important theme of both rhetoric and, to a lesser extent, policy. And yet there has often appeared to be a significant gap between these intimations of influence and the low-key, risk-averse and sometimes diffident policies followed in practice, as well as by the generally low-priority accorded to foreign policy.

One side of a constructivist approach to middle-powers would therefore look to the historical emergence of particular foreign policy ideologies or discourses. In the case of Canada, this may well shed light on the idea of middle-powermanship. In other cases it may well lead in other directions (as discussed above with India or Brazil, or as in the case of Mexico with the attempt to develop a foreign policy that, at least rhetorically, reflected the country's revolutionary heritage). So, even if it does not lead to hard theory, one can develop an interesting way into the category of intermediate powers, not by trying to identify some defining set of material attributes but rather by getting at the ideas and ideologies that motivate the states involved. All of the papers in this project have done this, albeit in different ways.

But the other side of the constructivist rescue of the idea of intermediate powers is to look at the category from outside. Historically Great Powers have to do both with crude material power but also with notions of legitimacy and authority. You can claim Great Power status but membership of the club of Great Powers is a social category that depends on recognition by

others -- by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy. So a constructivist approach would view power hierarchies in terms of *shared* understandings that develop amongst groups of states.

One of the difficulties facing potential aspirants to the Great Power club is that the criteria for membership may discriminate against them (as Japan found in 1918/19 over the issue of racial discrimination). Or the criteria may change in ways that work against their particular interests. For example, for much of the Cold War period the possession of nuclear weapons was widely seen a necessary in order to have a seat at the top table. But, in the post-Cold War period, acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability comes to be seen as a sign of unacceptable behaviour that violates other sets of emerging international norms. Or, as China is discovering to its discomfort, the still dominant western members of the club are able to say: if you want to be a fully-paid up member of the club, certain kinds of human rights behaviour is no longer acceptable.

It may be true that there is an implicit understanding that certain countries have developed a larger than normal role in a particular institution. For example, Brazil has been on the UN Security Council eight times, more than any other non-permanent member, except Japan; or one might point to the roles of Canada or Australia in the GATT/WTO. It may also be the case that having a firm regional power base is a potential route to middle-power status (although as both India and Brazil know all too well, the idea of 'regional representativeness' is strongly contested by their neighbours). And, for all the difficulties of definition, it may well be that we simply cannot avoid thinking about certain countries as intermediate powers -- because they are indeed 'in the middle' in terms of power capabilities; because they often have a choice between regional and broader-than -regional roles; because their interests are sufficiently wide for it to be impossible for them to stay internationally disengaged -- 'too big to play no role in the balance of forces but too small to keep the forces in balance by itself', as was said of Germany in the post-1945 period. And yet we must still recognize that middle powers have never enjoyed a well understood or broadly accepted status in international society and that the potential 'paths to power' and foreign policy strategies open to middle powers vary enormously both within and across regions. But to highlight the problems with the category does not in any way invalidate the relevance and importance of carefully-chose comparative work -- as indeed this project clearly shows.

Intermediate Powers and International Institutions

International institutions are an ubiquitous feature of the contemporary international system and of the global economy. The proliferation of international institutions is commonly associated with globalization and with increased levels of transnational exchange and communication. Institutions are needed to deal with the ever more complex dilemmas of collective action that emerge in an globalized world. Institutions are also associated with the vastly increased normative ambition of international society and with the attempt to institutionalize a wide range of values that regulate almost ever aspect of inter-state relations and also profoundly affect how societies are organized domestically. And institutions are closely bound up with power. Institutions are not just concerned with liberal purposes of solving

common problems or promoting shared values. They are also sites of power and reflect and entrench power hierarchies and the interests of powerful states. Indeed sovereignty may be increasingly defined not by the power to insulate one's state from external influences but by the power to participate effectively in international institutions of all kinds.

There is no great puzzle as to the advantages that often lead intermediate states to favour multilateralism and institutions, and the papers in this project do a very good job in unpacking and explaining them: the extent to which institutions empower weaker states by constraining the freedom of the most powerful through established rules and procedures (the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO is a good example); the degree to which institutions provide political space for important middle-level players to build new coalitions in order to try and affect emerging norms in ways that are congruent with their interests and to counter-balance or at deflect the preferences and policies of the most powerful; and the extent to which institutions provide 'voice opportunities' to make known their interests and to bid for political support in the broader marketplace of ideas. So intermediate states will seek to use international institutions either to defend themselves against norms or rules or practices that adversely affect their interests or, even in optimistic moments, to change dominant international norms in ways that they would like to see.

The traditional source of influence for intermediate states within institutions has been via coalition building and this is very much the focus of the paper on Brazil's involvement in the UN and the GATT/WTO. It is, of course, the case that coalitions amongst developing countries have been central to the multilateral diplomacy of India, Brazil and Mexico throughout the Cold War period (G77, NAM etc). But intermediate strategies are not limited to coalition politics. As Andrew Cooper demonstrates very nicely in his paper, Canada has historically played an important role as what one might call an 'activist insider': being a catalyst for diplomatic efforts, doing a lot of the donkey work in organizing meetings and promoting follow-up meetings; getting groups of experts together to push the agenda forward; exploiting what one might call the institutional platforms and the normative niches that give intermediate and, indeed, small powers more generally, greater room for manoeuvre than one might expect simply looking at them from outside of the institution.

But, whilst coalition-building seems an obvious route to greater influence, it can also bring problems. As the Mexico paper reminds us, external alignments (in this case with the US) can complicate domestic politics -- by increasing external involvement, shifting the domestic balance of power, and reducing the capacity of the Mexican state to play its traditional political roles. Foreign policy alignment, especially when alignment means deeper economic and social integration, may therefore undermine an increasingly fragile set of social and political balances within the country. Moreover, activist behaviour on the international stage carries with it the risk of raising your profile and of bringing you into conflict with major powers -- in Mexico's case, most obviously, the United States. They may therefore be very solid interest-based reasons for *not* seeking a more activist role in international institutions that are viewed as secondary to the core premises of foreign policy.

It is also true that coalition-politics has become far more complex with the end of the old East-West and North-South divides, intensified processes of regionalization, and a complex set of 'new' global issues. Within the WTO, for example, agricultural trade, services, investment, intellectual property, and biosafety each involve overlapping but distinct coalitions. A natural ally on agricultural trade may take a very different line on biosafety and trade in genetically-modified products. Tracking this complexity and tracing these coalitions relate to each other will be increasingly central to understanding intermediate state foreign policy.

Another area where the ideas contained in these papers could be pressed further concerns the nature of state interests. It is not very helpful to talk in terms of the interests of intermediate states in seeking out 'paths to power' without understanding where those interests have come from and how they have changed over time. As already mentioned, it is not always clear that interests do in fact involve seeking greater influence in international institutions. Moreover, as in the cases of Mexico, India, and Brazil, we see how clearly formulated and relatively coherent patterns of foreign policy ideas and behaviour came under immense pressure as a result both of the end of the Cold War and, even more, of the pressures of globalization, economic liberalization and political liberalization. In all of these cases foreign policies have undergone significant change over the past twenty years; and it is at least arguable that this has involved not just a shift in 'preferences over strategies' (ie different ways of attaining the same goals) but rather a shift in 'preferences over outcomes' (ie over the nature of the goals and values that foreign policy is seeking to promote).

It is therefore crucial to tease the balance between continuity and change and also to underscore the variation across cases. Although we may see many of the same pressures for change, the differences may be just as noteworthy. In all of these cases powerful external pressures for change came up against very deep-rooted sets of domestic social, political and economic structures and very distinctive national traditions, leading to foreign policy trajectories that continue to vary very significantly. This contrasts with the simplistic reading of globalization which tends to stress trends towards either fusion or fragmentation, homogeneity or particularist reaction.

The point is that over the past twenty years the character of intermediate state interests have shifted very considerably and we need to understand why and how this has happened. Although they are by no means the whole, or even necessarily the most important part of the story, it is worth considering the role of institutions in this process of interest-change. Institutions matter because they do more than just reflect power (as neorealists argue) or solve collective action problems (as institutionalists suggest). They also matter because they help explain how new norms emerge and are diffused across the international system and how state interests change and evolve. Institutions, then, may play an important role in the diffusion of norms and in the patterns of socialization and internalization by which weaker actors come to absorb those norms. Institutions may be where India or Brazil or Mexico officials are exposed to new norms (as on the environment); they may act as channels or conduits through which norms are transmitted (as with neoliberal economic ideas and the IFIs); or they may reinforce changes that have already begun to take place (as with Mexico and NAFTA).

It is therefore important to guard against easy assumptions that states interact within institutions with a set of fixed and unchanging interests. It is also important to recognise that states often do not know what they want when they start to go to negotiate on complex issues within complex institutional frameworks. They may shift their ideas through the process of institutional enmeshment and that process of enmeshment may shift power amongst different parts of the state bureaucracy or political or civil society, again leading to revised understandings of national interest.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the success of intermediate power strategies will always remain contingent on the choices of the major powers, and especially in the post-Cold War world of the US as the single most dominant state. Much therefore hangs on how far and in what ways a hegemonic US needs institutions.

Powerful states will always have more options: to determine which issues get negotiated via formal inter-state bodies and which are, for example, managed via market mechanisms; to deploy direct coercive power in pursuit of their own interests; and to threaten to walk away from an institution that is seen to become too constraining. Powerful states are able to influence when particular issues are left off the agenda of inter-state politics, who sets the rules of the bargaining game (meta-rules), and where the norms and ideas come from which are used to define issues and within which bargaining takes place. The capacity of existing institutions to constrain effectively the autonomy and unilateralist impulses of major states remains highly questionable. And many institutions continue to be hierarchically organized with decision-making restricted to a small group of major states (de jure as in the UNSC, or de facto as in the role of the triad in international trade negotiations).

And yet the picture for intermediate states is not all bleak. Large states, even hegemonic states, need institutions to legitimate their power, to deal with shared problems, and to spread the risks and burdens of leadership. To a much greater extent than realists acknowledge, states need international law and institutions both to share the material and political costs of protecting their interests and to gain the authority and legitimacy that the possession of crude power can never on its own secure. Moreover, the complexity of managing globalization requires deeper and stronger institutions that can only be constructed with much wider participation and with broader legitimacy.

In order to secure and sustain legitimacy institutions need to be seen to possess a degree of autonomy from the most powerful states. For powerful states the trade-off in multilateralism is to invest institutions with sufficient autonomy to be both effective and legitimate on the one hand, whilst also seeking to maintain as high a degree of control and insulation as possible on the other. Equally, to develop effective policies international institutions need to engage with a wide range of states and to interact not just with central governments but with a much wider range of domestic political, economic and social actors. If you want to solve problems in a globalized world, you cannot simply bully people into signing treaties; you actually need them to implement those treaties and this means broader participation on the part of those involved. Here the trade-off for the powerful is between the attractions (and real benefits) of managing international problems on the basis of hierarchical modes of governance on the one hand as against the structural need for deeper involvement and broader participation on the other.

But the central point to emphasize is these trade-offs provide intermediate states with some element of political purchase and at least a degree of empowerment and protection. The most serious dilemma for intermediate States is how to keep the powerful engaged, how to press for what they want and to resist the things that they don't like; but to do this in such a way as not to place too much strain on still weak institutional structures, nor to push the powerful to walk away. Managing this dilemma may often involve unpleasant concessions to the special interests or unilateralist impulses of the strong.

Institutional change and intermediate state opportunity

In this final section let me now turn to some of the changes in the practice of international institutions and see how these may have affected the countries that we are looking at.

First, the gap between ends and means. What we expect from international society has expanded exponentially. In contrast to the traditional goals of stable coexistence, we now treat as normal the idea that cooperation should safeguard peace and security (prohibiting aggression and protection against an ever broader range of threats to peace and security); solve common problems (such as tackling environmental challenges or managing the global economy in the interests of greater stability or equity); and sustain common values (such as the promotion of self-determination, human rights or political democracy). This expansion has been driven both by moral change and by material and pragmatic imperatives. But this hugely expanded normative ambition has run way ahead of the capacity of states and of inter-state institutions to deliver. Indeed the capacity of states, even of powerful states to control the system may have actually declined.

This gap between aspirations and proclaimed goals on the one hand and the means to secure those goals on the other opens spaces for intermediate states. Such states may seek to shape the intellectual debate and the ideas through which new issues are understood -- as, for example, in the role of the Scandinavian countries in developing and promoting the idea of sustainable development; the role of Canada or Australia in pressing the debate on cooperative security. The special character of the US increases the potential range of such roles. Hegemony requires power, a project and domestic support. The US certainly has a great deal of power, but the clarity of its hegemonic project is, in many areas and on many issues, far less obvious. And, of course, the difficulties of securing consistent domestic political support remain very serious. Exploiting the ambiguities, inconsistencies, and bureaucratic and political divisions within the powerful state has always been an important element -- perhaps the most important element -- in the strategies of weaker states. And this remains the case today. And yet, of course, there are real dilemmas as well. The United States has often tended to take support and acceptance of its own exceptionalist position for granted rather than as something that needs nurturing and rewarding. And whilst intermediate states may well find new roles as parts of coalitions of the willing involving the United States (in Kosovo, Haiti, East Timor), they may also find themselves left to assume most of the burden when the hegemon decides to go home, or when domestic opinion in the US shifts.

Second, there is the trend towards the harder and more coercive enforcement of international norms. The post Cold War period has undoubtedly witnessed increased calls for firmer and more coercive forms of international enforcement. One part (but only a part) of the debate has concentrated on the possibility that the UN might be able to function as a collective security system able to enforce the decisions of the Security Council both in cases of formal inter-state aggression (eg Iraq's invasion of Kuwait), and in cases which stretch the traditional notion of 'international peace and security' (eg Somalia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, northern Iraq, Haiti). We have thus witnessed an ascending scale of multilateral actions on the part of both the UN and regional bodies: from non-recognition (as with OAS and Haiti); to the application of economic sanctions; to conflict resolution and political reconstruction (as in Cambodia or El Salvador); to peacekeeping/peacemaking with a strong humanitarian component (as in Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor) and a heavier emphasis on military force and coercion; to military intervention to restore an overthrown government (Haiti); to large-scale collective enforcement action against Iraq. The most important element of these developments has been the shrinking of understandings of non-intervention and the inclusion of human rights and humanitarian concerns within the compass of threats to international peace and security, thereby permitting action by the Security Council under Chapter VII.

Yet such developments within the UN form only one part of a broader move towards coercive solidarism. Thus there has also been the growth of new and multiple forms of conditionality -- that is the institutionalised application of conditions to inter-state flows of economic resources as a means of inducing domestic policy change. A further important category of conditionality arises from the formalized establishment of criteria for admission to a particular economic or political grouping: the notion that membership of an alliance, economic bloc, or international institution depends on the form of government or respect for human rights, with increasingly explicit political criteria for admission to the EU, Mercosur, and, to some extent, in the OAS and, to a still weaker extent, the Commonwealth.

These moves provide both opportunities and dilemmas for intermediate states. They provide opportunities because the need for willing allies increases, particularly allies that are willing to engage directly in enforcement actions. But there are also very real problems. First, the costs of opposition rise. Thus India's traditional belief that a nuclear capability is both a natural part of its aspirations to increased status and a legitimate response to its security needs runs the risk of turning the country into a 'rogue' state. Second, the costs of activism also rise. If you aspire, for example, to a permanent seat on the UNSC, then it becomes harder not to take a stand on contentious issues and to avoid demands that you should bear the costs of 'policing the international beat'. And, third, these moves may undercut the sorts of special roles that middle-powers have sought to carve out for themselves. There is a real tension, for example, between the coercive enforcement of norms and the kinds of middle powermanship strategies favoured by countries such as Canada -- strategies that have often stressed the advantages of cooperative approaches to security over harder-edged collective security. This tension is even trickier when enforcement is not wrapped in a tidy legal package but depends on the special role of the United States or on a willingness to use an alliance such as NATO without clear-cut legal backing. Put more generally, intermediate states, for reasons discussed earlier, have a natural tendency to favour international law and formal institutional frameworks. But in the still rough trade of international politics, both order and the promotion of widely-shared values may well depend on

coercive power, on hierarchy and inequality, and on the particularist interests of a narrow group of states.

The third and final change that I would like to highlight concerns the increased pluralism of international institutional processes. As is often noted, interdependence and globalization have opened up transnational civil society as an arena for political action. The infrastructure of increased economic interdependence (new systems of communication and transportation) and the extent to which new technologies (satellites, computer networks etc) have increased the costs and difficulty of governments controlling flows of information, facilitated the diffusion of values, knowledge and ideas, and enhanced the ability of like-minded groups to organise across national boundaries.

It is very hard to capture the reality of many international institutions simply by focusing on inter-state bargains. International institutions in areas such as environment or human rights have been opened up to a broader range of actors, NGOs and social movements. Where this has not yet occurred (as with the WTO) there is considerable pressure for change in this direction.

Many different kinds of networks are involved in an increasingly pluralist and complex process of norm creation, development and implementation. One category concerns what have come to be called epistemic or technocratic communities whose power and authority derive from claims to specialist knowledge in such areas as economic or environmental policy. A second category involves legal policy networks as, for example, in international trade politics where increased judicialization has followed the development of increasingly sophisticated arrangements for arbitration and dispute settlement. And a third category concerns human rights networks whose influence does not derive from narrow economic incentives nor from power-political interests, but rather from ideas and values that are held directly, if still unevenly, by individual human beings. In areas such as human rights, NGO networks have become increasingly influential in standard setting, but also in the application and implementation of standards.

Again, this provides opportunities for intermediate states. There are more possibilities for constructing coalitions of the willing. So beyond inter-state coalitions we need to look to coalitions that cut across states and *transnational* groups, but also to *transgovernmental* coalitions that cut across state bureaucracies, private actors, and international organizations. Countries accustomed to pluralist politics adapt easily to such changes. They reinforce the capacity of countries such as Canada to develop effective 'insider strategies' and to build new sorts of coalitions (as in the cases of the international criminal court or the land mines campaign). Other countries have found it much harder to navigate in this kind of world, perhaps due to domestic political sensitivities or to inherited traditions of very statist foreign policymaking. Thus Mexico has been rather resistant to accepting the inevitability of NGO participation in international human rights, preferring instead to stress traditional, interstate bargaining and formal, often legalistic, positions. Other countries, such as Brazil, have moved a long way from the 1980s when human rights or environmental NGOs were regularly denounced as subversive. And yet it is a transition that is incomplete and often still problematic. Moreover states may lack the financial or technical resources to operate in this arena. Thus although the creation of the WTO dispute settlement process has been widely seen as a victory for small and

medium states, it is not clear just how many states have the legal, scientific or diplomatic expertise to exploit the system to best advantage.

Moreover the problems are not simply the result of diplomats or politicians hanging on to old-fashioned ways of conducting foreign policy. The illusion of liberal transnationalism is that it is an arena of shared interests and one in which power has been, if not displaced, then at least moderated. And yet civil society, both domestic and transnational, is an arena of political action in which power plays a central role. On the one hand, the agendas of NGOs will often work to favour the interests and values of individual states or particular parts of the world. There are therefore good interest-based, and value-based reasons why western liberal countries find it to their advantage to emphasize transnational civil society. On the other, *state power* is increasingly dependent on a capacity to act effectively within this arena: to form coalitions with NGOs or within trans-governmental networks, to be able to manipulate NGOs for one's own purposes. Thus, even for those that can navigate well in this world, there are still real dilemmas. Take, for example, the growth of trans-governmental regulatory networks dealing with police cooperation, banking and securities regulation, or environmental regulations. Sometimes these may be nested within agreements, as in the case of Mexico and NAFTA, but often they are not based on any formal inter-state agreement (or at best a non-binding memorandum of understanding). Some commentators praise the flexibility and effectiveness of such networks, unencumbered as they are by the formalism and bureaucracy of traditional international institutions. And yet the old political questions remain: whose interests are being served by the development of such networks and whose values promoted?

The Evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Re-orientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas

Andrew F. Cooper

The strong connection between multilateralism and intermediate or middle states has received some recognition in the International Relations literature. Keohane, in an early article, linked the two concepts together in a generalized sense: A middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone, effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution.ⁱ In a more specific vein, Lake made reference to middle power activism with respect to the global economic system. Middle-sized countries, he suggested, were able to provide infrastructure in defence of the international trading order; even though this support involved some costs.ⁱⁱ

This sort of commentary, made as part of wider investigations vis-à-vis international cooperation, opens the way for a much more detailed research program directed towards teasing out the conceptual underpinning and the practical implications of the relationship between multilateralism and intermediate states. A more extended analysis of this connection in case studies of Canada, and other selected countries such as India, Mexico and Brazil, allows a more nuanced appreciation of the role of intermediate states.ⁱⁱⁱ Traditionally, there have been a number of well-grounded motivations for intermediate states taking on a solid multilateral orientation. A necessary condition for this multilateral orientation in the Canadian case was a hard-boiled calculation of the...national interest.^{iv} Economically, Canada was viewed as deriving considerable material benefits from multilateralism because of the association of these practices with an orderly and predictable world environment which spread out the benefits beyond the great powers.^v Only by having Canada, and other intermediate supporters of the international order, become major stakeholders in a set of rules-oriented institutional arrangements, could the principles of 'general compromise and general compliance' rather than lawlessness in which the prizes go to the powerful and the predatory' be maintained.^{vi}

There appears, however, to be more behind the strong support of intermediate states to multilateralism than material interest. Although the notion of good international citizenship is highly prone to distortions, ambiguity and nostalgic mythology, Canada gained symbolic benefits from its commitment to the multilateralist system during the post-1945 period. Canada equated its intermediate status with a reputational impulse, in the sense of taking on special responsibilities for constructive, institutional-based activity. In summing up the values behind Canada's post-war foreign policy, John Holmes laid special emphasis on the view that : Countries which qualified as middle powers had to be very, very responsible and being responsible meant paying ones dues and not being irresponsible in word or deed.^{vii}

The core of this reputational impulse was focused in the economic domain, via a comprehensive active and sustained participation in all of the post-1945 institutional architecture including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well as the specialized agencies of the United Nations including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Moreover, Canada's efforts with regard to these organizations was marked by its active and sustained nature. As one policy analyst said of Canada's post-1945 role in the GATT: Among its members few have been consistently more zealous than Canada in the general management of GATT activities.^{viii} Concurrently, Canada's multilateral orientation extended into a variety of non-economic arenas. In common with other intermediate states, Canada adopted the role of a bridge-builder in the security domain. Although this role did not exclude acting as a mediator between East and West (breaking the deadlock on the acceptable candidates for UN entry in the mid-1950s, for example); more commonly, Canadian activity tended to focus on defusing tensions within the Western bloc (most notably, during the 1956 Suez crisis through which Lester Pearson won his Nobel Peace Prize) or attempting to multilateralize the behaviour of the bloc leader (on the Korean War). Part and parcel with this mediator role, peacekeeping became central not only to the definition of Canada's domestic national identity but its vocation in the world. Between 1948 and 1990 Canada took part in the highest number of peacekeeping operations on a comparative basis.^{ix}

A strong connection with multilateralism also helped an intermediate state such as Canada blend its dual tendencies towards followership with the US and the western alliance and attempts to counter-balance that followership with an alternative diplomatic approach. Followership, from this perspective, meant not only supporting the architecture of the economic order but also sharing the larger world view advocated by the US and Canada's other alliance partners as expressed through NATO and NORAD. Going along, nonetheless, did not mean unthinking and uncritical bandwagoning. While Canada saw the positive benefits accruing from constructive US leadership, it did not take this role for granted. Unsure of the willingness and/or ability of the US to operate in a consistent and constructive fashion, Canada took it upon itself to strengthen the multilateral system. This condition necessitated continual work to ensure 'some limits to the ambition and reach' of the powerful as well as the general compliance of other actors.^x

It is only through this lens of competing and/or complementary strategies that a fuller understanding of Canada's motivations for its multilateral orientation can be fully comprehended. Besides the material and symbolic benefits, a multilateral orientation enhanced what Grieco has termed voice opportunities. Because Canada shared many of the same interests and values of the US in supporting the post-1945 economic and strategic system, Canada as the weaker but still influential partner could concentrate its diplomatic efforts on ensuring that this set of regimes was constructed so as to allow it sufficient opportunities to voice its concerns so as to offset the domination by the US.^{xi} Whether targeted through GATT or the UN this strategy was, in large part, implemented through trying to make multilateralism as comprehensive or with as large numbers as possible. In some other institutional arrangements, such as in more exclusive clubs of NATO and the OECD, Canada worked with somewhat smaller numbers of countries. In still other settings, and in particular through the launching of informal or ad hoc coalitions with a loose network of like-minded countries (usually taken from the ranks of the intermediate states), Canada operated with much smaller group of countries still. In all of these variations of activity, nevertheless, Canada adopted a similar diplomatic style. Embracing the role of an insider, Canada directed its attention to working with other actors at the heart of the action. This type of engagement, with both an entrepreneurial and technical dimension, encompassed acting as a catalyst with respect to diplomatic efforts in the sense of triggering initiatives; the planning and

convening of meetings, setting priorities, and drawing up and fleshing out proposals; as well as a wide range of more routine activity surrounding liaison efforts, shuttle diplomacy, the use of formal and informal fora, working the corridors, and other means to push a given process forward.

A more detailed examination of the connection between intermediate states and multilateralism with special reference to Canada allows a closer look at the manner in which this connection has altered over time. As Cox has cautioned, this connection must be seen as part of a process not a finality. From this perspective, the middle power role should be not evaluated as a fixed universal but as something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system.^{xii}

By widening the parameters of the research agenda in this fashion, the lens through which intermediate or middle states is examined becomes shifted to the competitive interplay between structure and agency.^{xiii} That is to say, the overall context or milieu in which intermediate or middle states have to operate and the capacity and resources available to individual actors. Together structure and agency constitute a configuration and process of choice and constraints which shape and condition the multilateral orientation of this category of secondary actors. To be operational, this mode of analysis needs to identify the sources of initiative and restraint of the powers in the middle.^{xiv}

This second take interjects a more dichotomous quality to the connection between intermediate states and multilateralism. The dramatic changes of the late 1980s and 1990s have thrown up a considerable variety of new challenges, exposing intermediate states to greater uncertainties and vulnerabilities. With these challenges, however, has come new windows of opportunities. This room for manoeuvre has been enhanced by a number of factors. First and foremost must be placed the erosion of discipline imposed by the bipolar system. Not only are there are some gaps in leadership in which intermediate states have the potential to fill by activist behaviour, but the will and judgement of the US and the other great powers may lag behind those states with far less power but a keen interest and set of diplomatic skills. Secondly, the change in the issue agenda - and especially the widened definition of security - reinforces this approach. Thirdly, the growing awareness that multilateral institutions matter have profound implications for the diplomacy of intermediate states. This is particularly true concerning the increased acceptance that it is only with institutional cooperation and not the actions of single nation states (even one as powerful as the US) that many problems will be solved.^{xv} Fourthly, the greater saience of coalitions provide intermediate states with heightened flexibility between followership and counter-balancing.^{xvi} No longer faced with the stark choices of loyalty or exit, as imposed under the conditions of tight bipolarity, intermediate states have a greater array of options before them.

Viewed through this type of lens, the increasingly uneven or even contradictory character of Canadian diplomatic behaviour is apparent. With the end of the Cold War, much of the impetus for the traditional go-between or bridge-building activities in Canadian behaviour has been spent. There are also signs that Canada has begun to suffer from a loss of relative status, notwithstanding all of its deep-seated institutional connections and longstanding insider status. Indeed, Neack points to a new international system in which the traditional intermediate or

middle states are overtaken by a cluster of non-traditional middle states.^{xvii} Faced with a more regionally-based international system, there are indications as well that Canada (akin to other intermediate states) has sought to re-locate itself in a more enclosed neighbourhood.

Equally, though, Canada has demonstrated a considerable will and capacity to upgrade its multilateral activity in selected areas of the international agenda. These forms of intermediate state leadership and initiative-taking based on non-structural power and influence associated with the energetic use of their diplomatic capabilities. The skills Canada has used in these selective forms of endeavour are mainly based on an extended and intensified form and scope of coalition-building and persuasion.

Building on this conceptualization, this paper will explore more thoroughly two extended snapshots of the uneven character of Canadian multilateralism emergent in the 1990s. The first of these snapshots will look at the increasingly contested nature of the Canadian multilateral orientation in the economic arena. More specifically, the paper will examine the complex dynamic between the long-standing reputational impulse towards multilateralism and the competing pulls of alternative strategies in international trade for an intermediate state such as Canada. The second of these snapshots will examine a cluster of Canadian issue-specific initiatives targeted towards and facilitated by the widened security agenda. Although in some ways the ebb and flow patterns found in these snapshots contradict each other, in other ways they may be considered complementary. Both snapshots suggest at least a partial shift in multilateral orientation from large to small numbers.^{xviii} More decidedly, both extended snapshots highlight a decided tendency away from diffuse multilateralism (in which activity is widely spread) to a more concentrated pattern of discrete multilateralism.

The Established Hold of Multilateralism on Canadian Trade Policy

What stands out about Canadian trade policy is the targeting of so much of the reputational impulse towards multilateralism. The dominant theme, in Canadas official discourse and a good deal of its activity, remains the promotion of a set of rules which are intended to be binding upon the big as well as the small.^{xix} Much of the language used to depict Canadas foreign economic concerns in the 1980s and 1990s echo those of the immediate post-1945 era. Commanding the contemporary scene, as in the past, has been the Canadian concern for the establishment of as much a risk-free environment as possible. Institutional means, built on a global basis, remain the chosen route for engendering stability within the international economic system.^{xx}

What is equally striking is the extent to which there has been a bi-partisan consensus within the Canadian political elite on this issue. Little in the way of the sharp division of opinion across party lines, may be found on basics pertaining to the international economic system. The need for Canada to pursue international rules-keeping has been underscored by both Conservative and Liberal politicians. During his extended stint as Foreign Minister, Joe Clark epitomized the grip of multilateralism in Canadian thinking. As Clark put it at the Punta del Este meeting, which launched the Uruguay Round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations, the need for a new agreement determining the rules of governance in international commerce was as vital in the 1980s as it was in the aftermath of the Second World War: 'In the 40 years since that

creative burst of confidence, we have put those achievements at risk by taking them for granted. Countries which 40 years ago put the world ahead of narrow interests now apply protective trade measures outside GATT disciplines. The rules point one way, and governments go another'.^{xxi}

Nor were Clarks views exceptional among the Conservative party hierarchy. If his multilateral orientation was often more pronounced than some of his ministerial colleagues, the underlying principles on which Clarks views rested were little different than mainstream opinion. As the nature of the international system was transformed in the 1980s and 1990s, the Canadian response was put to a new and intense type of test. The defence of the embedded multilateral trade order remained attractive. As John Crosbie, from his vantage point as trade minister in 1989 warned, Canada risked being 'smashed' if a new set of rules was not established: 'Canada is a middle power and the [international trade negotiations] are of tremendous importance to Canada...We need the rule of law in trade affairs'.^{xxii}

With the Liberals return to office, Canadas commitment to the orthodoxy of a rules-based multilateralism was vigorously renewed. The Liberal Foreign Policy Handbook, released prior to the 1993 election, declared that: A regime of international law and order must be expanded to compete with - and eventually replace - the old reliance on power relations and coercion.^{xxiii} The Review of Foreign Policy, carried out by the Chrétien government, reiterated Canadas reliance on international institutions and regimes to formulate the rules of..global economic integration: A rules-based multilateral system remains the best protection for Canada being side-swiped by the big boys on the block.^{xxiv}

As with the Conservatives, particular Liberal Ministers were prepared to champion the rules-building cause. Of these individuals, Roy MacLaren stands out. A former diplomat, who built a prominent business career in the publishing world, MacLaren had remained part of a distinctive minority among Liberals who had vigorously opposed the economic nationalist tilt by the Trudeau government. Handed the portfolio of Minister of International Trade, therefore, MacLaren was ready to stand up for what he believed in (and what he had prepared for during the Mulroney years in office). Consistently, MacLaren hammered home the same theme: I believe that the conduct of Canadas trade relations should rest on the quest for greater international security for Canadian exporters through agreed rule-making and enforcement.^{xxv}

In operational terms, Canadas role of system supporter has undergone some evolution. As the performance of the US as the hegemon and/or manager over the international trade system has been transformed, Canadas functions in shaping the wider discourse and process have evolved in parallel fashion. The gap in leadership at the apex of the international hierarchy allowed some extension in Canadas relative freedom of action. Canada was prepared, in a number of ways, to use this expanded space of operation. Canada took the high road in a number of areas during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Canadas proposal for a new International Trade Organization, a formulation which translated subsequently into the World Trade Organization (WTO), looms large as an illustration of this type of positive action. Canada also was out in front with respect to the attempt to work out an internationally agreed definition on subsidies and improved disciplines on the use of countervail duties.^{xxvi}

While the creative side of Canadian rules-based activity has found a number of outlets in the 1980s and 1990s, the defensive side remains a dominant feature as well. As much as in the past, contemporary Canadian behaviour has been conditioned by a concern to constrain the US's unilateral/protectionist impulses. This impulse is evident in Canada's consistent efforts to channel US actions vis-a-vis trade remedies towards a multilateral and/or institutional dispute resolution context rather than resort to unilateral or bilateral mechanisms. One illustration of this type of thrust has been seen in Canada's continuing opposition to the imposition of extraterritorial doctrine by the US. The main change over time has been that this type of controversy no longer surfaces on Canada-US bilateral questions; where the US attempted to use this doctrine as a lever to curb Canadian (economic nationalist) policy. Instead, it has come to the fore almost exclusively on cases where the US has attempted to apply the extraterritorial doctrine through sanctions on third parties such as Cuba. This latter type of case has pitted the desire of the US government to have a global reach over multinational corporations versus the Canadian government's desire to subject subsidiaries or branch plants of American firms to the jurisdiction and direction of its own laws and policies.^{xxvii}

Another illustration of Canada's continued opposition to American unilateralism on trade issues emerged in the 1980s and 1990s with respect to the Super 301 legislation designed to target specific unfair traders. Indeed, Canada's response to specific measures of this sort demonstrated the extent to which the bi-partisan consensus has held up. Prime Minister Mulroney cautioned the US on the pitfalls of a return to 'the law of the jungle'.^{xxviii} On the Super 301, as on other cases involving US action directed at specific sectors, Canada came down firmly on the side of constructive forms of multilateralist dispute resolution rather than unilateralist coercive action. As MacLaren expressed the sentiment, Canada strongly disapproved the US's use of a unilateral device to remedy...unfair trading practices...We are confirmed multilateralists in Canada. We seek our trade remedies in the multilateral context rather than primarily using bilateral tools of the type of Super 301.^{xxix}

The Bending of the Multilateral Instinct

Having built up the impression that Canada's multilateral reputation rests on a solid foundation, it is necessary to test the Canadian performance in a more rigorous and comprehensive fashion. Notwithstanding the claim that Canada has faithfully embraced the post-1945 multilateral order, this image does not correspond with a number of counter-claims about Canadian trade strategy. If emanating from diverse perspectives, these critiques are consistent in the sense that they seriously contest the notion of a whole-hearted and consistent Canadian commitment and sense of responsibility to multilateralism as the dominant feature in Canadian trade policy.

The first critique targets Canada's motivation for adopting a high-profile stance as an advocate of multilateralism. Rather than being propelled primarily by a sense of responsibility towards the creation of an international order, an exaggerated form of status-seeking is included as a factor behind the Canadian impulse towards support for international regimes. Viewed from this angle, its image as a good international citizen helps win Canada prestige via entrance into - and an elevated seat at - the more selective clubs of the trading world. More instrumentally, this

image helps Canada achieve some sense of immunity from criticism of its own trade practices. From another angle, this impulse is linked to personal aggrandisement. To be sure, one measure of the success of Canada in developing its image of good international citizenship has been the frequent proclivity of Canadian politicians/officials to run for - and often to be selected - to key posts. One recent episode which highlights this tendency was the successful campaign of Donald Johnson (a former Liberal cabinet minister) to obtain the post of secretary-general of the OECD. Another has been the equally costly (but even more difficult) bid by Roy MacLaren for the post of executive-director of the WTO.

A second criticism of Canadas trade policy focuses in more detail at the inconsistencies in Canadas pattern of multilateral behaviour. From a macro-historical perspective, one view of Canadas post-war record contends that Canadas claim to be a whole-hearted supporter of the multilateral system is little more than an elaborate myth.^{xxx} Extending this critical mode of analysis, from a policy-specific perspective, one former practioner has challenged Canadas credentials as a good multilateral citizen. The scathing tone of this critique may be judged by the comment that Canada has gained a reputation for being *a nation of artful chisellers*.^{xxxii}

This chiseler image has been reinforced by a number of current issue-specific debates and controversies. One policy area which stands out in terms of its convoluted or distorted nature lies in the area of culture generally and the Canadian protection of its domestic magazines specifically. Having built up a solid line of defensive against the intrusion of foreign (primarily US, with its massive export-oriented industry) competitors, using such things as postal subsidies, the Canadian government was shocked by the 1997 ruling of the WTO that these policies were against the multilateral rules of the game. This result generated a number of alternative choices in order to maintain this defensive structure. One of these options focused on the attempt by Canada to build an international coalition of resistance against the further extension of a liberalization agenda through the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Initially, there was little attempt to argue that Canada was right in principle on this front, but rather that Canada was justified in its actions because of the actions of other countries. As Canadas present International Trade minister, Sergio Marchi, put it in one interview on the subject: The Americans protect certain culture. You cant buy into their TV stations over a certain percentage; they dont want you to touch their newspapers. Given these uneven circumstances, the argument was made that Canada should be allowed to keep closed a small part of the trade pie called culture.^{xxxiii} Ultimately, however, Marchi turned his attention to the question of a cultural exemption through the establishment of a new international accord which would set out rules on what kinds of domestic regulations could be used to promote and protect cultural diversity.

A second policy-area where Canada has been accused of being a chiseler is on support for its domestic aircraft industry. In a February 1999 interim ruling, the WTO judged that Canadas most prominent industrial development program (the Department of Industrys Technology Partnerships Canada program, benefitting firms such as Bombardier) was beyond the bounds of acceptable practice. Canadian sensitivity to this decision was made more acute by at least four contextual factors. The first of these factors was that this program had been given a funding boost in the recent 1999 federal budget. The second was that it had been Canada which had instigated this investigation, by its challenge to Brazils concessional financing program for Embraer, a principal competitor for Bombardier. The third factor relates to the spillover effect

from the decision. Besides ruling against the use of the Technology Partnerships program, the decision deemed illegal the utilization of concessional financing through the Canada Account, a \$3 million loan fund controlled by Canadas Minister of International Trade, to facilitate the sales of such items as the Candu Nuclear reactors. The fourth factor is the secrecy which Canada prepared its case. Indeed, it was this lack of procedural transparency as much as the substantive component of the case which largely accounted for the damage inflicted on Canadas reputational claims. In an article entitled *Heading North*, the London *Financial Times* sarcastically noted that: So you thought Canada was squeaky-clean The countrys reputation for openness took a beating last week in the latter-day arena for international disputes: the World Trade Organisation. Canada tried to defend subsidies for Bombardier, the aerospace company. The WTO wasnt impressed. It wasnt just that the trade ubermeisters thought all those sober-suited Canadians were too forthcoming with the filthy lucre. The Canucks, the WTO panel said, just outright refused to tell them what they needed to know. Canada said it risked compromising cabinet privilege if it gave up the relevant documents. But what about the countrys good guy image Observer knows there are attractions to playing the strong silent type. But this might be going too far.^{xxxiii}

A third - and arguably most significant - of the criticisms directed at Canadas trade policy record contends that the dominant influence on Canadian behaviour has been bilateralism not multilateralism. According to this view, rather than viewing multilateralism as the embedded instinct which has governed Canadian trade policy, with bilateralism occasionally intruding as a high risk exception, the lens should be reversed.^{xxxiv}

Much evidence can be mobilized to support the claim that it has been multilateralism not bilateralism which has been exceptional in the Canadian approach. This is especially true, of course, in the post-Free Trade Agreement (FTA) era. Nonetheless, the main question about Canadian trade policy is not about the overall hierarchy of preferences concerning multilateralism and bilateralism but whether these two approaches are mutually inconsistent and incompatible. For the opponents of bilateral free trade, the answer has long been clear. The FTA constituted a fork on the road; a turn which once taken^{xxxv}, allowed no return to the multilateral faith. By taking the bilateral direction, this argument went, Canada diminished its own range of options as an intermediate state at the international level. A narrower North American focus raised the spectre of Canada being locked into a 'North American fortress'.^{xxxvi}

The proponents of the FTA deal had a very different outlook on these questions. Far from undermining the international trading system, this form of bilateralism was said to compose a mechanism to buttress and revitalize multilateralism. In the words of two prominent liberal economists multilateral and bilateral free trade are part of the same package.^{xxxvii} The shift undertaken by the Mulroney government, according to this logic, served less as a decisive break than as a form of measured adjustment to the (problematic) status quo. Instead of being regarded as stark alternatives, bilateralism and multilateralism were presented as complementary elements of a 'two track' path. While choosing to enter into a closer economic relationship with the US, Canada could also remain true to its traditional supportive role in the international order. As the External Affairs task force stated: 'the choice for Canada is not between multilateral or bilateral approaches to trade but how both avenues can be pursued in a mutually reinforcing manner'.^{xxxviii}

Operationally, some advocates of the FTA agreement took this line of argument even further. Far from being restrictive or limiting, they contended that the FTA worked to regenerate the overall constructive multilateral element in Canadian foreign policy. At the very least, it was felt that any Canadian government (and especially Mulroneys Conservative government) negotiating this type of bilateral arrangement would have some considerable incentive to show that an institutionalized special deal with the Americans would not impair Canada's capacity to look after its own interests in the international arena. As Whalley suggested, Canada may well have a tendency to over-compensate for the FTA, in the sense that free trade with the US might increase 'the pressure on Canada to elevate its middle-power diplomatic role. The need is to demonstrate that Canada's sovereignty has not been impaired by the agreement, that Canada is a separate country that takes foreign policy positions independent from the United State'.^{xxxix} In a more tangible vein, Morici added: Multilateral progress continues to be an important goal for Canada as a means both for further broadening market opportunities and for balancing its growing commercial cooperation with the United States with expanded economic interests abroad.^{xl}

Regionalism in the Americas: Multilateral by an Alternative Route

Canada is often said to be a country without a clearly-defined and comfortable region. By geographical setting, and the logic of the FTA arrangement, Canada belongs firmly in North America. As a growing body of literature reminds us, however, it is important to distinguish between regionalism as description and regionalism as prescription.^{xli} Through this more critical lens, Canadas perception of regionalism remains highly politically contested.^{xlii} Any notion of being isolated with the United States in a narrowly-defined neighbourhood, within North America, brings out much of Canadas fundamental ambivalence about where it fits or sits in the global arena. A good deal of the attraction of multilateralism through the post-1945 era was that this orientation acted as a source of differentiation or as a safety valve; reinforcing the impression that Canada was not firmly attached to a single regional home, but rather straddled regions. From this vantage point, Canada appeared to be one of a special group of floaters in the international system.^{xliii}

Canadas difficulty in coming to terms with an extended version of its immediate neighbourhood was a function of both self-image and structural location in the international economy. While Canada is clearly a country of the Americas as well as a North American country, it was far from emotionally connected to Latin America (if not the Caribbean). Contacts were neither broad nor deep. With very different histories, political systems, and perceptions of national interests, their relations were modest and episodic.^{xliv} Rather than perceiving itself as a country of the Americas, Canadas position in the hemisphere was subordinated to its identification as a hybrid with Atlantic or even a Pacific or Arctic identities contained within an internationalist framework.

As with the FTA, the relocation of Canada into the NAFTA project raised questions about whether this arrangement serves as a building block or an impediment to the existing multilateral trade order. In principle, the NAFTA project appeared to be generally consistent with the tenets set out by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World

Trade Organisation (WTO). For NAFTA was designed to lower not raise barriers to trade. Non-discrimination was to be practiced to new entrants. The only criteria for entry was sound macroeconomic policy and a commitment to liberalization. From the perspective of its supporters, therefore, NAFTA was designed to foster the ultimate objectives of the multilateral system.^{xlv}

Scepticism about this view, in practice, emerged on two different but equally central questions. With the Uruguay MTN Round still in train from 1986 to 1993, the NAFTA project was criticised by a good number of observers for sending a negative signal about the on-going credibility of the multilateral system. More instrumentally, these concerns have been directed towards the trade diversion effects of NAFTA. At odds with the notion of open regionalism, the implementation of NAFTA has not meant a reduction of external barriers. On the contrary, in an apparent effort to distinguish more explicitly on an us and them basis,^{xlvi} the barriers to outsiders have been raised in many cases on sectoral lines. The most sensitive of these issues has centred on the application of standards about rules of origin. Goods from non-NAFTA countries become eligible for preferential treatment only if they go through a process of substantial treatment in the region.^{xlvii}

The other serious debate concerns the consequences of the widening of the project into a NAFTA plus arrangement. An argument can be made that the basic purpose of the new regionalism has remained consistent with the core rationale of the old multilateralism; that of counter-balancing or at least deflecting the influence of the US on Canada through the narrower one on one relationship. The only key difference is that Canada has moved to pursue a multilateral strategy with small numbers in its immediate neighbourhood as well as with large numbers on a global basis. Breaking away from its fear of excessive regionalism in the Americas, Canada has tried to extend the geographic and functional design of NAFTA in a number of ways. For one thing, Canada negotiated a separate bilateral free trade deals with Chile (the country at the top of the list of potential accession partners). For another thing, Canada has increasingly taken on a leadership role in the initiative on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). For this option was consistent with the longer-term Canadian approach of containing US aggressive unilateral actions with respect to trade remedy laws. The most tangible aspect of this approach was the potential the FTAA negotiations offered for providing a counterweight to anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Justifying the Canada-Chile trade agreement, Prime Minister Chrétien stated that: To sleep with an elephant is dangerous, now we will be three to watch the elephant. After Chile, Chrétien added, others will fall into line.^{xlviii} During a subsequent Team Canada trade mission to the region of the Americas, Chrétien added that Canada and the Latin American countries must unite to counterbalance the Americans.^{xlix}

Conversely, an argument can be made that this regional project reduces rather than expands Canada's options. To begin with, there is the familiar claim that bilateral or regional special deals can only be damaging to the interests of the smaller countries. As Helleiner has elaborated: They may win some concessions via special arrangements, but there is a high risk that they will, on balance, lose much more from their contribution to an overall disintegration of existing global rules and a failure to work sufficiently to build new ones.¹

It must be mentioned here that the Chrétien government worked hard to temper the image of the inherently exclusionary nature of regional blocs by talking up the idea of a NAFTA-European Union free trade agreement. In practice, though, Canada has had little success in directing an ambitious initiative along these lines. To complicate matters even further, Canada has been overtaken by other actors in the region of the Americas in the race to cut some separate deal with the EU. With the signing of the Mexico-EU Agreement on Economic Association and Political Cooperation in December 1997, and the subsequent rounds of trade negotiations, Canada has fallen behind its poorer NAFTA partner in terms of this cross-cutting option. The prospect of a MERCOSUR-EU trade deal placed Canada further on the defensive.

As such, Canada's out in front role on the FTAA can be interpreted not only as a sign of enhanced agency but of the measure of ingrained structural constraints. Canada's active support for the agenda of trade integration in the Americas may be viewed as a complementary instead of as a counter-balancing strategy with respect to the US. Still, it would be stretching the point to suggest that the adoption of this strategy has been by design; with Canada taking on an explicit role of proxy for the US because of a tightened adherence to a common set of ideological/political tenets.ⁱⁱ Rather, this approach appears to have evolved by way of default. Deprived of fast-track authority, the Clinton administration's capacity to deliver on the FTAA has been severely reduced in the late 1990s. There has been a need therefore for substitute leadership; a role taken on by Canada at both the Second Summit of the Americas (held in Santiago Chile in April 1998) and in the preparations for the next summit (such as in the hosting of the FTAA trade ministers meeting in Toronto in November 1999).

Multilateral Activism in the Widening Security Agenda

Driven by the seachange created by the end of the Cold War, the essentially contested nature of the concept of security has surfaced in a provocative and comprehensive fashion.ⁱⁱⁱ During the post-1945 era, there existed a commonplace understanding about what the essence of security implied. Both in terms of thinking and policy practice, the concept was applied to state security and the security of states predicated on the existence of some physical threat to territorial sovereignty. The question of who security was directed towards was equally straightforward; in that the target of concern or the distinctive other was almost uniformly the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. With the enormous changes in international politics, precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the disappearance of the bipolar rivalry between the US and the USSR, this uniformity of opinion ended. In Canada no less than a variety of other intermediate states, right at the top of the list of vital questions which needed to be addressed in the new environment, fell the issue of what was meant - or just as significantly, not meant - by security. Key assumptions, formerly accepted with little or no discussion, faced a serious, sustained and diversified challenge.

In operational terms, the Canadian response to this changing security agenda has had some considerable degree of continuity built into it. The multilateral bias remained well ingrained. On some specific issues, most notably on the Gulf War crisis, Canadian followership with the US and the western alliance became accentuated. In functional terms, Canada embraced the extension of peacekeeping in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Between 1988 and 1993 the UN Security Council created 14 new peacekeeping operations, as many missions as had

been established over the previous four decades. As Joseph Jockel summarizes: With one exception, Canada joined all these new missions, most notably in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia.^{liii} Moreover, the bulk of these newer missions have gone well beyond the limits of classic peacekeeping to encompass peace enforcement and peace building. Although Canadian troops were not directly involved in the military operations against the Somalian clan/militia leaders, for example, the Canadian role did include the mandate to establish a secure environment in which civil peace could be restored and humanitarian relief operations carried out. This work included the curtailing of armed looting, searching for and putting under surveillance the armed militias, and the seizure of weapons. This shift in peacekeeping imposed severe tests on Canadian activity, both with respect to will and capabilities (as shown most dramatically by the well-publicized problems associated with the now disbanded airborne division). The emphasis on humanitarian intervention in so many of these operations encompassed a shift from the onus placed in classic peacekeeping activities on the maintenance of order in the East/West context (through the prevention of escalation in regional conflicts) to an onus on justice. Whereas peacekeeping during the Cold War years focused almost exclusively on a response to inter-state tensions, peacekeeping as it evolved in the late 1980s and early 1990s ventured into the intra-state dimension. A variety of the new peacekeeping operations were prompted by precisely the kind of disputes which had been frozen by the Cold War, involving as they did long-suppressed rivalries and urges for self-determination.

If the peacekeeping of the 1990s contained accentuated risks, however, the centrality of these forms of activity in Canada's international activity remained firmly in place. Symbolically, this type of participation served as a means by which Canada could (and be seen to be doing so) pay its dues with respect to both NATO and the UN. More instrumentally, the promotion of peacekeeping on a global scale provided an important signal to offset the impression that Canada had drifted away from its sense of international commitment by closing itself off in North America. From this focal point, the enthusiasm for peacekeeping remained firmly attached to the notion that these practices enhanced Canada's voice opportunities.

As rehearsed by some aspects of the peacekeeping dossier, a considerable amount of novelty as well as familiarity can be found in the Canadian response to the new security challenges. Embedded in older habits, this multidimensional approach has been played out not only in a modified form but with a new scope and intensity. While much about the end results of this transition as of yet remains unclear, enough signals have come out to indicate that the Canada's multilateral activism on security issues (widely defined) is undergoing a process of transformation. The hallmark of this new approach are its embrace of a host of non-traditional security concerns and issues; its agile just in time nature; its more explicit tendency to counterbalance against rather than bandwagon with the US; and its application through an expanded network of intermediate states - supplemented by the inclusion of societal actors - in ad hoc coalitions of the willing.

The ascendancy of this robust form of evolving (and critical) multilateralism is often associated with Lloyd Axworthy, who has been Canadian Foreign Minister since January 1996. Although a long-time Liberal, Axworthy had never been entirely comfortable with the worth[y] but grey and oh so solid diplomacy of the Pearsonian era.^{liv} To highlight Axworthy's

contribution, however, is not to ignore the number of key contextual elements which facilitated this process of shape-shifting. Not only did the question of what encompasses the security agenda increasingly become the source of debate, but the space for a wider group of actors to operate expanded considerably with the release of the disciplines imposed by the Cold War. The impact of these changes was reinforced, in turn, by the spillover into diplomatic practice of new forms of technology and methods of communication.

In highlighting this shift in practice, it is valuable to examine three illustrations of this alternative form of multilateralism through ad hoc coalitions of the willing. The first of these cases is the Canadian-led initiative in the African Great Lakes region at the end of 1996. This case featured an attempt to put together a Multinational Force (MNF) to aid Rwandan refugees threatened by the escalating ethnic fighting/civil war centred in Zaire. Although highly controversial both in terms of its motivation and consequences, this initiative was portrayed by Axworthy as a good illustration of the ability of like-minded countries to get things done by building coalitions... rather than by coercion.^{lv} Axworthy's officials explicitly termed the 14 country Steering Committee put together after three weeks a coalition of the willing.^{lvi}

A second case features the coalition of the like-minded at the core of the campaign to ban anti-personnel land mines. As early as 1995, a core group of pro-ban nations were identified. Subsequently, these countries worked closely together through to the take-off point associated with a conference held in Ottawa from 3-5 October, 1996 at which moment Axworthy challenged other countries to return to the Canadian capital in fourteen months (December 1997) to sign an international treaty. This episode was widely regarded as an operational model because of its transformational quality, in that this coalition was regarded as having the power to change the dynamics and direction of the international agenda.^{lvii}

The third case showcases the efforts of some 44 like-minded countries in pushing for progress on a charter for a strong and permanent International Criminal Court in the run-up and during the 1998 UN Rome conference on the issue. Dubbed by some as the Group of Lifeline Nations, this coalition sought an independent court with an independent prosecutor as opposed to a body under Security Council control. This coalition held together from 1995 to 1998, over a period of time which placed much of its emphasis on the development of a detailed draft treaty.^{lviii}

With respect to the trigger for action, all of these cases were influenced by the changing balance between structural limitations and space for agency found within the international system. For a greater degree of autonomy was extended as the common enemy disappeared and the concept of security became extended to include non-military issues. In some cases, such as the Zaire/Great Lakes intervention, this autonomy allowed issue-specific attempts with regard to multilateral leadership. Frustrated by the lack of action on the part of the US and Britain, intermediate states tried to fill the gap. In other cases, such as the cases of the land mines and the International Criminal Court, this autonomy allowed an expanded measure of space for disagreement between the coalitions of the willing and the permanent members of the Security Council (and especially the US, France, Russia and China).

The scope of actors involved in these coalitions of the willing have also been considerably expanded. At the heart of all of this sort of activity remained a relatively fixed group of traditional intermediate states, featuring the Nordics, Australia, New Zealand, and some of the other smaller/medium-sized European countries. Canada kept in close contact with Australia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands as well as Spain and Belgium in developing the Zaire MNF force. Australia, New Zealand and the Nordic states were out in front with Canada on the International Criminal Court. On the land mines case, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand as well as Germany and Switzerland became part of the core group. Working with a number of non-traditional middle states, nonetheless, helped increase the credibility and efficiency of these coalitions. One good example of this mixed pattern of coalition activity is South Africa's role on the International Criminal Court.^{lix} South Africa brought not only a considerable degree of moral authority to the cause, but a wealth of practical experience (highlighted by the work of Judge Richard Goldstone on the trials of suspected war criminals in the former Yugoslavia). South Africa offered a viable means for extending the regional support for the ICC. Specifically, South Africa was instrumental in getting the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries on side with the ICC initiative. Another example was the support offered by a number of Latin American countries. Targeted increasingly as potential partners both outside and inside of government, these cases provided some further evidence of expansion of alternative diplomatic partnerships. Getting Mexico and many Central American countries on side was important for the credentials and operation of the land mines coalition. The support of Mexico, Argentina and Costa Rica buttressed the ICC campaign.

In cases where it proved difficult to get non-traditional intermediate states firmly on board, initiative diplomacy floundered. The prime case in point here is the Zaire/Great Lakes mission. Aided by Prime Minister Chrétien's campaign of personal/telephone diplomacy, which targeted President Nelson Mandela for special attention, South Africa had originally offered to provide support (possibly even including troops) for the operation. Sensitive to charges that it was subordinating a comprehensive made in Africa solution to an outside (and inadequate) form of international intervention, however, South Africa soon pulled back from this initial burst of enthusiasm.

The other key aspect of change in these ad hoc coalitions has been the increased scope of engagement taking place between governments and non-government organizations (NGO). At one end of the range of interactive behaviour,^{lx} NGOs have acted as catalysts for action; a pattern by which the activity of NGOs stimulates corresponding or complementary activities by governments. At the core of this dynamic is a triggering effect, in which the out-in-front behaviour on the part of NGOs helps frame the agenda for action by government. It was the call for help from societal groups, loosely clustered around the Rwanda NGO Executive Committee, that did much to prepare the way for the Zaire/Great Lakes initiative. Organizations such as the Red Cross, OXFAM, Care Canada, and Doctors without Borders all sent out early warnings that the refugee situation in Central Africa was deteriorating because of the changes on the ground in October and early November 1996. A number of NGOs, most notably Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, performed a similar triggering role on the ICC. For its part, the anti-land mines campaign provides a classic episode of this triggering effect. Beginning in the early 1990s, the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC) was mobilized into action against the scourge of land mines by its field workers. Going beyond the organizations traditional low-key technical mode of operation, the Red Cross took the lead in gathering a broad-based NGO coalition calling for a total ban on the production, export and use of anti-personnel mines.^{lxi} Eventually united under the auspices of the International Campaign To Ban Land Mines, this NGO coalition included the Vietnam Veterans of America, the German group Medico International, and the French group of Handicap International, together with Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights.

At the other end of this interactive behaviour is some type of strategic alliance, through which know-how is shared and some mode of formal or informal division of labour established. Notwithstanding its problematic nature, the Zaire/Great Lakes initiative demonstrated the extent to which a form of partnership between government officials and NGOs could be forged. In the field, some military equipment (including transport planes) was made available to NGOs. And NGOs were included in MFN briefing sessions. Domestically, a Zaire NGO-Military Coordination committee was established with representatives from World Vision, Médecins sans frontières, the Canadian Red Cross and Care Canada together with officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence (DND), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

More thoroughly, this sense of strategic alliance stands out on the land mines case. In declaratory terms, Axworthy and his advisors formed what amounted to a mutual admiration society with the NGOs. From one side, Axworthy talked of the campaign to ban land mines as a clear example of a new approach to international diplomacy...a coalition of the willing, including governments and civil society as equal partners, united around a set of core principles.^{lxii} From the other side, Jody Williams (the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize winner) lauded the actions of Canada and other like-minded countries for challenging the status quo. At the October 1996 conference, she praised Axworthy for his courage to call the question. After Axworthy completed his speech at the opening of the December 1997 conference, Williams led a standing ovation.

In operational terms, the activity of intermediate states and NGOs on the land mines campaign complemented and supplemented each other. As readily acknowledged by the participants, these partners remained in close contact with each other through the negotiating process and the working out of the final form of a draft treaty. In the words of one official: There were daily phone calls with governments and the NGO partners. Anti-mine conferences, special events and concerts were planned and executed.^{lxiii} At the same time, the NGO network helped bend public opinion towards the proposals offered by the coalition of the willing. Among other things, this network provided over the internet The Good List of Nations calling for a Comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel Land mines.

Conclusion

To highlight the development these well-publicized coalitions of the willing is not to oversell the prospects or the place of this alternative form of multilateralism on security issues in Canadian foreign policy. For all of the attention placed on these ad hoc initiatives, they exist side by side with all the other faces of Canadian multilateralism examined in this paper. One of

these faces finds expression in the economic arena. While far from being completely discarded, Canada's traditional orientation towards multilateralism in this domain has gone through a process of rapid mutation as this strategy co-exists with a number of other choices in the form of self-help, bilateralism and regionalism. No longer does the option of multilateralism have an unchallenged primacy in Canadian thinking or practice. A second face is the more acquiescent form of multilateralism, in which Canada goes along with the leadership of the US and the western alliance in return for being included and given the opportunity to be heard in the club. Long established as the dominant manifestation of Canada's multilateralism in the security arena, the staying power of this face is highlighted once again by Canada's behaviour during the Kosovo/Yugoslavia crisis (even though this approach is at odds with the attitudes of Canada's partners in the region of the Americas). A final face is the one in which Canada tries to combine support for multilateral institutions, whether composed on a large number of small number basis, with a desire to differentiate its own behaviour from that of the big powers and especially the US. This face comes out most vividly in the peacekeeping dossier where Canada has tried to use peacekeeping both as a mechanism to upgrade its international standing and to demonstrate that [we] are not a carbon copy of the Americans.^{lxiv}

In any case, the position of this alternative face of multilateralism is far from secure. Rather than raising Canada's standing on the world stage, ad hoc coalitions of the willing are said by some prominent opinion leaders to threaten Canada's status in international affairs. This sense of downgrading vis-à-vis Canada's coalition behaviour comes out most forcefully in Conrad Black's stinging critique of this new associational pattern: Canadians tend to feel keenly that Canada is on the verge of becoming a country of the first rank but it is not widely perceived to be so. To be at the forefront of a large group of secondary powers such as the Scandinavians and the Dutch and even the Australians is something of an underachievement for a wealthy nation of some 30 million people.^{lxv}

These coalitions of the willing have also been criticized as being frivolous, in the sense they have distracted attention away from the need to build currency through the extension of hard defence and intelligence assets in the world instead of exclusively through soft power techniques. Two Canadian academics have dubbed the approach adopted by Axworthy as little more than pulpit diplomacy.^{lxvi} Joseph Nye has added, more judiciously, that Canada should not get too carried away by the attention it has won for itself through this diplomatic approach: Canada has to think not just of how it supports land-mines conventions and international tribunals, it has to think of whether it was a wise decision to withdraw troops or withdraw funding for its role in NATO.^{lxvii}

All of this being said, these coalitions of the willing initiatives highlight a number of features about the rethinking and rejigging of Canadian multilateralism. Although Canada continues to be faced with some serious structural constraints about what it can do in the world, and how and where it should be doing it, a good deal more about Canadian foreign policy is up for grabs in the post-Cold War era. In a similar fashion to other intermediate or middle states, Canada has an opportunity to be more than simply an idea-taker with little or no room to influence the intellectual/policy agenda. Across the spectrum from the new thinking on security, peacekeeping/peacemaking, and multi-faceted regionalism, the latitude for Canada to present

ideas within the international system has grown as the boundaries of discourse/action have been stretched out beyond their former limits.

In the move from ideas to action, the range of activity available to Canada on the international stage is also impressive. In light of the transformation in international politics, Canada has both more space and a greater margin of safety. Military threats are of less concern in the post-Cold War world. Multilateralism has become more refined and pervasive. These tendencies play into Canada's source of strength and away from its weaknesses. It is one thing, however, for Canada to have abundant opportunities to contribute above its traditional weight. It is quite another for Canadian foreign policy to seize these assembled opportunities in a whole-hearted fashion, with a requisite amount of vision, confidence and will.

The scope of associational activity has been stretched considerably beyond its traditional limits. In spatial terms, Canada has freed itself from its historical fears of embracing the region of the Americas and so entangle itself in the US's backyard. Yet, the pursuit of this adaptive regional strategy will continue to have on it a heavy multilateral accent. In functional terms, the coalitions Canada participates in will take on an increasingly a mixed look; with a greater diversity of representation along traditional and non-traditional lines. As Axworthy has predicted: Though Canada will continue to work with established allies in many fields, it will increasingly work with new partners outside the North Atlantic community. Issue-based coalitions will become as important to the management of Canadian foreign policy as the alliance structure once was.^{lxviii}

In a similar fashion to other intermediate states, there will also be some impetus for Canada to pick its spots for focused joint activity most carefully. There remains the temptation for Canada to adopt a pattern of comprehensive engagement in international affairs; on the assumption that it could be everywhere and do everything. Set within a context of the widened international agenda of post Cold War world, though, a solid counter-argument can be made for some form of greater specialization. Indeed, as traced throughout this paper, there is already some considerable evidence that Canada has shifted from a diffuse to a more discrete approach as the most appropriate foundation for foreign policy activity both in the economic and security arenas. If Canada is to make a difference in the evolving international environment, especially in the expanded multilateral domain, this strong pull towards selectivity or niches will continue to be felt.

The concept of intermediate states as a distinctive category of actor in international relations remains, it needs to be reiterated, far from unproblematic. This contested nature becomes even more acute when the constellation of intermediate states is extended beyond traditional middle states such as Canada to a larger set of actors. Nonetheless, the value of the middle power lens has consistently been recognized by scholars who have looked for a more flexible (and appropriate) means of coming to terms with international affairs post-Cold War era. As Neack attests in a recent American foreign policy textbook: A different approach to theory development, such as that illustrated by middle power theory, might lead us to theories of state type and foreign policy behavior that actually reflects reality in its greater complexity.^{lxix} At the very least, this approach captures much of the variety and significance of the bottom-up forms of activities in selected areas of the evolving international agenda. Under conditions of complexity

and uncertainty, intermediate states have a greater necessity and greater opportunities to act skillfully and quickly, and to do so in concert with a wider range of actors and institutions. While the expression and target of this diplomatic activity varies considerably, according to national capabilities and preferences, the connection to multilateralism provides a common core ingredient. If multilateralism really does matter at the turn of the 20th century,^{lxx} therefore, the study of the motivation and roles of intermediate powers provides a rich source of empirical innovation and conceptual insight.

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ⁱⁱⁱ For recent interpretations, see Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in an Evolving World Order*. (Vancouver/Melbourne: University of British Columbia Press/University of Melbourne Press, 1993); Andrew F. Cooper, ed., *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 1997).

^{iv} John W. Holmes, *Canada: A Middle Aged Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 6. For a more conceptually sophisticated expression of this interest-based approach see Lisa Martin, The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Practice of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 91-121.

^v Robert Cox, 'Middlepowermanship, Japan, and the Future World Order', *International Journal* 44,3 (Autumn 1989), 824.

^{vi} See for example, A.F.W. Plumptree, 'Changes in the International Environment', *Canada's approach to the next round of GATT negotiations* (Toronto: Canadian Export Association, 21 February 1973), 3.

^{vii} John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order*, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 237. For an elaboration on the themes of reputation and skill in Canadian foreign policy, see Andrew F. Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon, 1997).

^{viii} Frank Stone, *Canada, the GATT and the World Trading System* (Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984), 41.

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^x Cox, Middlepowermanship, 824.

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- ^{xi} Joseph M. Grieco, The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme, *Review of International Studies*, 21, 1 (January 1995), 34. See also Louis Belanger, Andrew Cooper, Gordon Mace and Joel Monfils, Middle Powers and Regional Trade Cooperation: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the Setting of the FTAA Negotiations, paper prepared for the International Studies Association conference, Washington, DC, 19 February 1999.
- ^{xii} Cox, 'Middlepowermanship, 826. See also his 'Multilateralism and World Order', *Review of International Studies* 18, 2 (April 1992), 161-180.
- ^{xiii} See, for example, Philip G. Cerny, *The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State* (London: Sage, 1990).
- ^{xiv} Robert W. Cox, 'Globalization, Multilateralism, and Democracy', The John W. Holmes Lecture, ACUNS Reports and Papers 1991-2, 1.
- ^{xv} Joseph S. Nye, Jr., What New World Order *Foreign Affairs* 71, 2 (1992). 83-96.
- ^{xvi} On these themes, see Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Bound to Follow Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict, *Political Science Quarterly* 106 (Fall 1991), 391-410; Richard A. Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper, Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: the Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, *International Organization* 44 (Autumn 1990), 589-632.
- ^{xvii} Laura Neack, Empirical Observations on Middle State Behavior at the Start of a New International System, *Pacific Focus* 7 (1992), 5-22.
- ^{xviii} On this theme, see Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 299-300.
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